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Abstract
This thesis consists of eight chapters investigating the relationship between bank 
competition and capital allocation. Following the introduction (chapter 1), the second 
chapter provides a review of the literature. The third chapter extends a seminal 
contribution in the bank competition literature, the model developed by Broecker 
(1990). In chapter 4 I show that an auction framework may be an inappropriate way 
of modeling bank competition and I explore the implications of modeling bank 
competition in a more robust fashion for the allocation of capital. The fifth chapter 
aims to resolve a long-standing discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical 
literatures on bank competition and capital allocation. While theoretical work tends 
to see few benefits from more intense competition, the evidence suggests that the 
allocation of capital improves as bank competition becomes more intense. The 
theoretical model developed in chapter 5 reconciles these results by modeling banks’ 
objective function in a way consistent with empirical evidence on X-inefficiency in 
banks. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate the transmission mechanism through which a 
greater intensity of competition is transmitted within banks and study lending-related 
incentive structures through interview-based fieldwork. Chapter 6 provides 
motivation and outlines the scope of the study whereas the actual findings are 
presented in chapter 7. That chapter also analyzes the implications for the lending 
and monitoring decisions that co-determine the allocation of capital. Chapter 8 
concludes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
Throughout the present thesis, the phrase ‘bank competition’ is short­
hand for ‘intensity of bank competition’. More specifically, I shall think 
of the intensity of competition as a variable controlled by public policy 
(e.g., via the number of banking licenses granted) and I shall be inter­
ested in whether there is a degree of competitive intensity that could be 
said to be optimum in some well-defined sense. The intensity of competi­
tion matters in a number of respects; I concentrate on its impact on the 
allocation of capital. ‘Capital allocation’, in turn, refers to the extent 
to which the potential surplus from investing is actually realized. While 
most of the literature discussed below takes a microtheoretic and partial- 
equilibrium approach, the deeper questions underlying this research are 
macroeconomic. A better capital allocation (i.e., more surplus from in­
vesting) means, metaphorically speaking, a larger cake to share. Such a 
measure is a reasonable proxy for economic growth and welfare.
I concentrate on the effect of bank competition on banks’ role in over­
coming information problems in lending; this implies a focus on small and 
medium-sized enterprises which do not have access to alternative sources 
of external finance (except trade credit). There is a small theoretical 
literature that questions whether banks’ lending can be considered inde­
pendently of their funding [see Hellwig (1991), p. 48, for a discussion; I 
briefly discuss the main contributions in chapter 2]. Most of the literature 
considers competition for loans in isolation. I follow the literature and 
study the effect of competition on capital allocation for a given supply of 
capital (typically modeled as infinitely elastic at some exogenous interest 
rate).
In the present section I provide an outline of the thesis and relate my 
work to the literature reviewed in chapter 2. A more detailed discussion of 
how this work fits into the broader financial intermediation and Finance 
&; Growth literature is provided in Eggenberger (2006b).
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The contribution by Broecker (1990) holds a special place in the bank 
competition literature. In chapter 3 I extend Broecker’s model and show 
that contrary to Broecker’s conjecture, his bank competition game does 
not have an equilibrium in pure strategies even when banks are asym­
metric. In chapter 4 I move away from the auction framework used by 
Broecker by allowing applicants to renegotiate their offers. I show that 
the modified game has an equilibrium in pure strategies where for a given 
number of banks an applicant’s interest rate decreases with the number 
of offers obtained. Surplus unambiguously increases with entry as long as 
additional banks have an incentive to enter, so the allocation of capital 
improves as competition gets more intense. The intuition is that when 
testing is costless each additional bank will test all applicants and aggre­
gate information improves with entry. I also argue that all test results 
will effectively become public. [In principle, information spillovers lead 
to free-riding on others’ information acquisition. However, this is not a 
concern when information is obtained costlessly.] These observations are 
relevant for the subject of this thesis in that they demonstrate that re­
sults obtained by modeling bank competition as an auction axe critically 
non-robust to a more realistic specification (more realistic at least as far 
as lending to small- and medium-sized businesses is concerned). The 
implication for banking theory is that modeling creditworthiness tests 
and inter-bank competition should be robust to the empirically highly 
relevant phenomenon of test results becoming available to competitors.
In the literature review, I show that the theoretical literature on bank 
competition is pessimistic with respect to the effect of more intense bank 
competition on the allocation of capital whereas the empirical literature 
finds substantial gains. I argue that while the two literatures are not 
asking exactly the same questions, there is enough overlap to claim that, 
painting with a broad brush, these results contradict each other. While 
in chapter 4 I question the modeling of bank competition as an auction, 
in chapter 5 I offer a possible resolution for the discrepancy between 
empirical and theoretical results. I develop the argument that the main 
role of more intense competition may be that of a discipline device; a 
point hitherto overlooked in theoretical work. When other corporate 
governance mechanisms fail for whatever reason, a major benefit of more 
intense competition may be that it forces managers to work harder and 
thus leads to improvements in the allocation of capital. The existing 
theoretical work cannot capture this effect, because it assumes that banks 
maximize profit. Evidence in support of my conjecture is provided in 
section 2.7 on X-inefficiency in banks and section 2.2 which reviews the
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empirical work on competition and managerial effort. In chapter 5 I 
formalize this idea and demonstrate that in the presence of an effort- 
minimizing bank, the allocation of capital unambiguously improves as 
competition becomes more intense. In building the model, I also develop 
a novel way of modeling bank competition.
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the transmission mechanism that links the 
intensity of bank competition and the allocation of capital by investigat­
ing the subject of lending-related incentive arrangements. To understand 
the effects of more intense bank competition, one needs to understand 
how competitive pressures are transmitted within real-world banks. The 
existing theoretical literature abstracts from this problem by treating 
banks as black boxes represented by a single manager and only looks at 
incentive problems at the institution level, so the work reported in chap­
ters 6 and 7 can be read as a complement to the theoretical work in the 
preceding chapters. Given the amount of theoretical work on, for exam­
ple, incentives and bank regulation, it is astonishing how little effort has 
been devoted to studying actual lending-related incentive arrangements. 
Therefore, as far as the real-world applicability of theoretical work is 
concerned, one crucial question is how the pressures banks are facing at 
the institution level are transmitted throughout the organization. As an 
economist, one is trained to analyze incentives as a key element of this 
transmission mechanism.
The interview-based fieldwork I present in chapters 6 and 7 addresses 
the question ‘What scope is there for devising effective lending-related 
incentive arrangements in practice?’ Any such schemes or restrictions on 
such schemes ought to be of interest to a banking regulator, so I adopt 
the perspective of a regulator looking for sensible performance measures 
on which such incentive arrangements could be based. In chapter 6 I 
motivate my fieldwork and outline the scope of the study whereas the 
actual findings are described in chapter 7. I discuss a number of candidate 
objectives in detail and present obstacles and potential problems discov­
ered in the interviews. My findings indicate that it may be possible to 
construct sensible schemes, although serious doubts remain in particular 
with respect to the supporting risk management infrastructure.
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Chapter 2
Bank C om petition and 
Capital Allocation: A  Survey 
of the Literature
2.1 In trodu ction
In the present chapter, I shall attempt to summarize what the existing 
literature has to say about the optimum intensity of bank competition 
and I shall also point out gaps in the literature which I attempt to fill 
with my own work. In the remainder of this introduction, I give an 
overview.
While a belief that banks are ‘special’ is widely held among banking 
theorists, it seems reasonable to ask what can be learnt about the impact 
of more intense product market competition in general before looking at 
the specifics of bank competition. The theoretical and empirical litera­
ture linking competition and managerial effort is central to my argument 
indeed and is reviewed in section 2.2. In addition, I have surveyed contri­
butions which are not of critical importance in the context of this thesis in 
a separate note [Eggenberger (2006a)]. This note can be summarized as 
follows: I review the literature on product market competition outside the 
banking industry and examine the causal chain linking policy measures 
(e.g., entry liberalization) with certain outcomes of interest (e.g., pro­
ductivity growth) via changes in the intensity of competition (measured, 
for example, by concentration indicators) as well as the underlying mech­
anisms (e.g., competition affecting incentives for innovation). I discuss 
each of these elements in turn, paying particular attention to measure­
ment problems. I then look at empirical work. What one makes of the 
evidence inevitably is a matter of interpretation and judgement; given 
this qualification, the evidence suggests that more intense competition
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is beneficial. [In section 2.2 below I show that, empirically, competi­
tion in particular has a favorable effect on managerial effort.] The note 
concludes that the findings of the general product market competition 
literature are consistent with those for the banking industry specifically 
(see below).
Section 2.3 provides an overview of surveys similar to the present 
one. Section 2.4 is at the heart of the review and surveys the theoretical 
literature on bank competition and capital allocation proper, considering 
issues such as risk assessment and monitoring. Section 2.5 summarizes 
and critically reviews ‘lessons learnt’ from the theoretical literature. The 
bottom line is that there are few clear-cut answers and that, if anything, 
the theoretical literature tends to be suspicious of competition.
In section 2.6 I look at the evidence on the effects of more intense 
bank competition, the findings of which stand in contrast to those of the 
theoretical literature: Empirical work by and large tends to find more 
competition to be rather beneficial. One possible way of reconciling these 
results (which I have pursued further in my own work) is to note that 
agency problems are quite possibly particularly severe in the banking 
industry and that more intense competition might reduce these problems 
and the resulting inefficiencies. However, agency problems have not been 
paid much attention by the existing theoretical literature. By way of 
motivation, in section 2.7 I present compelling evidence of X-inefficiency 
in the banking industry.
2.2 P rod u ct M arket C om p etition  and M an­
agerial Effort
One important transmission mechanism linking more intense competi­
tion (brought about, for example, by entry liberalization) with outcomes 
of interest is thought to operate via managerial effort. Starting point 
for the discussion of this mechanism are the uncontroversial observations 
that 1) in many firms the managers are not the owners and that 2) man­
agerial effort may not be directly observable. The original contributions 
reviewed here view the degree of managerial effort as corresponding to 
‘X-efficiency’ [Leibenstein (1966); roughly, producing in a way that is 
cost-minimizing]: Higher effort leads to lower cost. The ‘manager’ rep­
resents the entire organization. (In particular, this means that incentive 
and information problems within the organization are assumed not to 
matter.)
Vickers (1995) conjectures that
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‘competitive pressure makes organizations internally more efficient by 
sharpening incentives to avoid sloth and slack’ (p. 1).
The principal (and, at least for the layman, highly intuitive) idea is 
that product market competition disciplines the manager in a principal- 
agent-setup by, for example, preventing him or her from shirking and 
empire-building at the expense of shareholders and by forcing him or 
her to exercise effort1. Hicks (1935) described managerial slack with the 
memorable sentence
‘The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life’ (p. 8), 
although he did not talk about a principal-agent problem. [Hicks 
conjectured that
‘It seems not at all unlikely that people in monopolistic positions will 
very often be people with sharply rising subjective costs; (...)’
and that monopolists would therefore not bother to find out by how 
much exactly they need to restrict output to achieve maximum profit.] 
In a well-known paper, Hayek (1945) noted:
‘How easy it is for an inefficient manager to dissipate the differentials 
on which profitability rests, and that it is possible, with the same tech­
nical facilities, to produce with a great variety of costs, are among the 
commonplaces of business experience which do not seem to be equally 
familiar in the study of the economist.’ (p. 523)
Three decades after Hicks had coined the ‘quiet life’ catchphrase, 
Leibenstein (1966) introduced the term ‘X-inefficiency’ which, roughly 
speaking, corresponds to the concept of ‘slack’:
‘The essence of the argument is that microeconomic theory focuses 
on allocative efficiency to the exclusion of other types of efficiencies that, 
in fact, are much more significant in many instances.’ (p. 392) 
Leibenstein explains:
‘The simple fact is that neither individuals nor firms work as hard, 
nor do they search for information as effectively, as they could.’ (p. 407) 
I review the theoretical literature on competition and effort in greater 
detail below.
How can more intense product market competition help in resolving 
the agency problem? On one level, it should not matter. This is the 
stance taken by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who note that
‘It is frequently argued that the existence of competition in product 
(and factor) markets will constrain the behavior of managers to idealized
1 Allen and Gale (2000b) point out that the exact nature of management failure 
might not be irrelevant (see p. 60 -  61). In other words, ‘effort’ may be a poor proxy 
for other kinds of failure that one might care about: Risk shifting, excessive con­
servatism, overconfidence, innate differences in ability independent of effort, private 
benefits of control. I will follow the literature in concentrating on effort.
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value maximization, ( .. .) .  Our analysis does not support this hypothesis. 
The owners of a firm with monopoly power have the same incentives to 
limit divergences of the manager from value maximization (i.e., the ability 
to increase their wealth) as do the owners of competitive firms.’ (p. 329)2 
Drawing on the original insight in Holmstrom (1979) that
‘essentially any imperfect information about actions or states of na­
ture [FN 28 omitted] can be used to improve contracts’ (p. 89),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) take issue with the view of Jensen and 
Meckling and observe that
‘( . . .)  competitive markets provide a richer information base on which 
to write contracts. The value of competition is obvious if one imagines 
explicit incentive schemes in which the manager is compared with other 
firms in his market. We know that relative evaluations will allow some 
reduction in the uncontrollable risk that the manager has to bear and 
this will reduce agency costs. [FN 30 omitted]’ (p. 96)
Prominent contributions building on this mechanism are Holmstrom 
(1982); Lazear and Rosen (1981) who pioneered the idea of tournaments 
in the context of optimum compensation schemes; Mookherjee (1984); 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983a) who provide a discussion of a number of 
related issues; Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983b); and Shleifer (1985) who 
develops the idea of yardstick competition that has been influential in 
utility regulation. Vickers (1995) provides a discussion of competition 
facilitating performance comparisons in general (pp. 7-12) as well as an 
illustration of the value of observing the performance of a second agent 
in a simple model (pp. 8-10).
Would the ‘competition facilitates performance comparisons’ argu­
ment carry over into a context in which explicit incentive schemes are 
not used? Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) argue informally that informa­
tion about competitors’ performance would also be valuable in a model a 
la Holmstrom (1999) which does not feature explicit incentive contracts 
(the incentive to exert effort is provided by a concern for reputation):
2 The authors also assert that
‘( . . . )  competition in the market for managers will generally make it unnecessary 
for the owners to share rents with the manager. The owners of a monopoly firm need 
only pay the supply price for a manager.’ (p. 329)
One might, somewhat facetiously, ask whether that is how Harvard Business School, 
where Michael Jensen teaches, hires professors -  by setting up an auction and awarding 
the job to the applicant offering to work for the lowest salary. (The analogy with a 
monopoly may not be perfect, but I would think that HBS has considerable market 
power allowing it to generate substantial rents.) More seriously, what Jensen and 
Meckling seem to assert is 1) that the labor market for managers is competitive and
2) that the degree of competitiveness of the labor market is independent of that of a 
firm’s output market. These are two separate and interesting ideas that one should 
be able to test empirically. However, I will not try to pick holes into these claims 
here.
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‘( . . .)  a sharper signal about performance will automatically lead to 
an increased level of effort in equilibrium (since effort responds positively 
to the signal-to-noise ratio). Observing competitors’ performance is one 
way in which signal strength is increased.’ (p. 96)
Vickers (1995) formalizes this intuition (see p. 10 -11) and adds 
precision as to the exact conditions under which competition leads to 
higher effort.
The contributions discussed next do not dispute the claim that com­
petition may increase the informativeness of performance signals. In­
stead, taking that channel for granted, they ask whether there are ad­
ditional effects through which the intensity of competition affects effort. 
Note that the contributions reviewed in the following continue to assume 
that some kind of incentive scheme is feasible. The effect of competition 
is then mediated by the incentive contract. The first model in this line of 
research is Hart (1983). Hart restricts permissible contractual forms in 
such a way as to rule out the effect of competition outlined above: Pay­
ments to the manager may only be conditioned on that manager’s own 
profits (so the profits of other firms cannot be used and neither can the 
input or output price, knowledge of which, in my understanding, would 
be sufficient to attain first-best here). Competition does indeed increase 
effort in Hart’s model. The mechanism is the following: Hart assumes 
the existence of two types of firms, entrepreneurial (implicitly owner- 
operated) ones that maximize profit and managerial ones operated by a 
manager paid according to an incentive contract (with the information 
base restricted as outlined above). A greater share of entrepreneurial 
firms could plausibly be interpreted as an increase in the intensity of 
competition. All firms need a common input, the price of which is sto­
chastic (and unobservable to principals), affects both total and marginal 
costs and could in principle differ across firms, although Hart assumes 
perfect correlation of firms’ input prices for simplicity. Managerial effort 
reduces costs and increases profit; indeed, the input (price) and effort are 
perfect substitutes by assumption. The product market is competitive: 
The good produced is homogeneous and there is a single market price 
that no firm can influence. Crucially, Hart assumes that the managers 
are infinitely risk-averse and that all they care about is a subsistence 
level of income: Any less would be catastrophic, any more provides no 
additional utility. The optimal incentive contract then boils down to the 
owners stipulating a (low enough) profit target such that
‘there is no excuse for the firm’s profit ever to be below [that profit 
level]’ (p. 371)
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The manager’s decision rule upon observing the realization of the in­
put price is simple: Exert just enough effort to attain the profit target. 
When the input price is high, the manager has to work hard, but when 
it is low, the manager can afford to slack off. However, since the en­
trepreneurial firms expand their output when the input price is low, the 
output price falls and the manager has to work harder to meet the target 
than if only that particular firm’s input price were low. The link be­
tween effort and the intensity of competition thus comes about because 
this slack-limiting effect is the more pronounced the greater the share of 
entrepreneurial firms. Hart himself wonders whether this result would be 
robust to a more general specification of the manager’s preferences:
‘We have studied the extreme case where salary incentive schemes are 
minimally effective in controlling managers. It will be interesting to see 
whether our main result -  that competition reduces managerial slack -  
continues to hold under more general conditions.’ (p. 381)
As Scharfstein (1988) demonstrated, it does not. In fact, in Scharf- 
stein’s model competition worsens slack. Interestingly, Scharfstein does 
not need to relax the assumption of infinite risk aversion (although it is 
not required either for the results in Scharfstein’s model to go through; 
all that is needed is risk aversion), but merely allows the manager’s util­
ity from income to linearly increase in income. (Utility from income and 
effort are both arguments of the overall utility function.) The result here 
-  in a reversal of the mechanism in Hart’s model — is that when the in­
put price is low the manager works hard (i.e., there is no inefficiency), 
but slacks off when managerial productivity is low. Scharfstein does not 
mention these terms, but one way to think about the manager’s behavior 
is in terms of income and substitution effects: Both leisure (non-effort) 
and consumption are desirable goods and it is not, in general, possible 
to predict how consumption of each of these goods will change as their 
relative price changes. Hermalin (1992) makes this idea quite explicit 
(labeling non-effort ‘agency goods’) and, apart from the income effect, 
considers three supplementary channels linking competition and effort3. 
None of the four can be signed unambiguously, although Hermalin de­
scribes sufficient conditions such that more intense competition makes a
3In addition to competition allowing the principal to make more accurate inferences 
about the actions chosen by the agent (as in Hart’s model), Hermalin distinguishes a 
‘risk-adjustment effect’ and a ‘change-in-the-relative-value-of-actions-effect’. Herma­
lin defines these effects as relating ‘to the possibility that competition changes the 
executive’s choice of action -  consumption of agency goods -  by changing the risk­
iness inherent in implementing different actions’ (p. 351) and ‘the possibility that 
competition can change the difference in expected profit between two actions, so the 
relative profitability of the better action (e.g., consuming fewer agency goods) can be 
“enhanced” or “diminished” by an increase in competition’ (p. 351), respectively.
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manager slack less (consume fewer agency goods). Hermalin also shows 
that under certain circumstances, the effect of more intense competition 
can be critically dependent on whether the owner or the manager has all 
the bargaining power, i.e., gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (inter­
mediate degrees of bargaining power are not considered). Schmidt (1997) 
explores an additional channel which he terms “threat-of-liquidation” ef­
fect: As competition becomes more intense, all else equal profits are lower 
so the manager has to exert more effort to avoid liquidation (which would 
lead to the loss of private benefits). At the same time, a “value-of-a-cost- 
reduction” effect may work in the other direction. The latter effect only 
arises, however, if the manager obtains a rent. The basic idea underlying 
this second channel is that with more intense competition, it may not be 
worthwhile for the principal to induce high effort (even though the cost 
of doing so has gone down). Schmidt describes what he calls ‘natural 
circumstances’ in which the “value-of-a-cost-reduction” effect is positive 
so that effort increases even when the participation constraint is not 
binding. However, I believe that these should be considered illustrations 
and special cases; as Schmidt himself points out (and illustrates with 
an example), the effect of competition on effort need not be monotonic 
and is, in general, ambiguous. An effect similar to the “value-of-a-cost- 
reduction” effect is investigated by Willig (1987). He studies the case 
of more intense competition translating into greater sensitivity of profit 
to managerial effort. His main result is ambiguous: If the effect of com­
petition is to reduce profit, X-inefficiency actually increases whereas the 
converse is true if profit is not affected by more intense competition (e.g., 
because the principal effect is to increase the elasticity of demand for the 
firm’s output).
Allen and Gale (2000b) criticize reducing the manager’s role to that of 
cost reduction. They also have misgivings about focusing on effort, noting 
that deviations from profit maximization may stem from different sources 
(see footnote above) and that competition may affect these differently. 
Output markets in all the models discussed here are competitive; Allen 
and Gale note that in oligopolistic markets competition may operate in 
different ways (p. 60-61). Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) also provide 
a brief discussion of the link between competition and managerial effort 
which, however, does not go beyond the work reviewed above (see pp. 
636-641, 643-644).
Note that, as observed above, all the contributions reviewed here4still
41 do not provide an exhaustive review of the literature; additional contributions of 
interest are Martin (1993); Bertoletti and Poletti (1996) who clarify some fine points 
on Martin’s paper; Graziano and Parigi (1998) who extend Martin’s homogenous
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assume that some kind of explicit incentive scheme can be used [although 
it may not be essential that incentives be explicit; implicit incentives (via 
reputation) might work]. A number of papers consider the case where 
incentive arrangements are not feasible at all. For example, Hart and 
Moore (1995) explain that
‘To simplify, we consider the (admittedly) extreme case in which the 
empire-building motive is so strong that no feasible financial incentive 
payment can persuade the manager not to invest ( . . . ) . ’ (p. 571)
However, Hart and Moore are not interested in the disciplinary role 
of product market competition, but in that of different types of debt 
contracts. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997) explore the importance 
of agency considerations for the role of product market competition in an 
endogenous growth model with innovation. Their ‘satisficing’ managers 
(which they label ‘conservative’) incur private costs from innovating and 
are motivated not by profit-maximization, but purely by a desire to hang 
on to private benefits of control at the least cost of innovation. With 
this preference structure, the effect of competition on growth is positive. 
A later, more nuanced model investigates the simultaneous operation 
of financial market discipline (via debt) as a discipline device [Aghion, 
Dewatripont and Rey (1999)]5.
I end the discussion of the theoretical literature here. Clearly, this 
work does not exactly constitute a ringing endorsement of the common- 
sense view that competition is an effective discipline device. All in all, 
from a theorist’s perspective the claim that more intense product market 
competition reduces managerial slack is not terribly robust. Only the 
evidence can tell whether common sense is leading us astray here or not.
Despite the importance of the subject from both an academic and 
a policy point of view, attempts to investigate the link between the in­
tensity of competition and ‘slack’ rigorously are fairly recent. One line 
of work uses frontier production function techniques to estimate techni­
cal efficiency. Prominent book-length contributions in this literature are 
Caves and Barton (1990), looking at U.S. evidence, as well as Caves and 
Associates (1992) which extends the scope of the analysis to an additional 
five countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, UK). Broadly speak­
Coumot model to differentiated Cournot competition; SjOstrom and Weitzman (1996) 
which is more of a statistics paper; Krishna (2001); Horn, Lang and Lundgren (1994); 
Horn, Lang and Lundgren (1995), Stennek (2000), and Raith (2003).
5 These papers complement work by Aghion and Howitt (1996) as well as Aghion 
et al. (2001) showing that different assumptions with respect to the innovation tech­
nology can establish a beneficial effect of competition on innovation, thus reversing 
the “Schumpeterian” effect that makes innovation dependent upon market power.
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ing, these authors find competition to be good for efficiency, although it 
should be noted that their work suffers from some serious methodolog­
ical shortcomings [see Tybout (1992) and Comanor (1994)]. Green and 
Mayes (1991) has grown out of the same research effort and discusses the 
methodology and some of the problems. Hay and Liu (1997) also make 
use of frontier production function techniques and investigate a dataset 
of 19 UK manufacturing industries at the industry level. They cautiously 
summarize their results as showing that
‘There is evidence of response by firms to short run declines in market 
share. Short run improvements in efficiency resulted, probably the result 
of greater managerial effort (...)’ (p. 615)
Another line of research considers not econometric estimates of (X-in) 
efficiency but the impact of competition on the level and growth rate of 
productivity. The first paper in this literature is Nickell (1996) which 
uses a panel data set on UK firms. Nickell finds strong evidence that 
more intense competition [measured by (lagged) market share] increases 
the level of productivity and that an increase in the number of competi­
tors or lower level of rents lead to stronger productivity growth. Nickell 
acknowledges that there are problems in the way that competition is 
measured, but presents plausible counter-arguments in his defense (pp. 
732-734). He also draws attention to the possible endogeneity problem, 
but argues that his approach manages to defuse this potential difficulty 
(p. 734, p. 739). Griffith and Harrison (2004) are not convinced and -  
with respect to his article -  note that
‘potential endogeneity in market share is not dealt with properly, so 
imputing a causal relationship between competition and TFP growth is 
problematic.’ (p. 15)
Such quibbles aside, the paper is widely cited and seems to have been 
the most solid evidence available on the reduction in agency costs brought 
about by greater competition at the time of its publication. A number of 
subsequent articles have bolstered the case for competition as a remedy 
to agency problems. Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) use a dataset 
almost identical to the one used by Nickell (1996) to investigate the fink 
between 1. the intensity of product market competition (as measured by 
the average level of ex post rents during the sample period normalized 
on value added), 2. financial market pressure (as measured by interest 
payments normalized on cashflow), as well as 3. shareholder control (as 
measured by a fairly complicated but not implausible indicator explained 
in the paper) and productivity growth. They find that all three measures 
of managerial discipline devices raise productivity growth (although the
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finding that a dominant external shareholder leads to higher productivity 
growth only if it is from the financial sector, but leads to lower produc­
tivity growth if it is not a financial institution is not really explained, 
see p. 793). There is some evidence in the data that financial pressure 
and a dominant external shareholder can substitute for product market 
competition as a discipline device:
‘our measure of competition has no positive impact on productivity 
performance in the presence of a dominant outside shareholder’ (p. 793).
Somewhat contrasting results are provided by Januszewski, Koke and 
Winter (2002) who investigate a panel of German firm-level data for close 
to 500 firms from the manufacturing sector. The authors claim that they 
manage to overcome the endogeneity problem by using lagged values as 
instrumental variables (although they acknowledge that these could be 
weak instruments). They primarily measure market power with firm- 
level ex post rents and find that productivity growth is higher in markets 
with more intense competition. In an interesting contrast to the results 
in Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997), they find that the presence of 
an ultimate controlling owner (see definition on p. 310) is associated 
with higher productivity growth only if that ultimate owner is not a 
financial institution and their results suggest that product market com­
petition and the presence of a controlling owner are complements rather 
than substitutes. These differences with the earlier work by Nickell et 
al. are acknowledged. The increase in the intensity of competition in 
Pavcnik (2002) comes about via trade liberalization. Her analysis is so 
careful that it supports a causal link running from the intensity of com­
petition to productivity; productivity improvements in her plant-level 
panel data set of Chilean manufacturing plants are large (in addition 
to selection effects). Griffith (2001) has panel data on UK establish­
ments and uses the phasing in of the EU’s Single Market Program as 
an instrument to sidestep the endogeneity of measures of the intensity 
of competition. She manages to show that the impact of this exogenous 
increase in competition was very different for two groups of firms: Those 
which could reasonably be expected to be suffering from agency prob­
lems (where the increase in competition led to improvements) and those 
that could reasonably be expected to be entrepreneurial without a ma­
jor conflict of interest between owners and managers (where the increase 
in competition did not have that effect). This allows her to argue that 
the channel through which an increase in the intensity of product mar­
ket competition leads to an increase in productivity is via a reduction 
in agency costs. Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) and Jagannathan
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and Srinivasan (2000) do not measure productivity directly, but rather 
choose a somewhat roundabout route to argue that product market com­
petition disciplines managers. They claim that firms can be categorized 
into ‘specialists’ that operate in rather uncompetitive markets as well as 
‘generalists’ who operate in markets where product market competition 
is more intense. Since in the former type of firm, managers are assumed 
to have leeway to use ‘free cash-flow’, the relationship between current 
leverage and future profitability is postulated to be positive. The reverse 
is said to be the case for ‘generalist’ firms operating in supposedly more 
competitive markets. The empirical results on a sample of 165 US firms 
support the authors’ contentions.
In summary, these findings tie in directly with the theoretical liter­
ature on slack and competition and suggest that, empirically, there is 
support for the view that more intense competition leads to increased 
productivity via a reduction in agency costs. In the remainder of this 
section, I discuss alternatives to product market competition as manager­
ial discipline devices and I discuss some empirical evidence that arguably 
compares the effectiveness of different devices.
In their survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
are sceptical with respect to the scope for incentive contracts to overcome 
the agency problem between owners and management:
‘While it is a mistake to jump ( . . .)  to the conclusion that managers 
do not care about performance at all, it is equally problematic to argue 
that incentive contracts completely solve the agency problem.’ (p. 745) 
There are, of course, other mechanisms that mitigate agency prob­
lems. Jensen (1993) distinguishes 1. capital markets, 2. the legal, po­
litical, and regulatory systems, 3. product and factor markets, and 4. 
the internal control system (headed by the board of directors) (p. 850). 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) discuss labor market discipline explicitly 
(p. 94-95). Allen and Gale (2000b) single out the following governance 
mechanisms as ‘most important’:
‘(i) The board of directors; (ii) executive compensation; (iii) the mar­
ket for corporate control; (iv) concentrated holdings and monitoring by 
financial institutions; (v) debt.’ (p. 37)
To give one well-known concrete example, Jensen (1986) advocates 
the use of capital structure (specifically, high leverage) to constrain man­
agement. In the later paper, Jensen (1993) argues against relying on 
product market discipline by pointing out that
‘Unfortunately, when product and factor market disciplines take effect 
it can often be too late to save much of the enterprise.’ (p. 850)
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) concede that
‘product market competition is probably the most powerful force to­
ward economic efficiency in the world’ (p. 738),
but argue that one cannot rely on product market competition alone. 
Allen and Gale (2000b) effectively take the diametrically opposed po­
sition and -  in view of divergent governance mechanisms that seem to 
have very little bearing on the relative success of an organization and the 
continuing success of non-profit organizations that have little in the way 
of explicit governance arrangements -  argue that the crucial disciplinary 
instrument is product market competition.
There is some empirical work that attempts to run ‘horse-races’ be­
tween the different mechanisms; the idea being that, in principle, the 
evidence should allow researchers to determine which devices to mitigate 
agency problems are the most important. To discuss this literature in 
depth would go beyond the scope of this review, but I will briefly discuss 
three articles of interest in addition to the papers by Nickell, Nicolitsas 
and Dryden (1997) and Januszewski, Koke and Winter (2002).
The first article does not look at the banking industry in particular. 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) use data on almost 400 control transactions 
in 39 different jurisdictions to directly measure the ‘private benefits of 
control’ and to analyze which factors are most important in reducing 
these:
‘Besides the law, we also consider extra-legal institutions, which have 
been mentioned in the literature as possible curbs for private benefits: 
competition, labor pressures, and moral norms.’ (p. 539)
In addition, the authors also investigate the influence of the press 
and the government in its role as corporate tax collector. While their 
focus is on expropriation by owners with a controlling stake rather than 
managerial slack, their results are clearly of relevance for the issue of 
reducing the latter:
‘We find that a high level of diffusion of the press, a high rate of 
tax compliance, and a high degree of product market competition are 
associated with lower private benefits of control.’ (p. 539)
Thus these results provide some additional support for the discipli­
nary role of product market competition.
In Schranz (1993) the market for corporate control (i.e., the discipli­
nary role of the threat of takeover) takes center stage. She takes advan­
tage of takeover regulations in the banking industry that differ across 
U.S. states and finds that
‘banks in active takeover markets are more profitable than those in
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markets restricting takeovers.’ (p. 323).
Firms that operate in markets where takeovers are restricted make 
more use of alternative mechanisms (such as concentrated ownership): 
‘However, use of these alternative methods does not completely com­
pensate for the absence of an active takeover market in improving firm 
performance.’ (p. 323)
Schranz controls for a number of alternative discipline devices among 
which is the competitiveness of the output market. That variable comes 
out as unimportant but she acknowledges that there may be problems 
with the way she measures competition using the state-wide Herfindahl 
index (see p. 307).
Finally, Crespi, Garcia-Cestona and Salas (2004) investigate the Span­
ish banking industry. Just as in the banking industries of many other 
countries, various ownership forms co-exist in Spain and their differing 
governance mechanisms are hypothesized by the authors to differ in the 
effectiveness with which they constrain management. They find this to 
be the case, but note that
‘ [P]roduct-market competition compensates for those weaker internal 
governance mechanisms [of the non-profit Savings banks]’ (p. 2311).
What is there to take away from this section? The first insight, I 
believe, is that on balance the evidence suggests that product market 
competition is effective in curbing managerial slack. Such a blanket as­
sessment does not do justice to the numerous qualifications that are called 
for and must be considered tentative. However, my reading of the liter­
ature suggests that the empirical work does indeed lend itself to such an 
optimistic assessment.
In addition, a second observation can be made: That theoretical work 
should on the whole (and again simplifying a complex debate somewhat) 
be much less in favor of product market competition than the evidence (as 
well as common sense, admittedly a suspicious arbiter) is a phenomenon 
that appears rather consistently across a number of literatures that this 
thesis touches on, namely work on the effects of more intense competition 
on
-financial stability and the failure probability of banks [see Eggenberger 
(2006b)]
-innovation and productivity [Aghion and Griffith (2005) explicitly point 
this out; I review the relevant literature in Eggenberger (2006a)] 
-managerial effort (see above)
In the remainder of this literature review, I shall demonstrate that 
the same discrepancy also arises in the differing conclusions of theoretical
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work on the one hand and empirical evidence on the other as to the effects 
of more intense bank competition with respect to the allocation of capital. 
First, however, I shall briefly provide a ‘meta-survey’ of other literature 
reviews on the subject.
2.3 Surveys o f  th e  B ank  C om p etition  L it­
erature
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of surveys similar 
to the present one (though sometimes with a different emphasis -  e.g., 
a focus on the competition-stability nexus rather than the link between 
bank competition and capital allocation). I shall comment briefly on each 
of them as I go along. Allen and Gale (2004) concentrate on the links 
between competition and stability and combine a survey of the theoretical 
literature with some original work. The bottom line of their review is 
that the presumed tradeoff between competition and stability may, even 
on theoretical grounds, be far more tenuous than is currently suggested 
by much of the literature. Allen et al. (2001) is an overview of papers 
presented at a conference promisingly titled ‘Competition Among Banks: 
Good or Bad?’ and not only summarizes the conference contributions, 
but also puts these into context. Berger et al. (2004) is likewise partly 
a conference overview, but gives far greater weight to a detailed review 
of the prior literature and the issues being investigated. As the focus of 
that survey is almost exclusively on empirical issues, I shall discuss it in 
more detail in section 2.6. The stated theme of Canoy et al. (2001) is 
the supposed tradeoff between competition and stability, although the 
paper surveys a lot of other, only loosely related literature along the 
way. Section 2.3. on empirical evidence provides a helpful introduction 
on the effects of market power in banking with respect to efficiency. 
Overall, the paper is clearly written from a public policy practitioner’s 
perspective and does not focus on theory. (For example, it contains 
an applied section on the Dutch retail banking industry.) Section 6 on 
the impact of banks’ corporate governance on the relationship between 
competition and stability is, on the face of it, very interesting from the 
point of view of my own interests. I believe that this perspective is highly 
promising, but the discussion in the paper is largely limited to a review 
of the general corporate governance literature. Surprisingly the authors 
do not discuss the argument that (bank) managers might actually be 
more risk-averse than owners so that agency conflicts in banking could 
be thought to make banks safer than they otherwise would be. Carletti
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and Hartmann (2002) also focus on competition and stability rather than 
the links between competition and some measure of efficiency. In its first 
part the paper takes an institutional perspective in that it concentrates 
on
’an analysis of the relative roles of competition and supervisory au­
thorities in the review of bank mergers for the G-7 industrialized countries 
and the European Union.’ (p. 5)
It provides a crisp outline of what competition policy is all about 
and sketches attitudes toward the desirability of bank competition (or 
lack thereof) in a number of industrialized countries before giving a de­
scription of the relevant institutional arrangements in the G-7 countries 
(plus the EU institutions which constitute separate actors). In the sec­
ond part the survey moves on to a discussion of the theoretical literature 
on competition and stability as well as the relevant empirical evidence. 
Plausible dividing lines are proposed for the theoretical literature (e.g., 
effects of competition on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets vs. 
effects on the asset side) and a number of contributions are reviewed in 
detail. In the assessment of the authors,
‘whereas most papers find some trade-off between bank competition 
and stability, the claim that they are generally negatively related is not 
necessarily robust.’ (p. 24)
In the discussion of the available empirical work, four sub-strands of 
literature are identified and discussed. The bottom line of that part of 
the survey is that
‘there does not appear to be a single ever-valid relationship between 
competition and stability in the banking system.’ (p. 29)
Cetorelli (2001) begins his survey by setting up a strawman and claim­
ing that
‘ [t]he common wisdom would hold that restraining competitive forces 
should unequivocally produce welfare losses.’ (p. 38)
That is actually not the common wisdom at all as I shall show in 
section 2.4. [Vives (2001b), for example, begins his survey with the claim 
that
‘Competition has always been contentious in banking.’ (p. 535)] 
However, this is not a real point of criticism with respect to this se­
lective, but insightful survey. Cetorelli looks at theoretical work first and 
outlines a number of important contributions in some detail. In both 
the theoretical and empirical work considered he focuses on efficiency 
considerations and ignores the competition-stability nexus. He also in­
vestigates a number of (what are from the point of view of the present
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survey) relative side issues, such as how government ownership of banks 
interacts with the effects of competition (Cetorelli outlines some of his 
empirical work suggesting that a purported positive effect of bank con­
centration vanishes when the degree of government ownership is high), 
the interaction of competition with regulatory restrictions on banks, and 
the links between market structure in the banking industry and the mar­
ket structure in borrower industries. In summary,
‘[t]he main conclusion that seems to emerge from the review of the 
current literature is that the market structure of the banking industry 
and the related conduct of banking firms affect the economy in a much 
more complicated way than through the simple association: more market 
power equals higher lending rates and lower credit quantities [i.e., via an 
improvement or a deterioration with respect to allocative efficiency]’ (p. 
39)
I will discuss Claessens and Klingebiel (2001) in section 2.6 since they 
concentrate on empirical work. They do not provide an academic litera­
ture review but a very broad-brush policy-practitioner discussion which, 
however, gives a good overview of the issues. Dell’Ariccia (2003) is not a 
survey so much as a collection of punch lines. He mentions about 30 pa­
pers in the space of three pages, but for this very reason is helpful in that 
the article provides a highly condensed overview of some recent banking 
literature (though with a broader scope than just ‘competition and capi­
tal allocation’). Not to be left out of this discussion of surveys is Freixas 
and Rochet (1997), the standard textbook on banking theory and related 
topics. The book is very helpful in discussing many different ingredients 
of bank competition models (monitoring to deal with moral hazard on 
the part of the borrower, for example), but the literature on bank compe­
tition and capital allocation (or bank competition and financial stability 
for that matter) is too recent to be given systematic coverage in the book. 
A number of models of bank competition are reviewed therein, but these 
are not investigating issues such as information acquisition incentives or 
monitoring intensity specifically. Guzman (2000) discusses a number of 
papers looking at competition and efficiency in detail. His survey is par­
ticularly helpful in that he goes beyond summaries and draws out some 
of the more general mechanisms at work. His dividing the literature into 
partial and general equilibrium models and his comments on the implica­
tions, for example, are very insightful. Hellwig (1991) looks at financial 
intermediation by banks (as opposed to markets) more broadly as well as 
relationship lending in particular and only touches on competition issues 
(in the treatment of exclusivity in the context of relationship lending).
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In the coverage of the material which that paper discusses it is, of course, 
somewhat superseded by now. However, it is still insightful in the way 
it sets out the distinguishing differences between various strands of lit­
erature (e.g., in a brief discussion of static vs. dynamic models of moral 
hazard or in a section that critically assesses to what extent it is appropri­
ate to leave out the refinancing side in models of financial intermediation) 
and in its willingness to really probe whether the theoretical literature 
(at least as it stood at the time of his writing) is on to something:
‘How does our theoretical analysis relate to the stylized facts pre­
sented by the economic historians (. . .)? What clues do we have that 
theory is in fact telling us the right story?’ (p. 37)
For example, Hellwig confronts the predictions of the theoretical mod­
els of relationship lending with empirical work and points out that these 
are not supported by the evidence. Neuberger (1998) concentrates on 
surveying empirical work on a range of industrial organization issues in 
banking, a number of which are relevant from the point of view of this 
survey. Her article is mostly a summary of results, not a discussion of 
methodological issues, and provides a helpful collection of stylized facts 
(e.g., on the extent of scale economies in banking). The article by Padoa- 
Schioppa (2001) was originally delivered as the keynote dinner speech 
at the above-mentioned conference titled ‘Competition among banks: 
good or bad?’ and deals with the subject of bank competition from 
a senior policy-practitioner perspective. Interestingly, Padoa-Schioppa 
asserts that technological progress, by making it easier to circumvent 
regulatory restrictions, is what triggered a more relaxed attitude toward 
competition on the part of regulators:
‘Even though I regret saying this to a predominantly academic audi­
ence, ideas tended to follow, rather than anticipate, a change which was 
largely due to technological factors.’ (p. 17)
Parigi (1998) concentrates on theoretical contributions related to com­
petition in the banking industry (including a section on competition and 
stability). He also covers areas that I do not mention at all such as, 
for example, network considerations in the operation of ATM networks. 
Van Damme (1994) surveys micro-theoretical work on banking and in­
termediation more broadly and is still a useful guide to the earlier litera­
ture. The section on competition, however, is brief and outdated. Vives 
(2001b) provides a survey on bank competition that blends a discussion 
of theoretical work with that of the evidence. In terms of the literature 
discussed, Vives’ article is very independent in the sense that it is not 
a collection of article summaries and, indeed, discusses few articles in
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detail. I think that this should be seen as a strength of the paper as it 
helps to ensure readability and gives the reader an excellent overview. A 
minor drawback is that the broad-brush nature entails confident asser­
tions with respect to issues on which both the empirical and theoretical 
literature are still somewhat divided. For example, Vives claims that
‘Even accepting that competition will be necessarily imperfect, vigor­
ous rivalry seems to be necessary both for static and dynamic efficiency 
of an industry.’ (p. 538)
I believe that Vives is right, but as I argue elsewhere that issue 
might be thought to deserve a more nuanced assessment [see Eggenberger 
(2006a)].
I now turn to a discussion of the primary theoretical contributions.
2.4 B ank  C om p etition  and C apital A lloca­
tio n  - T heory
2.4.1 Com m on assum ptions and overview
In the present section, I survey the theoretical literature on bank compe­
tition and capital allocation. The models reviewed tend to have certain 
features in common which I outline in the following. They take the exis­
tence of financial intermediaries and the use of debt contracts for granted 
and do not feature aggregate uncertainty (individual bank failures or sys­
temic crises; see above for surveys). The literature has evolved such that 
stability issues are largely ignored in models that focus on capital allo­
cation and conversely. Competition is typically driven by more intense 
competition between banks (not between banks and capital markets).
I concentrate on competition for loans, not deposits, although I do 
briefly review models in which bank competition operates via savings 
mobilization. More intense competition could conceivably lead to higher 
deposit interest rates and thus (even if the effect is ambiguous in theory) 
a higher savings rate. However, the evidence indicates that savings are 
rather interest-inelastic in practice [Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 
(2000), Bandiera et al. (2000)]. At any rate, most of the models simply 
assume that banks can obtain any amount of funds at some exogenous 
interest rate.
Agents are typically risk-neutral, benefit from limited-liability and an 
absence of bankruptcy or application costs and, with few exceptions [e.g., 
Caminal and Matutes (2002)], entrepreneurs’ funding requirements are 
fixed on a per-project basis and identical across projects. The cashflow
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characteristics and distribution of entrepreneurs’ projects are assumed to 
be exogenous.
Collateral, equity and other self-selection devices are typically not 
available in order to keep the action firmly on the side of the banks. In 
fact, quite a few of the models reviewed here do not even allow loan 
applicants to know their own type (thereby obtaining an informational 
advantage relative to lenders)6. I should note that it is a matter of deep 
conviction for some theorists that entrepreneurs must have an informa­
tional advantage with respect to their financiers. However, the evidence 
suggests an informational advantage in the opposite direction: The fi­
nancier may actually know more than the entrepreneur7.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to borrow from a single bank and, in most 
models, are assumed to borrow only once. My discussion of dynamic (‘re­
lationship lending’) models is limited to contributions explicitly exam­
ining the effects of competition. Empirically, a dynamic setup is maybe 
more appropriate as far as small- and medium-sized business borrowers 
are concerned (see below). However, the one-shot setup is by far the 
more prevalent modeling approach.
The literature largely avoids discussing the effects of competition on 
allocative efficiency. As far as the real-world problem of maximizing sur­
plus from investing is concerned, the evidence suggests that such pure 
market power effects are of considerable importance. However, they are 
conceptually uninteresting and much of the literature has implicitly as­
sumed them away to focus on informational issues instead. One way of 
removing the pure market power effect from models of bank competition 
is to keep demand for loans completely interest-inelastic and the supply
6 Park, Brandt and Giles (2003) and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) -  re­
viewed below -  are exceptions; in the first model applicants know their success prob­
ability and, in the presence of application costs, have to trade off between borrowing 
from a lower-interest rate bank with some probability or obtaining a loan from a 
higher-price bank with certainty; in the second model, sorting can be induced via the 
use of collateral. Since I follow much of the literature in keeping all the action on the 
side of the banks, I should note that there are a number of general banking theory 
contributions that feature sorting, in particular in connection with the use of collat­
eral [e.g., Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987)]. Freixas and Rochet (1997) also 
discuss this material in their textbook. A general discussion of collateral is provided 
by Coco (2000).
7Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) give references to the literature and memo­
rably note that ‘Economists of a certain stripe seem to have difficulty accepting this 
obvious point. For example, an anonymous referee of a previous version of this article 
wrote: “The idea that a bank has a better idea of the success of a project than the 
entrepreneur who dreamed up the project seems so off that I find the rest of the paper 
uninteresting.” An anonymous colleague of ours has a similar point of view: “The 
idea that a referee is more able to evaluate the quality of a paper than the econo­
mist who wrote it”, he says, “seems so off that I find the contents of their reports 
completely uninteresting.” ’ [see FN3, p. 727]
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of deposits perfectly interest-elastic8. With few exceptions [e.g., Gehrig 
(1998a) and Cetorelli (1997) where loan demand is elastic] that is the 
modeling approach pursued by the contributions reviewed below.
Not all models have all the features outlined here, but the preceding 
description strikes me as a valid general outline of common assumptions. 
If the papers in this strand of research really have as much in com­
mon as I claim, where do the differences stem from? I see three main 
sources of differentiation. Assumptions with respect to cashflow distri­
butions on both the project and aggregate levels are the first element. 
These assumptions give rise to different kinds of information problems, 
they determine which (screening/monitoring) technologies make sense, 
and they underlie the variations in surplus that different market struc­
tures generate. Second, technologies for reducing information problems 
vary widely and entail a number of additional assumptions (e.g., whether 
signals are privately observed or become public knowledge and how accu­
racy and cost are parameterized). Third, there is some variation in how 
banks are assumed to compete (e.g., Bertrand competition vs horizontal 
differentiation) and how the intensity of competition is parameterized.
From the standpoint of this thesis, the most interesting feature of 
lenders is their role in overcoming information problems. Roughly speak­
ing, these information problems can be grouped into three categories ac­
cording to the stage of the lending process at which they arise [see Freixas 
and Rochet (1997), p. 29]. Ex ante informational asymmetries between 
borrower and lender lead to adverse selection and can be remedied by 
the bank’s screening of projects. Banks assess applicants’ creditworthi­
ness and refuse to give entrepreneurs assessed as bad risks credit. At 
the interim stage, i.e., after a loan has been disbursed, informational 
asymmetries may give rise to moral hazard on the part of the entrepre­
neur. This moral hazard is typically modeled as a non-verifiable choice 
of effort level or production technology. The bank can help to mitigate 
the moral hazard problem by monitoring the borrower. Third, at the 
ex post stage, the borrower’s cashflows might not be verifiable. In this 
so-called ‘costly state verification’ framework, the bank may be able to 
alleviate the problem by ‘auditing’ or ‘punishing’ a borrower who does 
not repay9. A (loose) real-world interpretation of this might point to
8 Note that the effects of inefficient cross-subsidization between different risk classes 
of borrowers (good risks being charged ‘too high’ a rate and bad risks being charged 
‘too low’ a rate) differ from those of the conscious exercise of market power. Cross­
subsidization was arguably a first-order real-world concern until more risk-sensitive 
credit risk measurement and pricing tools were introduced by banks during the last 
ten years or so.
9Note that there is no agreement on the exact meaning of the term ‘monitoring’. 
For example, Hellwig (1991) uses the term ‘monitoring’ to denote the bank’s actions
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banks’ often central role in bankruptcy proceedings and in recycling the 
capital of failed firms. Fourth, in addition to these three information 
problems, banks may also have an important role in assisting borrowers 
who experience a negative liquidity shock, e.g. by renegotiating the loan 
contract or providing emergency liquidity assistance.
Although all four aspects ought to matter in real-world terms, they do 
not have easily captured equivalents available in datasets for empirical 
work -  a point I shall return to when discussing the empirical evidence. 
My emphasis on the first aspect, screening, is justified by the relative lack 
of literature on the others: For example, I am aware of only one paper 
dealing with monitoring and competition [Caminal and Matutes (2002)]. 
With the exception of Guzman (2000b) and Smith (1998), to the best of 
my knowledge there are no publications specifically investigating compe­
tition in the context of ‘auditing’. As for emergency liquidity provision 
and renegotiation, one would expect this to be given some attention in 
the literature on competition and relationship lending; however, actual 
formal models of this aspect are few indeed [I am only aware of Ding 
(2000)].
In the following, three sub-sections deal with models investigating 
screening, monitoring, and liquidity assistance, respectively. Interest­
ingly, to the best of my knowledge there is no contribution that investi­
gates these functions simultaneously in a bank competition setting. For 
example, most screening papers keep the cashflow distribution invariant 
and thus do not allow for a moral hazard problem on the part of the 
borrower in the first place [Schnitzer (1999a) and Schnitzer (1999b) are 
exceptions]; in the absence of this feature there clearly is no point in 
modeling banks’ monitoring10.
Both of the ‘auditing’ models mentioned are built around an overlapping- 
generations setup; a class of models I discuss in a separate sub-section. 
Related contributions (which do not directly address the issue of bank 
competition and capital allocation) are discussed next. Finally, I will 
briefly give some real-world illustrations.
2.4.2 Screening
I first consider screening models in which the quality of banks’ informa­
tion is exogenously given and screening is typically nothing more sophis­
in all three of the settings outlined above (p. 46). Freixas and Rochet (1997) follow 
Hellwig, but also use the terms ‘screening’ and ‘punishing’/ ’auditing’ in the way in 
which they are used here (p. 29).
10 There are a number of articles featuring, for example, both screening and moni­
toring in the broader theoretical banking literature; see, e.g., Thakor (1996).
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ticated than a costless test with fixed error probabilities. I then discuss 
models with endogenous information acquisition.
In Broecker (1990), banks receive costless imperfect binary signals on 
applicants’ type (which can be either good or bad). With banks engag­
ing in pure price competition, the key result in the context of this liter­
ature review11 is the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Broecker shows the existence of a unique and symmetric mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, derives the distribution function according to which banks 
set interest rates and obtains an expression for equilibrium profits. Banks 
have an incentive to underbid their rivals in order to achieve a better 
composition of their borrower pool -  alternatively, i.e., when they can­
not profitably underbid, they may find it optimal to ask for the highest 
possible rate. The intuition behind this result is that an applicant ac­
cepting to pay a high interest rate must have been rejected by all the 
banks setting lower interest rates and must therefore on average be a 
very bad risk. In other words, banks’ rejection decisions create external­
ities for other banks. Broecker shows that the average creditworthiness 
(or success probability) must be decreasing in the number of banks that 
are active; conversely, the expected interest rate is increasing in the num­
ber of banks. It is presumably this result that leads to Broecker’s paper 
being cited as showing that more intense competition between banks is 
bad for the allocation of capital. In fact, whether this highly stylized 
model warrants such an interpretation with respect to real-world banks 
is open to question (see below). Broecker’s model has a more than formal 
similarity with a first-price, sealed-bid, common value auction model and 
it is therefore not surprising that the externalities generated by banks’ 
rejection decisions are similar to the winner’s curse. I provide a slightly 
more detailed discussion of this important paper in the third chapter.
The contribution by Riordan (1993) makes the auction setting very 
explicit and, unlike Broecker (1990), directly addresses the question
‘Is more competition in loan markets a good thing?’ (p. 329)
Riordan’s model is basically a simplified version of the general auction 
model developed by Milgrom and Weber (1982). Once again, projects 
come in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ varieties. Given the auction setup, there is a 
single borrower and n banks who bid for the right to make a loan with a 
principal of one unit of capital. The bids are the repayments that the bor­
rower would have to promise the bank. Unlike in Broecker’s model where 
both types and signals are binary, the signals here are continuous (and 
assumed to satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property). Conditional
11 The paper has a second part that is largely of interest to game-theoreticians.
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on type, the signals observed by the banks are independent. Riordan 
obtains a condition that guarantees a unique interior cut-off level of the 
signal such that any bank observing a worse signal will not make a bid. 
It is that cut-off level that determines how likely it is that a loan will 
be offered. Riordan derives the unique, symmetric bidding function and 
shows that the equilibrium cut-off is increasing in the number of banks 
-  essentially due to the winner’s curse. He also obtains the probabilities 
that type I errors (a good type does not obtain a loan) and type II errors 
(a bad type obtains a loan) are made, but the effect of an increase in the 
number of banks on these error probabilities is ambiguous. This implies 
that there is no clear-cut answer to Riordan’s question. In sum, there 
is no definite result even within the context of the model as to whether 
more intense bank competition (proxied by the number of banks that are 
potentially bidding) would improve or worsen the allocation of capital. 
Still, Riordan is sceptical as to the benefits of more intense competition 
and notes:
‘The model suggests two reasons why more competition in loan mar­
kets might damage market performance. First, the statistic the market 
uses to select loans may become less informative about the quality of the 
loan. Second, the loan approval practices of individual banks may be too 
conservative, and more competition may make them even more so.’ (p. 
330)
Nakamura (1996) provides another variation on the auction theme. 
This model features the standard ‘worsening pool’ feature; as rejected 
applicants approach more and more banks, the average quality of the 
remaining applicants (i.e., those who have not yet managed to obtain 
a loan) worsens. Signals are assumed to follow the Normal and any 
lending that happens takes place at an exogenously fixed interest rate. 
(Nakamura also looks at the case where the prospective borrower gets to 
set the loan terms; a case that I do not consider here.) Three market 
structures capturing the extent of competition are compared: 1. Each 
borrower only approaches a single lender (captured by assuming that the 
lender knows that she is the only lender approached). 2. Borrowers can 
approach multiple lenders, but all the test results (rejections) that they 
have obtained are common knowledge (this is called a ‘hierarchy’). 3. A 
market labeled ‘anonymous’ in which borrowers can approach multiple 
lenders without their previous test results being known. The signal that 
the potential lender observes is costless and the accuracy (distribution) 
of the signal exogenously given. The relationship between the degree of 
competition and surplus is ambiguous.
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The whole point of an auction is a commitment on the part of all play­
ers not to renegotiate. Also, the three models sketched out here assume 
that price is all that matters. So how appropriate is this as a description 
of bank competition? It depends. A segment of the loan market, namely 
that of lending to large, established firms, really does function along sim­
ilar lines (including the one-shot, arm’s length, auction setup). However, 
the screening role of banks in this market segment is of marginal im­
portance -  borrowers in this segment are relatively transparent with a 
credit rating from the big agencies and probably followed by dedicated 
equity and credit analysts. For the kinds of borrowers that the banking 
literature narrowly defined is concerned with, there is solid evidence sug­
gesting that price is not all that matters (see section 2.6). In particular, 
rivals’ (price) offers should be thought of as common knowledge and, as I 
show in the companion chapter titled ‘On Broecker’s “Credit-worthiness 
tests and interbank competition”’, the results on the worsening of the 
applicant pool as the number of banks increases are critically non-robust 
to this modification. Why is the modified setup more plausible than the 
standard arrangement? Tests are assumed costless and good applicants 
at least would find it worthwhile to get tested by all banks. They then 
have an incentive to show all their favorable test results (showing them to 
be, on average, of better quality) to negotiate better loan terms; then by 
implication it is clear that any applicant unable to show good test results 
must be of lesser quality (in expectation). So this modification should 
emerge endogenously, unless loan offers were non-verifiable (which seems 
to be at odds with contemporary banking practice in industrialized coun­
tries, where loan offers by and large are made in writing). Shaffer (1998) 
notes a similar effect and points out that a greater number of banks does 
not worsen the applicant pool if banks’ signals are perfectly correlated.
I next review three papers that do not use an auction setup. In 
the first two information is arguably endogenous; however, the testing 
decision is so coarse that it seemed more appropriate to review these 
articles along with contributions in which accuracy is exogenous. Chiesa 
(1998) tackles the central topic of this survey head-on:
‘Does the removal of intra-state entry barriers increase welfare?’ (p. 
409) ‘Does a concentrated banking industry dominate a fragmented one? 
This is the question this paper seeks to address.’ (p. 410)
Her model ‘almost’ features aggregate uncertainty: In the bad state of 
the world, the bank decumulates capital because of losses on bad projects 
that fail in that state of the world (whereas good projects are always prof­
itable), but in equilibrium the bank will not become insolvent. Outside
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investors -  the bank’s depositors -  will see to that in that they limit 
the amount of funds they provide the bank with. (The article assumes 
that banks’ capital is not sufficient to finance all applicants with a fa­
vorable test result.) Only if the bank has enough at stake can outside 
investors be certain that the bank will in fact screen the applicants and 
only lend to those assessed as good (which will include some bad types 
falsely assigned to this category by the imperfect test) which in turn 
will ensure that the bank is solvent even in the bad state of the world. 
If the bank cannot fail, then it has every incentive to incur the cost of 
screening borrowers. Screening accuracy in that model is not exogenous; 
in fact, banks decide whether to apply their test but will always screen 
applicants in equilibrium and only lend to entrepreneurs with a favorable 
test result. However, it is assumed that the type I/II error probabilities 
are exogenously given. Chiesa compares a monopoly with a two-bank 
scenario. The result: Less lending and a worse composition of the bor­
rower pool under duopoly relative to monopoly. I have reservations as 
to the interpretability of this result, as the model setup is such that the 
banking market comes rather close to being a natural monopoly: The 
efficient outcome is to test an applicant exactly once. In particular, since 
there is no moral-hazard problem on the part of the borrower, even a 
complete expropriation of the entrepreneur does not affect surplus.
The article by Park, Brandt and Giles (2003) is very original in that 
it manages to relate its theoretical analysis to empirical work on bank 
competition in rural China. The theoretical setup considers a monopoly 
and a duopoly; an unusual feature of the model is that the incumbent 
(monopolist) is assumed to have to charge an administratively set interest 
rate below the market-clearing rate. This assumption accords well with 
the situation in China (and, as the authors point out, many developing 
countries in general). The resulting credit rationing is therefore not of the 
equilibrium [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)] type. There is no moral hazard 
on the part of the bank nor on the part of the borrower. Unlike in many 
other papers in the literature, which assume that the bank can obtain 
any amount of funds at a given interest rate, the bank is here constrained 
in its lending volume by the amount of deposits at its disposal (assumed 
exogenous). Again, the motivation for this feature is the situation in 
rural China where access to an interbank market is strictly limited. The 
information problem centers on adverse selection where borrowers differ 
in the success probabilities of their projects. The success probabilities of 
the aggregate borrower pool are assumed to be distributed according to 
some general distribution function (no specific functional form, although
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the Uniform is briefly investigated later in the paper). A monopolist 
that does not screen borrowers has to ration randomly until the avail­
able deposits have all been loaned out; the investment requirement of 
projects is assumed fixed, so rationing takes the form of a probability 
of obtaining a loan. The bank’s problem is anticipated and solved by 
the applicants who are assumed to know their type; applicants with a 
success probability lower than some threshold do not bother to apply 
for a loan because of a (fixed) application cost. Given this cut-off suc­
cess probability and the (exogenously fixed) interest rate, the bank is 
assumed to be at least breaking even (a fair assumption since otherwise 
the model would hold little interest). The bank can screen borrowers us­
ing the following technology: The effort decision is binary (in the sense 
that either all actual, not potential, applicants are screened or none at 
all; this assumption is required in light of the authors’ stated intention 
of avoiding fixed costs of screening) and the outcome of the test is an 
accurate assessment of the true success probability. Whether a bank 
screens is common knowledge. This means that if a bank screens, all 
the entrepreneurs that bother to apply to it will also obtain a loan and 
therefore there will be no rationing. The quality of the borrower pool 
improves as the bank screens; the question is whether the increase in 
profitability outweighs the cost of screening. In the duopoly model, the 
entrant can screen or not screen and -  in contrast to the incumbent -  
is free in the interest rate it sets. It is assumed that the entrant gains 
an exogenously determined share of the fixed-size deposit volume (which 
determines that bank’s lending capacity and reduces the lending capacity 
of the incumbent relative to the monopoly situation). With two banks 
and two possible effort choices, there axe four combinations of screening 
decisions to be investigated. This lends itself quite nicely to the stan­
dard normal form matrix representation (with mixed strategy equilibria 
discreetly being assumed away) and the authors argue that
‘the two most likely outcomes under competition are that the incum­
bent or entrant exerts effort to capture the best borrowers while the 
competitor does not exert effort.’ (p. 473)
It is shown that regardless of which of the four outcomes occurs, 
the threshold borrower quality (with applicants obtaining funding if and 
only if they have a success probability greater than this threshold) is the 
same as in the case of an informed monopolist. In other words, even 
when both duopolists do not screen their applicants, the allocation of 
capital improves relative to the case of monopoly without screening and 
is as good as that under monopoly with screening. The assumptions of
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application costs together with that of applicants knowing their types 
are the key drivers of this result. When thinking about which bank to 
apply to (if any), an applicant needs to be concerned not just with the 
interest rate, but also with the probability of actually being given a loan. 
Since the entrant bank is free in its choice of interest rate, the certainty 
of getting funding at the higher interest rate gives rise to sorting. The 
model does not make unambiguous predictions with respect to the effects 
of competition on the incumbent’s incentive to exert effort, although the 
authors point out
‘that the effect of competition on the incumbent’s effort decision de­
pends positively on the entrant’s market share and negatively on the 
extent of credit rationing when there is a monopolist lender, which in­
creases the effort incentive under monopoly.’ (p. 475)
It might be argued that this article ought to have been reviewed 
together with models in which screening accuracy is endogenous; in view 
of the technology employed and the fact that it is the possibility for self­
selection rather than screening as such that drives the results, I found it 
more appropriate to discuss this paper here.
The article by Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) is not so much 
a paper on bank competition as an exercise in contract theory. Two 
banks exogenously located at the extremes of a Hotelling line (where the 
travel cost as an indicator of the degree of horizontal differentiation is 
interpreted as the intensity of competition) face a pure adverse selection 
problem in lending to borrowers of two different types (success probabil­
ities). Through the use of credit contracts which specify both an interest 
rate and collateral level, banks may be able to induce borrowers to reveal 
their types in a separating equilibrium. Initially the inefficiencies con­
sidered derive from the social cost of collateral (worth less to the bank 
than to the borrower because of liquidation costs) and the travel costs 
rather than from type I/II errors with respect to positive/negative NPV 
projects. (The case where the low-type applicants axe negative NPV 
projects is considered later in the paper and it is shown that the para­
meter set for which surplus decreases with competition in that case is 
actually larger than in the case where lending to both types of projects 
is efficient.) The authors argue that in contrast to the standard Hotelling 
result higher travel costs in their setting do not necessarily reduce surplus 
(“welfare”), since more differentiation (less intense competition) may -  
at the same time as causing greater surplus losses from ‘travel’ -  lead 
to lower surplus losses from the socially wasteful use of collateral. The 
set of parameter combinations for which this is the case is characterized:
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The difference in success probabilities needs to be small and the absolute 
value of the probabilities relatively large. The preceding results are ob­
tained for small enough travel cost, so that banks actually compete for all 
borrowers. The authors point out that as travel costs increase and banks 
become local monopolies (with respect to one or even both types) surplus 
may in fact increase further thanks to lower social costs of collateral.
The main shortcoming of the papers reviewed above is that banks’ 
accuracy is exogenous or the information acquisition decision is extremely 
coarse. This feature would not only make practitioners frown; it is also 
dismissed by some of the world’s foremost banking theorists. Freixas and 
Rochet (1997) argue that
‘This appraisal of risk and correlative estimation of the risk-retum on 
a bank loan is one of the main functions of modern banking.’ (p. 6) 
and they note that
‘Banks may invest in an informational technology that allows them 
to screen the different demands for loans they are confronted with and 
to monitor the projects, (...)’ (p. 7)
Greenbaum and Thakor (1995) write
‘We should begin by noting that credit analysis, which is an integral 
part of the lending decision, is not a binary (0 or 1) process whereby the 
bank either conducts credit analysis or not. It should more appropriately 
be viewed as a continuum; the bank can perform credit analysis to varying 
degrees of detail. The more elaborate the analysis, the more costly it is 
for the bank. The point to note is that the degree of elaboration is a 
matter of choice for the bank and represents an important element of the 
spot lending decision-making process.’ (pp. 276-277)
In the next few models, information acquisition is endogenous. In the 
preceding auction models, the accuracy of the signals was exogenously 
given. One might think that modeling a bank’s creditworthiness test 
with the ensuing price competition as an (first-price, sealed-bid, com­
mon value) auction with endogenous information acquisition might be a 
promising route for further research. However, the technical difficulties 
of modeling this in a tractable way are considerable indeed. Well-known 
surveys of auction theory by McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Klem­
perer (1999) hardly touch on the subject despite its importance in a far 
wider context than that of bank competition. Two authors that have 
tackled the challenge (in a setup of restricted generality) are Matthews 
(1984) and, more recently, Persico (2000). Troge (2000a) investigates 
information acquisition in ascending bid auctions with both common 
and private value components. In a companion paper [Troge (2000b)],
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Troge studies information acquisition in a banking duopoly and finds 
that whether a bank knows the effort that the rival has expended on 
information acquisition is of critical importance for the extent of infor­
mation acquisition relative to the surplus-maximizing amount. In a later 
contribution also using an auction setup, Troge (2002) explores how the 
characteristics of an economy’s portfolio of (potential) projects influences 
the surplus-maximizing number of banks. A first-price, sealed-bid auc­
tion with one better-informed bidder is studied by Hendricks, Porter and 
Wilson (1994).
As for bank competition being modeled as an auction, the paper 
by Cao and Shi (2001) goes some way toward endogenizing information 
acquisition: Type I/II error probabilities are assumed exogenous, but 
the probability of obtaining a signal at cost c can be chosen by the 
bank. Signals are binary and imperfectly informative. A bank does not 
observe other banks’ information acquisition decisions and can decide to 
participate (or not) in a first-price, common value, sealed-bid auction 
and may, in particular, bid even if it has not obtained information on the 
applicant. The authors are looking for a symmetric equilibrium where the 
bid depends on the own test result (if any) and the common probability 
of acquiring an informative signal on the applicant’s type. Their main 
concern is the likelihood that a good project will not obtain funding (the 
other type of error is not discussed in detail). The authors point out 
the possibility that an increase in competition (as proxied by an increase 
in the number of banks) makes it less likely that a good project will 
obtain finance, because the informational externalities of an increase in 
the number of banks may lead to a decrease in the number of banks that 
are actually bidding. This is the standard ‘winner’s curse’ effect.
Hauswald and Marquez (2005) assume that symmetric banks com­
pete in a spatial competition model a la Salop (1979). (One section in 
the paper considers the case of asymmetric banks in the context of a dis­
cussion of mergers. However, the main results discussed in the following 
are obtained for the case of ex ante symmetric banks.) The stages of 
information acquisition and price competition are preceded by a third 
stage at which banks decide whether or not to enter (though entry de­
cisions are hardly the main concern of the paper). Banks can purchase 
an informative signal at a constant variable cost; types and signals are 
binary. The accuracy of the signal (captured as the probability that an 
assessment is correct) is increasing in the bank’s investment in a screening 
technology and decreasing in the ‘distance’ (a proxy for specialization, 
say, by industry) of the borrower from the bank. Note that the spa­
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tial competition setup does not serve to model loans as products that 
are horizontally differentiated by transportation costs; competition for 
borrowers is pure price competition between one informed and one unin­
formed bank (see below) and has only an equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
The distance between bank and borrower does, however, affect the accu­
racy of the signal. A crucial assumption is that whenever two competing 
banks obtain signals and their accuracies (affected by both the borrower’s 
location and the bank’s screening investment) with respect to a borrower 
differ, the less accurate bank only gets a noisy signal of the more accurate 
bank’s signal. It is this assumption that ensures that a borrower will be 
screened at most once. Banks only incur the variable cost of screening 
for applicants located up to some maximum distance away from them; 
the reason being that the informed bank’s expected profit decreases in 
distance, so that beyond some distance it is not worth incurring the cost 
of becoming informed. This creates the theoretical possibility of gaps be­
tween banks; i.e., market segments in which applicants are not screened 
at all. However, throughout much of the paper the authors assume that 
the cutoff distance is exactly the halfway point between two banks; this 
effectively ensures that each applicant gets screened exactly once (see p. 
11). Interest-rate competition is modeled as one informed bank bidding 
against one uninformed bank. As the first author kindly pointed out 
to me in personal communication [Hauswald (2005)], this is not due to 
the Salop setup (where each firm competes only against its neighbors), 
but rather is derived from a result in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom 
and Weber (1983). The informed bank is, in fact, competing against all 
uninformed banks; however, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber 
(1983) show that this is equivalent to one better informed bidder com­
peting against one less informed bidder. In the interest rate competition 
sub-game, the informed bank denies credit to applicants with a bad signal 
if its accuracy exceeds some threshold level; also in that case the unin­
formed bank offers a loan only with some probability. If the informed 
bank’s accuracy is less than the threshold level, both banks always offer 
credit. Interestingly, the more accurate the informed bank, the higher the 
(expected) interest rate paid by both types of borrowers (although in this 
paper as in most others in this literature, interest rates are completely 
without allocative significance). The intuition behind this result is that 
a better-informed competitor worsens the adverse selection problem and 
so forces the uninformed bank to ask for a higher interest rate (in expec­
tation) with the informed bank taking advantage by raising its interest 
rate as well. In the same vein, the interest rate is decreasing in the dis­
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tance between an applicant and the informed bank (and conversely for 
the uninformed bank) because the informed bank’s informational advan­
tage diminishes with distance. The optimum investment in the screening 
technology is analyzed and it is shown that it decreases in the intensity 
of competition (the number of banks) and increases in the fraction of 
bad types. Banks invest strategically to, as it were, worsen the adverse 
selection problem for their competitors (in turn enabling them to charge 
higher rates) and also to steal business from the neighboring banks by 
becoming better informed about those borrowers for whom competition 
is most balanced (in the sense that they are located close to equidistantly 
between the two rivals, so that no bank has an overwhelming informa­
tional advantage). In equilibrium with symmetric banks such attempts 
do not bear fruit in that no bank gains any market share; the authors 
show that bank profits would be higher if banks colluded, divided up the 
market ’50:50’ by agreeing not to screen applicants located beyond the 
halfway point and reduced their investment in the screening technology 
accordingly. Does greater accuracy improve the allocation of capital in 
the sense that less type I and II errors are made? Assuming that accuracy 
is high enough for the informed bank not to lend to an applicant with 
a bad signal and thus for the uninformed bank to be bidding only with 
some probability, type I errors (good types not obtaining loans) decrease 
in accuracy only if it exceeds some threshold; below the threshold type 
I errors become more likely the greater accuracy! (Type II errors always 
decrease in accuracy). What explains this at first glance counterintu­
itive result is the effect of improved accuracy in worsening the adverse 
selection problem for the uninformed bank. The likelihood that a good 
applicant will obtain a loan from an informed bank is increasing in accu­
racy indeed; however, the uninformed bank becomes disproportionately 
more cautious in granting loans as the informed bank’s information im­
proves and refuses to make an offer with greater probability. That there 
should be a threshold above which the beneficial effect of more accurate 
information dominates becomes clear when one imagines the error prob­
ability going toward zero. Then every good project that is screened also 
(in the limit) obtains funding from the informed bank. The threshold is 
a function of the number of banks (i.e., the intensity of competition); the 
authors show that when competition is already intense, good borrowers 
will benefit from further entry. Conversely, when the number of banks is 
small, entry makes it less likely that a good borrower will obtain a loan. 
Since entry always reduces equilibrium accuracy, type II errors become 
more likely as competition becomes more intense. The authors show that
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an increase in the intensity of competition has a non-linear effect: If the 
number of banks is already high, more entry is good (in the sense that 
gross surplus -  leaving aside the costs of investing in the screening tech­
nology -  increases). If the number of banks is low, entry is not beneficial. 
The surplus (“welfare”) effects are the main concern of this review, so 
will the investment in accuracy and the resulting allocation of capital be 
efficient overall? Once the costs of investment are taken into account, 
the authors show that -  in line with an earlier observation -  investment 
in the screening technology is socially excessive under free entry. The 
authors derive from this result the remarkable policy implication that it 
may be socially beneficial to limit banks’ investment in accuracy. What 
is the bottom line with respect to competition (entry)? In line with 
the preceding comments, the effect is not clear-cut and depends on how 
competitive the market already is. One possible outcome that contra­
dicts much of the received wisdom in the literature is that further entry 
may be surplus-increasing precisely because it leads to a reduction in 
socially excessive screening investment.
Leaving behind the auction setup, in Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor 
(1986) competition is not modeled explicitly. An exogenous interest rate 
term parameterizes the intensity of competition. Lending occurs at two 
dates and the authors’ main interest is in the reusability of information 
and how the degree of reusability affects screening incentives ex ante. For 
information to be reusable, there needs to be some positive correlation 
between borrower type at the two dates (and the bank also needs to be 
still solvent at the second date). It is assumed that there is no addi­
tional screening at the second date (and that no new borrowers enter the 
market). At the first date, the bank has access to a costly screening tech­
nology which determines the mix of applicants in terms of good and bad 
projects. The technology is not modeled explicitly, rather the proportion 
of applicants that repay is assumed to have a distribution that is affected 
by the screening intensity. Note that this model -  in contrast to most 
other papers reviewed in the present section -  features aggregate uncer­
tainty in the sense that the bank may go bankrupt; screening, by changing 
the composition of the applicant pool, merely changes the likelihood of 
this happening. The intensity of screening is shown to be greater the 
greater the correlation between type at the first and second dates (which 
increases the durability and therefore the reusability of information). 
Macroeconomic fluctuations could be thought to be one factor leading to 
less durable information. Higher lending (and lower deposit) rates also 
increase the intensity of screening. In so far as more intense competition
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leads to lower interest rates, competition is then bad for screening incen­
tives. Because project characteristics and loan demand are not modeled 
in detail, it is not clear whether more intense competition will reduce the 
surplus from investing, but there is certainly a presumption that it will. 
At any rate, a lower screening intensity translates directly into a higher 
likelihood of bank failure. The increased (expected) cost of bank failures 
would then need to be taken into account in any assessment of the effects 
of more intense competition.
Gehrig (1998a) endogenizes the accuracy of banks’ creditworthiness 
tests explicitly. In his model, projects have a binary cashflow distribution 
(successful -  unsuccessful). There are two types of projects, good and 
bad, which differ in their success probabilities. Conditional upon success, 
cashflows are drawn from a uniform distribution. Each entrepreneur is 
assumed to know his conditional-upon-success cashflow, but the bank 
cannot learn anything about it. Whether entrepreneurs know their type, 
however, turns out to be irrelevant. Bad projects’ success probability 
is by assumption so low that no bad project should be financed. Good 
projects are socially valuable if their cashflow exceeds a certain thresh­
old. The opportunity cost of capital is captured by the banks’ (constant 
and exogenous) deposit rate. Despite the absence of bankruptcy, search 
(or application) costs, collateral, or equity and despite limited liability, 
demand is elastic because entrepreneurs by assumption only wish to bor­
row if their conditional-upon-success cashflow is strictly positive. Thus, 
if a project is successful, the entrepreneur is willing and able to repay the 
bank in full. An unsuccessful project does not repay anything. Entre­
preneurs’ effort does not matter and as the interest rate increases, it is 
the lower quality projects that drop out first (where quality is measured 
by the conditional-upon-success cashflow; the success probabilities being 
homogeneous within each group). The screening technology available to 
banks takes the following form: By investing resources, a bank can ob­
tain increasingly accurate (but imperfectly informative) binary signals 
about the true type of an applicant. If the bank does not screen, signals 
correspond to population proportions (assumed to be common knowl­
edge). One important technical assumption in Gehrig’s model (which 
drives one of his results) is that the total shares of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
signals correspond to population proportions regardless of screening ef­
fort: This allows the determination of both type I and type II errors 
with a single choice variable. Gehrig uses a general function and does 
not impose a specific functional form. He considers a monopoly and 
a symmetric duopoly (albeit in one sub-case allowing for a first-mover
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advantage of the incumbent); each entrepreneur is assumed to borrow 
from a single bank only. The structure of the game is not such that 
banks first decide on their screening effort and then compete in prices: 
The two choice variables are chosen simultaneously. With the implicit 
assumption of a continuum of borrowers, there is no aggregate uncer­
tainty in this model. Gehrig obtains the following results: He derives 
a condition under which a monopolist’s screening effort is increasing in 
the loan rate and notes that this depends on the relative value of iden­
tifying a good project and avoiding a bad project (this is driven by the 
assumption with respect to the screening technology mentioned above). 
Gehrig considers two duopoly settings: In the first, Gehrig assumes that 
in a first round, a monopolist has the market to himself, that borrowers 
deciding to borrow from the monopolist are not allowed to switch to the 
entrant in round two, and that the entrant cannot credibly commit to 
a ‘low’ interest rate. Gehrig shows that with the right assumptions on 
parameters, one may obtain equilibria where the incumbent continues 
to charge the monopoly rate and continues to screen at the monopoly 
intensity even after entry. In that case the entrant charges a rate higher 
than the monopoly rate and screens at a lower intensity than the mo­
nopolist. This is because the entrant suffers from an adversely selected 
pool. Gehrig does not discuss what happens when these restrictions with 
respect to the parameters do not hold. When considering simultaneous 
competition between two symmetric duopolists, Gehrig finds that this 
game has no equilibrium in pure strategies [for the reasons analyzed by 
Broecker (1990)]. However, once again under certain assumptions about 
parameters, Gehrig shows that there may be a symmetric pure-strategy 
equilibrium with zero screening effort in which the competitive interest 
rate may be higher than the monopoly rate. Given the sensitivity to 
parameter values which do not have clear interpretations, generally valid 
conclusions with respect to the allocation of capital and the impact of 
competition (switching from monopoly to duopoly) thereon are hard to 
draw. [Gehrig (1998b) extends the basic framework by allowing success­
ful applicants to renegotiate their offers by playing off one bank against 
the other and likewise finds ambiguous effects of competition on surplus.]
Schnitzer (1999a) also endogenizes the bank’s screening decision. There 
are two types of projects, good and bad, with deterministic cashflows. 
In the first part of the paper, only the impact of market structure on 
screening decisions is considered. In the second, rather brief, part, mar­
ket structure is allowed to have an impact on surplus via the entrepre­
neur’s incentives to invest (non-verifiable, non-contractible) effort into
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the project (this activity is called ‘restructuring’ and translates either 
into a higher probability of success or a higher conditional-upon-success 
cashflow). The basic link is via interest payments: If a monopolist can 
expropriate all the surplus, it is not worthwhile for the entrepreneur to 
exert effort even when that is efficient. As for the screening part, banks 
have access to a technology that allows them to find out the true type 
of a project (with certainty) by paying a fixed fee. Schnitzer considers 
a monopoly and a duopoly. In the duopoly case, competition is a la 
Bertrand. Two sub-cases are analyzed: In the first, the results of bank’s 
creditworthiness tests become public (with the result that neither bank 
screens); in the second, the test results are private information. The 
model has a screening stage followed by a price-competition stage (at 
which the competitor’s screening effort is assumed known). The first 
result follows directly from the assumption that it is efficient to screen 
projects and states that a monopolist has optimal screening incentives 
so that the resulting capital allocation is efficient. If test results cannot 
be kept secret neither bank screens and the resulting capital allocation 
is inefficient (because a bad project would be funded). When one bank 
is informed and the other bank is not, there is no pure strategy equi­
librium, but Schnitzer characterizes the properties of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium (including bidding functions and expected payoffs). Building 
on this result, the outcome when test results are private information is 
described. In that case there are two pure strategy equilibria with one 
bank screening and the other not screening (but nevertheless bidding) 
and one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. In each of these equilib­
ria the capital allocation is not as efficient as under monopoly (because 
the screening cost is incurred more than once or because a bad project 
would be funded). Schnitzer claims that even under competition, a bank 
can have optimal screening incentives -  but this is only the case if with 
probability one the rival does not screen. Two different technologies as­
sumed to be available for ‘restructuring’ by the entrepreneur are consid­
ered: Schnitzer points out that when the effect of the interest rate on the 
entrepreneur’s effort level matters, the presumption in favor of monopoly 
will, in general, no longer hold. Various settings are outlined in which 
one of the three market structures considered here (monopoly, duopoly 
with private test results, duopoly with public test results) could be said 
to dominate. This depends on the parameters in a straightforward way: 
If ‘restructuring’ by the entrepreneur doesn’t matter (much), monopoly 
is best. If it is important that the entrepreneur be given incentives to ‘re­
structure’ and screening is costless, then duopoly with private test results
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is best. Information spillovers plus competition are best when screening 
is costly. It is interesting how adding the second stage (‘restructuring’) 
and moving away from an entirely passive borrower makes an important 
difference here. Competition in the first (‘screening only’) part of this 
model really cannot have much of a positive effect on the total surplus 
generated. (In particular, since screening leads to accurate information 
and a monopolist has optimum screening incentives there is no benefit 
from giving a project a second chance.) This may be different when the 
intensity of competition influences surplus via the effect of the interest 
rate on the entrepreneur’s effort incentives.
In a companion paper, Schnitzer (1999b) studies bank competition 
in a horizontal differentiation model. The applicants are distributed uni­
formly along a Salop (1979) circle and banks are assumed to be located 
equidistantly. The market is assumed to be covered and transportation 
costs are proportional to distance. (Note, though, that bad types are as­
sumed not to care about either interest rate or location.) As in Schnitzer 
(1999a), banks initially face an adverse selection problem which they 
can counter by screening applicants (testing their creditworthiness). The 
testing technology again is such that by paying a fixed fee a bank leams 
the type of all applicants with accuracy. A crucial assumption is that 
it is not actually necessary to screen a borrower; random lending is fea­
sible. Schnitzer also assumes that there is no free-riding on rivals’ test 
results (either through direct information spillovers or by borrowers go­
ing around with evidence of the offers they have received). It is shown 
that a monopolist bank has optimal incentives to invest in screening. 
With more than one bank, banks’ profits are decreasing in the number 
of banks that choose to screen, so the more banks are informed, the 
greater the incentive for an uninformed bank to screen as well. For low 
enough screening costs, the unique equilibrium is for all banks to become 
informed. For large enough screening costs, there are two pure strat­
egy equilbria in which all banks either screen or do not screen. The ‘no 
screening’ equilibrium may generate higher surplus than the equilibrium 
with screening. The tradeoff in terms of surplus is between the inefficient 
multiplication of screening and the loss from bad projects being financed. 
Schnitzer shows that even without exogenous costs of entry the number 
of entrants is bounded. While there is no explicit fixed cost of entry (as is 
traditionally assumed in this kind of horizontal differentiation setup) this 
model features an implicit cost of entry: The bank either has to pay to 
screen its applicants or accept a certain amount of loan losses. Schnitzer 
shows that the number of banks under free entry may exceed the socially
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optimal number of banks: This will be the case whenever screening costs 
are low enough. In an extension, the effect of the interest rate on the 
incentives of the borrower to exert effort is sketched.
The banks in Dell’Ariccia (2000) can screen applicants to filter out 
bad projects. The applicant pool consists of a fraction of new projects 
with characteristics unknown to all banks and a complementary fraction 
of ‘old’ applicants whose type is known to one bank. Banks will try to 
hang on to their (known) good borrowers, but get rid of the bad types. 
(Bad types do not go bankrupt and disappear, but rather re-enter the 
market, worsening the pool of applicants.) The proportions of good and 
bad projects within each group, however, are the same. Screening is as­
sumed to be costless to the bank and perfectly accurate, but it imposes 
a disutility on the entrepreneurs. In the initial version of the model (ex­
tended later in the paper), the interest rate is exogenously given and 
banks compete on screening requirements! Crucially, the average cred­
itworthiness is assumed to be sufficiently good for random lending (i.e., 
without screening) to be profitable. Dell’Ariccia shows that for a high 
enough proportion of new applicants, there may be equilibria (in either 
pure or mixed strategies) in which banks do not screen. This reduces 
surplus from investing in that bad projects would be financed. Compe­
tition in this setup is undesirable because an increase in the number of 
banks makes it less likely that banks will screen their applicants in equi­
librium. However, in an extension Dell’Ariccia shows that this finding is 
non-robust to how competition is modeled.
The fundamental point of Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) is to 
argue that -  contrary to what much of the theoretical and empirical 
literature is claimed to suggest -  there is a downside to strong creditor- 
protection laws enabling the extensive use of collateral. The authors’ 
argument is of some relevance for the matter of bank competition, even 
if the optimum intensity of competition is hardly their main concern. 
Manove and co-authors point out that a bank that is fully protected by 
collateral has less incentive to accurately assess project quality -  if the 
project fails, the bank does not stand to lose anything:
‘Collateral and screening are substitutes from the point of view of 
banks.’ (p. 728)
However, since project failure is costly to society, banks’ screening in­
creases surplus (leaving aside the costs of screening). In this view, weaker 
protection for lenders may act as a commitment device that forces banks 
to screen since they cannot rely on collateral to protect themselves against 
default. Weaker legal protection for financiers may then lead to less credit
49
being granted, but the reduction in lending is actually efficient! In the 
authors’ model, screening is non-contractible and can thus only be ‘sold’ 
packaged together with a loan. If the applicant posts full collateral, the 
bank has no incentive to screen and identify project type. The screen­
ing cost is assumed to be small enough for screening to be efficient and 
the question arizes why contracts would not emerge endogenously that 
give banks an incentive to screen -  by specifying a low enough collateral 
value -  and thus give rise to an efficient equilibrium. That happy outcome 
would indeed obtain if the information problem were simply one of entre­
preneurs not knowing the type (good or bad) of the project which they 
are assumed to choose at random. However, things are more complicated 
when -  as the authors assume -  there is an element of adverse selection 
with the applicants falling into one of two categories unobservable to the 
bank. Applicants know their category with high quality applicants hav­
ing a greater likelihood of choosing a good project (although applicants 
do not know the type of the project they have chosen). In this scenario, 
high quality applicants have an incentive to signal their type by posting 
full collateral. The reason is the following: In any (competitive) equilib­
rium in which the banks make zero profits, those borrowers that obtain 
a loan will have to cover the costs of screening, including the cost of 
screening those projects that are rejected. Since high quality applicants 
have a lower likelihood of choosing a bad project and being rejected, the 
pro-rated screening costs are lower for them in the separating equilib­
rium. Given certain assumptions with respect to the parameters, the 
low quality entrepreneurs have no incentive to mimic the other group 
and post full collateral, because their likelihood of losing the collateral 
is (much) higher. However, the separating equilibrium is socially inef­
ficient, because the group of high-quality entrepreneurs still chooses a 
sufficient number of bad projects such that screening that group would 
be efficient. In the light of the preceding comments, however, that does 
not happen because the banks are fully protected against any loss. One 
possible policy implication is that weaker protection for creditors might 
lead to a more efficient outcome. (Having said that, the authors do 
acknowledge that collateral also serves to reduce moral hazard which, 
however, this model explicitly does not feature.) Competition enters the 
picture in that a monopoly would lead to efficiency. The reason for this 
is straightforward: A monopolist manages to appropriate the entire sur­
plus generated by a project and so has the right incentives to not use 
collateral and instead screen every project, thereby avoiding inefficient 
financing decisions. The main advantage of restricting competition in
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this model, therefore, is that market power increases the incentives to 
screen.
2.4.3 M onitoring
In Caminal and Matutes (2002) the moral hazard problem is double­
sided: The bank cannot commit to the efficient level of monitoring (and 
there is nothing that can be done about it other than to provide the 
bank with different degrees of market power); moral hazard on the part 
of the entrepreneur arizes via the choice of production technology. The 
entrepreneur’s production technology is modeled in a richer fashion than 
in most of the literature: The entrepreneur picks both scale and the type 
of project, where the type of project determines the success probabil­
ity and the conditional-upon-success cashflow (which is also influenced 
by the decreasing-returns-to-scale production function). Specific func­
tional forms are assumed and justified later in the paper. The greater 
the success probability chosen by the entrepreneur the greater the ex­
pected return (but the lower the conditional-upon-success cashflow). The 
efficient choice of success probability is therefore one and the efficient 
scale of investment is to set the marginal productivity of capital equal 
to the bank’s refinancing interest rate. The assumptions with respect to 
the production technology also allow for the reasonably straightforward 
parameterization of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem. With a 
certain probability, increasing in the bank’s effort decision (with an as­
sumed quadratic cost function), the bank can observe the choice made by 
the entrepreneur. Effort decision and whether the monitoring has been 
successful are not known to third parties. In particular, the fact that 
the entrepreneur’s choice observed by the bank is not verifiable means 
that the gain from monitoring is not that this would allow for contracts 
to be written contingent on the entrepreneur’s choice. Rather, the as­
sumption is that the success or otherwise of a bank’s monitoring effort 
is known to both borrower and bank before project type and the scale 
of the investment are chosen. In other words, if the bank’s monitoring 
is successful, the entrepreneur and the bank enter negotiations and will 
typically agree on a larger (more efficient) investment scale. The bank 
is assumed to be able to find out whether the project has failed or not 
(regardless of whether it has learnt the entrepreneur’s choice), but is as­
sumed not to find out about the cashflow. This is a somewhat tricky 
combination, but the main idea behind it is simply to justify the use 
of standard debt contracts. Given the informational assumptions, the 
optimal contract is sketched out. That contract specifies a default in­
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vestment level and interest rate and becomes effective if monitoring has 
not been successful. If monitoring was successful, the two parties start 
bargaining and split any gains relative to the default contract equally. 
The bank will set monitoring effort in anticipation of these outcomes; 
it is shown that the bank’s monitoring effort increases with the interest 
rate specified in the default contract. Competition between banks enters 
the picture in that prior to the monitoring, negotiation and investment 
stages of the model, banks compete for borrowers. The market struc­
tures compared are pure price competition under 1. monopoly and 2. 
with two or more banks as well as 3. price-competition with horizontal 
differentiation between a number of banks on a Salop circle. It is shown 
that no market structure unambiguously dominates the others in terms 
of the surplus generated. The basic tradeoff is the following: The more 
market power banks have, the stronger their incentives to monitor and 
the more banks monitor, the fewer projects will go ‘undetected’ and suffer 
from inefficiently low investment. However, given that an entrepreneur 
is not detected, the shortfall of investment relative to the efficient level 
will be more severe the more market power banks have. Depending on 
the relative importance of these effects, it may be socially optimal for 
banks to have a degree of market power. In his survey, Vives (2001b) has 
succinctly summarized the tradeoff as follows:
‘More market power for the bank diminishes the moral-hazard prob­
lem faced by the bank, but aggravates it for the entrepreneur.’ (p. 539)
2.4.4 Liquidity assistance
The mechanism through which banks influence the allocation of capital 
in Petersen and Rajan (1995) is similar to ‘liquidity assistance’ (in both 
cases banks could be thought to cross-subsidize intertemporally), so the 
present sub-section seemed the most appropriate place for a discussion 
of this contribution. Competition is not modeled explicitly, it is para­
meterized by the interest-rate markup that the bank can demand. The 
model features
good and bad applicants as well as a moral hazard problem on the part 
of the borrowers, but banks cannot screen or monitor. Rather, banks’ 
role is to intertemporally shift returns from lending to the later phase 
of the lending relationship. This allows banks to charge low initial in­
terest rates which, in turn, makes it more likely that the moral hazard 
problem will be defused. A crucial assumption, therefore, is that firms 
can invest at two dates. Importantly, the bad projects drop out after the 
first period (they fail and return nothing). In terms of the notational
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conventions used in the paper, banks can thus costlessly detect firms’ 
types at date 1, but have no means of telling them apart at date 0. The 
bank is constrained in the interest rate that it can charge between date 0 
and date 1 because of the moral hazard problem on the part of the good 
entrepreneurs who, if charged too high an interest rate, have an incentive 
to shift risk and pick a risky negative NPV technology rather than a safe 
one. The more market power the bank has, the more easily it can extract 
rents from surviving entrepreneurs (by way of ‘implicit equity’) between 
dates 1 and 2 (when, by assumption, entrepreneurs do not have the op­
tion of choosing a risky project; the existence of a moral hazard problem 
at date 1 would limit the ability of the bank to charge a high interest rate 
and complicate the message of the model somewhat) allowing it to charge 
lower rates in the first period and still (at least) break even. Where is 
the social gain from that? The authors don’t state this explicitly, but 
if the proportion of good entrepreneurs were too low, the market would 
shut down. What the model shows is that the more market power banks 
have, the lower the proportion of good projects required for lending to be 
viable. For this reason, more intense competition impairs the allocation 
of capital. (That banks learn the type of their borrowers is irrelevant; 
bad types cannot be filtered out ex ante.) The article has been influen­
tial and derives much of its recognition from its empirical part (briefly 
discussed in section 2.6) which would appear to provide support for the 
model’s assertions.
The banks in Ding (2000) influence the allocation of capital via two 
channels: They screen borrowers and they (potentially) assist borrow­
ers with a cash injection in distress states. It is quite clear that Ding 
is primarily interested in the liquidity assistance mechanism (which he 
plausibly equates with relationship lending), so I shall concentrate my 
comments on this point, too. [As for screening, bank competition is once 
more modeled as a first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auction in which 
banks costlessly receive continuous signals; i.i.d. conditional on type. 
There are two types of borrower and signals are assumed to satisfy the 
monotone likelihood ratio property. However, the surplus (“welfare”) 
effects of screening are not investigated in detail in the article. That 
analysis would involve an assessment of aggregate type I/II errors under 
different competition regimes.] Ding takes as the starting point the ob­
servation that much lending happens on the basis of implicit contracts 
between banks and borrowers and that a desire to build or keep a good 
reputation may be one reason why a bank might honor such implicit, 
non-enforceable obligations even when this is costly to the bank. Ding’s
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main question is
‘how credit market competition changes the effectiveness of bank rep­
utation in enforcing a bank’s commitment.’ (p. 782)
The setup here is truly dynamic and modeled as an infinitely repeated 
stage game (with three dates /  two investment sub-periods). Banks are 
infinitely lived, entrepreneurs come and go. This latter assumption en­
sures that the commitment problem is one-sided: There is no question of 
the entrepreneur undertaking not to borrow from other banks. However, 
whether the bank will honor an implicit commitment to provide rescue 
funds to a distressed entrepreneur at an intermediate stage of the project 
is at the heart of the paper. Such a cash infusion is assumed to be socially 
efficient (though it leads the bank to incur a loss); such liquidity assis­
tance clearly is a source of ‘surplus from investing’. Entrepreneurs prefer 
to borrow from a relationship lender; i.e., a bank that promises to rescue 
them should their project go into distress. Should a bank ever break this 
promise, no entrepreneur will borrow from that bank on a commitment 
basis again. The gain to the bank of being known as trustworthy is cap­
tured as such a bank being able to charge a higher interest rate (having 
greater market power) than an arm’s length lender. Whether relationship 
lending (with commitment) is viable depends on the difference in market 
power between the two types of lender; i.e. the size of the interest rate 
differential. This is of crucial importance for the results of the model, as 
this opens the possibility of relationship lending becoming ‘more viable’ 
as competition becomes more intense because more intense competition 
might reduce the market power of an arm’s length lender (the interest 
rate that an arm’s length lender can charge) by even more than that of a 
relationship lender. An increase in the number of banks (higher intensity 
of competition) affects both the arm’s length and the relationship mar­
ket with the market power (and thus the interest rate) of each type of 
bank endogenously determined as the outcome of competition between 
banks (modeled as an auction). In the one-shot symmetric equilibrium, 
no distressed borrower is assisted. In the infinitely repeated game, three 
regimes can be distinguished: For very good signals, relationship loans 
are offered, for very bad signals credit is refused, and for intermediate sig­
nals arm’s length loans are proposed. Interestingly, relationship lending 
does not become monotonically more difficult to sustain as the number of 
competitors increases (competition becomes more intense). While in the 
limit (for very large n) relationship lending is only viable when there is no 
discounting, there is no relationship lending with monopoly either: The 
monopolist is already in a position where she can extract the borrower’s
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entire surplus and has no incentive to help in a distress state. Even two 
banks may not be enough to sustain relationship lending. If competition 
becomes more intense in the arm’s length market, the relative return to 
providing loans with a rescue commitment increases, leading relationship 
lenders to lower the threshold of the signal at which they are prepared 
to offer relationship loans. (Ding also considers competition from bond 
markets, but in line with my earlier comments I omit that passage.) The 
bottom line as far as my topic is concerned is that 1. liquidity assistance 
in distress states may be an important source of surplus (“welfare”) gains 
(an uncontroversial assertion) and that 2. relationship lending may not 
become monotonically harder to sustain as competition becomes more 
intense. Thus surplus (“welfare”) gains from liquidity assistance may be 
maximized for intermediate degrees of competition. This is in contrast 
with the result in Petersen and Rajan (1995) where less market power 
for the lenders always requires a better composition of the applicant pool 
for relationship lending (indeed, any lending) to be viable. That com­
mitment should become monotonically harder to sustain as competition 
becomes more intense is a theme beyond the banking literature [see the 
discussion in Petersen and Rajan (1995)], making Ding’s somewhat coun­
terintuitive result especially interesting.
I next review two contributions that should arguably be considered 
‘related contributions’, because they do not feature liquidity assistance 
and do not focus on surplus. However, because of the similarities with 
Ding (2000) it seemed more appropriate to discuss them here.
Boot and Thakor (2000) ask how more intense competition will affect 
relationship lending. They distinguish between more intense competi­
tion between banks and more intense competition between banks and 
the bond market and argue that the effects on relationship lending are 
different. (In line with my earlier remarks, I concentrate on inter-bank 
competition.) As in Ding (2000), banks can offer either relationship 
loans or arm’s length finance. A relationship loan in Boot and Thakor 
(2000) does not involve a promise to help with liquidity problems, but 
(following an investment by the bank in what the authors call ‘sector 
specialization’) is simply worth more to the borrower than a transaction 
loan (this is captured as an increase in the borrower’s cashflow in that 
the success probability of the project is higher when it is funded with a 
relationship loan). A borrower’s valuation of the benefit of a relationship 
loan over and above that of a transaction loan is assumed to decrease 
in the borrower’s quality (creditworthiness). More intense competition 
leads to lower investment in ‘sector specialization’ because of lower mar­
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gins. However, as in Ding (2000) competition reduces the return from 
both relationship and transaction lending. In contrast to much of the 
literature, banks’ lending capacity in this model is fixed and the asym­
metric effect of more intense competition leads banks to dedicate a larger 
share of their funds to relationship lending rather than transaction lend­
ing (even though the value of a relationship loan to borrowers is lower 
than in the absence of competition). The effects on surplus (“welfare”) 
-  which is not considered explicitly -  differ according to a borrower’s 
creditworthiness. The higher the quality of a borrower, the more the 
borrower will benefit from more intense competition. Borrowers of suf­
ficiently low quality may be made worse off. The impact on the surplus 
from investing in this model does not derive from screening (there are 
no negative NPV projects) or monitoring, but rather from relationship 
lending increasing the size of the pie that can be shared between bank 
and borrower. The results are partly driven by a refinancing side that 
is a little more elaborate than in most other models in that relationship 
loans are costlier to refinance than transaction loans (which are costlier 
to refinance for very high-quality projects than direct borrowing on the 
capital market would be). The intensity of competition is parameterized 
by the number of banks (which determines the likelihood that an appli­
cant will receive more than one offer) which in turn is driven by a fixed 
cost of entry.
Yafeh and Yosha (2001) also contribute to the literature that ex­
amines how relationship banking specifically is affected by more intense 
competition. They tackle the common presumption that market power 
is required in order for relationship lending to be feasible:
‘Without market power, banks would not be able to extract rents 
generated by investment in ties with firms, and consequently there would 
be little or no relationship banking.’ (p. 66)
Yafeh and Yosha argue that if one takes into account interactions 
between the markets for relationship lending and arm’s length finance, 
respectively,
‘under certain circumstances, greater potential competition in the 
arm’s length market may actually induce more relationship lending, not 
less.’ (p. 66)
Investment in relationship lending is parameterized as the fraction 
of entrepreneurs that could potentially obtain a relationship loan. This 
share is a choice variable for the bank. The basic tradeoff is between two 
effects: On the one hand, more intense competition in the arm’s length 
market reduces profitability in that market and induces banks active in
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both market segments to invest relatively more into relationship lending. 
On the other hand, more intense competition in the arm’s length market 
(which in the basic setup is modeled as an increase in the number of 
Cournot competitors) leads to lower interest rates on that type of loan. 
A bank offering relationship loans (which in this model do not have any 
explicit dynamic element and could be thought to be simply loans of 
higher quality) then needs to adjust the terms on such loans by leav­
ing more of the surplus to the borrowers which makes relationship loans 
less profitable and thus makes the bank invest less in relationship lend­
ing. For high degrees of competitive intensity (large numbers of Cournot 
competitors in the arm’s length market), the latter effect dominates and 
additional competitors lead the bank to invest less in relationship lending. 
As far as surplus is concerned, the authors show that investment in rela­
tionship loans would actually be excessive, although surplus (“welfare”) 
is not the primary variable of interest. In an extension, the authors also 
investigate entry deterrence in the arm’s length market in the context of 
this model.
2.4.5 Bank com petition  in general equilibrium  m od­
els
Most models of bank competition are partial-equilibrium models. How­
ever, a strand of work embeds bank competition in an overlapping- 
generations (OLG) framework a la Diamond (1965). It seemed sensi­
ble to group together these general equilibrium models regardless of the 
channel through which banks affect surplus.
Screening intensity is arguably endogenous (if not modeled in great 
detail) in Cetorelli (1997) who considers the polar cases of monopoly and 
perfect competition; the effect of competition on surplus is captured via 
its impact on capital accumulation (steady state level of per-capita capi­
tal). Banks can assess an applicant’s type with accuracy at a cost that is 
linear in the amount of capital intermediated. In terms of the economics, 
the key drawback to competition is that banks are assumed to be able to 
free-ride on a competitor’s information which destroys ex ante incentives 
for assessing creditworthiness and leads banks to lend to all applicant 
types. As Cetorelli himself points out, the assumption that the infor­
mation be available to competitors for free is not critical; any cost lower 
than the cost of the bank that first screens the applicant would allow the 
results to go through. However, the assumption of monopoly is critical; 
i.e., this is not a model about different degrees of market power. Even a 
second bank is enough to destroy screening incentives. The monopolist
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bank wastes less capital lending to bad types, but lowers capital accu­
mulation through the exercise of market power in the deposit market: It 
offers a lower interest rate to savers than a competitive banking system 
and mobilizes less capital for intermediation. Monopoly can lead to a 
higher per-capita steady state level of capital only if the proportion of 
good types is relatively low and the value of screening correspondingly 
high. Whether monopoly actually is better in this sense than perfect 
competition depends on the parameters (cost of screening, interest elas­
ticity of savings, interest elasticity of loan demand). Cetorelli argues 
that developing economies’ characteristics imply that monopoly may be 
beneficial there.
The same tradeoff is studied by Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) in a 
different framework that models competition as Cournot competition 
(rather than either monopoly or perfect competition) and so parame­
terizes the intensity of competition more finely. Surplus in that model 
may be maximized by intermediate degrees of competition.
Guzman (2000b) also studies the effects of banking market structure 
on growth in an OLG framework. One source of surplus losses from 
monopoly in his model is that monopoly makes it more likely that credit 
will be rationed. If the conditions give rise to credit rationing, monopoly 
will exacerbate it. Second, a monopoly charges a higher lending interest 
rate which requires more ex post auditing on the part of the bank with an 
associated loss of resources. Screening does not play a role here in that all 
projects are identical ex ante. The contribution by Smith (1998) is also 
built around an OLG model, albeit augmented by stochastic shocks [fol­
lowing Bernanke and Gertler (1989)]. Banks do not screen (all projects 
are ex ante identical), but rather act as ex post ‘cashflow-verifiers’ as 
in Diamond (1984) and arize endogenously. Imperfect competition (here 
driven by switching costs) is unambiguously bad in that it drives up 
the lending interest rate, reduces output and amplifies business-cycle 
fluctuations. Guzman (2000b) and Smith (1998) are the only papers I 
am aware of which model bank competition in a costly-state-verification 
setup. ‘Quality of information’ is not really endogenous here and the 
main effect of competition in these papers operates via allocative effi­
ciency.
In Paal, Smith and Wang (2005), banks act as liquidity providers 
along the lines of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in an endogenous growth 
model with money and overlapping generations of consumers. The au­
thors compare a competitive and a monopolistic banking system. At 
low interest rates, depositors can self-insure against liquidity shocks at
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low cost (the opportunity cost of holding cash is small). The higher the 
interest rate, the more market power a monopolist has. A monopolist 
bank can hold lower cash reserves and invest a larger portion of assets in 
productive real projects. This would suggest that surplus is greater un­
der monopoly. However, a monopolist bank will also hold down the rate 
of return paid to depositors, leading to a lower savings rate, less capital 
accumulation, and lower rates of growth. The net effect is determined by 
the nominal rate of return and depositors’ preferences. Even after taking 
into account that risk-sharing is always at least as good under competi­
tion as under monopoly, neither market structure unambiguously domi­
nates. In particular, for low enough nominal interest rates, both systems 
create an equivalent amount of surplus.
2.4.6 R elated  literature
I consider an article as a ‘related contribution’ if it has only some fea­
ture^) of interest and is thus somewhat peripheral to the main topic of 
this review. For example, a paper might be included if it models bank 
competition in an interesting way, but with a view to some outcome of 
interest other than the surplus from investing.
Marquez (2002) considers a pure adverse selection problem, albeit one 
where the borrowers do not (initially) know their own types. Learning 
about borrower types by banks in a first stage is automatic and accurate; 
the main interest of the paper is in investigating the impact of the extent 
of information asymmetry in the second-stage market. The information 
asymmetry is parameterized by the exogenous fraction of borrowers that 
look for a new lender for reasons other than them being of poor quality. 
More intense competition (which in this model cannot merely be equated 
with an increase in the number of banks, but rather requires looking at 
a number of parameters) has ambiguous effects on interest rates.
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) also consider a pure adverse selec­
tion problem. Their model features a banking duopoly where one bank 
has an informational advantage. The idea is that a fraction of the appli­
cants has borrowed from one of the lenders before and its type is therefore 
assumed known to the lender [i.e., the bank is essentially passive; there 
is no screening or monitoring technology, the lender identifies type as a 
costless by-product of lending as in, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1995)]. It 
is of critical importance to the results that the borrowers have no way 
of credibly conveying this information to the uninformed lender (i.e., no 
free-riding on the informed bank’s information). The uninformed bank is 
assumed to have a funding advantage -  this implies that there is no clear
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benchmark interest rate, making statements about surplus problematic. 
The authors are anyway not concerned with surplus, their main interest 
is in investigating the impact of changes in the severity of the adverse 
selection problem and in how the impact of changes in the uninformed 
bank’s cost of funds differs across markets with different degrees of infor­
mational asymmetry. The authors argue that the uninformed bank’s cost 
of funds parameterizes the intensity of competition and that competition 
that is in that sense more intense leads to a ‘flight to captivity’ of the 
informed bank; i.e., more lending to informationally captive borrowers.
Almazan (2002) embeds two banks competing on a Salop circle into 
the model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Just as in Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997), there is a double moral-hazard problem: Borrowers have 
the choice between two actions (one ‘good’, but not providing them with 
private benefits; the other ‘bad’, but giving them private benefits). The 
only way for them to commit to take the good action is for them to 
be monitored by a bank which reduces the private benefit from making 
the ‘bad’ choice. The bank in turn has the same problem: Monitoring 
imposes private costs on the bank and if the bank does not inject some of 
its own capital, a promise to monitor the borrower is not credible. Bank 
capital is assumed exogenous (see p. 97 of the paper for a defense of 
that assumption). A bank’s cost of monitoring is linear in its distance 
from the borrower; that distance is interpreted as the bank’s ‘expertise’ 
(location corresponds to specialization; the location choice is endogenized 
later in the paper).
‘The major question addressed with this framework is the following: 
How do specific forms of deregulation affect banks, and how do these 
effects differ across high-capital and low-capital banks? The different 
forms of deregulation I consider here are those that result in an increase 
in capital requirements, in an increase in interest rates, and in the lifting 
of geographic restrictions on the operations of banks.’ (p. 88)
The last of these measures in particular could be seen as parameter­
izing the intensity of competition. However, this paper only touches on 
bank competition and capital allocation since the major source of sur­
plus loss considered results from an entrepreneur borrowing from bank A 
when fewer resources would be required for the borrower to borrow from 
bank B. There is no heterogeneity in projects: Banks do not screen; as 
far as monitoring is considered, monitoring intensity is the same across 
borrowers. In the conclusion Almazan notes that in addition to endoge- 
nizing bank capital, allowing for agency conflicts within the bank would 
be a worthwhile extension. This points to the nature of the moral-hazard
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problem on the part of the bank in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and, by 
extension, Almazan (2002): the bank manager, implicitly, is claimant to 
100% of the bank’s profits, so moral hazard is not of the standard ‘effort 
incentive’ kind.
Another model in which banks reduce the ability to extract private 
benefits is Almazan and Suarez (2003). They introduce separation of 
ownership and control on the part of the borrowing firm and investigate 
the optimal incentive contract for management. One aim of their article 
is to provide a theoretical rationale for the positive stock price reaction to 
the announcement of bank loan agreements that is empirically observed.
Manove and Padilla (1999) deal with capital allocation, but the inten­
sity of competition plays no part in their analysis. Rather, they consider 
the case of overconfident loan applicants:
‘It is widely thought that market considerations lead banks to be 
overly conservative and cautious, discouraging the rational buyer more 
than is desirable. Here, we demonstrate that in markets with optimistic 
entrepreneurs, the opposite may well be true.’ (p. 326)
This article is less relevant from my point of view for two additional 
reasons: First, investment scale (which I would like to abstract from) 
plays an important role in the model setup and, second, the authors 
consider the role of collateral (which I likewise do not wish to stress). 
Just as in Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001), collateral makes banks 
less interested in the intrinsic quality of the underlying investment project 
(and might therefore be thought to reduce incentives for screening and 
monitoring).
Hyytinen (2003) studies ex ante screening by banks, though he neither 
investigates endogenous screening accuracy nor changes in the intensity 
of competition and his model does not aim at generating clear-cut impli­
cations as to the allocation of capital. Hyytinen focuses on the effects of 
(1) test results becoming more correlated across banks (actually, it is the 
two polar cases of no correlation and of perfect correlation that are inves­
tigated) and (2) an exogenous increase in the accuracy of the screening 
technology. The basic setup is the horizontal differentiation model of Sa­
lop (1979); banks are assumed not to be able to discriminate by location. 
All banks are assumed to have access to the same imperfectly informative 
screening technology where accuracy is parameterized as the probability 
that an assessment is correct, so the likelihood of making a type I er­
ror is exogenously restricted to be identical to that of making a type II 
error. In terms of results, Hyytinen goes through a number of compar­
ative statics exercises and explores the impact of screening accuracy on
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loan margins (decreasing in accuracy) and lending volumes (increasing 
in accuracy, assuming that the proportion of good types is sufficiently 
high). He shows that, everything else equal, margins, lending volumes, 
and profits are higher under independent than under perfectly correlated 
test results. When banks shift from independent to perfectly correlated 
tests (say, because of the implementation of an identical credit scoring 
tool) and the accuracy of the screening technology simultaneously in­
creases, Hyytinen shows that margins, lending volumes, and bank profits 
unambiguously decrease (assuming that the proportion of good borrowers 
is sufficiently high).
The changing intensity of competition in Hainz (2003) is captured as 
pure Bertrand competition, Bertrand competition with cost differences 
(referred to as oligopoly) and monopoly. The borrower has the choice 
between exerting high and low (but at any rate non-contractible) effort 
and in order to satisfy the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility con­
straint, the interest rate that the lender can demand is bounded above. 
However, the banks can ask for collateral; a bank with market power can 
ask for more collateral which allows it to also ask for a higher interest 
rate without violating the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint. 
Collateral is uniformly distributed in the economy: The borrower does 
not have the required liquid assets to finance the investment, but does 
have other assets that can be used as collateral. In the first part of the 
paper every entrepreneur’s endowment with pledgeable assets is common 
knowledge. The use of collateral is costly, because the liquidation value 
of collateral is less than the going-concem value, and may be different 
for different banks (this is the cost difference between banks). Surplus is 
driven by the threshold of collateral that is required to be able to bor­
row (the lower the threshold, the more surplus will be generated) and by 
the costs of liquidating collateral. When asset endowments are common 
knowledge, the same projects would be funded under the three differ­
ent market structures, but surplus is shown to be greatest under pure 
Bertrand competition, intermediate in the case of Bertrand competition 
with different costs, and lowest under monopoly because of liquidation 
costs that are decreasing in the intensity of competition. In the second 
part of the paper, the asset endowment is unknown to the lender. An 
entrepreneur can understate (but not overstate) her pledgeable assets. 
This part of the paper is not about banks’ acquiring information about 
their borrowers, it is an exercise in contract theory. The results with 
respect to surplus extend to the case where information is asymmetric: 
Monopoly generates the smallest amount of surplus.
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Gehrig and Stenbacka (2001) straddles the literatures on bank com­
petition and amplification and propagation of shocks by the financial 
system. They propose a mechanism built around banks’ screening incen­
tives that generates entirely endogenous cycles: In their model, screening 
of applicants by banks may worsen the pool of applicants so much (via 
the negative externality caused by rejection decisions) that banks cease 
lending until the pool (through an inflow of new good types) has im­
proved sufficiently. The screening technology that banks use to deal with 
the adverse selection problem (there is no moral hazard) is perfectly accu­
rate in their baseline model, but argued to be robust to imperfect signals 
in an extension. The overlap with the bank competition literature arises 
because only a competitive banking system generates screening cycles. 
A monopolist bank always knows which borrowers it has rejected previ­
ously, whereas competitive banks are assumed not to know the rejection 
histories of their applicants. Ruckes (2004) also examines how the inten­
sity of price competition and screening intensity evolve over the cycle. 
He endogenizes the banks’ screening and discusses type I and II errors, 
but the focus is clearly on the cyclical aspects.
The lending model in Chan and Thakor (1987) is characterized by 
both adverse selection and moral hazard. The intensity of competition 
does not vary since banks earn zero profits under both specifications of 
competition that the paper considers. In one case, all rents are obtained 
by borrowers; in the other case, by depositors. The authors allow for 
the availability of unlimited collateral (assumed to be worth the same 
to both borrowers and banks) and they investigate how the outcomes 
(notably the extent of credit rationing, if any) differ under the two types 
of competition. The authors’ main interest is in exploring the robustness 
of existing results in the rationing literature to the different specifications 
of competition.
Bouckaert and Degryse (2004) take a closer look at the informational 
advantage that an incumbent lender is often assumed to have relative to 
outside lenders. In their model, information sharing may emerge endoge­
nously in the sense that an incumbent lender may voluntarily relinquish 
her advantage in order to soften competition (for initial market share) ex 
ante. Incumbents’ informational advantage is also the subject of Padilla 
and Pagano (1997) who show that lenders may commit to sharing their 
private information with other lenders in order to ease the borrower’s fear 
of exploitation following information lock-in. This makes the borrower 
more willing to supply effort, increasing the lender’s profit in turn.
Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2002) and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube
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(2003) embed Broecker’s screening model (with exogenous accuracy) in a 
Hotelling setup. Their interest is not in capital allocation but in endoge- 
nizing the banks’ location decisions and game-theoretical methodological 
advances generating pure-strategy equilibria.
Thakor (1996) investigates endogenous costly screening and moni­
toring in the same model, but concentrates on an analysis of risk-based 
capital requirements and the impact of monetary policy on lending. Mon­
itoring by multiple banks has more value than being monitored by a single 
bank.
Winton (1995) examines the case for restricting entry into the banking 
industry as a by-product of an investigation into more fundamental is­
sues (to do with whether intermediation dominates direct lending); there 
are no clear-cut results as to the best market structure of the banking 
sector. The fundamentals of intermediation are also analyzed by Stahl 
(1988), Yanelle (1989), and Yanelle (1997) with implications that are rel­
evant beyond the field of financial intermediation. One question these 
contributions address is whether it is a legitimate modeling shortcut to 
consider in isolation only one side of the market that the intermediary 
operates in. In general this is not the case for, as Yanelle (1997) points 
out,
‘competition may lead the intermediaries to corner one of the two 
markets in an attempt to achieve a monopoly outcome.’ (p. 215)
Besanko and Thakor (1992) investigate deregulation in a spatial com­
petition model, but their model concentrates on allocative efficiency as­
pects. Banks take deposits and extend loans, but the results have little 
bearing on the question of capital allocation in that banks (in contrast to 
other providers of funds) are simply assumed to be able to observe project 
returns and are able to distinguish between borrower types. Chiappori, 
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995) study the effects of a deregulation of 
deposit interest rates, likewise in a spatial competition model. Winton 
(1997) also investigates bank competition for deposits. In Purroy and 
Salas (2000), banks likewise do not compete for loans, but for deposits. 
The paper is, however, rather interesting in the overall context of this 
thesis, in that it features a duopoly model where a profit-maximizing 
bank competes against a bank with ‘expense preference’ which is here 
taken to mean that this institution maximizes a weighted combination of 
profit and labor expenditure. As is consistent with the empirical ev­
idence from the Spanish banking market (which inspired their paper 
and where not-for-profit savings banks very successfully compete against 
profit-maximizing commercial banks), the ‘expense preference’ bank ac­
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tually achieves greater profit and market share, even though cost and 
demand functions are the same for both banks! This counterintuitive 
result is due to the not-for-profit bank effectively having lower marginal 
cost. Depending on the nature of competition (Cournot or price competi­
tion with horizontal differentiation) the owners of the profit-maximizing 
banks will design the incentive scheme of the manager either such as 
to mimic the preferences of the non-profit and behave very aggressively 
(Cournot case) or go in the opposite direction (price competition with 
horizontal differentiation).
Gual (1999a) [also see Gual (1999b)] applies the endogenous sunk 
costs model developed by Sutton (1991) to the European banking market 
and predicts that as the market size increases with integration, one should 
not expect to see an increase in concentration.
Dell’Ariccia (2001) shows that when banks cannot distinguish be­
tween applicants that have been rejected by a competitor and ‘new’ 
projects, the resulting adverse selection problem creates an endogenous 
fixed cost that limits entry into the banking industry. In the model, 
learning (of borrower type) is costless and is also referred to as ‘learning 
by lending’. The result hinges on the assumptions of bad projects not 
leaving the market (although they default on their first lender’s loan) and 
banks not being able to tell apart ‘old’ bad projects and untested ‘new’ 
projects. The same basic adverse selection mechanism built on ‘learning 
by lending’ is analyzed in Dell’Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999) 
who show that this information problem may give rise to what they term 
a ‘natural duopoly’.
Banerjee (2005) studies a banking duopoly in which banks can choose 
between two technologies for assessing the creditworthiness of applicants. 
The focus is on the different effects of type I and type II errors on technol­
ogy adoption incentives as well as the impact of uncertainty with respect 
to the extent to which the superior technology is indeed more accurate.
Screening is analyzed in the context of a traditional adverse selection 
model (i.e., the potential borrowers know their type, but the potential 
lenders do not) by Wang and Williamson (1998). In contrast to standard 
adverse selection problems, borrowers are risk-neutral here. The authors 
study a contracting problem rather than bank competition; lenders are 
implicitly assumed to be competitive. The punchline of the model is that 
debt contracts and financial intermediaries emerge endogenously. Debt 
contracts, in fact, are robust to randomization; under certain parame­
ter restrictions a separating equilibrium exists, borrowers self-select and 
only good types submit to screening with some probability (which al­
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lows lenders to establish type against the ‘payment’ of an effort cost). 
The authors plausibly argue that lenders incurring costs in the form of 
screening costs ex ante is a more appropriate description of reality than 
the ex post auditing costs in Diamond (1984).
Freixas and Rochet (1997) survey a number of bank competition mod­
els none of which, however, are of much interest in the context of the 
present review. For example, the Monti-Klein model (section 3.2, pp. 
57-61) is really just a Cournot model in disguise.
The contribution by Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2000) was in­
spired by the evolution of the Argentine banking sector during the 1990s. 
The authors take issue with the view that stricter capital requirements 
that reduce the number of banks will necessarily lead to less intense 
competition. That the relationship between the number of banks and/or 
concentration measures and the effective intensity of competition should 
be indeterminate is not news; however, the authors’ explanation is novel. 
They document that as capital requirements in Argentina were increased 
during the 1990s, the number of banks fell and the 10-bank (deposit) 
concentration ratio increased substantially. The intermediation margin 
still fell from 11% to 5%. The authors’ punchline is that banks may 
respond to tougher capital requirements by reducing the extent of hori­
zontal differentiation, thus reducing margins (under certain assumptions 
with respect to the marginal benefit from differentiation). Alternative 
explanations are given fairly short shrift even though the evidence that 
the authors present to document that differentiation has decreased does 
not strike me as all that convincing. Surplus is considered explicitly and 
derives from borrowers’ valuation of banks’ differentiation, roughly cor­
responding to travel costs. (All entrepreneurs are identical and screening 
does not play a role.) For some parameter values, tougher capital re­
quirements are shown to both enhance stability and increase aggregate 
surplus.
2.4.7 Som e real-world illustrations
Following this rather technical discussion, I would like to motivate this 
work by presenting some illustrations of the kinds of real-world issues 
that the models reviewed arguably address. For example, banks’ ability 
to select profitable projects and effectively monitor borrowers ought to 
be an important determinant of the rate of return.
The macroeconomic return on capital -  while seemingly a straightfor­
ward concept -  is actually tricky to calculate. The technical difficulties 
are compounded when one seeks to compare rates of return intemation-
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ally; for example, because of different conventions and assumptions em­
ployed in different sets of national accounts (which constitute the basis 
for the estimation). Walton (2000) and Citron and Walton (2002) pro­
vide excellent introductions and also state rates of return for a number 
of countries. For the years 2000 or 2001 (depending on data availability), 
rates of return ranged from 20.8% in Norway via 11.6% in the UK, 6.9% 
in the US, and 6.5% in Germany to 0.8% in Iceland. [Citron and Walton 
(2002), p. 21] One would of course expect there to be several major fac­
tors influencing rates of return, but banks’ ability to select projects and 
monitor borrowers likely is one of them.
Agrawal et al. (1996) compare returns on capital for the US, Japan, 
and Germany. What makes their study particularly interesting is the de­
tailed look at five industries in addition to the aggregate analysis. These 
case studies suggest that -  at least in the industries considered -  different 
degrees of management sophistication (rather than factors not under the 
control of management, such as more or less intrusive labor market regu­
lation) explain a large part of the observed differences. For example, high 
capacity utilization driven by astute marketing and pricing strategies will 
increase the return on capital. Management quality may, of course, be 
driven by any number of factors, but it does not seem too far-fetched 
to view banks’ financing decisions as one contributing factor (poor man­
agement being starved of funding and conversely for good management). 
Monitoring by banks may also help to keep management on the straight 
and narrow. From personal observation, I would argue that banks aid 
in the diffusion of effective management practices through their regular 
discussions with borrowers.
If anything, the rate of return on capital might be an even greater 
concern for developing countries. For example, a recent article in The 
Economist (2005a) investigates
‘the argument that India is much more efficient than China at using 
capital. Having invested an average of 22-23% of GDP for a decade, it has 
seen average economic growth of about 6% a year in real terms. China has 
invested twice as much, but its average growth rate has been only about 
50% higher than India’s. It is indeed staggering how much investment is 
needed to power Chinese growth. ( . . .)  India, meanwhile, is grappling 
with ( . . .)  how to raise investment rates. To emulate China’s growth, 
India would need to increase its investment to 30-35% of GDP, and there 
is little sign it can do that. ( . . .)  Suman Bery, head of the National 
Council for Applied Economic Research in Delhi, says both countries 
face the same challenge: a failure of financial intermediation. Neither
67
has found efficient ways to translate high rates of private savings into 
productive investment. China’s answer has been FDI, leading to what Mr 
Bery calls the “idiocy” of Chinese peasant savings financing the American 
Treasury. In India, the consequences have been underinvestment and a 
big fiscal deficit, financed by the banking system.’
To be fair, one ought to note that Chinese (state-owned) banks are 
still to some extent tools of fiscal policy rather than independent entities 
with a hard budget constraint, so perhaps the above passage is not com­
paring like with like12. The fact remains that where banks fail in their 
task of allocating capital, the (macroeconomic) implications are consid­
erable. Of course, it is not only banks that count since they allocate 
only a portion of capital. However, I only meant to illustrate how banks 
matter for the allocation of capital and why, therefore, the intensity of 
competition between banks may have a bearing on a number of first-order 
real-world issues.
2.5 Sum m ary o f  th e  T h eoretica l L iterature
In the following I briefly summarize and comment on the various mech­
anisms linking the intensity of competition and surplus proposed in the­
oretical work. There is no consensus in the literature as to their relative 
importance and results are often ambiguous and critically dependent on 
parameters that do not necessarily have clear-cut interpretations. Still, it 
seems fair to say that the literature overall is not enthusiastically in favor 
of more intense bank competition and considers competition-increasing 
interventions with a degree of scepticism. What is this scepticism built 
on?
First, the model setup may ensure that monopoly is the optimum 
market structure. This is easily seen by recalling a number of common 
assumptions: With a perfectly elastic supply of deposits and perfectly 
inelastic demand for loans allocative efficiency is not a concern. When 
cashflow distributions are invariant (i.e., higher interest rates do not, 
for example, worsen moral hazard on the part of the borrower) lending 
interest rates merely redistribute surplus between lender and borrower. 
A profit-maximizing monopolist is then practically guaranteed to maxi­
mize surplus: Screening incentives depend on how profitable it is to assess 
project type; a monopolist can ask for the entire surplus (unproblematic 
in a setting where distributional considerations do not matter). More
12 On China’s banks, see Lardy (1998) whose analysis is unlikely to have become 
superseded by developments in the last few years.
68
intense competition leads to lower margins and thus less incentive to ex­
ert screening effort which may adversely affect surplus. In the extreme, 
adding even a second lender may completely destroy incentives to screen; 
for example, if test results become public. (The same argument in princi­
ple applies to incentives for monitoring, although for monitoring to have 
a rationale, one would typically have to relax the assumption that the 
cashflow distribution is invariant.)
A related effect encountered in the literature is the presumed loss of 
surplus due to the (inefficient) duplication of testing costs: Each test 
can be thought to consume resources and may lead to additional good 
and bad projects being funded. The net effect is ambiguous although in 
theory at least it is possible that competition leads to a socially excessive 
amount of testing and information acquisition. A lot hinges on the exact 
specification of the screening technology. Barring different assumptions, 
it should be noted that type I errors [incorrectly rejecting a positive NPV 
project] and type II errors [incorrectly accepting a negative NPV project] 
are logically distinct. However, normally -  and quite plausibly -  a single 
variable is used to parameterize screening accuracy and determine both 
type I and II errors simultaneously. In that case, the way in which the 
two types of errors are assumed to be related may well drive the results.
However, an additional effect [which appears, for example, in Schnitzer 
(1999b)] may offset the diminished incentive to exert effort somewhat: 
Assuming that more intense competition worsens the composition of the 
pool of potential borrowers, it might become more worthwhile to filter 
out bad projects. In other words, as in Broecker (1990), the competitors’ 
decisions create a negative externality, but this might induce a lender to 
exert more effort rather than less and possibly increase surplus.
The literature hardly considers the possibility that lower lending rates 
might alleviate a moral hazard problem on the part of the borrower 
[Schnitzer (1999a), (1999b), and Caminal and Matutes (2002) are ex­
ceptions.] Even with an invariant cashflow distri-bution, the default 
probability should be increasing in the interest rate [leading to higher 
bankruptcy costs from ‘auditing’ in Guzman (2000b)]. However, much 
of the literature models borrowers’ default probability as independent of 
the interest rate.
Where banks obtain costless signals of exogenous quality, free-riding 
on others’ information acquisition and reduced incentives to exert effort 
as margins shrink are not a concern. However, as I show in the compan­
ion chapter extending Broecker (1990), the properties of the equilibrium 
still depend critically on whether signals are private or public informa-
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tion. When tests are less than perfectly informative and test results are 
less than perfectly correlated, private signals give rise to the winner’s 
curse effect and lead to the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria. 
Pure-strategy equilibria may obtain if test results are public. But what 
are the implications for surplus? Additional competitors worsen the win­
ner’s curse. This worries some authors even though the effects on surplus 
are far from clear-cut: The average creditworthiness of applicants may 
decrease, expected interest rates may increase and banks may become 
more cautious, but surplus might nevertheless increase. Still, a worsen­
ing of the winner’s curse due to increased competition is held by some 
authors [e.g., Riordan (1993)] to be undesirable. At any rate, modeling 
information quality as exogenous is both empirically less plausible and 
conceptually less interesting than endogenous accuracy.
The discussion so far centers on screening because that is what the lit­
erature concentrates on. I do, however, wish to mention some of the other 
channels discussed in the literature: Competition might make lenders 
less willing to help borrowers in a liquidity crisis which may be ineffi­
cient from a surplus perspective [Ding (2000)]. Competition may also 
affect the extent of the socially harmful use of collateral [e.g., Villas- 
Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999)] and the higher margins associated with 
less intense competition may allow banks to intertemporally subsidize 
their borrowers with potentially beneficial effects on surplus [Petersen 
and Rajan (1995)].
All in all, the theoretical literature is thus sceptical with respect to the 
benefits of more intense competition. As I will show in the following sec­
tion, the empirical work, painting with a broad brush, finds more intense 
competition to be rather beneficial. The possibility that the two litera­
tures are not asking the same question aside, this contradiction ought to 
be resolved. I think that the major omission in the existing theoretical 
literature may be the failure to look at the role of competition as a man­
agerial discipline device when other corporate governance devices are not 
functioning properly. I explore this idea in chapter 5 below.
2.6 B ank  C om p etition  and C apital A lloca­
tio n  - E m pirical W ork
In the present section I would ideally like to accomplish two things: Re­
view the evidence on the effects of more intense bank competition on 
capital allocation in general and, specifically, take the theoretical work 
reviewed above to the data. Unfortunately, the second task can only be
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tackled indirectly. Very few of the papers provide evidence on the partic­
ular theoretical model proposed. What empirical work there is does not 
look at the various hypotheses outlined in the preceding section directly. 
For example, a substantial part of the theoretical literature predicts that 
lower margins lead to less investment in information acquisition and that 
this reduces surplus. The empirical literature investigating this specific 
issue is, however, sparse indeed. It is difficult to even think of an oper­
ational proxy for information acquisition. The empirical work reviewed 
below tends to look at different outcome measures (e.g., local economic 
growth) and cannot easily be construed as a test of a hypothesis re­
garding a particular channel. So while ideally I would like to not only 
demonstrate which mechanisms proposed in theoretical work ‘matter’ 
but also quantify their relative importance, I am not aware of work on 
which such firm conclusions could be based. In the following I review the 
evidence and I extract from the available findings what is relevant for an 
assessment of the theoretical work surveyed above.
I should note two related complications: First, many of the theoretical 
models surveyed are implicitly models of lending to small and medium­
sized businesses, but the empirical work surveyed here does not focus 
on this sub-market. Second, the theoretical literature omits allocative 
efficiency considerations from the analysis whereas empirical work takes 
these into account. This leads Allen et al. (2001), for example, to assert 
that the two literatures are not asking the same question (see p. 6). I 
will argue below that that assertion is overly pessimistic and that recent 
empirical work does indeed -  albeit indirectly -  address similar issues as 
the contributions reviewed above.
One plausible approach is to posit that a causal chain links policy 
measures with outcomes via the intensity of competition. For example, 
a country might liberalize market access; competition becomes more in­
tense and -  controlling for other possible explanations (cyclical factors, 
technological advances etc) -  loan losses decrease. If such a study were 
carefully done, it might indicate (not prove) that competition has pushed 
banks to screen applicants and monitor borrowers more carefully. The 
work discussed below does not investigate the entire chain but only the 
fink between, on the one hand, either policy measures (postulated, but 
not demonstrated to be competition-enhancing) or measures of the in­
tensity of competition and, on the other hand, outcomes.
Aside from the liberalization of market access, policy measures of in­
terest might include, for example, an abolition of branching restrictions 
or the phasing-out of privileges for state-owned banks. As for the inten­
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sity of competition, Shaffer (1994) notes that
‘Economists and policymakers would like to be able to look at a single 
number (such as profitability, price level, bank size, or number of banks 
in the market) for a bank or for a market, compare it with the value that 
would occur in a perfectly competitive market, and conclude something 
about the degree of competition or monopoly power in the bank or market 
in question. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to establish a reliable index 
for this purpose.’ (p. 6)
I discuss the difficulties associated with the measurement of competi­
tion in Eggenberger (2006a). A banking-specific complication that I have 
not seen discussed elsewhere arises from the fact that interest rates also 
contain risk premia; intermediation margins are therefore highly prob­
lematic indicators of market power. A high interest rate may be due to 
the exercise of market power or the riskiness of the borrower and with­
out access to the highly confidential risk assessment of the bank it is not 
possible to say which it is. In particular, even ex post profitability is 
not a good indicator unless one looked at an entire credit cycle: Risk 
premia collected in good times are needed for economic downturns, so a 
few very profitable years may simply reflect the squirreling away of funds 
to cover future loan losses. Intermediation margins might be particu­
larly misleading if liberalization leads banks to start lending to hitherto 
neglected higher-risk borrowers: Margins would indicate a reduction in 
competition when, in fact, competition is effective and has highly de­
sirable effects. Roe (2001) observes that rents are typically shared and 
partly spent on inflated salaries and/or staff numbers which will affect 
other types of margins.
However, in line with the earlier comments, the outcomes studied are 
the greatest source of concern. As noted, theoretical work ignores alloca­
tive efficiency. If this were the only outcome that empirical work looks at, 
I would be guilty of comparing apples with oranges. However, while the 
two literatures are not asking exactly the same questions, recent empiri­
cal work does test the models surveyed, albeit rather indirectly. Unfortu­
nately, the variables examined in earlier work [notably profits and prices 
(see above)] do not really allow one to assess whether more intense com­
petition increases surplus beyond improvements in allocative efficiency. 
Before I discuss more recent research, I should note that Shaffer (1994) 
provides a survey of earlier work [mainly, but not limited to, research in 
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) tradition], Neuberger (1998) 
also skims the empirical literature based on the SCP paradigm. In their 
discussion of U.S. anti-trust policy in the banking industry, Gilbert and
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Zaretsky (2003) provide a table summarizing the results of about two 
dozen SCP studies. Their main interest is in finding out whether the 
empirical work supports the methodology employed by U.S. competition 
authorities (it mostly does, they claim), but their analysis provides useful 
background.
Fortunately, more recent work addresses these concerns. For example, 
Berger et al. (2004) note that
‘The types of economic consequences of market structure that are now 
examined in the research literature have expanded well beyond simple 
price and profit measures.’ (p. 439)
They give the following examples:
‘Investigators have expanded the research agenda to include analysis 
of the effects of concentration and competition on economy-wide growth, 
credit availability to SMEs, and the performance of nonfinancial indus­
tries.’ (p. 439)
Other variables that might capture what I am interested in are out­
comes such as, for example, direct estimates of (X-in)efficiency or loan 
losses.
I should note that a small number of papers argue that the ques­
tion is more complicated than ‘Is competition good or bad?’ Cetorelli 
(2001) presents evidence which, he argues, suggests that the degree of 
competition in the banking industry may have heterogeneous effects in 
different industries and at different stages in the life-cycle of borrowing 
firms. Overall, he claims,
‘the empirical findings suggest that banking market structure has 
both positive and negative economic effects, and it is hard to establish 
which one ultimately dominates.’ (p. 41)
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) use a multi-industry, multi-country 
dataset and show that on average bank concentration is bad for indus­
try growth. However, they also apply the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
methodology and show that industrial sectors more dependent on exter­
nal funding grow faster where the banking sector is more concentrated 
and that this is true a fortiori for younger firms. Their results are thus 
consistent with the view that, once we move beyond allocative efficiency 
considerations, less intense competition may have something to commend 
it. Claessens and Laeven (2005), however, also apply the Rajan and Zin­
gales (1998) technique; their measure of competitiveness
‘is positively associated with countries’ industrial growth, suggesting 
that more competitive banking systems are better at providing financing 
to financially dependent firms.’ (p. 181)
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Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) look at the relationship 
between concentration and new firm creation in Italian data. They find 
a positive (though quantitatively small) association between new firm 
creation and concentration and they further argue that this effect is 
more pronounced for sectors that they consider especially information­
ally opaque. These results might be interpreted as support for the view 
that competition destroys incentives for information acquisition. Notable 
among those sceptical of more intense competition are Petersen and Ra­
jan (1995) who (for a cross-section of small U.S. firms) find that less 
intense bank competition [as proxied by the Herfindahl index of the local 
deposit (sic) market; while this choice of proxy is problematic, the au­
thors offer a thoughtful defense] means easier availability of funding for 
young firms. Note that the predictions of their model are not consistent 
with evidence reported, for example, by Berger and Udell (1995) that 
suggests that loan terms get more favorable for the borrower as the lend­
ing relationship ages. Zarutskie (forthcoming) finds that deregulation 
has different effects on young and old firms. If one accepts the assump­
tion that age proxies informational opaqueness, her results also might be 
considered consistent with the Petersen and Rajan (1995) hypothesis.
While these contributions suffer from measurement and other prob­
lems (using concentration indicators to measure the intensity of competi­
tion seems to be a particular problem), competition almost certainly has 
multiple effects and I do not doubt that some of these may be surplus- 
reducing ones. On balance, however, I would argue that the negative 
findings are fairly robustly contradicted by much other work.
In a series of papers [Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1998), Jayaratne and Strahan (1997), Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1999)], Jayaratne and Strahan found that U.S. branching deregulation 
had positive effects: Non-interest costs (including wages) fell and so did 
loan losses. Cost reductions were passed on to borrowers. Intriguingly, 
economic growth accelerated. The finding on loan losses in particular 
suggests to me that competition has beneficial effects beyond improve­
ments in allocative efficiency. Indeed, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) note 
that
‘Improvements in the quality of bank lending, not increased volume 
of bank lending, appear to be responsible for faster growth.’ (p. 639)
They argue that a selection effect is responsible for these results: 
Deregulation allowed better banks to expand at the expense of less effi­
cient ones. Working with U.S. data, with states deregulating at differ­
ent times, avoids a host of econometric problems associated with cross­
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country datasets and the authors’ robustness checks strike me as un­
commonly thorough and ingenious. Black and Strahan (2002) find that 
following the abolition of branching restrictions, the rate of new busi­
ness incorporations increases. This result is confirmed by Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2006) who argue that
‘the empirical evidence ( . . .)  strongly supports the idea that in mar­
kets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face greater difficulty 
gaining access to credit than in markets in which banking is more com­
petitive.’ (p. 437)
Cetorelli (2003) concludes that
‘More competition in banking appears to promote job creation among 
industrial establishments at the start-up stage and to permit them to 
prosper in the immediate wake of their entry into the market. At the 
same time, more bank competition accelerates the exit of more mature 
establishments from the market. These results are consistent with the­
ories suggesting that banking market power may represent a financial 
barrier to entry in product markets.’ (p. 144)
Surveying a batch of recent contributions, Berger et al. (2004) con­
clude that
‘The new research distinguishes between concentration13 and compe­
tition and generally finds that bank competition is good from a social 
perspective.’ (p. 444)
More specifically,
‘The findings with respect to the measures of competition other than 
concentration are generally robust. More regulatory restrictions on bank 
competition are associated with bad outcomes—such as less favorable 
prices for customers, less access to credit, and reduced stability of the fi­
nancial system. Less binding impediments to foreign bank ownership and 
entry are generally associated with more favorable prices for customers 
and more access to credit (good). State bank ownership is generally 
associated with less access to credit and reduced financial system sta­
bility (bad). Thus, policies that restrict bank competition—regulation, 
barriers to foreign bank participation, and direct state control of bank­
ing resources—tend to be associated with bad outcomes and diminished 
overall economic performance.’ (p. 445)
Berger et al. (2004) note that
‘Other restrictions on competition, such as barriers to new bank entry, 
interstate banking prohibitions, and implicit or explicit limits on cross- 
border banking may have the same unfavorable or favorable effects on
^Concentration measures have long been known to suffer from severe methodolog­
ical problems, see Eggenberger (2006a)
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SME credit, industry performance, and economic growth.’ (p. 439)
In his survey-plus-original-work on recent U.S. financial deregulation, 
Strahan (2003)
‘focuses on how one dimension of this broad-based deregulation— 
the removal of limits on bank entry and expansion—affected economic 
performance.’ (p. I l l )
Strahan argues:
‘In a nutshell, the results suggest that this regulatory change was fol­
lowed by better performance of the real economy. State economies grew 
faster and had higher rates of new business formation after this deregula­
tion. At the same time, macroeconomic stability improved. By opening 
up markets and allowing the banking system to integrate across the na­
tion, deregulation made local economies less sensitive to the fortunes of 
their local banks. ( . . .)  the results support the idea that competition 
and openness in financial markets are beneficial. This finding is accepted 
when applied to industrial firms—for most economists, free trade and 
competition are akin to motherhood—but it is much less accepted when 
applied to the financial sector.’ (p. I l l )
Strahan also briefly discusses the political economy considerations 
explaining the timing of deregulation. However, his main findings of in­
terest here are the impact of competition on the growth rate and the rate 
of business creation. While the first effect probably captures improve­
ments in allocative efficiency to some extent (Strahan does not provide 
data on interest-rates or margins, so this is hard to gauge), the second 
effect can plausibly be interpreted as a reduction in type I errors (i.e., 
fewer worthwhile projects not obtaining funding).
The contributions cited do not conclusively analyze the mechanisms 
through which more intense competition brings about the observed changes, 
While clearly not an exclusive explanation, I conjecture that a reduction 
in managerial slack has a first-order effect. Berger et al. (2004), for 
example, note that
‘( . . .)  research found that banks in more highly concentrated local 
U.S. markets have lower cost efficiency, presumably because of reduced 
effort or pursuit of other goals by managers when competition is lax.’ (p. 
439)
Berger and Hannan (1998) look squarely at the effect of competition 
on measured X-inefficiency. The authors note that
‘Extrapolating these estimation results to the entire U.S. banking in­
dustry, we find that the additional operating cost attributable to market 
concentration appears to be several times larger -  perhaps twenty times
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larger -  than the social loss due to the non-competitive pricing of bank 
outputs, as measured by the welfare triangle. ( . . . )  The dominance of 
the efficiency cost over the social loss associated with mispricing is robust 
with respect to a large number of variations in samples, specifications, es­
timation techniques, and controls for alternative explanations.’ (p. 464) 
Claessens and Klingebiel (2001) likewise note that 
‘Banks operate below their technical possibilities, and measures that 
would induce financial institutions to act efficiently from the standpoint 
of costs are essential. The most important of these measures is compe­
tition, which has been found to affect performance measures in a wide 
variety of countries.’ (p. 20)
Park, Brandt and Giles (2003) in the empirical part of the paper 
discussed above find
‘positive effects of competition on effort and financial performance.’ 
(p. 463)
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) study Italian data. One of the 
punchlines of their paper is that
‘banks, in a non-competitive environment, become lazy and inefficient 
in screening customers and this inefficiency is exposed after liberaliza­
tion.’ (p. 2)
While this brief review can hardly claim to be the last word on bank 
competition, I conclude the discussion of my central claim — that more 
intense bank competition is beneficial -  here. In the following section 
I present evidence on the extent of X-inefficiency and managerial slack 
in the banking sector -  the reduction of which I conjecture to be an 
important effect of more intense bank competition.
Several additional strands of empirical work have some bearing on 
the subject of bank competition. One line of work that ought to be of 
interest to theorists analyzes how banks actually compete. Degryse and 
Ongena (2004) provide an overview and, in particular, discuss the role 
of distance and spatial competition. In a separate contribution, the au­
thors present evidence on spatial price discrimination using Belgian data 
[Degryse and Ongena (2005)]. Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2005) discuss 
evidence from Norwegian banks that suggests that banks might engage 
in vertical differentiation; a bank with lower loan losses might be able to 
ask for a higher interest rate as borrowers wish to signal their creditwor­
thiness. Greenwich Associates (2002) provide evidence that the interest 
rate is not all that matters in lending. Evidence of price dispersion in loan 
pricing for given risk is provided in Oliver Wyman & Company (1996) 
and Oliver Wyman Sz Company (2000). A separate, but related strand of
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work aims to determine how competitive the banking industry actually is. 
Examples are Bikker (2003) and Bikker and Haaf (2002b). Bikker (2003) 
applies the Bresnahan methodology to a number of EU loan and deposit 
markets and finds limited evidence of market power. Using the Rosse- 
Panzar technique, Bikker and Haaf (2002b) find evidence of monopolistic 
competition. The authors discuss some of the methodological underpin­
nings for measuring competition in Bikker and Haaf (2002a). Cetorelli 
(1999) outlines (and criticizes) U.S. regulators’ current approach to bank 
competition issues revolving around concentration measures and presents 
Bresnahan’s markup technique as an alternative (along with an applica­
tion to Italian data). A discussion of economic and legal issues to do 
with the market definition in [U.S.] banking markets is offered by Amel 
and Starr-McCluer (2002). One additional important topic is consolida­
tion and its implications for competition. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan 
(1999) review the U.S. experience, the Group of Ten (2001) provides an 
exhaustive study of consolidation in rich countries, and the International 
Monetary Fund (2001) looks at financial sector consolidation in emerg­
ing markets. Finally, an important question from a policy perspective 
is whether there is something special about foreign banks, foreign bank 
entry, and cross-border banking: Berger et al. (2000) study cross-border 
banking. A volume edited by Litan, Masson and Pomerleano (eds) (2001) 
collects a number of articles on various aspects of foreign participation 
in developing countries’ financial markets which is also the topic of a 
chapter in an IMF International Capital Markets Report [International 
Monetary Fund (2000)].
2 .7  X -Inefficiency in  B anking
In the following I briefly present evidence showing that banks suffer from 
X-inefficiency in the sense of Leibenstein (1966): Apart from allocative 
inefficiencies due to price distortions, market power may create scope for 
managerial slack that leads to resources being wasted (e.g., by not min­
imizing costs). While the idea is conceptually simple, measuring such 
inefficiencies is involved. Frontier techniques are the workhorse used by 
most of the literature [see the survey by Murillo-Zamorano (2004)]. Fron­
tier techniques for measuring (in)efficiency come in many varieties, all of 
which go back to Farrell (1957). The basic idea is to envisage a technol­
ogy isoquant and ask how far the input bundle chosen by a producer is 
from this (by definition efficient) frontier and, furthermore, how far the 
input bundle chosen is from the cost-minimizing input bundle (which is
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not only technically, but also allocatively efficient). Looking at efficiency 
from the input and cost-minimization perspective as sketched here is 
equivalent to taking an output and revenue-maximization perspective as 
long as returns to scale are constant. Murillo-Zamorano (2004) provides 
an overview of the various techniques that this basic idea has given rise to. 
Parametric techniques impose functional forms on the efficient frontier 
whereas under non-parametric approaches [notably Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA)] a functional form is estimated from the available data. 
Murillo-Zamorano further distinguishes between deterministic paramet­
ric techniques (which have the drawback that all deviations from opti­
mality are attributed to the agent) and stochastic parametric techniques 
which allow for specification failures and exogenous factors. Murillo- 
Zamorano points out that where different techniques have been applied 
to the same data, the results axe not always mutually consistent.
Bauer et al. (1998), for example, find such a lack of mutually consis­
tent results in banking-related efficiency studies. They go beyond mutual 
consistency of the various techniques, provide a broader set of consistency 
criteria that include what they term “believability conditions” (see p. 
87), and specifically study the banking industry. The authors compare 
DEA with three parametric techniques (stochastic frontier, thick frontier, 
and distribution-free approaches) and give concise, non-technical descrip­
tions of the various techniques. The parametric techniques are found to 
yield similar results that differ somewhat from those obtained with DEA.
While I am mainly interested in X-inefficiency, the techniques out­
lined above have been deployed to assess economies of scale and scope, 
product mix, and risk diversification. Clearly, one would not want to 
erroneously attribute efficiency gains due to, say, scale to management 
quality, so alternative drivers of efficiency need to be considered. One 
particular concern in banking is the effect of risk. The case for including 
risk considerations in the estimation of productive efficiency is made by 
Hughes and Mester (1998) and Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001). These 
authors find that, after explicitly taking into account risk, there may be 
large scale economies in banking (whereas the conventional wisdom in 
the field is that scale economies are exhausted at very small bank sizes 
of maybe as little as one billion dollars in assets). Vives (2001b) notes:
‘A problem arises in that empirical studies of scale economies and cost 
efficiency typically do not account for risk. Indeed, the studies measure 
the effect on cost of the joint increase in scale and risk. Noting that 
the lower cost of risk management of a larger, better-diversified bank 
may induce the bank to take on more risk, cost savings may not then
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be detected, if to take on more risk is costly. Controlling for risk-taking, 
large economies of scale that increase with asset size are found in U.S. 
banks.’ (p. 540)
However, to the best of my knowledge even the presence of sizeable 
scale economies would not invalidate the finding that banks suffer from 
considerable X-inefficiencies.
A large literature applies different techniques to assess economic effi­
ciency in the banking industry, although as Bauer et al. (1998) point out, 
these contributions do not usually cross-check the results by using several 
techniques. In the following I present findings drawn from a number of 
surveys of this literature.
Bauer et al. (1998) note that
‘Frontier inefficiency or X-inefficiency of financial institutions has gen­
erally been found to consume a considerable portion of costs on average, 
to be a much greater source of performance problems than either scale 
or product mix inefficiencies, and to have a strong empirical association 
with higher probabilities of financial institution failures over several years 
following the observation of substantial inefficiency.’ (p. 86)
Neuberger (1998) has a brief section on X-inefficiency and observes 
that
‘( . . .) X-inefficiencies, brought about by lacking managerial ability 
to control costs or maximize revenues, have been foimd to be especially 
important in banking. They account for at least 15-25% of costs ( . . . ) ’ 
(p. 109)
Saunders (1997) (reviewing the empirical evidence for the U.S.) writes: 
’Efficiency studies find quite dramatic cost differences among banks 
(...). [T]hese studies find that sometimes as little as five per cent of the 
cost differences among financial intermediaries (...) can be attributed to 
economies of scale or scope. This suggests that cost inefficiencies related 
to managerial ability and other hard-to-quantify factors (so-called X- 
inefficiencies) may better explain cost differences (...) among financial 
firms (...).’ (p. 262)
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) includes a section on efficiency 
and surveys a number of articles (pp. 157-165). In contrast to most 
of the literature cited thus far, Schure, Wagenvoort and O’Brien (2004) 
work with European data and find that
‘Managerial inability to control costs (X-inefficiency) is with 17-25% 
[of costs] the main source of bank inefficiency in the EU.’ (p. 371)
An earlier strand of work investigates expense preference behavior 
by banks. Important contributions in this line of research [started by
80
Williamson (1963)] are Edwards (1977), Hannan (1979), and Hannan and 
Mavinga (1980). Informal, but nevertheless very interesting evidence on 
agency conflicts in banks and their implications for various aspects of 
performance is provided by Davis (1995) for the case of the Australian 
banking industry and Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003) for the case of Japan, 
where entrenched management is said to have actively pursued the ‘ever- 
greening’ of delinquent loans with disastrous consequences for the banks 
themselves, healthy real-sector firms, and the macroeconomy.
Banks suffer from particular corporate governance problems (opaque­
ness, accounting discretion making it easy to manipulate results, regu­
latory restrictions on takeovers etc) which may explain the presence of 
substantial X-inefficiencies. Berger and Hannan (1998) tackle head-on 
the hypothesis that relatively low intensity of competition is what drives 
inefficiencies and explicitly set out to test the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis:
‘The basic hypothesis tested is that the market power exercised by 
firms in concentrated markets allows them to avoid minimizing costs 
without necessarily exiting the industry. The reduced pressures to mini­
mize costs may result in lower cost efficiencies for firms in concentrated 
markets through one or more of several mechanisms -  shirking by man­
agers, the pursuit of objectives other than profit maximization, political 
or other activities to defend or to gain market power, or simple incompe­
tence that is obscured by the extra profits made available by the exercise 
of market power. Using detailed estimates of the efficiency of over 5000 
banks and measures of local market concentration [for the markets] in 
which these banks operate, we find strong evidence that banks in more 
concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency.’ (p. 464)
While concentration measures are a dubious indicator of market power, 
the results are nonetheless suggestive.
All in all, substantial evidence of X-inefficiency in banking (probably 
due to particularly severe corporate governance problems in that indus­
try) is consistent with the hypothesis that more intense bank competition 
has beneficial effects primarily because it reduces managerial slack.
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Chapter 3
On Broecker’s 
’Creditworthiness Tests and 
Interbank C om petition’
3.1 In trod u ction
The allocation of capital is an important determinant of the growth rate 
of an economy. Whilst there axe various sources for the financing of in­
vestment (the most important being retained earnings), banks (financial 
intermediaries) play an important role even in highly disintermediated 
economies. Small and medium-sized enterprises in particular usually do 
not have access to external finance from sources other than banks (and 
their trade creditors). How accurately banks assess their clients’ credit­
worthiness thus has considerable implications for the economy at large. 
Given this perceived externality it is not surprising that the regulation 
and performance of banks is a key public policy concern in most coun­
tries. The present chapter focuses on how the intensity of competition 
between banks affects how well they do their job. Since the intensity of 
competition can be affected by government policy (e.g., via the number of 
banking licenses that are issued), this question is of great interest to pol­
icymakers and there is now a considerable body of evidence (discussed in 
the literature review) that suggests that eliminating restrictions to com­
petition between financial intermediaries leads to an improved capital 
allocation.
However, the theoretical literature in this area is concerned less with 
the potentially problematic lack of competition than with the risk of ’too 
much’ competition. Thorsten Broecker’s paper ’Credit-Worthiness Tests 
and Interbank Competition’ [Broecker (1990)] started one strand of the 
literature and has inspired many subsequent authors. Claims that more
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intense competition is detrimental are often made with reference to that 
article.
The purpose of the present chapter is to investigate the key result of 
Broecker’s paper, the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in a 
certain type of banking game, and to extend it to the case of asymmetric 
banks. In the original model (which assumes that banks’ creditworthiness 
assessments are equally accurate), Broecker conjectured that if the banks 
were asymmetrically well-informed, only the most accurate bank would 
stay in the market and a pure-strategy equilibrium would obtain. In the 
following, this conjecture is shown not to be correct. Even if banks are 
asymmetric, interest-rate competition does not lead to an equilibrium in 
pure strategies. The intuition underlying this result is shown to be the 
same as that underlying the result in the symmetric case: A bank always 
finds it profitable to either undercut the rival by an epsilon or to charge 
the highest possible interest rate.
3.2 B roecker’s ’C red it-W orth iness T ests and  
Interbank C o m p etitio n ’
Two related questions are of interest with regard to the allocation of cap­
ital: Do those projects that should be financed obtain funding? And con­
versely, do those projects that should not be financed not obtain funds? 
Broecker (1990) provides a model that allows a first stab at answering the 
question how the intensity of competition between intermediaries will af­
fect the allocation of capital. Because so many of the subsequent papers 
in this literature have been inspired in one way or another by Broecker’s 
model and its assumptions and it wall be referred to throughout the 
present paper, it seems appropriate to summarize his contribution here1.
3.2.1 Applicants
Banks compete for a continuum [0,1] of risk-neutral loan applicants who 
need the loan to be able to invest in their project. These projects axe 
- following an investment of one unit of capital at date 0 - assumed to 
have a discrete cashflow distribution with the following returns at date 
1: Each project will be successful and have a return of RMAX >>  1 with 
probability pi (where subscript i denotes the type of project) and will fail 
and have a return of zero with probability 1 — p*. Broecker assumes that
1 The results of Broecker’s two-stage-game, discussed in section 3 of his paper, are 
of limited interest for the present purpose and are therefore omitted.
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there are two types of applicants: A proportion 7 , 0 < 7 < 1, of good
projects with a relatively high success probability and bad projects with
a relatively low success probability which make up a fraction (1 — 7 ) of 
the applicant pool. 7  is common knowledge. To simplify the analysis I 
will in the following assume that
f l  fo r  i = Good (3 l)
P for i = Bad, 0 < p < 1
This assumption will not substantially change anything, but it will 
get rid of the pi and lighten notation.
A SSUM PTIO N  1 : A bad project makes losses in expectation:
fjRMAX < 1 (3.2)
In other words, a good project is always successful whereas a bad 
project is on average not profitable. Note that the applicants are ex­
tremely passive in this game. Each applicant demands one and only one 
loan of a fixed size of one unit of capital, but demand for the loan is 
totally interest-inelastic. Any borrower will simply accept the lowest in­
terest rate offer, if they have any offers. For simplicity it is assumed that 
an applicant offered an interest rate so high that her expected return is 
zero is assumed to accept the loan nevertheless and that an applicant 
with several identical best interest rate offers will choose each with equal 
probability. If an applicant manages to obtain funds, she will invest them 
and obtain the realized cashflow at date 1. Moral hazard is not an issue 
as the cashflow realization is completely independent of entrepreneurs’ 
effort and decisions. If their project is successful they will repay the 
bank. (In fact borrowers are so passive that it does not matter whether 
they know their own type or they do not.) A critical assumption is that 
borrowers do not have bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs for borrowers 
would have an effect similar to application fees in that they affect good 
borrowers differently from bad borrowers. Bankruptcy costs together 
with the assumption that borrowers know their type would change the 
results completely. Broecker assumes that no self-selection devices are 
available, so that even if applicants knew their own type, there would be 
no way in which the banks could extract this information. Up-front ap­
plication fees may not be used (and would not make much sense anyway 
since the applicants are assumed not to have any funds of their own). 
Collateral is assumed not to be available. Instead, the bank has to rely 
on its screening of the potential borrowers.
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3.2.2 Banks
There are n > 2 risk-neutral banks that compete in interest-rates. Prior 
to the interest-rate competition stage, banks screen their applicants and 
obtain costless and imperfectly informative signals about an applicant’s 
type. The screening is conceptually quite straightforward: Each bank 
subjects each applicant to a credit-worthiness test that either has the 
result {This applicant is of good type} which is denoted g or {This ap­
plicant is of bad type} which is denoted b. The true types are abbreviated 
in uppercase; i.e. a truly good applicant may be written as G and a truly 
bad applicant can be written as B. As these tests are not perfect a good 
applicant may be categorized as bad and conversely. If the statement 
{This applicant is good} is defined as the Null hypothesis, then to cat­
egorize a good applicant as bad is a type I error and to categorize a 
bad applicant as good is a type II error. It should be noted that there 
is nothing that suggests that the likelihood of making one type of error 
affects the likelihood of making the other type of error. However, note 
that plausibility suggests reasonable restrictions as in Assumption 2. The 
testing technology is such that a project that is truly good (truly bad) 
has a higher probability of being categorized as good (bad) than a bad 
(good) project. In particular, the probability that a good (bad) project 
is categorized as good (bad) is greater than 7 (1 — 7 ), i.e. the tests are 
at least somewhat informative:
A SSU M PTIO N  2:
Pr ob(g\G) = qG > ' y > l - q B = Prob(g\B) (3.3)
This may equivalently be stated as
Pro6(6|B) = qB > 1 — 7 > 1  — qG = P ro6(6|G) (3.4)
The notational convention used is thus that g* is the probability of being 
correctly identified as being of type i whereas 1 — g* is the probability 
of making a type I or type II error respectively. Errors are assumed to 
be independent among banks (the results would still go through with 
correlated errors unless the correlation were perfect). Consider the com­
position of the groups with good and bad signals, respectively, after a 
single bank has screened all applicants. The group with good signals will 
consist of qa'y good types as well as (1 — qB)(l —7 ) bad types. The group 
with bad signals is composed of (1 — qG) j  good types and qB( 1 — 7 ) bad 
types. Knowing the composition of the two groups, it is possible to obtain 
their respective average success probabilities (i.e., the average probabil-
86
ity that the loan will be repaid). For the group with good signals, that 
average success probability is • This expression is greater
than the overall average success probability 7 +  (1 — 7 )/? which in turn 
is greater than the average success probability of only those applicants 
assigned to the bad group, - To see this, note that
<iol + ( l + ( 1 _ 7)i8
QgK +  (1 — <7b )(1 — l ) P  >
>  q a 2 +  (1 -  qb)(  1 -  7)7  +  qg7(1 -  i ) P  +  (1 -  qb)(  1 -  i ) 2P 
« = >  (*••) >  9g7[1  -  (1 -  7 )] +  (1 -  Qb )( 1 -  7)7
+9g7(1 -  7)/? +  (1 “  9b)(1 -  7 )/? “  (1 “  Qb)(  1 -  7)7/5 
Deleting terms on both sides of the inequality yields 
0 > - q G7(1 -  7) +  (1 -  Qb)(  1 -  7)7 +  9g7(1 -  7 )/5 ~  (1 “  <?b)(1 -  7)7/5 
Grouping terms, this can be rearranged as
<7g7(1 -  7)(1 — /? )> ( !  — gs)(l -  7)7(1 -  P )  
which is true by assumption 2. In the same way
7 +(1 - 7)4» ?~*?)7 +gi,? r7)f(1 - ^ G)7 +  gB(l - 7 )
(1 -  gG)7 [l -  (1 -  7 )] +  (1 -  7 ) /5 ( l  ~  9g)7 
+ q B( l  -  7)7  +  9b(1 -  l)P -  9b (1  -  7 )7 ^
> (1 ~ 9 g)7 +  9b (1 -7 ) /?
Once again deleting terms on both sides of the inequality and rearranging 
yields
9b( 1 -  7)7(1 -  P) >  (1 -  qG){ 1 -  7)7(1 -  P)
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which is true by assumption 2. Note that it does not necessarily follow 
that an applicant with a good signal is more likely to be good than 
bad. That will always be the case when 7 ^  but need no longer hold 
when 7 is sufficiently low. As a counter-example that is compatible with 
assumption 2, consider 7 =  0.1, qc = 0.11, and qs = 0.91.
Assumption 1 implies that it is impossible to break even lending to 
a bad borrower. However, the group of applicants assigned to the bad 
group by the test contains some good types as well and the average suc­
cess probability of that group will therefore be greater than (3. Broecker 
assumes that the average success probability of those projects categorized 
as ’bad’ is so low that in expectation a bank cannot break even lending 
to one of these projects:
A SSU M PT IO N  3:
(1 — 9g )7  +  <?b (1 — "()0 j ^ m a x  k  1 (3 .5 )
( l - g c ) 7  +  9 n ( l - 7 )
Lending to the group of applicants categorized as ’good’ is, however, 
feasible:
A SSU M PT IO N  4:
W  + ( } r ^ - j ) P R MAX > J (3 6)
q a  +  (1 -  ?b)(i  - 7 )
These latter two assumptions are important insofar as they ensure 
that all banks offer only a single interest rate to those applicants they 
believe to be good. If lending to those projects categorized as bad were 
feasible, banks could offer two interest rates to account for the different 
default probabilities which would greatly complicate the analysis. An im­
portant assumption (to be relaxed below) is that banks’ tests are equally 
informative. Although Broecker does not mention this explicitly, it must 
be impossible for banks to subject their applicants to the test more than 
once and thereby improve the accuracy of their results. Alternatively, 
the results of multiple tests run by the same bank must be perfectly 
correlated. Also, banks do not learn each other’s test results, neither 
can they condition on their rivals’ assessments. As for the banks’ refi­
nancing, Broecker assumes that banks can borrow unlimited amounts of 
funds at a zero interest rate. Alternatively, one could assume that banks 
are lending their capital. In either case, the question as to what about 
these financial intermediaries turns them into ’banks’ is justified, but not 
pursued by Broecker. Neither do I pursue it here. The contracts that the 
bank offers can be described as standard debt contracts (SDC), the use 
of these contracts is assumed. However, given the assumptions about the
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cashflow distribution it is not obvious in how far a debt contract differs 
from an equity contract.
3.2.3 Interest-rate com petition
Applicants costlessly apply to all banks and borrow with probability £ 
from one of the k banks (if any) that offer them the lowest interest- 
rate based on their test results. Banks are thus competing in prices 
(given the test results) and I am therefore looking for an equilibrium in 
interest-rates2. The key result of Broecker’s contribution is that such an 
equilibrium does not exist in pure strategies, there is only a (unique and 
symmetric) mixed strategy equilibrium in which banks make interest rate 
offers according to a distribution function over interest rates3. Broecker 
points out that
’banks face externalities caused by the interest rates and the rejection 
decisions of the other banks’ (p. 430).
1 illustrate this for the case of two banks: If bank 1 charges a lower 
interest rate than bank 2, everyone who gets an offer from bank 1 will 
accept it and the composition of bank l ’s borrower pool only depends on 
the accuracy of its own screening. The group of entrepreneurs applying 
to bank 2, however, is made up of those applicants who were rejected 
by 1. As banks’ test results are at least somewhat informative, the pool 
of applicants left for bank 2 then contains relatively many bad projects. 
There will thus be an incentive for bank 2 to undercut in turn as the 
improvement in the composition of its borrower pool will more than 
outweigh the reduction in profits due to the lower interest rate. However, 
it will not be optimal for one of the banks to set their interest rate lower 
than some value; rather than cutting the rate further it could increase its 
profits by raising the interest rate to the highest possible amount RMAX 
(remember that the demand for loans is assumed to be inelastic)4. But
2 The notational convention used throughout the paper is to refer to repayments 
(i.e. the gross interest rate consisting of the principal and a net interest margin) as 
the interest rate.
3 If the number of potentially active banks exceeds a certain threshold value, banks 
do not necesssarily make interest rate offers to those applicants that they believe to 
be good, but leave the market with some probability that is strictly increasing in the 
number of banks that are potentially active. I will abstract from the possibility of 
some banks not making offers at all, as it does not add much to the analysis.
4 Implicit in this description is the assumption that the higher-rate bank can at least 
break even when charging RMAX. This is the equivalent of assumption 5 discussed 
below (for the case of asymmetric banks). Assumption 3 says that it is not possible to 
break even on the group of applicants tested once and rejected, assumption 4 states 
that the opposite is true for the group of applicants tested once and accepted. The 
higher-rate bank’s borrowers have the same average success probability as a group of 
applicants that have been tested twice and have been rejected once and accepted once. 
It is intuitive that the average success probability for this group is greater than that
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of course, if, say, bank 2 charges R MAX, bank l ’s best response is to 
charge just an s less than bank 2. In this way, for any interest rate 
that bank 1 sets bank 2 has an incentive to either undercut or charge 
the highest possible interest rate R MAX and conversely. The mechanism 
sketched out here is behind Broecker’s proposition 2.1. which establishes 
the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
3.2 .4  Average Success Probability
Since banks’ tests are informative, the average success probability (the 
average probability with which a borrower is able to repay the loan) 
decreases with the number of banks. To see this, note that the probability 
that a good (bad) borrower is rejected by n banks is ( l—qG)n (<?#), so that 
when there are n banks, [1 — (1—qc)n]l good applicants and (1—g^)(l—7 ) 
bad applicants will obtain a loan. The condition for the average success 
probability to be decreasing in the number of banks is therefore:
d [1 -  (1 -  qG)n]l +  ft(l ~ g%)(1 ~ 7) n n r |
dn [1 -  (1 -  qo)71]! +  (1 ~ Qb ) { 1 “  l )
Noting that (3 = [1 — (1 — j3)], this can be restated as
d [1 -  (1 -  ?o)"]7 +  (1 -  «S)(1 -  7) -  (1 -  /?)(! -  <?S)(1 -  7)
dn [1 -  (1 -  qG)n]j + (1 -  qnB)( 1 -  7 ) < 0
d_
dn
1 - ( 1 - / 3 ) ( 1 - < & )(!-7 )
[1 -  (1 -  qG)n]7 +  (1 -  qnB) { l  ~  7 ) .
< 0
Now dividing both numerator and denominator by (1 — qB)( 1 — 7 ) 
one obtains
d_
dn 1 -
( 1 - f l
[1 -  (1 -  qG)n\7 + 1
< 0 (3.8)
(1 — 9S)(! —ir)
Differentiating with respect to n yields:
d [1 -  (1 -  qG)n]7 = 
dn ( l - q % ) ( l - j )
for applicants tested once and rejected, but less than that for applicants tested once 
and accepted. So assumptions 3 and 4 neither rule out nor imply that it is possible 
to charge this group R MAX and break even.
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(1 -  ^ ( 1 -  7) ~ 9^  'n^  ~ 9^  + ~  ^  ~  9<3^  ln^ B^
(3.9)
As the logarithms of (1 — qc) and (qs) are necessarily negative, the 
whole expression is negative and the inequality holds. There is a natural 
interpretation for this result: As the number of banks n increases, the 
ratio of accepted good types (of whom there are [1 — (1 — qG)n]l) to 
accepted bad types (of whom there are (1 — q7^) (1 — 7 )) decreases. This 
shows that the average success probability is decreasing in the number 
of active banks.
3.3  A sym m etric  B anks
Broecker conjectured that the non-existence result was not robust to an 
asymmetry in banks’ information, i.e. banks that have tests of different 
accuracy. He claims that
’it is quite clear that a bank with a more reliable or less costly test 
than those of the other banks will be the only bank that stays in the 
market [and that] this bank will make positive profit.’ (p. 445)
In the following I will show for the case of two banks that the men­
tioned result is in fact robust to such a modification.
3.3.1 Superior screening accuracy
Modified assumption 2 captures the superiority of bank l ’s screening 
technology. Superscripts refer to the bank, so bank 1 has a lower proba­
bility of making errors than bank 2:
A SSU M PT IO N  2’:
Pr obl{g\G) = qlG > q2G > 7 > 1 -  q2B > 1 -  qlB = Yxobl (g\B) (3.10)
Once again, this can equivalently be stated as
Profr1^ !? )  =  > 1 — 7 > 1  — qc >  ^~  Qg ~  Pro61(6|G) (3.11)
To make this question interesting, I will assume that it is indeed 
possible for the less accurate bank charging the higher interest rate5 to 
make a profit - otherwise one would have a monopoly by assumption:
5 Given the inelasticity of demand, the bank charging the higher interest rate wil 
always charge the highest possible interest rate R MAX.
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A SSU M PT IO N  5:
9g(! ~  9 a ) 7 + (1 ~  gpgeC1 ~  7)/? r m a x  ^
< £ ( i  -  i b h  +  ( i  -  -  7) 1 ’
3.3.2 N on-existence o f a pure-strategy equilibrium  
w ith  asym m etric banks
In this section I will investigate Broecker’s conjecture that a bank that 
is unambiguously more accurate than its rivals will be the only bank to 
remain in the market. It turns out that not only is there no reason to 
think that the less accurate bank will leave the market, but that the 
modified game will have an equilibrium very similar to the one in the 
symmetric game. I summarize this in the following
Proposition 1 The asymmetric game where one bank is unambiguously 
more accurate than the other bank does not have an equilibrium in pure 
strategies. However, under assumption 5 both banks will stay in the mar­
ket.
Proof: To see that both banks will stay in the market, note that 
regardless of the interest rate set by the rival, both banks can guarantee 
themselves a strictly positive profit by setting RMAX. Assumption 5 en­
sures that bank 2 (the less accurate bank) will make a profit at this rate; 
it is clear that bank 1 must then make a profit at that rate as well.
To show that the game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium, I 
have to show that there is no set of strategies such that each bank is using 
its best response, given the rival’s strategy. First, note that because the 
demand for loans is inelastic, a bank that decides to set a rate higher than 
its rival will always set RMAX. Similarly, a bank that decides to undercut 
its rival will undercut by an s only, as this allows it to capture all the 
applicants with offers from both banks. Bank j then has three possible 
responses to bank k charging R k 1. It can charge R MAX, 2. it can charge 
Rk, or 3. it can charge Rk — e. Note also that the only interest rates I 
have to consider are from the interval [1, RMAX], as no bank would ever 
set a repayment below one or greater than R MAX. I will first show that 
it is never a best response to set the same rate as the rival, as setting 
the same rate as the rival is always dominated by either undercutting the 
rival by e or by charging R MAX.
Note that the bank undercutting the rival will capture all the appli­
cants that have offers from both banks, whereas it would capture only 
half of them if it set the same rate. Because these applicants have offers 
from both banks, their average creditworthiness must be higher than that
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of the remaining applicants and a bank that manages to capture all of 
them must be better off than a bank capturing only half of them as long 
as both banks are making non-negative profits when charging the same 
rate. If one bank were not at least breaking even when charging the same 
rate as the rival it would anyway be in that bank’s interest to raise its 
rate to RMAX which, as noted above, will guarantee it positive profits. 
In sum, if banks can never find it optimal to charge the same rate, they 
must be charging different rates.
To complete the proof I wish to show the following: No matter which 
interest rate the rival sets, it is always in a bank’s interest to either 
undercut by e or to raise its interest rate to RMAX. The other bank will 
always have an incentive to either undercut in turn or to raise its own 
rate to R MAX, such that the rivals never choose mutually best responses. 
The following lemma establishes this result:
Lem m a 2 For bank j  there exists a critical interest rate RG such that
R k e  (Rkc , Rmax] : \imirj (Rj = Rk -  e) > nj (Rj = R MAX)
Rk = Rkc -. l^im = Rk -  e) = = RMAX)
Rk E [1, R kc ) l^im 7T = Rk -  e) < = RMAX)
Note that lim 7rJ(HJ = Rk — e) — 7 =  RMAX) is a continuous
£ —>0+
function of Rk and is given by lim [qG,y(Rk — £ — 1) — <7g)(l —e—>0+
7 )(JRfc- e - l ) ]  - { \ - q kG)(iG^ {RMAX- I )  - q ^ ( l - ( fB) { l- j ) P ( R MAX-1 ) . 
Differentiating this difference in profit levels with respect to Rk shows 
that the derivative is strictly positive.
(  lim *>(& = Rh - £ ) ~  nj (Rj = R MAXU  dRk \e-»0+ J
= W d  +  Pi1 -  9b)(! -  7)] > 0
, so lim 7 =  Rk—e)—^ {R ^  =  RMAX) is monotonically increasing£—>0+
in Rk. I have already shown that when bank k sets R max bank j  has an
incentive to undercut, i.e. lim 7rJ(i?J =  R MAX — e) — 7ri(R? = R MAX)£—*0+
is positive. All I need to show is that for some R k bank j  makes a 
higher profit by setting RMAX rather than by undercutting bank k, i.e. 
lim 7 = R k — e) — ^ { R i  — R MAX) < 0. Then by the intermediate 
value theorem the existence of the critical interest rate is established.
To find such an Rk, define R?{R? < Rk) as the lowest interest rate that 
bank j  can set such that it just breaks even when it charges a lower rate
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than its rival, i.e. R? < Rk. Let bank k charge R?(Ri < Rk) — e. If bank 
j  now undercuts by e it is making a loss and would, by assumption 5, 
do better by charging R MAX which would guarantee it a strictly positive 
profit. What determines the critical interest rate is the profit that each 
bank can guarantee itself by charging the maximum interest rate. At the 
critical rate, the profit that the bank can obtain from undercutting is 
exactly what it could obtain from raising its rate to R MAX, at any lower 
interest rate the bank must be strictly better off by charging R MAX.
If the banks’ critical interest rates are different (as they must be if 
banks achieve different accuracies), the non-existence of an equilibrium 
in pure strategies is immediate. I conjecture that there is once again an 
equilibrium in mixed strategies, albeit an asymmetric one.
3 .4  D iscu ssion
In the interest-rate competition game analysed here, there exists for both 
banks a critical interest rate defined as that interest rate set by the rival 
such that, on the one hand, undercutting the rival by e and, on the other 
hand, charging the highest possible interest rate R MAX yield the same 
profit. If the rival charges more than the critical rate, the best response is 
to undercut by s; if the rival charges less, the best response is to charge 
the maximum interest rate RMAX. Both banks have an incentive to 
undercut each other up to the greater of the two critical rates. The bank 
with the greater critical rate will then jump to R MAX, prompting the 
rival to charge R MAX — s, thus starting the cycle of undercutting anew. 
This cycle of undercutting followed by a jump to the highest possible 
rate which in turn triggers a new round of mutual undercutting is the 
intuition behind the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. 
It is shown that the mechanism at work in the asymmetric game is the 
same as in the symmetric game: the difference in accuracy has not played 
a role at all in the proof (except in that it affects the critical rates). 
The non-existence result obtained by Broecker, contrary to Broecker’s 
conjecture, is thus shown to be robust to an asymmetry in the testing 
technology. Even when banks achieve different levels of accuracy, there 
is no set of interest rates such that each bank is using its best response 
given the rival’s interest rate and neither bank has an incentive to change 
its interest rate.
As an aside and by way of motivation for the following chapter, note 
that the general setup of Broecker’s model is such that the validity of 
policy recommendations based on it can legitimately be questioned. In
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the (symmetric) version of the game investigated by Broecker, the mixed- 
strategy equilibrium is very hard to interpret: Is there a real-world equiv­
alent of banks randomizing over an interval of interest rates? Other 
features of the model also make me suspicious of its applicability to real- 
world issues. For example, error probabilities are exogenous and constant 
regardless of the number of applicants. Yet in spite of such difficulties, 
claims that more intense competition between intermediaries is harmful 
are often made with reference to this model. As shown above, one conclu­
sion that can be drawn from Broecker’s paper is that the more banks are 
in operation, the lower the average credit-worthiness of borrowers will be. 
It is presumably this result that leads to Broecker’s paper being cited as 
showing that more intense competition between banks is bad for the allo­
cation of capital. The operation of more banks clearly entails an increase 
in the number of bad projects that obtain funding, but that is the best 
capital allocation that can be achieved with the screening technology in 
this model. In sum, the set-up of the model is such that its applicability 
to the analysis of real-world banking issues must be in doubt. The follow­
ing chapter shows that moving away from Broecker’s auction framework 
and allowing applicants to renegotiate their offers leads to the existence 
of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Chapter 4
Interest rate com petition  
w ith renegotiation
4.1 In trod u ction
The following modification of Broecker’s game is motivated by the obser­
vation that in some market segments interest rate competition between 
banks in practice operates in ways quite different from Broecker’s auc­
tion setting. In particular, during the fieldwork reported in a companion 
chapter I learned that it is common for applicants to return to banks 
that have made them an offer and to try to convince the bank to im­
prove the terms of the offered loan contract by showing the offers they 
have obtained from other banks. In the sample of banks I visited, banks 
do not insist on borrowers keeping the terms of the loan contract offered 
to them confidential and make their offers in writing, so that they axe 
indeed verifiable. To the extent that another bank’s loan offer conveys 
favorable information, it is then in an applicant’s interest to seek to im­
prove existing offers by making use of this information. This effectively 
leads to test results becoming public. There is every reason to expect 
this mechanism to develop endogenously: those applicants with many 
favorable test results have an incentive to show them; then everyone who 
cannot show evidence of many favorable test results must be of lesser 
quality (in expectation). In principle a bank would consider the average 
creditworthiness of those applicants whose testing histories are unknown, 
but because the above average applicants always have an incentive to doc­
ument their high quality, the average falls and falls and eventually there 
is perfect separation by risk class. In order not to be mistaken for the 
worst category of applicant, all other applicants (i.e., all those with more 
than one offer) have an incentive to show all the offers they got.
It seems quite intuitive that the mechanism outlined here leads to a
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pure-strategy equilibrium where the interest rate offered by each bank to 
each applicant when all test results have been revealed is such that the 
bank just breaks even. Borrowers with only a single offer will be charged 
the maximum interest rate - this is not surprising as, in the absence of 
other lenders, the bank making the offer is a monopolist.
4.2  T h e m odified  setu p
I specifically assume that in the standard interest rate competition game 
as outlined in the previous chapter, there are now two rounds instead 
of just one. After the first round, applicants can reapply to all those 
banks who made them an offer in the first round and try to negotiate 
a lower interest rate. To do this, they show evidence of all the offers 
they have obtained. Since it is clearly in an applicant’s interest to show 
all the offers obtained and since applications to banks are assumed to 
be costless, an applicant with m  offers must have got n — m  rejections 
when the number of banks is n. A bank that has rejected an applicant 
in round 1 cannot make an offer in round 2. For ease of exposition, let (3 
(the probability that a bad project is successful) equal zero. To simplify, 
I assume that all of these applicants still want to borrow. It is consistent 
with the model setup that applicants do not know their type.
D efinition 3 D e f i n e = ' + ( ~ )  ( j ^ )  '
As I  show below, this is the repayment at which a bank can break even 
lending to an applicant that has obtained m offers from n banks.
A SSU M PTIO N  4’:
< rm ax  (4.!)
Then the following result obtains:
Proposition  4 The interest rate competition game with renegotiation 
has the following equilibrium in pure strategies: In round 1 all banks ask 
for R max from an accepted applicant In round 2 if m = 1 (the applicant 
does not have any other offers) the initial offer of RMAX is not modified. 
I f  m > 2 (i.e., the applicant obtains at least one additional offer), set
a
Proof: To see that R [ — \ is indeed the repayment at which a bankw
breaks even lending to an applicant with m offers from n  banks, note
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that the number of good signals in n applications is a binomial random 
variable and the probability of obtaining m  offers in n applications will 
depend on type as follows. Let ( — ) denote that m  offers have been
W
obtained in n applications. Then
Prob( Q  |G) =  (  # ( 1  -  qG)n- m (4.2)
Prob( Q  |B) =  (1 -  qBT q l - m (4.3)
Also note that Pr ob(G) = 7 and Pr ob{B) =  1 — 7 . Then by Bayes’
Rule:
Prob{ I — ] |G) Pr 06(G)
P r o 6 (G |g ) )  =
Prob{ ( ^  j  |G) Pr 06(G) +  Prob( ( ^  ) |B) Pr 06(B)
C f1 _  9c)n_m7 +  ^ )  (1 -  qB)mq%~m(i -  7 )
m(and similarly for PTob(B\ ^—J )). Then
<4-4'
 ^ qG ' Kl - q G} 7
and noting the definition of i.e. Pr ob(G\ =
establishes the result.
As by assumption 4’ i?[ —) < R MAX, a bank will initially offer aW
loan at the repayment R MAX to any applicant for whom the test result is 
favorable. Charging a repayment higher than R MAX does not make sense 
and charging less than RMAX cannot be optimal, as a bank can always 
lower but not raise its offer in round two and has no advantage from 
setting a lower rate in round one. If the applicant does not manage to 
obtain any additional offers, the bank is a monopolist and does not need 
to revise its interest rate offer downwards. The condition R \ —] < R maxW
ensures that this is (weakly) profitable for the bank, as ^ is the 
repayment at which a bank can break even lending to an applicant that 
has obtained m  offers from n banks. If the applicant has at least one
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additional offer, the proof showing that charging R \ — J is an equilibrium\ n j
price simply follows Bertrand’s classic argument for the case of price 
competition with constant unit costs. To see that jR | — } is indeed aw
Nash equilibrium, note that ah banks make zero profits at this interest 
rate. A bank lowering its price below R\ — ) will make losses whereas
W
a bank charging more than ^ will not have any borrowers and 
still make zero profits. For n = 2 banks, this is a unique pure strategy 
equilibrium. As for additional equilibria when n > 2, note that charging 
less than R  ( — j would result in losses. The worst that can happen to
W
a bank charging R  ( — I or more is to break even, so it is clearly not
W
optimal to charge less than R  ( — 1. If one bank were to be alone in
W
charging Hi — ) and its rivals all demanded strictly more than R I —
W \ n
then clearly the bank charging the lower price is not behaving optimally 
as it could make strictly positive (instead of zero) profits by raising its 
price a little. However, any combination of interest rates involving at
least two banks charging H( — ) would be an equilibrium.
W
Note that assumption 4’ is a generalized version of Assumption 4. To 
see this note that assumption 4 with =  0 becomes
 _ ? 2 T _ ------  R M A X  >  !  (4 5)
Qg I  +  (1 -  Qb ) (1  - 7)
Thus assumption 4 is a special case of R ( —J < R max obtained byw
setting n = 1. In terms of the economics, assumption 4’ (one good signal 
out of n tests) is more restrictive than assumption 4 (one good signal out 
of one attempt) in the sense that if assumption 4’ holds, then so must 
assumption 4.
R em ark  5 It follows from the definition that R \ — ) > R \ m  ), i.e.
\ n j  \  n J
> ( - )  > > ^ (the higher the number
of offers given the number of banks, the higher the average quality of the 
applicant and the lower the break-even rate). In fact, it can be shown
.1 . .  QG QB r ^ A ™ + l
R em ark 6 An applicant obtaining m offers from n +  1 banks must on 
average be less creditworthy than an applicant obtaining the same number
of offers from n banks: ^  f ac >^ —IjTy) ~ ^  =
1 - q G \ n j
This can be seen as follows:
\  / 1 \  m /  \  n+1—m /
R 1 ^ L \  = 1 + ( 1 - 9 A  (  IB \  ( 1 - y
n + 1) \  qG J \ l - q G/  \  7
 ^ \  m /  \  n—m /  \  /  -,
i  ~ Q b \  l  Qb  \  (  qB w  i  -  7
=  1 + qG J \ l - q GJ \ \ - q GJ \  7 
Qb
=  1 + M ? ) - >
R em ark 7 It is good news when both the number of offers and the num-
r ( m \  /ra  + 1\  fm  4- Tber of tests increase by one: ft I — 1 > R I  — j , since ft [
j i )  \  n + 1  /  V^ +  l
=  1 - q B 
Qg
Note that
' . -i\ / 1 \ / i  \  m /  \  n+1—(m+1) /
R i m  ) 11 '  1 ~ qB ' '  I  Qb \  / 1 — 7
n + l j  \  Qg J \  qc J \1  - g c /  V 7
=  1 +
The reason that assumption 4’ is required is that with Ri — | >W
R max, the bank must be making losses on applicants to whom no other 
bank has made an offer. The setup of the model guarantees that every 
bank in the market will end up with some of these borrowers. Since - 
following the above reasoning - the bank would still make zero profits 
on all borrowers with 2 or more offers, the bank’s expected profit when 
R i —] > R max must be negative. Then the bank is surely better offW . . .
not making any offers at all. However, it is not an equilibrium for all
banks to leave the market. Assuming that all other n — 1 banks leave the 
market and decide not to lend, Assumption 4 guarantees that the n — th 
bank has an incentive to stay in the market. The conclusion is that when 
RMAX, any equilibrium must involve the use of mixed strategiesW
which, however, I do not believe to be of much interest nor particularly 
plausible in the present setting. I therefore rule out that possibility via 
assumption 4’.
4 .3  E ntry
The above comments relate to a situation with a given number of banks. 
Assuming that banks enter sequentially, how many banks will enter the 
market? When there are already x banks in the market, entry will occur 
if a single bank charging R MAX that is alone among x+1 banks in making 
an offer to an applicant can break even. This will be the case if and only 
if
R \ P P i ) - RMAX
This can also be written as
< Qb Nx ^  ( dMAX i\  7 Qg
Note that the l.h.s. is increasing in x  and so the higher x the more 
unlikely it is that an additional bank has an incentive to enter the market. 
(The assumption of a fixed market size is maintained.)
4 .4  Surplus
As ultimately my concern is with the allocation of capital, a question 
worth asking is what the relationship is between the intensity of com­
petition in the modified game and the net surplus generated by the en­
trepreneurs’ borrowing (gross surplus generated by good projects minus 
loan losses on bad projects). It turns out that the effect of more intense 
competition is unambiguously beneficial.
Proposition 8 Free entry maximizes the net surplus.
Proof: Let S (x) denote the net surplus as a function of the number 
of banks. S(x) — [Number of good borrowers with x banks (RMAX — 1)+ 
Number of bad borrowers with x banks (—1)] =  (1—(1—qG)x)l{R MAX ~  1)
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— (1 — <7b)(1 — 7 ) Under which condition would S(x  +  1) be greater than 
S(x)7
S(x + 1) =  (1 -  (1 -  qG)x+1H R MAX -  1) -  (1 -  « |+I)(1 -  7)
=  [1 -  (1 -  «,)*(! -  qG)]l(RMAX -  1) -  [1 -  <fB( 1 -  (1 -  t e ))](l -  7 )
=  [1 -  (1 -  qGf  +  (1 -  qG)xqGh ( R MAX ~  1) -  [1 -  <fB + <£(1 -  qB)} (1 -  7)
This can be split up as follows
= [1 -  (1 -  qo)xM R MAX -  1) -  (1 -  «S)(1 -  7)
V   - ............................................../
S(x)
+(1 -  qGrqG7(RMAX -  1) -  q%( 1 -  <te)(l -  7>
So S(x + 1) -  S(x) = (1 -  qc)xqGj(RMAX -  l) -  g |( l  -  qs)(l -  7)- 
This means that
S(x  +  1) — S(x) > 0
(1 -  qG)xqGl ( R MAX -  1) -  9b (1 -  Q b ) (  1 -  7 ) > 0 
(1 -  qG)xqGl ( R MAX -  1) > <fB{ 1 -  <te)(l -  7 )
^  (Rmax -  1) - ? ----- ^
1 — 7 1 — qs 1 — qG
This shows that S(x + 1) — 5'(a:) > 0 if and only if ( <  (RMAX — 
1) But that is just the condition for entry to occur.
Banks’ incentives and those of society are here perfectly aligned. The 
net surplus accrues in the form of either bank profits or profits accruing 
to good borrowers. In the appendix I show that aggregate bank profits 
are falling in the number of banks, whereas the aggregate net surplus 
accruing to good borrowers is increasing in the number of banks (always 
assuming that the number of banks has not yet reached its maximum). 
The preceding proposition shows that the net effect of an increase in the
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number of banks on net surplus is positive. This is an encouraging re­
sult, given negative results obtained in earlier literature and discussed in 
the accompanying literature review. Riordan (1993), for example, using 
an explicit auction framework somewhat similar to Broecker’s implicit 
auction framework in referring to his results notes that ’the model sug­
gests two reasons why more competition in loan markets might damage 
market performance. First, the statistic the market uses to select loans 
may become less informative about the quality of the loan. Second, the 
loan approval practices of individual banks may be too conservative, and 
more competition may make them even more so.’ (p. 330) These win­
ner’s curse - related phenomena cannot arise in the present setting where 
all test results become public.
One may now ask how the surplus is distributed and how an increase 
in the number of banks affects the expected profit of borrowers and banks. 
Loans to bad borrowers are a pure social loss in this framework, but the 
likelihood of a bad borrower obtaining a loan is increasing in the number 
of banks. The average bank must be worse off, for not only do aggregate 
bank profits fall, but these have to be shared among a larger number 
of banks. I formally show that this is the case in the appendix. For a 
good borrower, the expected profit is the product of the probability of 
obtaining a loan (which must increase in the number of banks) and the 
profit per borrower (about which little can be said without more detailed 
analysis as with more banks both good borrowers’ aggregate profits and 
the number of good borrowers among whom these profits are distributed 
increase). I show in the appendix that a good borrower’s expected profit 
is indeed increasing in the number of banks.
4.5 E x p ected  in terest rate for a g ood  bor­
rower
The last point in the preceding section suggests that a good borrower 
must ex ante, i.e. before knowing whether she has obtained at least one 
offer, always prefer more to fewer banks. But would she prefer more 
to fewer banks even conditional on knowing that she has obtained at 
least one offer? Phrased differently, is the average profit accruing to 
each accepted good borrower increasing in the number of banks? It 
turns out that the answer to that question hinges on whether the average 
or expected interest rate paid by a good borrower is decreasing in the 
number of banks. To see this, note that the expected profit per good 
borrower who invests is simply aggregate profits divided by the number
104
of good borrowers:
(1 -  nqG( 1 -  gg)"-1 -  (1 -  qGT h ( R MAX- ! ) - ( ! - n (l -  q g ) ^ 1 -  f B)( 1 -  7)
(1 -  (1 -  qG)n)7
(4.7)
The numerator in the above expression is composed as follows: All 
those good borrowers with only a single offer (of whom there are nqc{ 1 —
Qg)71-1 7 ) are made to pay R MAX and so do not earn any profit. (1 —
Qg)71!  good borrowers do not manage to obtain a loan. All other good 
borrowers obtain a net cashflow of (RMAX — 1). However, because banks 
make exactly zero profit on all borrowers with two or more offers, these 
good borrowers also have to pay the loan losses on all the accepted bad 
borrowers of whom there are (1 — q^) (1 — 7 ). As the loan losses on the 
n (l — g s )^ _1(l — 7) bad borrowers with only a single offer are paid for by 
those good borrowers with only a single offer, the remaining loan losses 
to be covered are (1 — n(l — qB)0B~1 ~Qb){1 ~  7 )-
By taking (1 — (1 — qG)n)l{R MAX — 1) out of the fraction, a good 
borrower’s average profit can be rewritten as
ln MAX ^  nlG (l-q G )n~1'y{R'',AX +
1a > (1 -  (1 -  )7
(4.8)
(Rmax — 1), the net surplus created by a good borrower’s project, is 
independent of the number of banks. However, the second term denotes 
the average interest expense with n banks which depends on the number 
of banks1. Therefore, the average profit per accepted good borrower will 
increase in the number of banks if the average interest expense per good 
borrower is decreasing in the number of banks. The above expression for 
the average interest expense could in principle be differentiated directly 
with respect to n, but the resulting derivative cannot be signed in a 
straightforward way.
That the change in a good borrower’s expected interest rate when
1 An alternative way of obtaining an expression for the expected interest rate is to 
note that the probability that none of n banks makes an offer to a good applicant is 
(1 — qc)n, so the probability that at least one bank makes an offer is (1 — (1 — <JG)n)- 
Conditional on receiving at least one offer, a good borrower’s expected interest rate 
is then E(R\m >  1, n, G) =
o V - W "*-'11 - + 1  Q c t 1 - < « )
However, {E(R\m >  1 ,n , G) — E(R\m >  l , n + l ,  G)} cannot be signed in a straight­
forward way.
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the number of banks increases should be ambiguous becomes plausible 
when one decomposes the expected interest rate with n banks into its 
two components. The expected interest rate for a good borrower when 
there are n banks can be rewritten as:
nqG{ 1 -  go)71- 1 'y(RMAX -  1) -  n (l -  qB)qnB-l {l -  7) (1 -  gg)( 1 -  7 )
(1 -  (1 -  qG)n) l  (1 -  (1 -  qG)n)7
(4.10)
The expression is obtained straight from the preceding fraction by simply 
grouping banks’ revenues on those good borrowers with only a single 
offer, nqG(l — qG)n~1j ( R MAX — 1), with their loan losses on the accepted 
bad borrowers with only a single offer, n (l — g#)g^-1(l — 7 ). The first 
term, therefore, consists of bank profits (divided by the number of good 
borrowers) which - as I show in the appendix - are decreasing in the 
number of banks. The second term denotes the ratio of bad borrowers 
to good borrowers which is increasing in the number of banks.
The change in a good borrower’s expected interest rate is therefore 
the sum of two opposing effects. The intuition underlying this result is 
that with an additional bank, on the one hand banks’ monopoly power is 
reduced. In the situation in which an applicant obtains only a single offer, 
the bank is a monopolist and the borrower is completely expropriated 
(whereas with two or more offers, the borrower only pays the actuarially 
fair interest rate). Having to hand over the entire cashflow RMAX, all else 
being equal, drives up the expected interest payment. As this is less likely 
to happen when there is an additional bank (the probability of obtaining 
two offers or more goes up), the effect is to reduce the expected interest 
payment. On the other hand, an additional lender gives bad projects an 
additional opportunity of obtaining funding. This increases loan losses 
on bad projects which have to be covered by the good borrowers through 
their interest payments. Therefore, the second effect of an additional 
lender is to increase the good borrowers’ expected interest payments.
4 .6  B reak-even  rates non-m onoton ic in  ac­
curacy
An observation that is somewhat puzzling at first glance is that the banks’ 
break-even rate R  ( — ) is not monotonically decreasing in qG and Qb (the
W
parameters which measure the bank’s accuracy in correctly identifying 
an applicant’s type). Differentiating with respect to these parameters
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gives:
d _ ( m \  . ., _ /  m \  . n Tm .
(») - (_ )|K(»J_ < 4 n |
dqB qB( i - q B)^ qB
n — m
n (4.12)
Thus a bank’s break-even rate will decrease in qc iff. <?g < ~  and 
it will decrease in qB iff. qB > Is there a convincing economic
interpretation for this? Why might a break-even rate ever increase when 
the signal accuracy increases?
The answer lies in noting that the break-even rate is determined for 
a fixed ratio of offers (m) to tests (n). Say that #g = ~ initially and 
that it increases by a small amount: The break-even rates for all those 
applicants with more than k offers then decrease and the break-even 
rates for all those applicants with less than k offers increase. That makes 
perfect sense, for a low number of offers with a more accurate test is 
worse news than with a less accurate test and the break-even rates for 
these applicants should be revised upwards accordingly. Similarly, a high 
number of offers is better news with a more accurate test than with a less 
accurate test and so break-even rates for such borrowers should fall. As 
qc increases from near zero at first only the break-even rates of the worst 
applicants will increase whereas the break-even rates for the lower-risk 
applicants will fall. However, as qc increases towards one, the break-even 
rates on intermediate borrowers that had initially fallen in qc will start 
to increase again until eventually, for very high levels of qc almost all 
applicants except for the very lowest risk groups will see their break­
even rates increase and not fall. To look at the extremes, the break-even 
rate for applicants with a single offer will only decrease in qc if <?g < 
whereas the break-even rate of an applicant who obtains offers from all 
the banks that she applies to decreases in qc as long as qc < 1 =
An analogous reasoning applies to qB (albeit in reverse): As qB in­
creases from zero, the break-even rates for all but the best applicants 
increase in qB. However, as qB increases further, the break-even rates 
for even intermediate risks start falling in qB and as qB nears one, the 
break-even rates for all but the worst risks will be decreasing in qB.
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4 .7  C onclusion
In the present chapter I showed that when moving away from the auc­
tion framework used by Broecker by allowing applicants to renegotiate 
their offers (based on the total number of offers they have received), the 
modified game has an equilibrium in pure strategies where for a given 
number of banks an applicant’s interest rate decreases with the number 
of offers obtained. Surplus unambiguously increases with entry as long as 
additional banks have an incentive to enter. Therefore, free entry maxi­
mizes surplus. The intuition behind this result is that in a setup where 
testing is costless and results become public knowledge, each additional 
bank will test all applicants and aggregate information improves.
Note that this finding is robust to differences in testing accuracy. To 
see this, note that in the first round of interest rate offers, banks still 
ask for the maximum interest rate (the entire cashflow of a successful 
project) regardless of their accuracy. No matter how accurate a bank, in 
the first round the bank has nothing to lose by setting such a high rate. 
It can always revise the offer down in the second round. However, if it 
turns out to be the only lender that has made an offer, it can get away 
with the high rate so there is no incentive to make a lower first-round 
offer. In the second round, all creditworthiness assessments still become 
common knowledge, because the applicants’ incentives to reveal all their 
offers is unchanged. Creditworthiness assessments of different accuracies 
still become public knowledge and are taken into account by all banks 
in the revised estimate of the applicant’s default probability. Under the 
maintained assumption that a bank’s accuracy is known, having a more 
accurate testing technology therefore does not offer a bank an advantage. 
All borrowers with two or more offers will continue to be charged the 
actuarially fair interest rate; applicants with a single offer have to accept 
a repayment of RMAX.
In the model presented here, competition unambiguously has a ben­
eficial effect. However, one does well to remember that this result is 
obtained for a specific set of assumptions, most importantly the assump­
tion that testing is costless. When testing is costless, free-riding on rivals’ 
creditworthiness assessments is not a concern with respect to surplus. 
However, in much of the work that is sceptical with respect to compe­
tition, the various surplus-increasing activities of banks (ex ante testing 
etc.) are costly. If the information obtained by, for example, expending 
managerial effort on accurate creditworthiness assessments becomes com­
mon knowledge - as is the case in the present chapter - then this would 
destroy the incentive to produce this information in the first place. As it
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is rather plausible that creditworthiness assessments and other types of 
monitoring are costly, this observation clearly points at the limits of the 
model presented here. The results would not carry through into a more 
general setting in which screening is costly.
However, the model does show that results that rely on modeling 
bank competition as a Broecker-style (first-price, sealed-bid, common 
value) auction (and the resulting winner’s curse effect) must be inter­
preted with caution, too. As illustrated here, these may not be robust 
to borrowers being able to renegotiate loan offers from individual banks 
on the basis of all the loan offers obtained. Clearly, the question is 
whether an auction framework is appropriate for modeling bank compe­
tition. Based on the empirical evidence discussed in the literature review 
and personal observation in the course of my fieldwork, I argue that it is 
not, at least not as far as lending to small- and medium-sized businesses 
is concerned. The implication for banking theory is that the modeling 
of bank competition and creditworthiness tests should be robust to the 
possibility of test results becoming (partially) public and thus available 
to competitors.
4.8  A p p en d ix
4.8.1 A ggregate profit accruing to  good borrowers
I will first show that the aggregate profit (or net surplus) accruing to good 
borrowers is increasing in the number of banks if the number of banks 
has not yet reached its maximum. To see this, note that with n banks, 
(1 — (1 — qc)n) j  good applicants each realize a payoff of (R MAX — 1) as 
(1 — qG)ni  good applicants are not accepted by at least one bank. These 
good borrowers must be paying for the loan losses on those bad borrowers 
with 2 or more offers [of whom there are Pr ob(m > 2 |n ,£ )( l  -  7 ) =  
(1 — n(l — <?s) ^ _1 — <?£?)( 1 — 7 )], a category of borrower on which the 
banks merely break even. All those good borrowers with only one offer 
(of whom there are nqc{ 1 — qG)n~ll) ,  however, have to hand over their 
entire cashflow of R MAX which goes to cover loan losses on bad borrowers 
with only a single offer (of whom there are n( 1 — qs)q%~1{l — 7 )) and also 
earns some strictly positive profits for the banks as long as the number of 
banks has not yet reached its maximum. The aggregate profit obtained 
by good borrowers when there are n banks is therefore given by
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(l-n9G(l-9G)"-1- ( l - ?G)")7(fiM'4x-l)-(l-n(l-9B)9r1-9S)(l-7)
(4.13)
To see whether this is increasing in n, the number of banks, one 
could in principle simply differentiate the expression with respect to n. 
However, the resulting derivative cannot be signed in a straightforward 
way. That is not surprising for there is no reason to think that the 
good borrowers’ profits are increasing monotonically in n for any number 
of banks. However, by comparing good borrowers’ profits with n and 
with n + 1  banks and making use of the assumption that the number 
of banks has not yet reached its maximum, it is possible to show that 
good borrowers’ profits are indeed increasing in the number of banks. 
Aggregate good borrowers’ profits with n +  1 banks are given by
(1 -  (n + l)<te(l -  qc)" -  (1 -  QgT+1)i{ R MAX ~  1)
A
— (1 — (n +  1)(1 — qB)q i -  qB+1)(l “  7) (4.14)
'------------------ s/------------------ '
B
In order to obtain the difference between good borrowers’ aggregate 
profits with n and with n +  1 banks, I first obtain alternative expressions 
for A =[1 -  (n +  1)?g(1 -  Qg)71 ~(1 -  qG)n+1] and B  =[1 — (n +  1)(1 -
qB)qnB ~  q ? 1]:
1 -  (n +  1)<7g(1 -  q cT  -  (1 -  gc)n+1 =
1 — nqc( 1 — <7G)n-1(l — Qg) ~ q d  1 — qc)n ~  (1 — Qg)u{ 1 — Qg) —
l - n q d l - q c T  1+riqd^~QG)n 1-qG(l-QG)n- ( l-q G )n+ (l-qG )nqG =
1 -  nqG{ 1 -  qG)n~1 -  (1 -  qG)n +  nq2G( 1 -  qG)n_1
An alternative way of writing — B  = — [1 — (n +  1)(1 — qs)qB ~ Qb+1] 
is obtained as follows:
-(1  -  (n +  1)(1 -  qB)qnB -  g”+1) =  
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-(1  -  n( 1 -  qB)qnB J[1 -  (1 -  qB)\ -  (1 -  qB)qB ~ qB[ 1 -  (1 -  qB)]) =
- (1  -  n( 1 -  qB)qnB 1 +  n(l -  qB)2qB 1 -  (1 -  qB)qB -  +  (1 -  qB)qB) =
- ( 1  -  n (l -  q ^ q ^ 1 ~Qb + n (! -
Substituting the expressions thus obtained in the above expression 
for good borrowers’ aggregate profit with n +  1 banks, then subtracting 
from this good borrowers’ aggregate profits with n banks and eliminating 
identical terms, the difference between good borrowers’ profits with (n +  
1) banks and with n banks reduces to
n & d  -  qa)n- ^ ( R MAX -  1) -  n(l -  qB)2<&-'(l -  7)
Thus if I can show this expression to be positive, I will have shown
that good borrowers’ aggregate profit is increasing in the number of 
banks. Equivalently I could show that
nq%{ 1 -  qG)n~ll{ R MAX -  1) -  n (l -  q s f q ^ A  -  7 ) > 0
<(+ nq2G{ 1 -  qG)n 1'y(RMAX -  1) > n(l -  qB)2qB *(1 -  7 )
^  (I— > j 
qB 1 — 7 1 — qB
^  A  ~  Qg \n-i 7 w l  -  QB\ 2  1 M 1
> ( _ T )(^ ) (r m ax- 1) (4-15)
It is here that the assumption that the number of banks has not yet 
reached its maximum comes in. I know that when the number of banks 
has not yet reached its maximum, it is true that
(—!—  )n < (Rmax -  1) ■ QG (4.16)
1 — Qg 1 — 7 1 — qB
which can also be written as
1^_QG\n > .I r j y  1------- (4 17)
K Qb  } ~  7 Qg (Rm a x ~  1) K }
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QbMultiplying both sides in (4.17) by (-------- ) yields
1 -  Qg
, 1 - g O y - i  >  1 - 7  Qb  1 - g B 1 
( qB 1 “ 7 1 - q c  qo (RMAX ~ 1) 1 ’
Using this result in (4.15) above one obtains
1 - 7  Qb  1 -  Qb  1  ^ 1 - 7 , 1 - ^  2>   -----
7 1 — qc Qg (RMAX — 1) 7 qc (RMAX — 1)
«■ > j  (419)
1 — Qb  1 — <7g
which is clearly true. This shows that the good borrowers’ aggregate 
profit is increasing in the number of banks, as long as the number of 
banks has not yet reached its maximum.
4.8.2 B anks’ aggregate profit
A bank breaks exactly even on all those borrowers who have two or 
more offers. However, up to the maximum number of banks it makes 
a strictly positive profit on those borrowers who only get one offer - in 
other words, for whom the bank is a monopolist. With n competitors, 
banks’ aggregate profits are thus simply given by
nqG{ 1 -  qa)n~ H R MAX ~ 1) ~ "(1 “ <te)<fi_1(l -  7) (4.20)
Again it is not obvious from differentiating with respect to n whether 
aggregate bank profits are decreasing in the number of banks (as long as 
that number has not yet reached its maximum). However, it is possible to 
show that aggregate bank profits with n banks are greater than aggregate 
bank profits with n +  1 banks as long as the number of banks has not 
yet reached its maximum. First, note that aggregate bank profits with 
n +  1 banks are given by
(n +  l)<ta(l -  qGr i ( R MAX -  1) -(n + 1)(1 -  qB)q%( 1 -  7 )
C D
Part C can be rewritten as follows:
(n +  l)«fc(l -  qG)nl (R MAX -  1) =
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ngG( 1 -  -  qch(RMAX -  1) + <7c( 1 -  qa)nl(R MAX ~ 1) =
nqG( l -q G)n- 1'y(nMAX- l ) - n q l ( l - q G)’' -1y(RMAX-l)+qG( l -q G)’''y(RMAX- l )  = 
nqG(l—qG)n~1'y(RMAX—l)—qG(l—qG)n~1j ( R MAX—l){n[l — ( l—qG)} — ( l—qG)} =  
rigG(l -  qG)n~'l(RMAX -  l ) - ? G(l-9 G )’1_17(-RM'4X- l ) [ n - ( « + l ) ( l - 9 G ) ]
' --------------------------------------------------S,------------------------------------------------- '
*
In the same way, part D can also be rewritten:
- ( n  + 1)(1 -  qB)qB(l ~  7) =
- n ( l  -  qB)qnB~l [l -  (1 -  gB)](l -  l )  ~  (1 -  9b)9b(! ~ l )  =
-n {  1 -  qB)qB~l ( 1 “  7) +  ^(1 ~ 9b)29£~1(1 ~ 7) “  (1 -  9b)9£(1 -  7) =
- n ( l  -  qB)qB~l { 1 -  7 ) +  (1 -  “  7)fa(l “  9b) “  9b] =
- n ( l  -  qB)qB~l { 1 -  7 ) +  (1 -  qB)qB~ \ l  -  7)[n -  (n + l)gB]
' ~ '♦
When subtracting bank profits for n + 1 banks from the expression for 
bank profits for n banks, inspection shows that the terms marked with 
an asterisk cancel out. The difference is thus given by
qG(l-qG)n~1'y(RMAX- l ) [n - (n - \ - l ) ( l -q G) ] - ( l - q B)q%-1( l - 'y ) [n-(n+l)qB]
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If this can. be shown to be positive, banks’ aggregate profits with n 
banks are greater than with n 1 banks. Alternatively, I can show that
>MAX
1 -  7 1 -  qB
7 Qg [n -  (n +  l)( l -qc)] > n - ( n  + l)qB
Substituting (4.18) on the left-hand side, the inequality reads
1 - 7  qB 1 ~<7B 1
7 1— qa <Jg (RMAX — 1)
Canceling terms, one obtains
1 -  qc
^ — [n -  (n +  1)(1 -  qG)\ > n -  (n +  1 )qB
^  qBn ~ qB{n +  1 ) ( 1  -  qc) >  ( 1  -  Qc)n -  (1 -  qc){n +  1 )qB 
which reduces to
qB >  (1  -  <Zg)
which is clearly true and proves the claim that banks’ aggregate profits 
are decreasing in the number of banks.
4.8.3 E xpected  profit for a good borrower
For a good borrower, the expected profit is the product of the probability 
of obtaining a loan (which must increase in the number of banks) and 
the profit per borrower (about which a priori little can be said as with 
more banks both good borrowers’ aggregate profits and the number of 
good borrowers among whom these profits are distributed increase). It 
is, however, possible to show that a good borrower’s expected profit is 
indeed increasing in the number of banks. The expected profit with n 
banks is given by
Good borrowers’ aggregate profits with n banks _ . . , „ . ——  -------------—-------------- —-----------    * Pr ob(m > 1 G, n)
Number of good borrowers with n banks
Pr ob(m > 1|G, n) *7 . By cancelling the probabilities the expected profit 
with n banks can thus be written simply as
(4.21)
Now note that the number of good borrowers with n banks is simply
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Good borrowers’ aggregate profits with n banks
7
In the same way, a good borrower’s expected profits with n + 1 banks 
can be written as
Good borrowers’ aggregate profits with n+1 banks
7
But it was already shown that the aggregate profits increase in the 
number of banks, so a good borrower’s expected profit with n +  1 banks 
must be greater than with n banks.
4.8 .4  E xpected  profit per bank
As noted above, with n competitors banks’ aggregate profits are given 
by
n<7c(l -  9c)"”1 'f(RMAX -  1) -  »(1 -  qB)q T i Ci ~  7) (4-22)
With n +  1 competitors, the corresponding expression is
(n +  l)9c(l -  qG)nl(R MAX -  1) -  (n +  1)(1 -  qB)qnB( 1 -  7) (4.23)
Average (or expected) profits in the two cases are then given by
*j(i -  qc)"-1 i (Rm ax  - 1) -  (i -  feJflST'U -  7)
for the case of n competitors and
9c ( l -  qC)nl (R MAX -  1) -  (1 -  qB)ql( 1 -  i )
for n + 1 banks. I wish to show that - as asserted in the paper - 
average profits with n banks are greater than average profits with n +  1 
banks. This means showing that
9g (1 -  qGT - H R MAX -  1)  -  (1 -  qB) q T \  1 -  7 )
> 9c(l -  qa)nl (R MAX - ! ) - ( ! -  qs)q%( 1 -  7)
«• 9o(l -  <ta)"-,7 (flM'4X -  1) -  (1 -  -  7)
>  9g ( 1 -  qG)"~X~t{RMAX — 1)(1 — 9g ) -  (1 -  qB)qB~'(  1 -  7)[1 -  (1 -  9b )]
115
<*> <& ( 1 -  9G) " - '7 ( f i M^  -  1) >  (1 -  q B f q nB- \  1 -  7)
, . 9G 9G 7 / t)M AX  -j \  ^ / 9B \n—1
*  T ^ T ^ T ^ (iJ - J) > (T 3 ^ )
^  HB HG HG J ( t>MAX  i \  ^  /  HB 
^  l - g a l - q B l - g B l ^ {R - 1 ) > ( T ^ )
S V . I ««' y
Once again making use of the condition that the number of banks has 
not yet reached its maximum and that, therefore, (as indicated by the 
bracket)
9g 7  / r>MAX i \  t  9b Nn
T ^ T s — ^  ~ l ) ^  (r ^ - )
it is shown that the average profit for n banks is greater than the 
average profit for n +  1 banks.
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Chapter 5
Bank Com petition and 
X-Inefficiency
5.1 In trod u ction
In the literature review I showed that the theoretical literature is sceptical 
with respect to bank competition. The empirical literature, however, 
finds substantial gains from more intense bank competition. I argued 
that while the two literatures are not asking exactly the same questions, 
there is enough of an overlap to claim that, painting with a broad brush, 
these results contradict each other. The main purpose of the present 
chapter is to offer a possible resolution for this discrepancy.
In a nutshell, my argument is the following: The main role of more 
intense competition may be that of a discipline device - a point over­
looked in the existing banking literature. When other mechanisms of 
corporate governance fail for whatever reason (and, as the evidence on 
X-inefiiciency in banks suggests, they do fail), a major benefit of more in­
tense competition may be that it forces managers to work harder (which 
in turn improves the allocation of capital). The existing theoretical 
work cannot capture this effect because it assumes that banks are profit- 
maximizing entities. In the present chapter I formalize this conjecture 
and demonstrate that in the presence of an effort-minimizing bank, sur­
plus unambiguously increases in the intensity of competition. The evi­
dence is certainly consistent with this line of reasoning.
In the next section, I present the building blocks for the model: the 
way in which I model bank competition and X-inefiiciency plus a set of 
standard assumptions. In section 5.3., I study the benchmark case of 
two profit-maximizers competing against each other and in the following 
section, I let a profit-maximizer compete against an effort-minimizer. 
This section (5.4.) is the main part of the chapter and is followed by a
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brief discussion of possible extensions and a conclusion. Many derivations 
have been moved to the appendix to unburden the exposition.
5.2 T h e  B asic M odel: A ssu m p tion s and  
M otivation
In the literature review I argued that certain assumptions recur in the 
bank competition literature and that models differ mainly in their as­
sumptions with respect to cashflow distributions, the technology that 
helps to overcome information problems (e.g., a monitoring technology), 
and the way competition is modeled. In the following sub-section I re­
state the standard assumptions that I use. I then motivate and discuss 
the two innovations of this paper. First, on a technical note, the way I 
model interest-rate competition is novel. Second, in a more substantial 
departure from the literature I allow for an agency problem on the part of 
the bank that leads the manager to minimize effort rather than maximize 
profit.
5.2.1 Standard assum ptions
When project cashflow distributions are invariant and common knowl­
edge, there is no role for monitoring or screening and there is no role for 
competition either: In particular, the interest rate is irrelevant; it merely 
redistributes surplus but does not affect how much surplus is generated. 
(This property, however, is not robust to even small modifications. A 
bankruptcy cost, for example, would ensure that only the lowest feasible 
interest rate maximizes surplus.) In the following I focus on monitoring, 
not screening, so I assume that cashflow distributions are common knowl­
edge. However, monitoring alleviates a moral hazard problem which I 
explain in the next sub-section.
As is commonly assumed in the literature, entrepreneurs are very 
passive: They all require one unit of capital each to start a project, 
but have no funds of their own (no equity) and no collateral. There 
are no bankruptcy costs and no application costs (though I will allow 
for processing costs to be borne by the bank as part of a horizontal 
differentiation setup). Projects are homogeneous except for location. 
Since the assumption that every entrepreneur borrows from a single bank 
only is maintained, there is - unlike, for example, in Thakor (1996) - no 
question of monitoring costs being duplicated. All agents are risk-neutral.
The existence of financial intermediaries and the use of standard debt
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contracts is assumed. I have three comments to make on these two short­
cuts: 1. They are standard in the bank competition literature. That in 
itself is not a good justification, but it is indicative of the difficulties 
inherent in building a model that explains everything. 2. Financial in­
termediaries exist and standard debt contracts are the main contractual 
form used when these lenders put capital at the disposal of entrepreneurs. 
3. Both institutions - that of the financial intermediary as well as the 
use of standard debt contracts - axe endogenized in other contributions.
1 stick to a one-shot static setup which, even though this is the ap­
proach chosen by much of the literature, strikes me as a more serious 
misdemeanor than simply assuming the existence of financial interme­
diaries. Clearly, at least in terms of the number of transactions (if not 
lending volume) only a small share of real-world lending to businesses 
occurs in the true arms-length setting that the static setup implies and 
these are likely transactions that are little different from disintermedi­
ated direct finance (typically involving large borrowers that are relatively 
transparent thanks, for example, to an agency rating). In other words, 
the specifics of financial intermediation are more appropriately explored 
by investigating a dynamic model [as, for example, in Petersen and Raj an 
(1995)] or, possibly, even an infinitely repeated game [as, for example, in 
Ding (2000)]. However, a static framework is sufficient to make the point 
I wish to illustrate.
The loan portfolio of each bank is assumed to consist of a contin­
uum of projects. This avoids the problems associated with aggregate 
uncertainty. Since banks’ cashflows are effectively non-stochastic, it is 
plausible that a bank should always be able to repay its debts1. The rate 
of return p > 1 (at which banks can borrow any amount of funds) serves 
as the benchmark for determining whether a project is surplus-increasing 
(it is a positive NPV project) or it is not (it is a negative NPV project)2. 
I shall stick to the partial-equilibrium framework that is conventionally 
used in the bank competition literature and accept p as exogenously given 
(determined by savers’ preferences etc). In the absence of a well-founded 
social welfare function that would allow me to make value judgements 
with respect to distributional effects, the concept of surplus is the best
XI will argue that the bank manager will not default as long as he can avoid it 
and that he always can avoid default indeed. Lenders know this and will, therefore, 
not be troubled by the assumption (to be discussed below) that the bank’s return is 
unknown.
2 There is no discounted cash-flow analysis in any of the following, but I shall 
nevertheless use the customary phrase ’positive (negative) net present value (NPV) 
project’ for projects that are socially valuable (wasteful) in that they generate (reduce) 
surplus [they achieve a rate of return greater (lower) than the opportunity cost of 
capital p\.
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criterion available for judging the relative desirability of different alloca­
tions. (I will be using the terms ’surplus’ and ’expected surplus’, ’loss’ 
and ’expected loss’ etc. interchangeably; given the setup, the realized 
values are the same as the expected values.)
I follow the literature and omit allocative efficiency considerations 
from the analysis by keeping demand for loans inelastic. This simplifies 
the model setup and in view of strong evidence of overconfidence may 
not even be that outrageous an assumption3. One reason for this is 
a desire to focus on what is special about banking and that is banks’ 
role in acquiring and processing information as well as their monitoring 
function. Another reason is that allowing demand for credit to be elastic 
means that the precise characteristics of the assumed demand function 
would drive the results.
5.2.2 M odeling com petition
Since I wish to study the effects of more intense competition between 
banks, I need to find a way to parameterize the intensity of competi­
tion. A route chosen by many papers in this strand of research is to 
model competition as pure price (Bertrand) competition and to compare 
the outcomes of monopoly and duopoly (effectively perfect competition). 
This comparison is then said to yield insights as to the effects of more in­
tense competition. The implicit assumption in this is that by comparing 
the extremes, we learn something about what is happening at interme­
diate degrees of competition. I do not mean to claim that this approach, 
for all its lack of granularity, is invalid. However, I wish to make two 
comments:
First, to the extent we want to take a cue from real-world bank com­
petition, we would want to avoid the extremes of monopoly and perfect 
competition: The empirical evidence rather consistently suggests that 
banks enjoy an intermediate degree of market power. Second, many bank 
competition models are set up almost as natural monopolies. Surely that 
calls for caution in interpreting the results, especially when comparing 
monopoly with perfect competition. Bertrand competition will normally 
lead all profits to disappear which, for example, may make it impossible 
to acquire any information. That may be too extreme a description of 
reality.
I believe that limiting attention to the extremes of competition is best 
understood as an attempt to sidestep tractability issues. A typical setup
3 See the references in Manove and Padilla (1999) where over-confidence plays an 
important role.
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investigated in the literature is a two-stage game where banks compete 
in prices (interest rates) in the second stage and in some kind of accuracy 
variable in the first stage. Modeling competition as a Bertrand duopoly 
and monopoly, respectively, means that to all intents and purposes there 
is no strategic interaction at the price competition stage, as there would 
be if, for example, the competition model used were of the Hotelling 
(1929) type which easily becomes intractable in such a setup. One alter­
native approach is to let the interest rate enter parametrically; i.e., let 
the interest rate itself parameterize the intensity of competition [as, for 
example, in Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986) or Petersen and Rajan 
(1995)]. The logic behind this is that more intense competition ought to 
lead to lower interest rates. One might gain in terms of tractability, but 
lose a possibly interesting part of the story, i.e., the explicit modeling of 
the link between competition and the interest rate.
In the following I outline the setup that I employ in this model which 
should go some way toward addressing the concerns raised above. I 
use a tweaked version of the Hotelling model in which competition is 
parameterized in a very smooth fashion (so that results should be some­
what more robust), but which avoids the tractability problems hinted 
at above. Inelastic demand is neatly captured by the standard ’covered 
market’ assumption and the intensity of competition is quite naturally 
parameterized by the transport cost parameter t.
I keep the number of banks (one located at each end of the line4) 
fixed at two and assume that a bank located at x — 0 incurs a process­
ing cost of xt when lending to a borrower located at x. Conversely, the 
bank located at x = 1 incurs a processing cost of (1 — x)t when lend­
ing to the same borrower. Distance (which need not be taken literally 
and might also represent industry specialization) thus captures a cost 
difference, t parameterizes competition and is exogenous (controlled by 
a regulator, for example). In contrast to the standard Hotelling model, 
I do not restrict banks to setting a single interest rate. In fact, each 
bank will set an infinity of different interest rates, although that is an 
artefact of the assumption that applicants constitute a continuum (with 
a mass normalized to one). Entrepreneurs choose purely on the basis 
of the stated interest rate (price). As will become clear, that is not a 
completely innocuous assumption. Some entrepreneurs could achieve a 
higher expected return by choosing their lender strategically.
Apart from lending money, banks may also provide an additional 
service which, in keeping with the standard terminology in the literature,
41 will abstract from endogenizing the location decisions throughout.
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I refer to as "monitoring". If a bank monitors a project, this increases the 
entrepreneur’s expected cashflow as follows. Two production technologies 
are assumed to be available, one of which will lead the project to be 
successful (and thus yield conditional-upon-success cashflow R »  p) 
with probability pn (the high-return technology) and one of which will 
lead to a lower success probability P l  < P h  (th e  low-return technology). 
In the absence of monitoring, only the low-return technology is accessible 
to the borrower. The borrower does not consciously trade-off between 
the gain from a private benefit (there is none) and a reduction in the 
expected cashflow of the project as is often assumed in similar monitoring 
setups [e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)]. Effort does not play a role. 
The technology choice problem is exogenous; no matter how intense the 
competition between banks and, therefore, no matter what the interest 
rate, a borrower on its own is unable to make use of the high-return 
technology. By way of motivation, note that the entrepreneur might 
not even realize that the high-return technology is available. This is 
not a far-fetched assumption: The loan officers I talked to in the course 
of my fieldwork provided an abundance of examples of borrowers being 
totally oblivious to their decisions being misguided. An attentive loan 
officer could alert the entrepreneur to the scope for pursuing a more 
suitable course of action. (There are also, of course, situations of genuine 
disagreement between borrower and lender, but much of the time the 
loan officer’s advice may not be contentious. The banker, talking to 
many entrepreneurs and having an inside view of many companies, simply 
develops specific expertise that many a borrower is not reluctant to draw 
upon.) Therefore, one plausible way of thinking about the monitoring 
service provided by the bank is to view this monitoring as the provision 
of advice, technical and financial know-how, and so on with a beneficial 
effect upon the return distribution. This is also consistent with the way 
that monitoring is viewed in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.
I make the following assumptions:
1. The cost of monitoring is a flat per-borrower cost of m  in terms of 
non-contractible effort.
2. Monitoring is assumed to always be profitable, i.e. {ph ~Pl)p~ 11^  >
0. This implies that monitoring is always efficient' i.e. (pjj —p i)R  — m > 
0.
3. For simplicity, all projects are assumed to be positive NPV projects 
even when they are not monitored: plR  > p + 1.
4. Both banks are competing for all applicants. Not only do banks 
know that the rival is making an offer; interest-rate offers are assumed
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to be common knowledge. I assume that the following tie-breaking rule 
is in use: If both banks offer the same interest rate, the applicant will 
choose the bank with the lower break-even rate (BER). The idea behind 
this assumption is that the bank with the lower BER could always cut 
its offer by an epsilon; rather than fiddle with epsilons I assume that the 
tie-breaking rule applies. This keeps the notation simple.
5.2.3 Formalizing X-inefficiency
A central building block of many models of bank competition is that 
incentives for information acquisition (screening) or monitoring are in­
creasing in market power (margins), so that more intense competition 
may mean lower screening or monitoring effort and less surplus (because 
it leads to lower margins). My point in the present chapter is that this 
mechanism only operates if banks are profit-maximizers. The exact op­
posite may be the case if banks - because of agency conflicts - pursue 
objectives other than profit-maximization. The most important way in 
which I depart from the existing literature thus consists of relaxing the 
assumption of profit-maximization5. In view of compelling evidence of 
banks suffering from X-inefficiency (which I review in section 2.7), it 
is surely reasonable to ask whether this modification lets earlier results 
appear in a new light.
I model banks that suffer from an agency problem as effort-minimizers. 
They monitor as few borrowers as possible, subject to their attaining a 
profit target 7r. The banks are not assumed to be totally indifferent to 
profit above the target level: Preferences are lexicographic in the sense 
that for given effort, the bank prefers more profit to less. (This feature 
is helpful in obtaining equilibrium bidding strategies.)
Which primitive assumptions might justify this setup? As is standard 
in a principal-agent setup, the owner of the bank needs the services of a 
manager to run the bank, the manager’s effort is non-contractible, and 
the manager does not have the capital to purchase the bank. Of course, 
since there is no aggregate uncertainty the return on the loan portfolio is 
non-stochastic. It should be possible to find out exactly what the effort 
level chosen by the manager was, making it exceedingly easy to construct 
an incentive scheme. However, I assume that the bank’s true profits are
5 A few contributions in the literature do consider the presence of a moral hazard 
problem on the part of the bank [for example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and the 
extension by Almazan (2002)], but this is quite different from an agency problem that 
leads the bank manager to exert only as much effort as is strictly required to keep 
the bank afloat. There is also an older literature on expense preference started by 
Williamson (1963) and adapted to banking, largely in empirical work by, for example, 
Edwards (1977), Hannan (1979), and Hannan and Mavinga (1980).
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not observable. In view of the opaqueness of banks and the well-known 
scope for manipulating earnings and hiding losses in banking, this is a 
strong, but not outrageous assumption.
In order to be able to focus on the link between the intensity of 
competition and the allocation of capital without having to deal with 
contract-theoretic considerations, I follow Hart and Moore (1995) and 
Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997, 1999) in assuming away the possi­
bility of more than token incentive compensation. Rather, the contract 
between owner and manager is similar to a standard debt contract: the 
manager keeps the job (which provides him or her with some large, but 
unspecified private benefit) as long as the profit target is met. What 
makes the owner’s threat to fire an underperforming manager credible 
is that the owner could sell the bank to some other investor who would 
put the assets to some other use. Bank branches, for example, might 
be converted to supermarkets. The rate of return that an alternative 
investor could achieve thereby determines the bank owner’s bargaining 
power and the bank manager’s profit target. The competitive rate of 
return p provides a floor, but the banking industry is assumed to be 
different from other industries in that competition is restricted through 
regulation of some sort, so that the rate of return in the banking industry 
is potentially greater than p. The bank manager becomes the de facto 
residual claimant for these potential rents.
The extent to which potential rents axe converted into actual prof­
its rather than slack depends on the banker’s type. A profit-maximizing 
banker will not take profit in the form of slack, whereas an effort-minimizer 
has the lexicographic preferences sketched above and minimizes effort 
subject to attaining the profit target. I assume that the bank manager 
is the only person able to run the bank and that the only limit to his 
or her bargaining power is the owner’s outside option of selling the bank 
to another investor. These assumptions may seem strong, but they cor­
respond surprisingly well to certain features of reality. For example, in 
practitioner statements talk about target rates of return on equity is per­
vasive. However, for a given amount of equity, a target return on equity 
effectively boils down to a profit target.
For a more concrete illustration, consider the fact that around the 
world much of the banking industry is owned by the public sector. The 
bankers working in these public-sector banks may be civil servants; at any 
rate, they will tend to benefit from rather extensive employment guar­
antees. Remuneration structures in state-owned institutions, be they 
banks or ministries, are typically fairly rigid and tend to be built around
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a system of fixed grades with associated, invariable remuneration lev­
els. Whatever the deeper rationale for such a system (which may well 
have a justification), it makes it difficult or impossible to use financial 
incentives to reward performance. If such a system goes hand in hand 
with an employment guarantee, we are not far from the setup described 
above. Employment guarantees are not absolute and a banker could still 
be fired for cause, but it would have to be a very significant and ver­
ifiable underperformance. This minimum performance standard is the 
equivalent of the minimum profit level tt introduced above. Subject to 
this minimum performance standard being met, it is plausible that the 
banker will minimize effort as is assumed here as there is no incentive to 
maximize profit.
Incidentally, one need not consider public-sector banks to find a set­
ting roughly corresponding to the model setup described above. In many 
industries with industry-wide wage bargaining, similar systems of fairly 
inflexible employment grades are in use. In fact, one of the reasons why 
the banks that I visited for my fieldwork were interested in the collabora­
tion was that precisely such a system of fixed grades was in place which 
senior management wanted to replace with a more performance-related 
remuneration system. Clearly, the assumption of effort minimization is 
a strong one, but it is not without plausibility in many real-world insti­
tutional contexts.
5.3 B enchm ark case: C om p etition  b etw een  
tw o profit-m axim izers
To establish a benchmark, I first study the case of two profit-maximizing 
banks. The objective is to find equilibrium bidding strategies, compute 
profit and surplus, and investigate how these respond to changes in the 
intensity of competition, parameterized with the cost parameter t . I 
begin by stating the following
Lemma 9 Conditional on having won a bid, a profit-maximizing bank 
monitors all borrowers at the monitoring stage.
A bank that makes a loan to a borrower against a promised repay­
ment of P  can choose between obtaining P  with probability p i and not 
monitoring or it can incur the cost m  and obtain P  with probability 
Ph. It will be more profitable to monitor i f f  (pnP — m) — p iP  > 0 <=$■ 
(Ph  ~ Pl)P ~  m > 0. It must be the case that P  is strictly greater than
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the refinancing cost p, so [(pn ~Pl)P ~  > [(ph — Pl )p ~  m]. However,
[{Ph ~ Pl)p — m] > 0 by assumption, so the lemma follows.
I can use this result in obtaining the equilibrium bidding strategies.
Proposition 10 The interest-rate competition game has the following 
equilibrium in pure strategies: Let P fk , x , M)  denote the break-even rate 
(BER) for bank k lending to a borrower located at x conditional on the 
bank monitoring the borrower (M ). Then bank k bids as follows: For 
x such that Pfk , x ,M)  < P( l ,x ,M)  under the tie-breaking rule bank 
k wins the loan with a bid of Pf l , x ,M) ,  making an expected profit of 
Ph[E.(1,Xi M )— P(k,x,  M)]. For x such that P(k , x ,M)  > P(l ,x ,M),  
bank k bids P(k,x,  M),  but under the tie-breaking rule bank I wins the 
loan with the same bid ofPfk,  x , M), making an expected profit ofpn[E(k, x , M)- 
P(l, x, M)\
Proof: Throughout the chapter, I will without loss of generality as­
sume that bank A  is located at x = 0 and that bank B  is located at x = 1.
Given that both banks will be monitoring all borrowers, the break-even 
rates are defined by the equations
P h P ( A , x, M) = p + m  + xt
and
PhE.(B, x, M ) = p +  m  +  (1 — x)t 
so the break-even rates are
r>t a p + m  + xtP{A, x, M)  = -------------- (5.1)
P h
and
P(B,x,M)  = P + m + {1- x)t (5.2)
Ph
For an applicant located at x, the difference in BERs is given by
P ( A , x , M ) - P { B , x , M) =
p + m + xt p +  m + (l — x)t 
P h  P h
“ “ [ x f - ( l - x ) t ]  -  
P h
— (2x — l)t 
P h
Clearly, this difference is monotonically increasing in x. For x = 0,
E ( B , x, M)  exceeds E(A,  x, M ) by The reverse result is obtained for
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an applicant located at x = 1 : P_(A, x, M) exceeds P(B,x,  M)  by 
The BERs are equal for x — i.e. each bank takes half the market6. The 
stated strategies are mutually best responses. Given that the lower-cost 
bank bids at the higher-cost bank’s cost, it is an optimal response for the 
higher-cost bank to bid at cost. If the higher-cost bank bid below cost, it 
would make a loss so it would be better off if it raised its bid to its BER. 
If the higher-cost bank asked for a repayment strictly greater than its 
cost, the lower-cost bank could increase its profit by asking for the same 
rate as the higher-cost bank, so that cannot be an equilibrium either. 
Given that the higher-cost bank bids at cost, the lower-cost bank’s best 
response is to ask for the same interest rate for this will ensure that it 
wins the loan. If it asked for a strictly higher repayment, it would not 
win the bid and forego a positive profit, so that cannot be an equilibrium. 
If it offered to lend at a rate strictly lower than the higher-cost bank’s 
bid, it could increase profit by increasing its bid so that cannot be an 
equilibrium either.
Expected profit is less than the difference in break-even rates, for 
the winning bank will be repaid with a probability of pn only. As an 
illustration, consider the expected profit that A makes on a borrower 
located at x < | .  A wins the bid asking for a repayment of P{B, x, M), 
which, however, A  will receive with a probability of pfj only. The cost 
of the loan to A  is p + m  + xt = PhR{A, x , M). Taking the difference, 
A's expected profit is PhR ( B , x, M ) ~PhR{A , x, M) = Ph [R{B, x , M) — 
R(A, x , M)\. I illustrate this in the following diagram.
6 The case of x —  ^ which is not covered by the tie-breaking rule can be ignored, 
because a particular point on the distribution has no positive probability mass. For 
the sake of notational clarity, I assume that entrepreneurs prefer to borrow from bank 
A when the banks’ break-even rates are equal.
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P (A ,x ,M )
t/P.
(p+m )/P ,E (B ,x ,M )
0 .5 1 X0
Break-even rates when both banks are maximizing profit
The diagram shows the break-even rates for both banks increasing in 
the borrower’s distance from the bank. The bank with the lower break­
even rate wins the loan and, conditional on the project’s success, obtains 
the higher break-even rate as repayment. Note that the expected profit 
is not given by the difference in break-even rates, but by the difference 
in break-even rates multiplied by Ph -
5.3.1 Profits and Surplus
It is now possible to obtain profit and surplus and see how these respond 
to changes in t. Profit for each bank is most conveniently obtained as the 
product of the number of borrowers and the average profit per borrower.
Rem ark 11 Alternatively, one can obtain each bank’s profit by integra­
tion. Given the market shares established above, the profit expressionsl
are then t\a = J02( 1 — 2y)t dy and ttb = Ji{2y ~  1)£ dy, respectively. In 
view of the simple structure, I  find the formulation below more intuitive. 
To avoid unnecessary notation, in the remainder of the chapter I  only 
state either the integral formulation or the formulation of profit as the 
product of demand and average per-borrower profit, but I  have in each 
case checked that both approaches give the same result.
Each bank wins a loan portfolio of size one-half (with the total number 
of borrowers normalized to one). The average per-borrower profit is given
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by the borrower located at x = |  for A and by the borrower located at 
x = |  for B.  Therefore,
ft  a  =  I p h [ P ( B ,  X =  i  M) -  P{A, X =  i  Af)]
1
4 (5*3)Pi/ Ph
B's profit is
ftB =  x =  |  M)  -  £(B , rc =  M)]
p + m + - t  p +  m +  (1 — -)£_______ 4 _______  4 t
4
(5.4)
P// P//
Profit is increasing in t. This is not surprising since an increase in t
surplus? All applicants obtain a monitored loan and the average process­
ing cost is | .  Surplus is thus given hy pnR  — p — m — J and is increasing 
in the intensity of competition, because the intensity of competition is 
parameterized by a processing cost that is a social loss. The latter effect 
is not surprising, since it is constructed into the model.
Why are monitoring incentives not affected by t even though less 
intense competition leads to higher margins and therefore makes moni­
toring more valuable? This result is due to the assumption that [([pn — 
P i ) p  — m ] > 0, so that it is always not only efficient but also profitable to 
monitor. The benefit from monitoring is decreasing in the interest rate, 
but even for small t it is larger than the (fixed) cost of effort it entails. 
This is enough to induce a profit-maximizing bank to choose the effi­
cient level of monitoring7. The properties of the monitoring technology 
are an empirical issue about which we know little. Here I assume that 
monitoring has the simple technological structure outlined above.
Lastly, note that the profit expression in the two-profit-maximizers 
case provides an upper bound for the profit target 7r: It makes no sense 
to set a profit target that even a profit-maximizing bank would not be
7 An analogy from the corporate governance literature might be monitoring by 
dominant shareholders. Even though a shareholder with less than one-hundred per­
cent ownership does not reap the full benefit from monitoring management (leaving 
aside tunneling and similar tricks to expropriate other shareholders), the benefit that 
it does obtain may be sufficient to lead it to monitor efficiently (for example, if mon­
itoring is a ’yes or no’ choice as it is here).
corresponds to a reduction in the intensity of competition. What about
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able to attain, so it must be the case that
n < 7 (5.5)4
5 .4  O ne profit-m axim izer and  one effort- 
m inim izer
I next consider the case of one profit-maximizing bank competing against 
one effort-minimizing bank. This section is at the heart of the chapter and 
illustrates how more intense competition can operate as a managerial dis­
cipline device. The key objective in the following is to demonstrate that 
in the presence of an effort-minimizing bank, surplus is monotonically 
decreasing in t (with higher t corresponding to less intense competition) 
and to analyze the various channels through which t affects surplus. In 
the two-profit-maximizers case discussed above, the only effect of t on 
surplus is the direct one: Processing costs are a social loss so higher 
processing costs mean lower surplus. In the present scenario, the effects 
of t on surplus are more complex.
I begin by giving a brief overview. I will show that three regimes 
defined by two particular threshold values of t need to be distinguished: 
For large enough values of t, the effort-minimizer will not monitor at all; 
for intermediate values of t the effort-minimizer will be forced to monitor 
some borrowers and when t is low enough, all of the effort-minimizer’s 
borrowers will be monitored. I will also demonstrate that surplus is 
continuously decreasing in t.
5.4.1 The effort-m inim izer’s break-even rate
Without loss of generality, I assume that A  is the effort-minimizer (lo­
cated at x = 0) and B  the profit-maximizer (located at x = 1). For 
the profit-maximizer, nothing changes: B  will continue to monitor all its 
borrowers; its BER for an applicant located at x  is therefore still given 
by (5.2):
Ph
Let p+m+t define I  and let — define F. Then one can also write
Ph  Ph
P(B, x , M)  as
P( B,x , M)  = I - F x
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Given borrower location, a bank that monitors breaks even at a lower 
rate than if it did not. As I shall show, this gives the profit-maximizer 
an advantage at the interest-rate competition stage.
As for the effort-minimizer A, I need to state break-even rates both 
for the case where A monitors and for the case where A  does not monitor 
a borrower. If A  monitors, (5.1) applies:
P(A,x , M)  = p + m + Xt 
P h
Let define E.  Then one can also write P(A, x , M)  as
P(A, x , M) = E + Fx
Let U stand for unmonitored. In that case, A's BER is defined by 
the equation
PlE.{A, x,U) = p + xt
so by simple rearranging, A's break-even rate when not monitoring can 
be shown to be
£ ( A i , f / )  = —  (5.6)
Pl
Let define G and let — define H. Then P(A, x, U) can also be
Pl  p l  — v ’ ’ '
written as
P(A,  x, U) = G +  Hx
The changed notation will simplify some of the derivations below.
The most straightforward way to proceed is to distinguish between 
the three cases mentioned above (the effort-minimizer monitoring none, 
some, or all of its borrowers) and establish which values of t lead to which 
of the three cases.
5.4.2 R egim e 1: N o m onitoring by the effort-m inim izer
My approach is to assume that the effort-minimizer can attain its profit- 
target 7T without monitoring, proceed on that assumption and analyze 
the outcome that obtains to establish under which parameter restrictions 
the initial assumption holds. Thus by assumption the effort-minimizer 
A  does not monitor, so its BER is given by (5.6). B's BER is given by 
(5.2). The difference is
P( A,x , U) — P ( B , x yM) = 
— G + Hx  — (I — Fx)
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= G — I  +  (H +  F)x
Bidding strategies and m arket shares
The difference in break-even rates is clearly a continuous function of and 
monotonically increasing in x. The equilibrium bidding strategies are es­
sentially unchanged from the game with two profit-maximizers discussed 
above. I restate the result with the required changes in notation, but the 
argument of the proof is the same as above and so is not repeated.
P roposition 12 The interest-rate competition game with one effort-minimizer 
(by assumption bank A at x = 0) and one profit-maximizer (bank B at 
x = 1) has the following equilibrium in pure strategies: Let Pfk, x , Z) de­
note the break-even rate (BER) for bank k lending to a borrower located at 
x conditional on the bank monitoring the borrower (Z  = M ) or not mon­
itoring the borrower (Z = U). Then bank k bids as follows: For x such 
that P ( k , x , Z ) < P f f x ,  Z ),under the tie-breaking rule bank k wins the 
loan with a bid of P(I, x, Z), making an expected profit ofpjj[P(l, x, Z) — 
P(k,x,Z)] if it monitors the borrower and pl[P(I, x, Z ) — P(k,x,Z)] i f it 
does not monitor the borrower. For x such that P.(k,x, Z) > P(l, x, Z), 
bank k bids P(k, x, Z), but under the tie-breaking rule bank I wins the loan 
with the same bid ofP(ky x , Z), making an expected profit ofpn[P(k, x, Z) —
Pfl, x , Z)\ if it monitors the borrower or PL[P(k, x, Z)— P ( f  x , Z)] if it 
does not monitor the borrower.
Proof. The previous argument applies analogously. ■
Knowing banks’ bidding behavior, it is straightforward to establish 
market shares (which are equal to a bank’s demand). Define X (A  —
U\B  = M \t) as that value of x such that PfA,x,U)  = P(B,x,  M).
Then A  has a market share of max{0, X ( A  = U;B = M; t )} and B  has 
a market share of m injl — X( A = U;B = M ;t), 1}. X{A  = U]B =
M\t)  is given by To see that this is correct, note that A's market 
share X( A = U] B = M; t )  when not monitoring (which I shall refer 
to as the effortless market share) is given by that value of x for which 
P ( A , x , U ) - P ( B , x , M )  = 0.
P(i4, x, U) -  P{B , x,M)  = G -  I  + (H + F)x = 0
x =  L d L  = X ( A = U-,B = M; t)
An explicit expression for X (A  = U;B = M;t)  can be obtained as 
follows:
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_  _  p + m + t ____ £_
X{A = U;B = M;t) = j - ± =  ™ «
PH PL
{ p + m + t ) p L _  p p H
  Ph Pl_______ Pl Ph
tPL I t p H 
PHPL PLPH
= (p + m + t)pL -  ppH 
t {pL  +  P h )
_  PPL +  rnpL +  t p L -  p p H 
K p l  +  P h )
=  tPL PPL +  -  PPH
t(PL  +  P h ) t ( p L +  Ph )
=  P l  p (P l ~  P i/) +  ra(pL - 1  +  1)
{Pl  +  P i/)  t ( p L +  p H)
= Pl  p {p l  ~ Ph ) + m  -  (1 -  pL)m
(Pl + P / / )  ^(p l  +  P/z)
= Pl  _  1 P(P// ~ P l)  ~ rn  + (1 -  pL)m 
( P l + P / / )  t  (p l + P h )
Clearly, X ( A  = U\ B  = M; t) is increasing in t [since [p(p// — P l ) — m\>
0 by assumption] and converges to (P]^ PH) < |  as t tends to infinity.
X (A  = U; B  = M; t )  is positive i f f
P l  1 p (p h  ~ P l ) -  m +  (1 -  p L) m
(Pl  +  P //) t  (p L +  p H )
O  tpL > pijpn ~ P l ) — m  + (1 — pL)m
Let p ( p H ~ P l ) ~ m  + (1 -  p/,)m = p ( p H ~ P l ) ~ P l m  define C > 0.
Then X (A  = U;B = M;t) > 0 i f f
t > £  (5.7)
Pl
When X( A = U\B = M; t) is positive, A  has a strictly positive market 
share. I have started the discussion by assuming that A  can attain its 
profit target without monitoring so (5.7) has to hold. All that (5.7) 
ensures is that A  actually makes some loans, so it is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for A  not to have to monitor at all. In the following
1 shall also write X ( A  =  U\ B = M\t)  more briefly as X(t).  I illustrate 
regime 1 in the following diagram
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P(A ,x ,U )
t
E (B ,x,M ) • (p+m )/PH
0 X-tilde 0.5 X
Regime 1: Break-even rates when the effort-minimizer does not monitor
at all
Profit expressions when A does not m onitor a t all
I can now obtain expressions for tta (the effort-minimizer’s profit) and 7r# 
(the profit-maximizer’s profit). A's profit from lending to an entrepreneur 
at x and not monitoring is
PL [ P ( B ,  x ,  M )  -  P(A, x, U) }
Given market shares, A's total profits Eire then
= PL(H + F) X ( t ) x - y
.2-1 *(0
0
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=  P l
— P l
ts+s]IN]*
— 15 N l '
tpH +
Pl P h  P h Pl
= t P h + P l 'I 1 
Ph  I 2
It is clear from inspection that 7ta is increasing in t since was 
shown to be increasing in t. Substituting for X(t):
nA = t P h  A pL
1 PPl  + mpL +  tpL -  ppH'
P h 2 t ( p L + P H )
= t P h  +  P l 1 t p L - C
P h 2 t ( P L + P H ) _
~l 2
P h
1 (tPL ~ C j‘
2{P l + P h ) \  t
Let D denote the positive constant 2(ph +  Pl); D =  2(pn + Pl) > 0. 
Then A's profit is given by
1 (tpL - c f
^  =  PhD  1------ (5-8)
it a is always positive. That is an artefact of the property that math­
ematically it is quite possible for x and therefore X(t)  to be negative. 
Given that, as shown above, X( t ) is monotonically increasing in t y that 
will happen for low enough values of t. In that case, a negative market 
share is multiplied by a negative average per-borrower margin, leading to 
an expression that is positive overall. The average per-borrower margin 
will be negative for negative X  (t) since mathematically it is equal to the 
margin on the borrower located at When X(t)  is negative, however, 
it must be the case that X  (t ) < < 0. By definition, break-even rates
are equal for x = X(t),  so when X(t)  is negative, B  must have a lower 
BER than A for x = leading to negative average per-borrower profit 
for A. In terms of the economics that is, of course, nonsense. Market 
share and demand cannot be negative.
I had above restricted t to values greater than — so that A has strictly 
positive demand; t = is the value of t that leads 7ra to take the value 
of zero. I will discuss the shape of A's profit function tta in more detail 
in the appendix when I analyze how tta responds to changes in t. One 
observation that is usefully made at this point is that A's average per-
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borrower profit is increasing in t. To see this, note that A's average 
per-borrower profit is given by
While this term may well be negative for small enough £, it is always 
increasing in t.
B's profit 7tb can be obtained in much the same manner. B's profit 
on a borrower located at x  when monitoring (when, by assumption, A  is 
not monitoring) is given by
Ph [E(A,x , U ) - P ( B , x ,M)\
= pH[G + Hx -  (I -  Fx)}
= p„[(H + F ) x - ( I - G ) }
=  Ph  (H + F)[x -  X(t)}
B's profit ttb is then given by
X(t)
J X(t)
— P h  (H + F)
= M i +£) I1-**(*>+(*(*>)*
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= h > 4 — + — ) M « y2 \ P lPh  P h P l )  '  /
1 f ( P H  +  Pl \  PPL + rnpL +  tpL -  ppH V
2 pl t (P L + P i f )  ;
=  - f ( PH + P L ^  f +  tPn  ~  PPL ~  m PL ~  tpL +  PPH \
2 V P l  ) \  t(pL +pH) )
f P h  +  Pl \  (  tPH +  C  x 2
2 \  P l  J  K K p l + P h ) 
I f  1 \  (tpH +  C)2
P l  \ 2 (P l +  P # ) /  t  
Once again using D = 2(pn + P l ) > 0, B's profit is given by
1 {tpH + C)2 , .
 i  (5 9)
As was the case for A, B's average per-borrower profit is increasing 
in t. To see this, note from the above derivation that B's average per- 
borrower profit is given by
r . 1  - ( -  X  (t) rT. X  if) r \ i
P h { E ( A ,  x = ------  , U) -  P{B, x =    , M)\ =
1 f  tpn +  C
P l  \  2
which is increasing in t.  In the appendix I analyze how kb responds to 
changes in t.
I collect these results in the following
P roposition  13 Assume that the parameters of the model are such that 
the effort-minimizer, bank A, can attain its profit target without mon-Q
itoring any of its borrowers. This implies that t > — . In that case,
P l
1 (tpL -  C)2 1 (tpH +  C f
it a = ------------  — and 'Kb = -   (where C and D are
P h D  t pLD t
positive constants as defined above). Then both ka and Kb are increasing
in t.
A n explicit lower bound for t
Thus far I have proceeded on the assumption that A can attain its profit 
target without monitoring. The following result states an explicit suffi­
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cient condition for this to be the case.
Proposition  14 Let t(A = U\B = M) denote that value of t such that 
tta(A  =  U) — 7r when the effort-minimizer (bank A) is not monitoring 
at all. Then t(A = U \B = M ) is given by
2 P L C f P “ D -  +  1 2 \ ! 4Pl C p h D k  +  (Ph D k f  (5.10)
2 (Pl ) 2 (p L)
(The derivation is provided in the appendix.)
I have now provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the effort- 
minimizing bank not to be monitoring at all: The lack-of-competition 
parameter t has to be greater than or equal to the value of t, t(A = 
U \B — M), established above. For values of t strictly between and 
t(A  = U ,B = M), j i  < t < £(A = U\B  =  M), A  has positive market 
share (demand) and profit even when not monitoring, but does not attain 
the profit target 7r. In that case, the only option open to A is to monitor 
some or all of its borrowers. I will investigate the scenario of t < t(A = 
U;B = M) in cases 2 and 3 below.
Surplus
I now turn to surplus, for this is ultimately the variable of interest. One 
might conjecture that surplus is invariant to changes in t as long as 
t > t(A  = U] B  = M) since A will not monitor any borrowers when t 
exceeds its critical value and B  monitors all its borrowers irrespective of 
the value of t. However, that conjecture is not correct.
Proposition 15 Let t > t(A  =  U;B = M ) . Then the effort-minimizer 
(bank A) does not monitor any of its borrowers. However, surplus is 
strictly decreasing in t .
Proof: See appendix.
Even though the effort-minimizer A  does not monitor at all when 
t > t(A = U;B = M), surplus is strictly decreasing in t. A's (invari­
ant) monitoring decision apart, there are three effects that play a role: 
Higher t gives A  more market share. This lowers the average processing 
cost (in terms of distance); however, the direct effect of higher t out­
weighs the indirect effect, so processing costs are increasing in t. Leaving 
aside processing costs, surplus is decreasing in t because, as noted, higher 
values of t allow A  to take a larger market share. A, however, does not 
monitor at all. Since monitoring is by assumption efficient, this reduces 
surplus. One could argue that the positive effect of lower t (more intense
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competition) via lower processing costs is assumed into the model. How­
ever, my argument here shows that the beneficial effect of competition 
is robust to this criticism: Surplus before processing costs is likewise de­
creasing in t, because less intense competition gives the effort-minimizer 
larger market share.
Summary
In the present sub-section, I studied regime 1 in which the effort-minimizer 
does not monitor at all. I derived bidding strategies for both banks as 
well as expressions for market shares and profits and I obtained a lower 
bound t(A — U;B = M) for the lack-of-competition parameter t such 
that the effort-minimizer can reach its profit target without monitoring. 
Finally, I also showed that in regime 1 surplus is decreasing in t. All of 
these results have been obtained for the case of t > t(A  =  U;B = M). 
When this condition does not hold, A will have to monitor at least some 
of its borrowers to attain the profit target. That is the scenario I inves­
tigate next.
5.4.3 R egim e 2: T he effort-m inim izer m onitors som e, 
but not all borrowers
If t is less than t(A = U]B = M), A (the effort-minimizer) cannot attain 
its profit-target n without at least some monitoring. As I show below, 
there is another threshold value for the lack-of-competition parameter t, 
t*, such that when t < t*, A has to monitor all of its borrowers. For 
t* < t < t(A = U 'B  = M) A  has to monitor some, but not all of its 
borrowers. That is the regime I study in this subsection.
When t > A's effortless market share X{t)  and A's effortless profit 
are strictly greater than zero but insufficient to attain the profit target. 
In that case, A  could increase profit by monitoring in one of two ways:
A  could monitor thus far unmonitored borrowers already in the portfolio 
(i.e., with locations 0 < x < X(t)) or A  could steal market share from 
B  by monitoring borrowers located between X(t)  and |  (as the earlier 
discussion in the two-profit-maximizers case shows, the maximum market 
share that A  could obtain by monitoring all borrowers is for x > |  
B's  cost advantage is unassailable). Below I study this decision in more 
detail.
(5.5) implies a lower bound for t, so for 47r < t < bank A  - 
when not monitoring at all - has no positive market share (demand) and 
consequently no profits either, t = — turns out not to be a particularly
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interesting value of £; however, for expositional reasons it is nevertheless 
convenient to consider the two cases ^  < t < t(A = U\B = M ) and 
47r < £ < ^- separately.
— < t < t ( A  = U;B = M)
Pl
The only way for the effort-minimizer A to reach the profit target is to 
monitor. How would A  proceed? A  would want to monitor as little as 
is necessary. Given that the per-borrower cost of monitoring is constant, 
A  monitors in the order of profitability; i.e., first the project which it is 
most profitable to monitor, the next most profitable project next and so 
on until the profit target is attained. The earlier discussion suggested
- I show this rigorously below - that the closer a project is located to 
A's own location at x  =  0, the higher A's margin on the project. That 
reasoning would imply that within each of the two regions 0 < x < X(t)  
and X(t) < x < A  would begin monitoring from the left, so to speak,
i.e. at the lowest value of x . However, it is not obvious whether it is 
more profitable to monitor hitherto unmonitored existing borrowers or 
to monitor in order to gain a cost advantage and steal borrowers from 
B. In particular, it might appear possible that A's best course of action 
is to begin monitoring in one region only; then monitor in both regions 
simultaneously until the profit target is attained. That scenario would 
require that the gain from monitoring in the first region is initially (i.e., 
for low values of x) greater than in the other region, but that - as the 
effort-minimizer monitors less and less profitable borrowers located at 
increasing values of x - the gain from monitoring the most profitable 
projects in the other region eventually equals the gain from monitoring 
additional projects located in the region first targeted.
However, the following proposition shows that the order in which A 
monitors projects and the location of monitored projects can be described 
very simply:
P roposition  16 Let ^  < £ < t(A = U,B = M). In order to bridge the 
gap between the effortless profit and the profit target, A obtains additional 
profit by monitoring borrowers located in the interval [0, x*( 
t(A  = U]B = M))] where < £ < t(A  = U\B = M)) is defined in 
a piecewise fashion as set out below. First, let t* be defined by
t * =  C { P h  ~  P l ) +  (Ph  +  P l ) 2E  
%Ph Pl
+  ^ ■+ y/C2 +  2C{pH ~ P l )k +  (Ph  + P l ) 27L2
I P h P l
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For t* < t < t(A = U;B = M),  x* (^  < t < t(A = U;B = M )) is given 
by x*(t* < t < t(A = U]B = M )) with the property that 0 < x*(t* < t < 
t(A = U;B = M )) < X(t*), i.e., the effort-minimizer (bank A) lends to 
projects located in the interval [0, X(t)], but only monitors projects located 
in [0,£*(...)] where £*(...) < X(t*). x*(t* < t < t(A = U\B  = Mj) is 
defined by
[(Ph ~ PL)t + C\
(.Ph ~PL)t
2 (Ph  - P L ) ( t - t )  [ t t  (pLf  -  C 2 ]
[ (P H~PL) t  + C\ -
CPh  ~  PL) t  V (Ph  +  Pl )1
For < t < t*, t < t(A  = U ,B = M )) is given by <
t < t*) with the property that X(t*) < < t < t*) < i.e., the
effort-minimizer lends to projects located in the interval [0, £* (...)] and 
monitors all of them. x* (^  < t < t*) is defined by
2 V 4 t
c_
Pl
borrowers, so this case is discussed in more detail below.
However, when — < t < t* A monitors not only some, but all of its
This result states that A  always begins monitoring at x = 0 and mon­
itors projects in the order of increasing distance from A's own location. 
A threshold value of t called t* is the largest value of t such that A  mon­
itors all the borrowers it wins effortlessly, i.e. projects located between 
0 and X(t*). For t smaller than the critical value, A  has to steal market 
share from B  in order to attain its profit target; this case is studied in 
regime 3 below.
I first give an overview of the proof: I show that A begins moni­
toring at x = 0 and moves out from there by monitoring projects lo­
cated successively further away from A!s own location (i.e., character­
ized by increasing x). I then obtain the expression for the critical value 
x*(t* < t < t(A = U;B = M )) such that A monitors borrowers located 
in the interval [0, x*(t* < t<  t(A = U ,B = M))\ with x*(t* < t<  t(A = 
U;B =  Mj) < X(t*).
By assumption t > so that X(t)  > 0  and, even without monitor­
ing, A makes a strictly positive effortless profit of tta = — as 
demonstrated above8. However, A  falls short of the profit target tt and so
8 In obtaining that expression I had only used the assumption that A does not 
monitor at all and that B  monitors all its borrowers; in particular I had not made 
use of assumptions with respect to t. Having said that, the profit expression is only 
meaningful for t which, however, is true by assumption here.
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needs to monitor some of the borrowers already in its portfolio and/or win 
additional market share from B  (likewise by monitoring). The additional 
profit from monitoring a current borrower located at 0 < x < X(t)  is 
given by
p„ [P(B, X,  M) -  P(A, X,  M)\ -  pL [P(B, X,  M) -  P(A, x, U)]
This difference is explained as follows: I subtract from the (expected) 
profit that A makes on a monitored borrower the (expected) profit that 
A  makes on an unmonitored borrower (at the same location). When mon­
itoring, A  obtains the promised profit margin [P.(B, x , M) — P (A , x, M)\ 
with probability Ph ] when not monitoring, the profit margin is given by 
a different expression, [P(B,x, M)  — P(A, x, £/)], and is only obtained 
with probability Pl - Clearly, [P(B,x, M)  — P(A,x,  M)\ is the same as 
that obtained in the two-profit-maximizers case when both banks were 
assumed to be monitoring and is given by F(1 — 2x). The profit mar­
gin [P(B, x , M) — P( A , x, U)] had been obtained as [I — G — (F +  H)x]. 
Note that the monitoring cost m  does not appear explicitly in the differ­
ence; it is contained in the expression for A's break-even rate P(A, x , M).  
Substituting the expressions for the profit margins, the difference can be 
written as
pHF(  1 -  2x) -  pL [I -  G -  (F +  H)x\
= pHF  -  2pHFx — pL{I — G) + pL(F +  H)x
=  pHF -  pL(I - G ) -  [2pHF -  pL{F +  /f)] x 
This is decreasing in x i f f
[2pHF —pL(F +  H)} > 0
2pHF  > Pl (F + H)
t f t  t . . tpL tpn v
&  2P h —  >  P l (  1------ ) =  P l ( -----------H -------- )
P h  Ph  P l  P h P l  P lP h
Ph
which is clearly true. This formally proves the claim that was made 
earlier on: This expression is decreasing in x , so the smaller x  (i.e., the 
closer a borrower is located to A) the more profitable it is to monitor that
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borrower. Therefore, if A decides to monitor any borrowers already in its 
loan portfolio (i.e., with 0 < x < A(t)), the bank will begin monitoring at 
x = 0 and will monitor in order of increasing x. Note that this expression 
gives the actual (expected) profit from monitoring an existing borrower, 
not profit conditional on the success of the project. The expression stated 
here has already been corrected for the fact that it will be obtained with 
a probability of pn only.
However, in the case of projects located at X(t) < x < - ,  A  can gain 
a cost advantage by monitoring and underbid B.  What is the additional 
profit from doing so for a borrower located at x l  Since the profit when 
not monitoring is simply zero (it is B  that makes the loan in that case), 
the gain from monitoring is given by pn [P ( B , x, M) — P(A , x, M)\ which 
is equal to
pHF( 1 -  2x)
= pHF  -  2pHFx
(This expression, too, has already been corrected for the fact that it 
will be obtained with a probability of pu only.) Once again, this shows 
formally that the earlier claim is correct and that the profitability of 
monitoring is decreasing in x for projects located at A(£) < x < | ,  too.
Therefore, if the effort-minimizer were to monitor projects in that range, 
it would begin at x = X(t)  and then monitor in order of increasing x.
Monitoring in order to gain market share superficially appears to 
be more profitable than monitoring to increase the return on borrow­
ers already in the portfolio: In the former case, the additional profit is 
given by pu [.P ( B , x , M ) — P{A, x, M)]; in the latter case, it is the same 
Ph [P.{B» x i M) — P (A , x , M)] minus something positive {pl [P (B , x , M) — P (A , x , £/)]}. 
However, these expressions refer to different location ranges. As the 
proposition claims, it turns out that it is unambiguously more profitable 
to monitor existing borrowers than to steal market share from B.
The argument is the following: x = X(t)  is the location of both 
—the existing borrower that it is least profitable to monitor and 
-the additional borrower which it would be most profitable to steal 
from B.
(By definition of X(t),  borrowers located in [0, A(t)] are borrowing 
from A  and borrowers located in (A(t), 1] are borrowing from B,  so the 
statement is not quite correct; the borrower which it would be most 
profitable to steal from B  is located just to the right of X  (t). However, 
that does not affect the argument.)
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Therefore, if I can show that for the project located at x  =  X(t)  
both types of monitoring yield the same profit, I will have shown that 
the effort-minimizer always begins monitoring existing borrowers at x = 
0 and only steals market share from B  if, when monitoring all existing 
borrowers (i.e., all those with locations 0 < x < X ( t )), the profit target 
has not yet been attained. Demonstrating that both types of monitor­
ing yield the same profit for the borrower located at x = X(t )  requires 
showing that
p«F(l -  2x) -  pL [I -  G -  pi,F(l 2x)
- p L [I -  G -  {F + = 0
I - G
^  (F + H)
However, the last equality must be true by the definition of X(t).  
That proves the claim. I have shown that A monitors in order of in­
creasing x , beginning at x  = 0. I illustrate regime 2 in the following 
diagram.
E (A ,x,M )
/
(p+m )/P ,
V
0.5* X -tilde
Regime 2: The effort-minimizer has to monitor some, but not all of its
borrowers.
The next task is to obtain an explicit expression for t*. For a cer­
tain value of t which I call t* in the proposition, A will attain its profit
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target by monitoring exactly those projects that would borrow from A  
anyway. In that case, x* =  X(t*). The expression x* when t > t* is dif­
ferent from the one when t < £*, this is why x* needs to be defined in a 
piecewise way. I first derive £*, then x* (t* < t < t(A = U;B = M))  and 
x* < t < In order to obtain an explicit solution for t* I proceed 
as follows. I know A's profit when lending to and monitoring the bor­
rowers in the interval [0, X(t)]. I set that profit equal to the profit target 
which gives me a quadratic equation in t. I obtain the two values of t 
that solve the equation, only one of them should fulfil the requirement 
that it be greater than ^  and smaller than t(A = U\B — M). I show 
that the ” — ” root is less than — and therefore cannot be the value of t
PL
that I am looking for. Last, I show that the ” +  ” root is greater than ^  
and less than t(A = U\B = M)  and constitutes the solution. The actual 
calculations have been moved to the appendix to simplify the exposition.
Ultimately, the variable of interest is the interval in which A monitors 
borrowers, i.e. [0, £*(£)]. Defining t* is important because the expression 
for x*(t) is different for t > t* and t <t*.  I first define x*(t* < t < t(A = 
U \B = M )) and, in the next sub-section, consider < t < t * )  (which
applies to regime 3 in which A  has to monitor all its borrowers in order 
to attain the profit target). When t > t*, x*(t* < t < t(A = U;B = M)) 
(which I abbreviate as x* in the following) is defined by the equation:
x*—
Ph K ) (ph -  PL)t +  C +  1 ( » L - C )2 =PhD t -  \ >
x*ph [(l — y )  (PH ~ PL,)t + D\ is the additional profit that A  makes 
by monitoring existing borrowers located in the interval [0, x*]. The ad­
ditional profit from monitoring an existing borrower located at x is given 
by pHF ( l - 2 x )  - p L [I — G — (F +  H)x] = X- [(1 -  x) (pH ~PL)t + C\ . 
If A  monitors borrowers located in the interval [0, a;*], its additional profit 
from doing so is given by the product of the number of borrowers moni­
tored (a;*) and the average per-borrower profit which is the profit on the 
borrower located at x =  1S J^ 's Pr°ht hi the absence of
any monitoring. The sum of these two expressions has to be equal to the 
profit target 7r. I derive the x* thus defined in the appendix where I also 
show that the following three properties hold:
1. x*(t = t) = 0
2 .  x ' t t  =  r )  =  x(r) =  (
’ \t*(PH +Pl)J
3. x* is monotonically decreasing in t and continuous
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5.4.4 Regim e 3: The effort-m inim izer m onitors all 
projects that it lends to
When t falls to t* or beyond, A needs to monitor all the projects in its 
loan portfolio. Restating the result above, for < t < t*, < t
< t(A = U;B = M )) is given by < t <t*)  with the property that 
X(t*) < < t < t * ) < ^ j  i.e., the effort-minimizer lends to projects
located in the interval [0, x*(...)] and monitors all of them. x*^vl < t —
t*) is defined by
To see that this expression is correct, note that I had earlier shown that 
a bank located at x =  0 lending to and monitoring borrowers in the 
interval [0, x], x < makes a profit of PhF{ 1 — 2x) = (1 — 2x) t  on 
a borrower located at x.  Therefore the total profit from lending to and 
monitoring borrowers in the interval [0, x], x < is given by x(l —2 | )t = 
x(l — x)t  as the product of the number of borrowers and the average per- 
borrower profit (which is the profit on the borrower located at |) .  Since 
by assumption t  < t*, this profit incorporates the effortless profit which 
does not now need to be considered separately. Then the x* up to which 
an effort-minimizer monitors projects is defined by:
*‘(1 ~xlt = K = ^ D itPLt C) ( 5 ' 1 2 )
This is a quadratic equation in x* which can be solved as  follows:
X * ( l  — X*)t =  7T
X*t —  (x*)2t  —  7T =  0 
—  X*t  +  (X*)2t  +  7T =  0 
<£> (x*)2 ~  X* +  j  =  0  
The candidate solutions are
: 5±VT-f
The {plus}  root can be ruled out immediately, since x* has to be less 
than or equal to one-half. So for ^  < t < t*, A  monitors borrowers up 
to x* where x * is given by
I illustrate this in the following diagram:
P (A ,x ,U )
(p+m )/PHP(B ,x,M )
0  X-ti!de 0 5 X
Regime 3: The effort-minimizer monitors all the borrowers in the loan
portfolio
from inspection.
These results complete the discussion of the scenario in which the 
effort-minimizer A makes a strictly positive effortless profit, but not 
enough to attain the profit target; i.e., — < t < t(A = U,B = M)  (com­
posed of the two regimes — < t < t* and t* < t < t(A = U\B = M)).
Pl
This forces the effort-minimizer to monitor some (regime 2) or all (regime 
3) of the borrowers in its portfolio. I show that there is a critical thresh­
old of the lack-of-competition parameter t which I call t* such that when 
t is strictly greater than t*, A lends to those borrowers that it can win ef­
fortlessly and monitors only some of them. When t is strictly less than t*,
Note that x* y— < t < t*j is monotonically decreasing in t and con­
tinuous for t > 47t:
is given by:Then
So x* ( — < t < t* ) is monotonically decreasing in t. Continuity follows
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A not only lends to its effortless borrowers but also steals market share 
from B; in that case (as well as when t = t*) A monitors all projects 
that it lends to. I now briefly turn to the discussion of the case in which 
A has no effortless profit since it does not win any borrowers without 
monitoring, i.e. 47r < t <
47T <  t  <  —
 —  PL
Whenever t < t*, the effort-minimizer monitors all the borrowers that 
it lends to. Whether t is greater than (and the effortless profit thus 
strictly positive) or not does not matter: The expression defining x* 
does not change: x* (jjj- < t < t*^ j = x* 4^7r < t < . Since x* = \  —
y  |  — f  is a continuous function of t for t > 47r, it is also continuous at 
^-9. No particular significance attaches to the value that x* takes when 
t = This is different for x*(t = t) which is zero by definition and 
x*(t = t*) which is equal to X(t*), t* being the highest value of t such 
that A  monitors all borrowers in its lending portfolio. In summary, I 
can simply restate the previous result and note that x* 4^7r < t <  is 
given by
The above result on x* being a decreasing function of t continues to apply, 
of course. Note that when t = 47r, the square root term is knocked out 
and A  monitors projects up to x = | .
5.4.5 Surplus in regim es 2 and 3
The ultimate variable of interest is surplus and how it changes with t. 
In light of the preceding sub-sections, I note that I need to consider two 
regimes in which different expressions for x* apply: Surplus for t greater 
than t* (t* < t < t(A = U’B = M )) and surplus for t less than t* 
(47T < t <t*).  However, the central result applies across both regimes:
Proposition  17 For 4n < t < t(A = U,B = M), surplus is continu­
ously decreasing in t. Surplus is also continuous a tt = t(A = U] B — M ).
To unburden the exposition I demonstrate this result and analyze the 
various effects that play a role in the appendix and only give an overview
9 As noted in the discussion of the two-profit-maximizers case, there is a lower 
bound for t such that for t  below that lower bound, the effort-minimizer A is not be 
able to attain its profit target regardless of monitoring intensity (i.e., neither would 
a profit-maximizing bank). That lower bound for t was shown to be 4]r. I implicitly 
assume — to be large enough relative to 47T for the present discussion to make sense.
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here: I first consider regime 2 and show that for t* < t < t(A = U]B = 
M ) surplus before processing costs is decreasing in t whereas processing 
costs (which reduce surplus) axe increasing in t. Surplus before processing 
costs is decreasing in t because lower t leads A  to monitor more of its 
borrowers which increases surplus. Lower t also reduces A's effortless 
market share, thus increasing the market share of B  which monitors all 
of its borrowers. Processing costs reduce surplus and are increasing in t. 
The direct effect of higher t assuming a constant effortless market share 
for A is to increase processing costs; this direct effect dominates the 
indirect effect which lowers processing costs (because higher t increases 
Afs effortless market share so that more projects borrow from A at lower 
processing cost than if they borrowed from B). Since processing costs 
enter surplus with a negative sign, an increase in t increases processing 
costs and lowers surplus. Overall, then, surplus is decreasing in t.
In regime 3 (47T < t < i*), surplus before processing costs is constant; 
all borrowers are monitored. However, surplus still increases as t falls all 
the way down to 47t. The source of this surplus gain is a reduction in 
processing costs. As t falls, x* increases, so more projects borrow from 
A  at lower processing cost than if they borrowed from B. In regime 3, 
therefore, the direct and indirect effect of t on processing costs operate 
in the same direction. So surplus is decreasing in t even though surplus 
before borrowing costs is constant. Interestingly, this property is not 
entirely assumed into the model. The direct effect of t on processing 
costs certainly is an artefact of the model setup in which the intensity of 
competition is captured by the difference in costs. However, the indirect 
effect (via the impact of t on A's market share x*) runs in the same 
direction as the direct effect, so that even if one ignored the direct effect, 
surplus would still be decreasing in t.
The final task is to show the continuity of surplus. The continuity of 
surplus follows from standard results except at the two threshold values 
t = t* and t = t. In the appendix, I show that surplus is continuous at 
these values of t and thus at all values of t > 47r.
5.4.6 Summary
In this sub-section, I let a profit-maximizing bank compete against an 
effort-minimizer. I describe how the effort-minimizer monitors borrowers 
as a function of the intensity of competition and I show that there are two 
threshold values of t (which parameterizes the intensity of competition). 
For t > t(A = U, B  — M) (regime 1) defined in (5.10), the effort- 
minimizer does not monitor at all. For t* < t < t(A = U;B — M)
149
(regime 2) [with t* defined by (5.14)], the effort-minimizing bank will 
monitor some but not all of its borrowers. Finally, for t < t* (regime 
3), the effort-minimizer monitors all borrowers in its portfolio. Building 
on these results, I show that surplus is continuously increasing in the 
intensity of competition (with lower values of t corresponding to more 
intense competition) and that, in particular, surplus is continuous at the 
threshold values of t. I also decomposed changes in surplus and analyzed 
the different effects that play a role.
5.5 P ossib le ex ten sion s
While I am confident that the present contribution captures a first-order 
effect that has been overlooked in earlier literature, it will not be the 
last word in the debate on the optimum intensity of bank competition. 
Which extensions appear particularly interesting? Within the context of 
the present model, I do not think that one would gain much additional 
insight by letting two effort-minimizers compete; that scenario is rather 
close to collusion. It might be more interesting to model the different 
technologies available to the borrower in a more graduated way. I have 
kept this element as simple as possible in the above; however, it would 
be worthwhile to see whether the results are robust to a formulation in 
which efficient monitoring choices by the profit-maximizing bank are not 
a given.
Would the results change if the borrower (entrepreneur) were also 
an effort-minimizer and would work harder (and generate more social 
surplus) if she had to pay higher interest rates? Quite possibly, yes. 
However, I do not believe that scenario to be very plausible. I think 
of banks’ small- and medium-sized business borrowers as rather entre­
preneurial (profit-maximizing). Only the evidence can tell whether this 
conjecture is correct. While there is work investigating the effect of fi­
nancial market pressures on large companies (finding that debt can be an 
effective discipline device), I am not aware of a dataset that establishes 
a disciplinary role of debt for smaller, more entrepreneurial companies.
In the above, strategic interaction in the sense of cooperation be­
tween effort-minimizer and profit-maximizer has been ignored. However, 
I think that there might be more scope for collusion when one of the 
player minimizes effort rather than maximizes profit. This aspect is not 
captured here, but may be worth looking into.
Adding a screening (creditworthiness test) stage would be interesting 
far beyond the model developed here. While there are general contract
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theory problems combining moral hazard and adverse selection, the inter­
action has, to the best of my knowledge, not been considered in the bank 
competition literature (i.e., the assumptions that the cashflow distribu­
tion is invariant and common knowledge are not relaxed simultaneously.) 
Schnitzer (1999a) is a partial exception which discusses the implications 
of allowing for borrower moral hazard in a screening model, but does not 
feature monitoring. Allowing for both screening and monitoring would 
give rise to interesting questions. For example, would screening intensity 
and monitoring effort be substitutes or complements? In concrete real- 
world terms, would a bank with lax credit standards simply be a more 
active monitor in such a way as to equalize the marginal cost and benefits 
for both activities? Or are there links that make it impossible to make 
one decision independently of the other? The very definition of what a 
positive NPV project is may depend on whether it is monitored and with 
what intensity it is monitored. I conjecture that much will depend on 
the assumed cashflow characteristics and properties of the technologies.
Lastly, I think that more robust modeling of information acquisition 
with private-value components that reduce the value of free-riding on 
rivals’ creditworthiness tests that is such a pervasive real-world phenom­
enon would be a promising route.
5.6 C onclusion
In the model developed in this chapter I explored a'mechanism that 
reconciles the existing theoretical work on bank competition with the 
empirical literature. As I showed in the literature review, the theoreti­
cal literature is sceptical with respect to the effects of more intense bank 
competition. The empirical literature, however, was shown to have found 
large gains from more intense bank competition. I hope that the con­
jecture explored in the present chapter, namely that banks (and agents 
generally) may not maximize profits and that it is worthwhile to study 
the implications this has, will prove fruitful and be developed further by 
others.
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5 .7  A p p en d ix
5.7.1 R egim e 1: Profits are increasing in t
Since increases in t indicate a reduction in the intensity of competition, 
one would expect profit to be increasing in t. For sensible parameter val­
ues that turns out to be the case indeed. Profit is the product of market 
share (demand) and average per-borrower profit and, in the case of A, 
both have been shown to be increasing in t. Things are less straightfor­
ward in the case of B. B's average per-borrower profit is increasing in t, 
but its market share (demand) is decreasing in t. In the following I show 
formally that both profit expressions are increasing in t.
Beginning with it a, it is instructive to write the expression as follows:
7TA =
1 ( t p L - C f
P h D
1
P h D  
{tPL)2
t
2 tPLC &
t t
P h D
t (pL f  -  2pLC + t
This expression describes a hyperbola; 7rA goes toward minus infinity 
for t —> 0 from below and toward plus infinity for t —> 0 from above. 
Differentiating wA with respect to t yields
Otta = 1
d t  Ph D
The first-order condition suggests that ixa might take extreme values for 
the values of t  defined by
(Pl )2 ~ =  0
^ ( P l) = - p
2 C2 & t 2 =
(p l Y
The solutions are U = — and to =  To check the second-order
1 PL *  PL
condition, I differentiate tta with respect to £ a second time:
d 27XA /  1 \  2 C2
dt2 \PhD J t3
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Therefore it a takes a minimum for U = — and a maximum for to =  ^ l C^.
A  1 pl pl
However, a look at the economics shows that only a subset of values of 
t make economic sense as opposed to being mathematically valid. First, 
t clearly cannot be negative. Second, I had already restricted t to be 
greater than ^  so that A  has positive market share (demand); ^  is 
exactly the value of t for which it a reaches a minimum (of zero). In sum, 
for sensible values of £, i.e., t > it a is monotonically increasing as the 
earlier discussion suggested.
The discussion of the effects of t on it b  proceeds along analogous lines:
1 (tpH + C)2
'Kr =
P l D
1 ( t2 (pHf  +  2tpHC +  CM  =
PlD \ t t t
C2'
t (Ph )2 + 2pnC  4- —
P l D  \  t
The shape of B's profit function is quite similar to that of tta- Differen­
tiating itb with respect to t yields
dnB 1 ( ,  \2 C2\
dt PlD  t2 )
The necessary condition for itb to take extreme values is therefore given
/  \ 2  &<*(Ph ) = -^ -
o t 2 = C2
CPH)2
The solutions are t\ — — and U — 1—11^ . To check the second-order
1 PH * PH
condition, differentiate 1Tb with respect to £ a second time:
d2itr /  1 \  2 C2
dt2 \ P l D )  t3
So itb  takes a minimum for U = — and a maximum for to =a 1 Ph  * PH
No attention needs to be paid to negative values of t, but could it be 
that there are reasonable values of t such that itb is not monotonically 
increasing in t (as the earlier discussion suggested might happen)? It 
turns out that the answer is no; for sensible values of t the positive effect 
of t on average per-borrower profit will dominate the negative effect of
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t on B's market share (demand) and ttb will be strictly increasing in t.
To see this, note that sensible values of t can be translated as t > —.
’ Pl
7r# must be increasing in t for t > Since and by assumption
t > —, t must also be greater than —.
P L ’ ® PH
5.7.2 R egim e 1: D erivation o f an explicit expression
for t ( A  =  U ; B  =  M )
Let 7T > 0 denote the profit target. A will be able to attain the target 
without monitoring if and only if
1 f e - C f
IT A =  f;------- 7-----  >  7LPhD t
<3> t2 (pL)2 -  2tpLC +  C2 > PhDjU
The values of t that will cause this relation to hold with equality (and only 
one of which, in the light of the earlier discussion, will be economically 
meaningful) are given by the quadratic equation
t2 (Pl)2 — 2pLCt — pnDiit + C2 = 0 
2 2PlC + PhDv C2
Mathematically, the solutions are given by
+ _  2pLC +  phDtl ^ I f  2pLC + pHD n \  C2
1/2 ' 2<P,f  ' ±Vi 2 (pi)2 /  " W
2plC +  PhDk , I f  2pLC +  PhDk\ 2 22 (pLf  C2
2 (pLf  VV 2 (pLf  )  22(Pl)2 (Pl)2
_  2pLC +  P h D h  
2 (Pl  f
\ / 22 (Pt)2 ° 2 + 2 * ZPl C p h D w + (p„ D nf  -  22 (pLf  C2
2 (Pl )
=  2PL~ ,+  P)2 D E  ±  r, / 1 n2 \ / 4Pl C p h D v  + (Ph D-kf  2 (Pl ) 2 (pjr) v
From the preceding discussion, I know that the correct solution must be
greater than The ” root does not fit the bill:
2'PL' 2 1 P-)2'DK ~ ^ AplCphD-  +  (p h D il)2 <2 (pl) 2 (pL) v 2pL pL
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2pLC +  PhDk -  yjIplCphDk  + (phD'k) 2 < 2pLC
O  Ph D k  — y j 4 p l C p h D k  +  {p h D k )2 < 0
** Ph D tl <  y j 4Pl C p h D tt + (p h D jl)2
&  (p h D tt)2 < 4Pl C p h D tt +  {p h D'k) 2
<^> 4PlCphDtt > 0
which is clearly true. However, the ”+ ” solution is greater than ^  and 
therefore constitutes the critical value of t that I am looking for:
2PlC + Pj I *  l j 4pLCpHDK+(pHDKf > | Pl C
2 (P l ) 2 (pi) 2piP i
«  2piC +  PhDtt + \J4pLCpHDv + (p hD%)2 > 2pLC
O  PhD it +  \J^PlCphDtt +  (phDtt)2 >  0  
which must be true.
5.7.3 R egim e 1: Surplus is decreasing in t
I first obtain an expression for surplus. All applicants will obtain loans, 
but only a fraction (1 — X(t))  will be monitored. Surplus (before process­
ing costs) on a monitored borrower is (puR — p — m) whereas surplus 
(before processing costs) on an unmonitored borrower is (plR  — p). The 
average processing cost incurred by A  (as a function of average borrower 
distance from A) is the average processing cost incurred by B is
Y ^ t .  Aggregate surplus S  is then given by S = X(t) (piR — p — 
Z&t) +  (1 -  X(t)) [pHR -  p - m  -  (1~ f .
I first rearrange this expression slightly, as it will be instructive to con­
sider surplus before processing costs and (distance-dependent) processing 
costs separately.
S =  X(t)(pLR - p ) - ( * ^  t + ( l - X ( t ) )  (p„R -  p -
-  X(t)(pLR - p ) + { l -X ( t ) )  (pHR -  p -  m ) - | ( x w ) 2 + ( i - x ( t ) ) :
=  (PhR  -  p - m )  -  X(t)  (pHR - p - m -  pLR  +  p) 
[(X (t))2 +  l - 2 * ( t )  +  (x ( t ) ) '
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=  {PhR -  P - m )  -  X(t) [(pH —  pL) R  — m \ - -  
'---------------------------^ ' Z
surplus before processing costs
2A’(t) + 2 (A’(t)V
processing costs
Since I need to differentiate S  with respect to t, it will be convenient to
have an expression for 9 . Recall that X(t) = — (Ph+Pl ) ~
c   T h p r p f o r p  9 — r j - Wt P n + P L )  —  Q  A<? t h p  n rp p p d -Up h + p l V  AnereIore> at ~  t^PH+PL)2 ~  tHPH+PL)' a s  tne precea
ing rearrangement shows, ^  can be written as the difference between
^surplus before proc. costs) ^  l  next obtain expressions for
these terms and then establish the overall sign of 
I begin with surplus before processing costs:
d (surplus before proc. cos ts) 
dt
d [{phR  ~ P - m )  -  X(t) [{pH — pl) R  — m]) 
dt
1(ph - pl) R - ™ \  =
( - 1);
dt
C
't*(pH+PL) l(PH- p L ) R - m ] < 0  
Later on, it will be convenient to write this as
/ 2 ( PH P l ) C  r/   \ n____ _______
( ^2t*(pH+pL)2 ^   ^ '
Inspection suggests that surplus before processing costs is decreasing in 
t.
Processing costs change with t as follows (note that I omit the nega­
tive sign; I will re-insert it when I take the difference):
d —d (proc. cos ts) 2 1 -  2X(t) + 2 ( X ( t ) \
dt
1 -  2X{t) +  2
21 t 
+  2
- 2
dt
dX(t)
dt + 2 * 2X(t)
dX(t)
dt
-  -  X(t)  +  ^X(t)^ + 1
dt dt
t2{pH +  P l ) 2 1 2t(pH +  pL) (tpL -  C) 2 (tpL -  C)2 dX( t )+t2{pH +  P l ) 2 2 2t(pH +  pL) t(pH +  pL) 2t2(pH +  pL)2 + t - ^ ( 2 X ( t ) - l )
Note that the first three terms grouped together here capture what one 
might call the direct effect of higher t on surplus; i.e., the effect of changes
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in t on processing costs assuming an unchanged split of the market X(t).  
These terms now have the common denominator 2t2(pn +  Pl)2- This 
allows me to consolidate terms in the numerator as follows:
t2(pH + P l)2 -  2t(pH +  pL) (tpL -  C) +  2 (tpL -  C)2 =
=  t2 [(pHf  +  2pHpL +  (p l ) 2] ~  2t(pH + P l Y p l  
+ 2 t(pH +  pL)C +  2 (t2 (pL)2 -  2tpLC +  C2) =
=  t 2 ( p h ) 2 +  2PHPLt2 + 12 (pL)2 -  2t2pHpL -  212 (pL)2
+2tpHC +  2tpLC + 212 (pL)2 — 4tpLC +  2C2 
Cancelling terms, I am left with
t2 (Ph f  + 12 (pL)2 + 2tpHC -  2tpLC +  2C2 =
t2 (P h  f  + t2 (pL)2 +  2Ct{pH -  P l ) +  2C2
Given that the denominator 2t2(pH + P l ) 2 clearly must be positive, this 
establishes that the direct effect of t on surplus is the intuitive one: Higher 
t leads to higher processing costs which (when multiplied with the nega­
tive sign that I omitted here) lead to lower surplus. Turning now to the 
term +t (2X(t) — 1), I note that this can be written as:
+ t^ W (2 X (J )  -  1) =dt
2 C
2 t2{pH +pL) 
2 C
2 ( tpL-C)  t(pH +PL)
_t(PH+PL) t(pH +pL)_
2 tpL - 2  C -  tpH -  tpL
2 Kp h +Pl) 
2 C
2 t2{pH+pL)2
(-1)2 C
Kp h +Pl)
(tpL - 2 C -  tpH) =
[2C +  t{pH -  pL)] =
2 t2(pH +Pl)2
-AC2 -2 C t (p H - p L)
2 t2(pH +pL)2
The preceding expression captures the indirect effect of t via changes in 
X(t)  induced by changes in the intensity of competition. The indirect 
effect clearly is negative. A decrease in the intensity of competition leads 
to a redistribution of market share from B  to A and reduces the average 
distance that a borrower has to travel. Keeping everything else equal,
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this reduces processing costs and increases surplus. I can now use the 
results of these computations to obtain an expression for 8foroc— that 
consolidates the direct and indirect effects:
d  (proc. costs) 
d t
_  t2 (P h ) +  t2 (p l ) + 2Ct(pH — pL) +  2C2 —4C2 — 2Ct(pH — p l )
2 t2(pH +  P l ) 2 2 t2(pH +  pL)2
Since these fractions have a common denominator, I can add them to 
get:
t2 (Ph)2 + 12 (pL)2 +  2Ct(pH -  pL) +  2C2 -  4C2 -  2Ct(pH -  pL)
2t2(p// + P l)2
Cancelling terms, I am left with
t2 (P h  f  +  t2 (pL)2 -  2C2
2 + P l )2
If I can show that this expression is positive, I will have shown that 
overall processing costs are increasing in t .  The denominator must be 
positive, so I need to show that t2 (pn)2 + 12 {pl)2 ~  2C2 > 0. Recall that 
by assumption t  Then it must be the case that
t2 (Ph )2 + 12 (p l ) 2 ~  2C2 > ( — )  (pH)2 + ( — )  (p l ) 2 ~  2C2 > 0\Pl J \Pl )
&  ( — }  (Ph ) 2 ~ C 2 > 0
\ P l .
C2(Ph)2 > C 2(plf
which clearly is true. So processing costs are increasing in t . When 
multiplied with a negative sign (as the term for processing costs will 
be in the surplus expression), the effect of increases in t  on surplus via 
processing costs is negative: Higher t  leads to higher processing costs and 
lower surplus. The proof is now substantially complete. I have shown 
that surplus before processing costs is decreasing in t  and that processing 
costs (which enter surplus with a negative sign) are increasing in t .  For 
completeness I combine these two partial results:
d S  2 (p h + P l ) C  . t 2 ( p H) 2 +  t 2 { pL) 2 - 2 C 2
at = 2t2(pn+pl)2 {(ph ~P l ) r -  m] w t o T i t f  < °
^  ( - 1 ) 2 (Ph  +  P l ) C  [(;pH - p L) R ~ m \  -  [t2 ( pH ) 2 + 12 ( pLf  -  2 C 2] <  0
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I now use the result obtained above demonstrating that t 2 (p//)2+£2 {p l ) 2- 
2C2 > (Ph)2 +  (Pl)2 ~  2C2 > 0. This means that
(-1 )2 (pH + P l ) C  [{pH ~ P l )  R — m ] — [ t2 {jpH f  + 12 {jpLf  -  2C2]
< (-1 )2 (pH + pL)C \{pH ~ P l ) R -  m]
< (-1)2 (pH + pL)C [(pH - p L) R - m ] <  0 
which must be true and establishes the claim made in the proposition.
5.7.4 D erivation o f t*
Consider a bank located at x = 0 lending to and monitoring projects 
in the interval [0, x], x < | .  This is exactly the behavior of a profit- 
maximizing bank. The profit that a profit-maximizing bank at x = 0 
competing against another profit-maximizing bank makes on a borrower 
located at x < \  had already been obtained as
Ph [E(B, x , M) -  P(A, x, M)\ =  (1 -  2x)t
If this bank lends to projects located in [0, x] its total profit will be given
by the product of x times the average per-borrower profit which in turn is
xthe profit on the borrower located at —. Therefore, the profit expression 
that I am looking for is
x(l — 2—)t =  x{l — x)t
I can now substitute X ( t ) in for x and set the product equal to the 
target profit n. Since X  (t) is A's market share when not monitoring, the 
expression X(t)  1  — X ( £ ) J  t is equal to the profit that A makes when 
lending to these X (t) borrowers and also monitoring them.
X{t) 1 -X (£ )]*  =  tt
tpL -  CX  (t) had earlier been shown to be equal to 
tPH + C
t(PH+PL)_
t ( P H + P L ) _  
so the above equation can be stated as
t  =  7T
, 1— X(t)  equals
---
1
tr- 1 o
1
tP H  +  C
t ( P H  + P l ) . M p h + P l ) .
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Cancelling the t in both denominator and numerator on the l.h.s. and 
multiplying both sides by (pn +  Pl)2^  yields
(tpL -  C) ( tpH +  C )=  7l(ph +  p L)2t
t2PLPH ~ CtpH + CtpL -  C2 -  7i(pH +  PL)2t =  0
t2p Lp H -  C(pH ~ PL)t - 1i (p h  +  PL)2t  -  C2 = 0
^  t2 _  C( pH - p L) +Tl ( PH+PL) 2t  _  C 2 =  Q  
P l P h  P l P h
The two candidate solutions are thus:
C(pH ~  P l ) +  k (p h  +  P l ) 2tl/2 • 2PlPh
±  i . C(ph ~ Pl) + e (Ph + Pl)2\ 2  ^ C2 4pLpH
%PlPh J  PlPh 4pLpH
= C(pH -  Pl) +  1L(Ph +  Pl )2 
%PlPh
± 2pLpH ^ ( C (pH ~  P l  ^+  ~(PH +  P l^  +  4 C 2 Pl Ph
Note that (C(pH -  Pl ) +  e(Ph + Pl ) 2)2 = C 2(p h - P l ) 2+ 2 C ( p h - P l ) z (p h +  
P l ) 2 + e 2 ((P h  +  Pl ) 2) 2 and that C 2 (p h ~ P l ) 2 and 4C 2Pl Ph  can be com­
bined as follows: C2(pH ~ P l ) 2+  4C2pLpH = C2[(pH)2 -  2pLpH +  (pl)2 +
4PlPh \ = C2(ph +  Pl )2- Taking {pu +  Pl )2 out from under the square 
root allows the candidate solutions to be written as
. C(pH ~ Pl ) +  k (ph +  Pl )2 
t i n :  ^
±  (Ph +  Pl) ^ q 2  + 2C(pH -  pL)% +  k2(Ph +  Pl )2
*PlPh
By assumption, t* has to fulfil the requirement tha t £  < t* < t(A =
restrictions. In fact, the ” — ” root is less than —. To see this, consider
’ PL ’
the inequality
U;B = M). I will next show that only one of the two roots satisfies these
ie -
p
C(pn ~  Pl) +  7L(Ph +  pL)2 
%PlPh
-  +  PL  ^yJC2 + 2C(pH ~  Pl )ZE +  K2(ph +  pL)2 < —
%PlPh Pl
Multiplying through by 2PlPh and moving C(pn ~Pl ) to the r.h.s. yields 
k (ph +  Pl )2 ~ (Ph +  Pl ) yJC2 + 2C(pH -  Pl )k  +  7L2(Ph +  pL)2
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< 2CpH ~  C(pH ~  P l ) =  C(pH +  P l )
Dividing by {pjj -f pi) and isolating the square root term on the r.h.s., I 
obtain
e (p h  +  P l ) — C <  y/C2 +  2C(pH ~  P l )e  +  E 2(p h  + P l )2
Squaring both sides leads to an inequality that must be correct, validating 
the initial claim that the ” — ” root can be ruled out:
E 2(p h  +  P l ) 2 ~  %e (Ph  +  pL)C +  C2 <  C2 +  2C{pH -  Pl ) e  +  E 2{Ph  +  P l ) 2
Q
To see that the ” +  ” root is bigger than — , I repeat the preceding steps
Pl
(with the ” < ” replaced by ” > ”) for the ” +  ” root to obtain
C -  k (p h  + P l ) <  V C 2 +  2C(pH -  Pl )e  +  E 2(p h  +  P l ) 2
Squaring both sides leads to the same inequality already shown to be 
correct:
C2 -  2tt(pH +  pL)C +  7T2(pH +  P l ) 2 < C 2 +  2C(pH -  pL)E  +  E 2(p h  +  P l )2
The ” +  ” root also has to be smaller than t(A = U;B = M) :
C(pH ~  P l ) +  h (p h  + P l )2 , ( j >h + P l ) / rr> , n^ ,;----- _ — rzTv>.
------------- t o ------------- + ~ P ^ h W C  +  C ( P H  ~  P l ) ~  +  "  ^  +  PL)
<t(A  = U;B = M)  
where t(A = U\B  =  M)  is given by
t(A =  U-B =  M) =  2VlC1~V^ D~ +  "~7" T2 \ ] 4P l C p h D k  +  (p h D tt)2
2 [Pl ) 2 (pL) v
Multiplying through by 2 {p l ) 2 P h  to get rid of the fractions, this is 
C{pH ~  P l )Pl  +  e (Ph  +  Pl ) 2P l
+ ( P h  +  P l )Pl y/C2 +  2C(pH -  pL)E +  E 2(Ph  +  Pl ) 2
< 2pLCpH +  (Ph)2 De  +  Ph \J^PlCphDk +  (phDtl)2
I now proceed as follows: I consolidate the non-square root terms on the 
r.h.s of the inequality. I then replace yJC2 +  2C(pn — P l )e  + E 2{p h  + P l ) 2 
with a bigger expression and I replace yj^PlCphDtt +  (phDtt)2 with a 
smaller expression. If I can show that the inequality still holds, I will
161
have demonstrated that the original inequality must have been correct, 
too. Bringing all the non-square root terms to the r.h.s., replacing D 
with 2(ph + Pl ) and arranging terms in the order numeral, C, 7r, Pl , Ph > 
I have
2PlCph +  (Ph )2 D tl -  C(pH -  pL)pL -  n{pH +  Pl )2Pl
= 2CpLpH +  2tt (pHf  (pH +  pL) -  CpLpH +  C(pL)2 -  £Pl (ph +  Pl)‘ 
Cancelling terms and grouping, this is
CplPh +  C(pL)2 +  7T_(pH +  pL) [2 (pH)2 -  pL(pH +  pL)\
= CpL(pH +  pL) + 7i(pH +  Pl)[2 (Ph)2 ~  PlPh ~ {pl)2]
= CpL(pH +  Pl) +  k (ph + Pl)[(ph )2 ~  (.Pl f  +  Ph (ph ~  Pl )] 
Now note that
y / c 2 + 2C(pH -  Pl)k  +  K2(Ph +  Pl)2 +  4CpLK
> \ / C 2 + 2C(pH -  Pl)iI +  1L2(Ph +  Pl)2 
The former square root can be transformed as follows:
y / c 2 + 2C(pH -  P l ) k  +  K 2 (P h  +  P l ) 2 +  4CpLZ
=  \ / C 2 +  2  C(pH +  P l ) k  +  IT 2(pH +  pL)2
= C +  k {p h  +  P l )
Multiplying this with (pn +  P l )P l , the original inequality whose va­
lidity I want to prove can be made more restrictive:
P l (p h  + P l ) [C +  7i(pH +  P l )]
<  C p l {p h + P l ) +  1L(p h  +  P l ) [ (p h ) 2 ~  (p l ) 2 
+ P h (p h  ~ P l )] +  P h ^ p l C p h D k  +  (pHDn)2 
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Replacing yj^PlCphD t^  +  {phD ir)2 with a term smaller than yjAp^CPh Dtt + (phDuY 
will make the inequahty even more restrictive. The term I use is 2phK(Ph +
P l ) =  P h D k  = y j (P h D tt)2 < yjIpl C p h D tt + (p h D e ) 2 - Cancelhng 
C p l (p h  +  P l ) on both sides, the inequality then becomes
P l (p h  +  P l ) tl(p h  +  P l )
< 1l{PH + Pl )[(ph )2 ~ (Pl )2 +Ph (ph  ~  Pl )] +  2 (pHf  k {ph +Pl )
Moving all terms to the r.h.s gives 
0 < 1t_(ph +  Pl )[{p h )2 ~  (Pl )2 +  Ph (ph ~ Pl ) + 2 {pHf  -  pL{pH +  Pl )] 
which when written as 
0 < e {Ph +Pl ){{Ph )2- ( P l )2+Ph {Ph ~P l) + {p h )2~{ pl)2+Ph (Ph ~Pl )] 
must be true. This shows that t* is equal to
C(pH - v L)  + nivH ±P.): +^ ± g L )  VcB + 2C(pg _ } + ^  + )a
2PlPh %PlPh
(5.14)
When t takes the value £*, the effort-minimizer is lending to and
monitoring exactly its effortless borrowers; i.e., projects located in the
t*PL — Cinterval [0, X(£*)] = 0, When t takes a value greater
t*{pH+PL)
than t* (t* < t < t(A = U’B = M)) A will monitor existing borrowers
in the interval [0,or*(£* < t < t(A = U;B = M))] with x*(t* < t <
t(A = U,B = M)) < X{t* < t < t(A = U-B = M)) (i.e., lend to
some projects without monitoring them) and, conversely, when t takes a
value smaller than t* (— < t < t*) A monitors borrowers in the interval
PL ~
[0,z*(g- < t < £*)] with x*(£  < t < t*) > X ( ^  < t < t*). In
other words, in the latter case the additional profit from monitoring A's
effortless borrowers is not sufficient to attain the profit target; A  also
needs to steal market share from B.
5.7.5 D erivation o f x*(t* <  t  <  t ( A  =  U ; B  =  M ) )
It will be convenient to use (5.11) and to replace 7r with _T_ (tPL-c) wj1^cj1 
it must be equal to by definition of t(A =  U,B = M) (here abbreviated
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as t). The difference between n and _1_ ^ tpL t is then given by
1 (tpL -  C)2
TT —pHD t 
1 (tpL -  C f  1 (tpL -  C f
PhD 
1 1
PhD 
2
t
t o . d T A t{tPL- C)2- t{ tpL- G)2] =
1 1
— [t  (i P L )2 -  2ttpLC + tC2 - t  (tpL)2 +  2ttpLC -  tC2]P//1/ tt
Cancelling 2ttpi,C and grouping terms, I am left with 
1 1
P h D U
[t£ (.Pl  f  t)C2] =
s s W r i ' w ’ - ' i
The original equation can then be written as
Ph
n 2^ '— J ( P H ~ P L ) t  + ~C
( t ~ t )
%Ph(ph +  Pl) t t  
Multiplying through by —2pn gives
[tt(pL)2 ~ C'2}
=  ( - 1) 
Rearranging the l.h.s:
(-l)x*  [(2 -  x*) (pH -  Ph)t +  2C] 
1 ( t - t )
(.Ph +  Pl) tt
[t t (pL) - c 2]
(~l)x* [(2 -  x*) (pH ~PL)t +  2(7] =
-x*2(pH ~ P L ) t  + {x*f (pH ~ P L ) t  -  x*2C 
(x*)2 (pH -  PL)t ~  2 [{pH ~ PL)t +  C) x* 
Moving all terms to the l.h.s., I have
(x*)2 ( p H -  P L ) t  -  2 [ ( p H -  P L ) t  +  C] X*
164
+ d T 5 a 5 r [ “ “ ’ - c ' i - 0
Dividing through by {ph ~ Pl )  ^ yields the quadratic equation 
(_.\2 _  2 [(PH ~ PL)t +  C\
(  '  ( P H ~ P L ) t
+  T~ 5 - ^ 5 ^  [« (PL? ~  C21 =  0
( ( P h ) 2 -  ( P l ) 2) ( t f t  l ~ ^ L> J
The candidate solutions are therefore
. [(P h  ~  P L ) t  +  C]
1 /2  ’ (P h  ~  PL)t
(P H - P L ) t  J  ((pH)2 -  ( PLf )  (t f t
Inspection shows that the ” +  ” root can be ruled out immediately as the 
resulting x* would be greater than 1, whereas the solution needs to be 
less than |  (A will not lend to borrowers located further away than |) .  
The result can be simplified a little by pulling ~(^h.pL)t out from under 
the square root:
[(P h - P l ) 1 + C ]_______ ( [ { P H - P L ) t + C ] \  (Ph - P l ) ______ 1 „ (t-*)  \ f f ( n  \ 2  / >^21
(p h - p l )* y \  (p h - p l )* J  (p h - p l ) ({p h ) 2 - ( p l ) 2) [t )  t  l - ' P l ' J
_  [ ( P H - P L ) t + C ] _  1 t l\(-n T) ) f  I H 2 P^H-PLHt-VlitiPL)2- 0 2 ]
( P H ~ P L ) t  ( P H - P l )I Y  (ph+pi . )1
(5.15)
I wish to show that this expression for x* satisfies the following three 
requirements:
1. x*(t = t) = 0
2. ( J g z £ _ )
3. x* is monotonically decreasing in t  and continuous (continuity is 
established by invoking standard results on the continuity of a function 
following from the continuity of its components and the observation that 
t by assumption is restricted to be in the interval ■£• < t <t{A = U;B =  
M))
Property 1 can be demonstrated by inspection. Setting t  = t  knocks 
out the second term under the square root and leads x* to vanish.
Property 2 is more complicated. It involves showing that
\ ( P H - P L ) t * + C ]  _  1 . / _  W* , r ] 2 _  CP H - P L ) U - f ) \ f t ( p L ) 2 - C 2
( p H - P L ) t *  (p h - p l )** y  (■'Ph  P l )  J (p h + p l )*
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= ^  t*pL-C \
} *  ( P H + P L ) )
I first simplify the above equation as much as possible. The preceding 
expression is equivalent to
i . c _________1 \ / \ ( t )  v  ) t *  i r^ i2 (ph - p l )  ^  f*)[r hpx.)2 c 2
1 +  (P H - P L ) t * ( P H - P L ) V  V [ { P H  P L )  ] ( P H + P l ) . t
(  2L___________c____^ _  Q
\  (PH + P L ) t* ( p h + P l )  J
which in turn can be written as
JEM I <2____ |_
. . _l_<r*r I * ( v t r w  r»*- if*  '(p h + P l ) (P H ~ P L ) t * * *( PH+Pl )
- T ^ ^ H - V L ) t ' + c f  -  )2- c2l -  0
Multiplying through by t* yields
em !L -1 k |_1  I( P H + P l ) (P H - P L ) (P H + P L )
- r a  yj [(Ph -P l)?+C f  -  -  0
Note that __- ___ I___ - __ = C(<pH +PL ^ c-(PH-~p-±). =  2CPH_ Mul-
(p h - p l ) (p h + p l ) (p h - p l )(p h + p l ) (p h ~ p l ) (p h + p l ) '
tiplying the equation by (p h  — P l ) and moving the square root term to 
the r.h.s. I obtain
( P H~PL) PHt *  i 2C p H _  , \ ( n  _ _  _  ( P H - P L )  h  t * ) [ t * t ( P L ) 2 C 2
(p h + p l ) (p h + p l ) Y [{Ph Pl) J (p h + p l ) t
Taking the factor (Pjf+PL) °ut of both expressions on the l.h.s. allows me 
t°  write as [(p„ -  pL) f  + 2C], so squaring
both sides gives
( o ^ f c ) ) 2 l(PH-PL)f+2Cf  =  [{pH- PL)t'+C ? - ^ {±
While it looks as if there might be scope to simplify this expression 
further, proving the validity of the preceding claim at some point involves 
substituting the expressions obtained for t* and t into the equation and 
that is computationally involved indeed. Instead of doing this manually, 
I have employed Maple, the maths engine that is part of the Scientific 
Workplace software package, to ascertain the veracity of the claim by 
using the {check equality) command. The statement is indeed true10.
10Using Maple requires certain changes to the notation that are not documented 
in the manual /  online help. Maple will only work with expressions that contain 
exclusively standard parentheses, i.e., ( and ), and also will not accept underlined or
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As for property 3, there are two routes to showing that x* is monoton­
ically decreasing in t. The first involves simple differentiation of x*. The 
second route proceeds by noting that the equation
Ph
1 (tpL - C ) 2
H    =  7TpHD t
implicitly defines x* as a function of t  and that the requirements for 
applying the implicit function theorem to compute ^  are fulfilled. I 
then use Maple to establish the equivalence of the solutions obtained 
following these two routes. I begin by restating
* •  =  ^ r PL)V  -  i— ^ i \ l { ( P h - P l )* +  C f  -( P H - P L ) t  ( P H - P L ) *  y  J ( P H+ P L ) l
and rewriting this as
x* = 1 + C
{Ph  ~  PL)t  (Ph  ~  PL)t
s/Y
- 1 + < s r h s | c - ' ' ? l
where
Y  = [(pH - p L)t + c y -
2 (.Ph  - P L ) ( t - t )  [ t t  (pL)2 -  C2}
(Ph  + P L ) t
Differentiating x* with respect to t  gives
dx* _  d 
dt dt
d
_(PH~PL)t_
* [c -  V y ] +  -— - d
(Ph  ~  P L ) t  d t
[ c - V ? \
where — [C — y/Y] is given by
Note that
d_
dt (Ph ~  PL)t_
~ ( P h - P l ) =  ( ~ 1 )
(Ph  ~  PL)2t 2 (p H ~  PL)t2
otherwise decorated characters, so for example n is replaced by P. I have collected 
all computations in a SWP file, maple-computations.tex, which I would be pleased to 
make available for checking upon request.
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In differentiating Y  with respect to £, I rewrite Y  as
,2 (Ph - P l )Y  = [(pH ~ PL)t + C\ -
(.Ph  +  P l )£
( t - t )  [tt_(pL)2 - C 2)
(Ph  ~ P l )
(V H + P L ) t
where
dY
~ PL)t +  C\ {pH -  pL)
9 ( t - t ) *  [tt (pLf  -  C2] + ( t - t ) ^  [tt (pL)2 -  C2]
dt
^ - ( t - t ) *  [tt(pL)2 -  C2} +  (t -  t ) £  [tt(pLf  -  C2]
= [(“ !) [tt (Pl f  ~  C2] +  (t -  t)t (pL)2]
= [~tt(pLf  +  C2 + (t f  (pLf  -  t t (pL)2)]
= [C2 +  (;t )2 (pl )2 ~  2tt (pL)2)]
Thus
^  =  2 [(ph ~  PL)t +  C] [C2 +  (£)2 (pL)2 ~  2t t(pL)2)]
This can be simplified further: 
dY  1
~8t = ( P H + P l ) ^  "  VL)t(PH "  PL](PH +Pl)L 
+2C(pH -  Pl )(ph + Pii)t -  (ph ~  Pl )C2 
- (P h ~  Pl ) (t )2 (pLf  +  (Ph ~  Pl )2tt (pL)2}
= (PH ^ pL) t ^2t~^ PH ~  P l  ^ KPh )2 “  (P ^ 2] +  2Ct-(Pn +Pl)(ph ~  Pl )
~ C 2(ph ~  Pl) ~  (t)2 (pL)2 (Ph ~ Pl ) +  2t t (pL)2 (pH ~  Pl )}
Cancelling 2 tt (p l )2 (p h ~Pl ) and pulling (p h ~Pl ) out of the expression,
I am left with
S "  =  S " + P L ) t  (2tt(P" )2 +  2Ci(PH +PL) ~ ° 2 ~  a)2 (Pi)2)
Cancelling (pn — Pl) and substituting in the other elements, I obtain
—  = ^  *\C -  V y ]
dt (pH -P L ) t2 [ V 1 
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Clearly, it is not straightforward to sign this expression. Following 
the second route and applying the implicit function theorem yields a far 
more manageable result. Call the l.h.s. of (5.11) :
Ph
1 -  y  ) (Ph ~  Pl)t + C
1 (tpL - C )H —-------------- =  7r
Ph D  t
F(-)
Then ^  =  ( - l ) -g ^ - .  Note that D = 2(pH+pL); = ^ ElL
dx* t t
2 tpLC C2  ^ „ C2
t + -j~ = t (.Pl)2 -  2pLC +  and that = -j£-.*
d t
X Ptf (  2 )  ^  Pl  ^+  2pH{pH + p L)
< ° 2 (Pl) ~~p
1 x*(2-:r* )(p / / - p L) +  1
2p//
Ph
(Ph + P l )
t2 (Pl )2 ~  C 2 
t 2
dx*
1 -  - j  ) (P# ~  P f )1 +  c + x
2Ph
([(2 -  x*) (pH -  pL)t +  2C] -  x*(p„ -  pL)t)
1
2 P//
2 [(1 -  x*) (pH -  pL)t +  C]
Putting these results together and cancelling in the process:
2 Ph
x* (2 -  x+) {pH -  pL) +  ------— -
d x ^ _ (_  _____________________(Pg + ^ )
&  1 2 [(1 -  x*) (pH -  pL)t +  C]
i 2 (p l)2 -  C2
Leaving aside the (—1) preceding the fraction and recalling that by as­
sumption t  , the numerator of the expression must be positive. Then
the overall sign of will be negative if and only if the denominator is 
positive. The condition for this to be the case is
2 [(1 -  x*) (pH -  pL)t +  C\ > 0
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(P h  ~  P L ) t  + C > x * ( p H -  p L ) t
^ (PH -PL)t  + C > x .
[Ph  ~  P L ) t
which must be true since it has been shown that A would not monitor 
borrowers located beyond x  = \ . This result confirms that x*  is decreas­
ing in t .  Using Maple, I have confirmed that the results obtained via the 
two different routes are equivalent11.
5.7.6 x* (£-L < t <  t )  =  X(t*) for t  =  t*
To show that x* < t < t*^ j = X{t*) for t = t*, 1 begin by writing the 
term under the square root, |  — =, as follows:
1 _  5  =  1 _  1 1 (;tpL - C  f  
4 t 4 t PhD t
With D replaced by 2(pn + P l )  and both fractions converted to the same 
denominator, this can be written as
(tpL ~ C f1 _  2L = 1 ttpH (pH + pL) _  12 1_______________ =
4 t 4 ttpH (pH +pL) 12pH2(pH + pL) t
= + ^ ~ 2 - c )2) 
Noting that (tpi ~ C)2 = (t)2 (pi)2 — 2tp^C +  C2, the expression is
{ t t p H  (P h  + P l ) ~  2 ( t ) 2 CP l  f  + 4tpLC -  2C2)4 ttpH {p h  +  P l )
Pulling the |  out from under the square root, x* is given by
X 2 2
\
ttpH (P h  +  P l )
{ t t p H  CPh + P l ) - 2  i t ) 2 (p l ) 2 +4tpLC -  2C2)
Y
The equation that is to be shown to hold is
t*pL ~ C
t*(pH +PL)_
11 As noted above, I have recorded all computations step-by-step in a SWP file, 
maple-computations.tex, which I would be pleased to make available for checking 
upon request.
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This can be rearranged as
t*PL ~ C
t* (Ph +Pl ]).
1 7L 
4 ~ t *
Multiplying both sides by 2 and moving the terms on the l.h.s. onto the 
same denominator
j _  2 (t*pL -  C) =  t*(pg + P L )-2 ( t* p L -C >)
**(P//+Pl) (Pj/ + P l)
<^>
Squaring both sides
t*(Ph - P l) + 2C ? l l  _  j l  = 
(pH +  Pl) V 4 i*
2
[£*(Plt ~ Pl) + 2(7]2 =
t*tpH (Ph +  Pl )
Canceling £*(pj/ +  Pl) on both sides
1
**(Pj/ + P l),
(**£p// (pH +  P l ) -  2 (t)2 (pL)2 +  4tpL<7 -  2C2)
[£*(Ptf — Pl) + 2(7] =
=  - J -  (t*tp# (p/f +  p l)  -  2 (t)2 (p l)2 +  4£pL(7 -  2<72)
tPH
Noting that [t*{pH -  pL) +  2C]2 = ( t* f  (pH -  pL)2+4i* (p ^ -p l) (7+4(72 
and getting rid of the fractions
((£*)2 (pH -  p l )2 +  4t*(pH -  pL)C +  4C2) tpH =
— (t*tPH (Ph +  P l) ~ 2 (£)2 (p l)2 + 4tpLC — 2C2) t*(pH +  p l)
Multiplying out gives (£*)2 (pH -  pL)2 tpH +4t*(pH- p L)CtpH +4C2tpH = 
= t*tpH (pH + p l )  **(ph +  Pl) ~2 (£)2 (p l)2 **(p// +  Pl) +4£plC7*(p// +  
Pl )  —2 C2t*(pjj +  p l )  which can be rearranged in the order numeral, 
C, t*, t, p l ,  Ph,  (Ph  ±  Pl) • (t*)2 tpH (ph ~  P l ) 2 +  4Ct*tpn(pH ~  P l )  
+4C2tpH =  (t*)2tpH { P h + p l ) 2 - 2 1* (t)2 {pL)2 ( p h + p l )  +4Ct*tpL{pH +  
P l )  —2C2t*(pH +  Pl)- Moving everything to the l.h.s. and combin­
ing terms: (£*)2 tpH [(ph)2 -% PhPl  +  (p l)2 -  ( p h ) 2 ~ ^ P hP l  ~  (p l)2] + 
4Ct*t [(pH)2 - P h P l  ~ P h P l  ~  (Pl)2] +4C2tpH +21* (t)2 (pLf  (pH +  Pl) 
+2C2t*(pn + P l)-  Cancelling terms, the equality can be rewritten as
- 4  (£*)2 tpL {p h )2 +  4Ct*t ((pH f  -  2PhPl ~  (p l)2)
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+4C2tpH + 21* (t)2 (pL)2 (p# + pL) +  2C2t*(pH + pL) = 0
This is as much as I have been able to simplify the original equality 
manually without substituting in for t* and t. I have confirmed that the 
equality holds using the {check equality) command in Maple. As noted 
above, the SWP file with the calculations is available upon request.
5.7.7 Surplus for 47t < t  <  t ( A =  U; B  =  M )  decreas­
ing in t
I consider the two cases in turn, t* < t  < t(A = U;B = M) first. Surplus 
(expected surplus) before processing costs on a monitored borrower is 
given by PhR  — p — m, (expected) surplus before processing costs on an 
unmonitored borrower is PlR — P- All projects obtain a loan, but not 
all of them are monitored: Projects located in [0, x*] borrow from A and 
are monitored; projects located in (x*, X(t)] borrow from A, but are 
not monitored, and projects located at x > X(t)  borrow from B  and 
are monitored again. As above, I will consider surplus before processing 
costs and processing costs separately. A total of x* +  (1 — X(t)) borrowers 
are monitored, the remaining X(t) — x* are not monitored. Thus total 
surplus before processing costs is given by
(x* + ( l  -  ^ W ) )  (PhR  -  p - m ) + ( x { t ) -  x ( p LR -  p)
S urplus before processing costs
=  ( l  -  -  s* )) CPhR  -  p - m )  + (x ( t )  -  x*) (pLR -  p)
= (PhR  -  p -  m) -  {x{t)  -  x*) \(pHR - p - m ) -  (pLR -  p)]
-  (PhR  - p - m )  -  ^X(t) -  x*) [(pH - p L) R ~  m]
Clearly, the crucial term in this is ^A(t) — x*^ which captures the num­
ber of borrowers that are not monitored. If this can be shown to be 
increasing in £, surplus before processing costs must be decreasing in t. 
[This formulation takes into account the fact that (^X(t) — x*J enters 
surplus with a negative sign.] I have shown X(t)  to be increasing in t 
and I have shown x*, which has a negative sign, to be decreasing in t. So 
surplus before processing costs is decreasing in t.
As for processing costs, I state these as the product of the number of 
borrowers and the average processing cost. In the case of A, the number 
of borrowers is X(t)  and the average processing cost is thus ^p-t. Then 
A’s total processing costs are ( x ( t ) ) 2 f . In the case of B, the number
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of borrowers is (1 — and the average processing cost is therefore
1 leading to total processing costs for B  of |  f 1 — .In  sum
>
(*w )2)
processing costs
All expressions relating to processing costs are exactly unchanged from 
the scenario where A  did not need to monitor at all; results and interpre­
tations carry over as well: Processing costs are increasing in t. The direct
sign, an increase in t increases processing costs and lowers surplus.
I have now shown for t* < t < t(A = U\B = M) what I set out 
to show: Surplus (the sum of two components) is unambiguously de­
creasing in t. The second component of surplus, processing costs, is 
increasing in t for the same reasons as in regime 1. However, surplus 
before processing costs (the first component) is now affected by an ad­
ditional factor: An increase in t also leads to a reduction in x* (i.e., A 
monitoring fewer borrowers). Since X(t)  enters surplus with a negative 
sign, both of these effects link increased values of t with lower surplus. 
I could try to consolidate all four effects formally as I did above, but in 
view of the unwieldiness of the expressions involved (notably that for x*) 
this is likely to be very tedious and unlikely to provide any additional 
insights. Note that surplus is also a continuous function of t.
I next consider the case of < t < t* (regime 3). For 47r < t < £*, A 
lends to and monitors borrowers located up to x* (where the definition of 
x* is different from the one for regime 2) with B  winning the remainder 
of the market (1 — x*). All projects are being monitored, so is surplus 
invariant to changes in t? Not quite. Surplus increases as t falls all the 
way down to t = 47t. The source of this surplus gain is a reduction in 
processing costs. As t falls, x* increases. More projects borrow from A  
at lower processing costs than if they borrowed from B. So surplus is
decreasing in t even though surplus before processing costs is constant 
for 47t < t < —.— — — 7>r
effect of higher (lower) t assuming an unchanged division of the market 
X(t)  is to increase (decrease) processing costs; this direct effect domi­
nates the indirect effect that lowers (increases) processing costs, because 
an increase (decrease) in t leads to an increase (decrease) in X  (t) - more 
(fewer) projects borrowing from A  at lower processing cost than if they 
borrowed from B . Since processing costs enter surplus with a negative
PL
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Formally, A  and B  monitor all borrowers in their loan portfolios of 
size x* and (1 — x*), respectively. Then surplus before processing costs 
is
x* (Ph R  — p — m) + (l — x*) (PhR  - p - m )
= (PhR  - p - m )
which does not vary with t. As for processing costs, in the case of A  the 
number of borrowers is x* and the average processing cost is thus ^ t .  
Then A's total processing costs are (a;*)2 In the case of B,  the number 
of borrowers is (1 — x*) and the average processing cost is ^Y~t, leading 
to total processing costs for B  of |  (1 — x*)2. Formally, the sum of these 
terms is
Once again, it makes sense to consider the direct and indirect effects of t
t  («•)* + L (i _  *•)* =
= | ( l - 2 x *  +  2(x*)2)
processing costs
Differentiating this with respect to t gives
/
change m costs tor given x* change in costs for giyen t
separately. The direct effect relates to the effect of t on processing costs 
keeping x * fixed. One would expect the sign of the direct effect in the 
above equation to be positive. Note that
i  -  X* +  (x*)2 = i  -  x*( 1 -x * )
The relevant x* is given by
Therefore
\ - x * { l ~ x * )  =
1
2
1 7T
4 ~ 1
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So if I can show that (5 — f ) > 0 , 1 will have shown that the direct effect 
of t on processing costs and therefore surplus is the intuitive one: Higher 
t means higher costs and lower surplus.
1 7T - - = | > o ^
1 7r-  > = <£>2 t
t > 2n
But since t by assumption is greater than 47r, the preceding inequality 
must hold.
The indirect effect of t on processing costs relates to the change in 
costs via the change in x* induced by changes in t. The relevant compo­
nent of costs is given by
/  * dx* dx*
+t \ 2 x ~ d t~ ~ 9 t
dx*
= t ( 2 * * - l )  —
dx*I had shown to be given by
11 7T 1 1 — 2x* dx*Note that \ ----- — = ----- x* = ---------- . This means that —— can beV 4 t 2 2 dt
written as
dx* 1 1 7T 1 7T
—  = ( - 1 ) - --- -----— = f -1 ) ----- ------ —dt K 2 1 —2x* fi K (1 — 2x*) t2
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Substituting this above yields
( - l ) t ( l - 2 < ) ^  =
= ( - i ) ‘ ( i - 2 * * ) ( - i ) ( r ^ f
ZL 
~~ 1
This term has a positive sign in the sum capturing processing costs. 
Therefore in the present case the indirect effect of t (in contrast to regime 
2) also links increases in t with increases in processing costs (and, there­
fore, decreases in surplus). What axe the economics behind this? When 
t > t*, an increase in t leads to an increase in A's effortless market share 
X{t). That is bad for surplus because A  does not monitor the most dis­
tant borrowers in that scenario (even though a higher market share for 
A means lower processing costs). When t < t*, the effect of an increase 
in t is to decrease x* because it allows A  to monitor (and therefore lend 
to) fewer projects which means that B  takes a greater market share (but 
has higher processing costs).
It is now but a formality to add up and consolidate the direct and 
indirect effects. Both effects are going in the same direction, so it is not 
surprising that the overall effect of higher t on processing costs (surplus) 
is positive (negative):
d (processing costs) 
dt
1 * . , *n2 - (~ ~dx* dx*= - - £ *  +  (x*y +t 2x*~— -
2 V dt dt
change in costs for given x* change Jn costg for given f 
1 7 r \ 7T 1
2 - 7 j + 7  =  2 > 0
In summary, in the case where 47r < t <t* surplus is also decreasing in 
t , even though all projects are monitored. Interestingly, this property is 
not entirely assumed into the model. The direct effect of t on processing 
costs certainly is an artefact of the model setup in which the intensity 
of competition is captured by the difference in costs. However, the in­
direct effect (via the impact of t on Afs market share x*) runs in the 
same direction as the direct effect, so that even if one ignored the direct 
effect, surplus would still be decreasing in t. Note also that surplus is a 
continuous function of t.
Surplus is given by different expressions in the three regimes t >
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t(A = U\B = M), t* < t < t(A = U,B = M), and 4n < t < t*. What 
remains to be done is to show that surplus (and not just x*/X(t))  is 
continuous at the threshold values for t that separate the three regimes, 
namely t = t(A = U,B = M) and t — t*. Formally, I need to show that
lim S(t) =  S(i) 
lim S(t) =  S ( f )
This boils down to demonstrating that two equalities set out below 
hold. These state that surplus at the threshold values of t is the same re­
gardless of whether one uses the surplus expression relating to the interval 
above or below the threshold value. The demonstration as presented here 
avoids formalities and examines whether surplus is smoothly decreasing 
in t everywhere. I have shown this for almost all values of t for which 
surplus is defined, namely t > 47r. All that remains to be shown is that 
surplus is continuous at the threshold values.
I first consider is t = t(A = U]B = M). The l.h.s. of the equation 
uses the surplus expression as defined for t* < t < t(A = U;B = M); 
the r.h.s. uses the surplus expression relating to t > t(A = U;B = M):
(pHR -  p - m )
-  [(pH — pL) R  — m]
- = ( l - 2 X ( i )  +  2 ( x a ) ) 2')
= (PhR  - p - m )
- X( t )  [(p h  — P l ) R — m \
1 2X(t) + 2 fx(t)Y
Inspection shows that x * ( t ) = 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the equality to hold. But that is precisely the property that I had 
earlier demonstrated. So surplus is indeed continuous at t = t(A =
U;B = M).
The other value I consider is t =  £*. The r.h.s. of the equation uses 
the surplus expression as defined for t* < t < t(A = U',B = M); the
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l.h.s. uses the surplus expression relating to 4 7 [ < £ < £ * .  Note that 
the x* that relate to these two regimes are different, although I initially 
abbreviate both of them with the same symbol x* to save on notation:
(PhR  - p - m )
- | ( l - 2 x * ( t ‘ ) +  2 ( x *  ( O ) 2 )
?
= (PhR  - p - m )
-  (-Y(f) -  z*(£*)) l(pH - p L) R -  m]
- | ( i - 2 * ( t * )  +  2 ( x ( r ) ) 2)
I can rely on earlier work to show that this equality holds. First, note 
that cancelling (pnR — p — m) on both sides and multiplying through by 
(—1) yields the following, slightly simpler expression:
| ( 1  —2x*(t*) +  2 (z*(«*))2)
=  (-*(<*) -  **(<*)) [(Ph  ~ P l ) R ~  m]
+ |  ( l-2 X (« * ) +  2 (j? (t* ))2)
I had ear her demonstrated that X(t*) = x*(t*). This knocks out the 
first term on the r.h.s. to yield
| ( l - 2 x * ( C )  +  2(x*(t*))2)
=  | ( i - 2 ^ (n + 2 ( ^ ( t * ) ) 2 )
Clearly, the equality holds if and only if x* (£*), which here refers to
is equal to X(t*). That is what I have shown in the preceding sub-sub­
section. Therefore, surplus is continuous at t = t*.
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Chapter 6
Lending-related incentive 
schem es as a tool of bank 
regulation
6.1 O verview  and Sum m ary
I begin this chapter with an introduction (6.2) that motivates the research 
reported here. In particular, I defend the non-standard methodology em­
ployed, namely the use of interviews to address the question ‘What scope 
is there for devising effective lending-related incentive arrangements in 
practice? Is it possible to construct incentive schemes that align the in­
terests of a regulator with those of the banks?’ I approached this subject 
by interviewing approximately 120 practitioners in a sample of German 
banks. Reporting the results of qualitative interviewing is an inherently 
‘wordy’ affair and I only have space to discuss the main issues and findings 
in the body of the thesis. A separate note with supplementary material 
[Eggenberger (2006c)] is available upon request. In that note I discuss 
how the regulation of lending-related incentive schemes fits in with the 
current framework of bank regulation. I provide a summary in section
6.3 below. In the following section (6.4), I set out the case for regulating 
incentive compensation in banks [also in the form of an extended sum­
mary of a more detailed discussion in Eggenberger (2006c)]. Three issues 
are examined: I provide evidence that lending-related incentive arrange­
ments should be an area of concern for bank regulation and I document 
that this view is shared by a number of prominent academics. Next, 
I argue that there are good reasons for being sceptical as to whether 
these incentives are appropriately taken into account at present. Third, 
an extensive literature review shows that we know very little about ac­
tual incentive arrangements and that what we do know is fairly worrying.
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The last section of chapter 6 discusses the questions of interest and scope 
of the study in more detail (6.5). I explain that I concentrate on non­
tradable credit risk in combination with long or indeterminate maturities 
where, in addition, the borrower’s cashflow distribution is influenced by 
the bank’s monitoring and considerable discretion on the part of loan 
officers means that human effort and judgment matter. If -  unlike in 
the case of small-business lending -  these preconditions are not met, 
constructing an incentive scheme would be a relatively straightforward 
matter. Note that the focus on non-tradable risks means that credit 
portfolio management is beyond the scope of my study. Next, I explain 
that I concentrate on line employees from both the front- and back-offices 
as well as work-out specialists dealing with problem loans and I argue 
that these employees have considerable discretion. I outline how human 
effort matters and how its exercise (and therefore the scope for the use 
of incentive schemes) is constrained by the sophistication of the avail­
able IT and software architecture. I set out the general requirements 
that a lending-related incentive scheme should fulfill from the point of 
view of a regulator: It should be able to 1) deal with staff turnover; 2) 
make possible a regular (at least annual) performance evaluation prior 
to the maturity dates of loans; 3) evaluate performance objectively and 
link remuneration to performance in an explicit fashion; and 4) provide 
incentives, in particular, for post-disbursement monitoring.
In chapter 7 I report my findings in detail. Following an introduction 
(7.1) I explain and defend the methodology I used in my fieldwork (7.2). 
The cooperation with the Employers’ Federation of German Cooperative 
Banks which sponsored the study is described in Eggenberger (2006c). 
The sophistication of risk-rating and pricing tools is a potentially criti­
cal constraint for the design of incentive schemes. Therefore, in section
7.3 I outline the credit risk rating and pricing methodology in use in 
the sample banks and I show in which ways there is scope for human 
influence. I also discuss the implications for incentive schemes. In the 
following section (7.4) I describe possible objectives (performance mea­
sures). I outline desirable features of incentive schemes and give some 
institutional and organizational background. The discussion of possible 
objectives for front-office employees (loan officers) begins with comments 
on the use of profit targets, followed by the analysis of several other 
candidate objectives. The risk objective must be at the heart of any 
lending-related incentive scheme and is discussed in detail. The section 
ends with a discussion of possible objectives for credit analysts and the 
turn-around/liquidation unit. Two important caveats are tackled on the
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basis of the existing literature rather than my fieldwork: In section 7.5 
I review potential shortcomings of the risk measurement tools currently 
in use and in Eggenberger (2006c) I outline fundamental doubts with 
respect to explicit contingent-pay schemes.
What is the bottom line of this fieldwork? While it would be intel­
lectually dishonest to claim to be able to give a definitive answer to the 
above question on the basis of the fieldwork reported here, my findings 
indicate that it may be possible to construct sensible schemes. I illustrate 
this claim here with two potential objectives:
1. Linking a front-office employee’s remuneration with the profit he 
or she generates for the bank is conceivably a useful objective from the 
point of view of both bank and regulator. However, many practical is­
sues would need to be resolved. Some of these (such as the heterogeneity 
of business customers that makes it difficult to design comparable port­
folios for different relationship managers and may, therefore, undermine 
the fairness requirement) are mainly a headache for the bank. Other 
problems (such as possibly inaccurate profitability estimates) are more 
directly a concern from the regulator’s point of view. On the basis of 
my exploratory interviews it is not possible to gauge the extent to which 
such difficulties make it inadvisable to use a profit objective.
2. By comparing actual and expected loan losses on a portfolio, it 
may be possible to measure the quality of a loan officer’s risk-related 
work. While such an objective may expose employees to considerable 
risk, simple work-arounds may be able to defuse this problem and suffi­
ciently isolate employee performance from exogenous fluctuations. It is 
not possible to say with confidence that such an arrangement would be 
effective in practice, but my interviews suggest that it may well work.
I discuss these and additional candidate objectives in detail and present 
obstacles and potential problems discovered in the interviews. In sum­
mary, my findings do not provide conclusive proof that the regulation of 
incentive compensation in banks should be a tool of financial regulation. 
However, the results of my fieldwork constitute a first stab at the question 
of whether there is scope for devising effective lending-related incentive 
arrangements that align the interests of a regulator with those of the 
banks. My hope is that regulators will build on these findings and use 
their influence to further explore this sensitive but critically important 
area.
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6.2 In trodu ction  and M otivation
This chapter and the next aim to establish whether there is scope for de­
vising effective lending-related incentive arrangements in practice. While 
the question is straightforward, the methodology employed in this chap­
ter, interview-based fieldwork, is sufficiently unusual for an economics 
doctoral thesis to warrant a brief explanation. I came across the sub­
ject of lending-related incentive arrangements via the theoretical work 
reported in the preceding chapters. I wondered how the elements of 
mainstream theoretical work correspond to reality and I started looking 
for literature on incentive structures in banks. The dearth of available 
material piqued my interest and I decided to pursue the topic further.
One angle from which to study real-world incentive structures is as 
an extension to theoretical work akin to a robustness check. In the the­
oretical models of bank competition reviewed earlier in this thesis, there 
is much discussion of the effort exerted by ‘the manager’. In those mod­
els the fink between the intensity of competition and effort, while often 
subtle, is always reasonably transparent. A theoretical model hopes to 
gain insight into a problem by isolating and capturing some aspect of 
reality. One prerequisite for that approach is to consider banks as black 
boxes such that a single agent represents hundreds or even thousands 
of employees. In reality, not surprisingly, the mechanism through which 
competitive pressures are transmitted to and within the black-box that 
is the bank is far more complex and complicated. Therefore, as far as 
the real-world applicability of theoretical work is concerned, one crucial 
question is how the pressures that the bank is facing at the institution 
level are transmitted throughout the organization. As an economist, one 
is trained to look for and analyze incentives as a key element of this trans­
mission mechanism. In particular, organizational slack might be linked 
with the absence of appropriately designed incentive schemes. The work 
presented here can thus be read as a complement to the theoretical work 
in the preceding chapters.
While the perspective adopted in the earlier parts of the thesis is that 
of a policy-maker keen to maximize surplus, the concerns outlined above 
also matter from the point of view of financial stability: A lot of things 
can go wrong even if incentives are cleverly designed at the institution 
level. In this sense the perspectives of a policy-maker whose priority is 
surplus and that of a financial regulator who seeks to prevent systemic 
crises (and, to some extent, individual bank failures) are different, but 
overlap. In both cases the basic issue is how to influence behavior in 
desirable ways.
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Given that in the rest of the thesis to all intents and purposes I ig­
nore the possibility of bank failures, I decided to approach the subject of 
lending-related incentive arrangements from a regulator’s point of view 
and ask whether banks could be made safer through cleverly-designed 
rules on permissible or mandatory lending-related incentive arrangements 
where incentive arrangements are understood in the narrow sense of an 
explicit link between objective performance measures and remuneration. 
(That is what a regulator could impose in contrast to, say, intrinsic moti­
vation on the part of bankers to take risk in a disciplined manner.) Such 
rules on compensation arrangements would limit the autonomy of owners 
and top management to run their banks as they see fit and thus consti­
tute an intrusion, but the principle of intrusion surely is not contested if 
there is to be regulation at all.
That particular intrusion might also be a rather useful one. I make 
this claim on the basis of an extensive literature review [included in 
Eggenberger (2006c) and summarized below] in which I show that bank­
ing failures and banking crises are systematically associated with dys­
functional incentive arrangements. There is little information on incen­
tive structures in the public domain and what information there is is 
fairly worrying. All this suggests that far from being a peripheral issue, 
incentive structures should become an important concern for regulators. 
To the best of my knowledge, other researchers have not ventured beyond 
making that assertion. My contribution is to investigate what actually 
could be done about dysfunctional incentive arrangements. In my fact­
finding I look at issues that may appear pedestrian to a theorist, but 
in analyzing the scope for sensible lending-related incentive structures 
it surely would be most inappropriate to assume away the concerns of 
practitioners.
This work is built on the premise that a desire to avoid systemic 
crises can justify restrictions on permissible incentive contracts or might 
even entail prescriptive regulation. The evidence I have seen suggests 
that existing incentive arrangements are problematic from a financial 
stability point of view. In many cases such incentive structures may not 
even be the result of a conscious tradeoff between different objectives 
(e.g., senior management consciously inducing loan officers to take risk 
in ways that appear imprudent from the regulator’s point of view), but 
may reflect simple carelessness. I realize that this conjecture is difficult 
to square with our usual idea of rational actors, so given the lack of hard 
evidence I do not wish to overstress this point.
By way of analogy, I note that prior to the Basel II discussion many
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banks argued that it was not necessary to differentiate loans very finely 
by risk and that sophisticated statistical rating tools were a waste of time 
because such systems would not achieve anything that the judgement of 
an experienced banker could not accomplish without all the formality. A 
few years later people thought about this very differently. So (abstracting 
from unintended flaws in the New Capital Accord) this may even be a case 
of regulation in which all sides have gained. It is possible that judicious 
regulation of incentive arrangements may have similar beneficial effects.
It is one thing to assert that existing incentive structures are dys­
functional; it is quite another to actually analyze whether one could do 
better. That involves looking at many nitty-gritty issues, as the only 
way to find out what we need to know is to talk to practitioners. As I 
document below, among academics, regulators, and even practitioners, 
the issue of lending-related incentive arrangements is largely uncharted 
territory.
In terms of practicalities, I focused on working with German banks. 
This was partly for logistical convenience, but mainly because the Ger­
man banking sector is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation 
and variety in organizational forms. I eventually worked with cooperative 
banks, but at the outset it seemed reasonable to try for a sample as var­
ied as possible. Having said that, I was also in contact with banks from 
other countries and German for-profit as well as public-sector banks.
I first attempted to convince the Bundesbank to support my project. 
The board member in charge of banking regulation confirmed that the 
question was of great interest, but pointed to legal restrictions and noted 
that the Bundesbank by law has to keep confidential all information 
obtained from the banks it supervises (meaning that I would not be 
able to use it in my thesis). There was also concern that banks which 
were at the time (spring of 2002) assisting the Bundesbank prepare for 
the revision of the Capital Accord through various quantitative impact 
studies and surveys should not be burdened with further requests for 
cooperation. I therefore contacted banks directly to gain their support 
on my own. This was an exercise as gratifying as it was frustrating. It 
was gratifying because the interest my proposal generated on the part of 
senior practitioners proved that I was on to something. In particular, the 
interest among banks far larger than the banks with which I eventually 
worked suggests that the subject has not been dealt with in a convincing 
way outside my sample. Anecdotal evidence gathered in conversations 
with practitioners and regulators supports that view. With respect to 
the topic of interest, there may actually be little difference between banks
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(including banks outside Germany).
The experience was also frustrating as I invested a considerable amount 
of time and effort into getting banks to support my research only for the 
project to be ground up by organizational politics. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it has become clear to me that compensation arrangements 
may be among the most sensitive issues in the life of an organization1. 
By contrast, bankers were often surprisingly comfortable talking about 
their risk rating technology and revealing information that I would expect 
to be far more commercially sensitive than information on remuneration 
structures. In the case of almost all banks that I contacted, I initially 
approached the person in charge of credit risk methodology as I intended 
to look at (actual and potential) incentive structures from a risk man­
agement point of view. In a number of cases the negotiations reached 
an advanced stage (progressing from telephone conversations to more de­
tailed proposals to meetings with senior managers) before organizational 
politics of some kind (one unit being interested, but other units not co­
operating; unease about the reaction that participating in such a study 
would provoke on the part of the union) brought discussions to an end 
or resulted in offers of cooperation too restricted for me to be able to 
tackle the question of interest. In addition to disclosing its compensation 
policies and allowing access to fine managers, a bank also would have 
needed to explain its risk management infrastructure and run the risk 
that potential shortcomings would be discovered and spill over into the 
public or semi-public2 domain.
The bottom line is that it was very difficult to gain the kind of access 
to banks required to tackle the research question. However, working di­
rectly with banks is the only way to obtain the information needed and 
I did eventually manage to find an organization to work with. There are 
few cases that I am aware of in which a researcher has managed to gain 
that kind of cooperation. Comparable work either involves established 
academics [e.g., Bartel (2004), James (1996), Santomero (1997)] or reg­
ulators [e.g., Treacy and Carey (1998), English and Nelson (1998)] who 
have substantial powers of persuasion short of invoking any statutory
JBy way of illustration, in a discrimination lawsuit recently brought against Mor­
gan Stanley which was widely reported in the financial press, the bank -  despite 
apparently having a strong case in purely legal terms — settled out-of-court for an 
amount of USD 54 million rather than having to divulge details on its compensation 
policies. The Economist (2004f) noted that it was not hard to see why a settlement 
suited the bank: ‘Morgan Stanley dreaded seeing tales of its traders’ boorishness in 
the tabloids and on daytime television. ( . . . )  Just as scary, perhaps, a trial would 
have revealed details of people’s pay, to the glee of the firm’s competitors and the ire 
of some of its employees. And all this even if Morgan Stanley had won.’
2 As part of the confidentiality agreement that I signed, I am allowed to use my 
findings in the thesis, but I am not allowed to use them in any other way.
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rights to information.
I am confident that my findings are a substantial step forward and 
shed fight on the problems inherent in designing and implementing lending- 
related incentives. I hope that the analysis of both existing and desirable 
incentive arrangements will be taken further by others. As will become 
clear, the only way to advance our knowledge is to talk to practitioners.
6.3  In cen tives in th e  con tex t o f bank reg­
u la tion
In section 1 of Eggenberger (2006c) I demonstrate that regulation of 
incentive arrangements might be a useful addition to the current bank 
regulatory framework -  a framework that has steadily evolved from a 
focus on quantitative regulation to a more qualitative approach. Sub­
section l.A outlines why banks may be thought to be ‘special’. Sub­
section l.B sketches out the current regime of bank regulation centered 
on capital requirements. Sub-section l.C looks at regulatory strategies 
beyond capital requirements and, in this context, briefly examines the 
case for the regulation of incentive arrangements in banks.
6 .4  T h e C ase for R egu la tin g  Incentive C om ­
p en sa tio n
This section -  like the preceding one -  constitutes background material 
and is included as section 2 in Eggenberger (2006c). In the following, I 
provide a summary.
In 2.A I outline the evidence on the role of incentives (and, therefore, 
their regulation) in bank failures and banking system distress. The main 
findings are the following:
• Bank failures have multiple and diverse causes.
• Human error and other (in principle) avoidable problems dwarf the 
role of exogenous shocks.
• Bad loans are the leading proximate cause of failure; credit risk 
management in particular is an area of concern.
• Dysfunctional lending-related incentives are a major contributing 
factor to bank distress.
Sub-section 2.B asks why regulators should bother to regulate com­
pensation when this is really a task for owners. A number of mainly the­
oretical arguments are considered. However, it is argued that only a look
186
at the evidence can reveal whether the issues outlined ought to be con­
sidered material real-world concerns or of merely theoretical relevance. 
Specifically, one would want to know which incentive arrangements are in 
place, whether they cause problems and whether they can be improved.
These questions are addressed in the following sub-section (2.C) as 
part of an extensive literature review. More specifically, I examine
• Descriptive material on human resource management policies in 
banks, in particular compensation practices;
• Academic studies of top-management compensation;
• Other academic work that touches on human resource management 
practices, including compensation, in banking;
• Publications by and/or for practitioners, banking textbooks, and 
academic publications that are prescriptive in nature;
• Credit-rating agencies’ material; and
• Pertinent Government Regulations (Germany, U.S., and BCBS)
The upshot of this literature review is that little can be learnt about 
actual incentive schemes in real-world banks from public sources; there is 
hardly any literature on the subject, even when a generously broad search 
protocol is used. However, I show that what little we do know is fairly 
worrying. None of the sources presents a blueprint for a sensible incen­
tive scheme nor describes such an incentive scheme in operation. Scat­
tered references in practitioner material, the literature on the causes of 
bank failures and the anecdotal evidence I gathered in numerous discus­
sions with practitioners and regulators suggest to me that the paucity of 
publicly available information on lending-related incentive arrangements 
cannot be taken as an indication that these do not matter. Dysfunctional 
incentive arrangements have been identified as a key driver of bank fail­
ures and a cause for concern even for banks that are in good financial 
health. Thus, the most plausible explanation for the apparent gap in the 
literature is that the lack of material reflects a dearth of appropriately 
designed incentive schemes. The conclusion that emerges from this lit­
erature review is that there is no substitute for talking to practitioners 
to examine in more depth those schemes in use and the arrangements 
that could be effective and feasible. In particular, one question hanging 
over the entire issue is whether it is at all possible to construct sensible 
incentive arrangements. [An appendix (2.D) discusses the sources used.]
In the following, I present selected quotations that illustrate the con­
cerns of a number of prominent academics with respect to lending-related 
incentives.
Llewellyn (2002) asserts that
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‘incentive structures and moral hazards faced by decision-makers (bank 
owners and managers, lenders to banks, borrowers and central banks) are 
central to an understanding of bank crises.’ (p. 160)
Expanding further on the incentive structures within banks, he notes 
that the following issues are relevant:
‘the extent to which reward structures are based on the volume of 
business undertaken; the extent to which the risk characteristics of deci­
sions are incorporated into the reward structures; the nature of the in­
ternal control systems within banks; internal monitoring of the decision­
making of loan officers; the nature of profit-sharing schemes and the ex­
tent to which decision-makers also share in losses, etc. High staff turnover 
and the speed with which officers are moved within the bank, may also 
create incentives for excessive risk-taking. (...) [B]ank managers have fre­
quently been rewarded on the basis of the volume of loans made. Many 
cases of bank distress have been associated with inappropriate incentive 
structures creating a bias in favour of balance sheet growth (...).’ (p. 
162)
John, Saunders and Senbet (2000) argue that
‘bank regulation, through capital requirements and asset restrictions, 
has limited effectiveness, given the high leverage ratios of banks.’ (p. 96) 
They advocate a
‘prominent role for management compensation structures in bank reg­
ulation’
and point out:
‘Unlike capital and asset regulations, which have at best indirect ef­
fects on managerial incentives and thus on managerial decisions, altering 
top-management compensation is a direct and effective way of influencing 
managerial return and risk-taking incentives.’ (p. 97)
Santomero (1997) points out the desirability of appropriate incentive 
schemes, but like the other authors cited here has clearly not investigated 
in detail how such arrangements could be made to work:
‘To the extent that management can enter incentive compatible con­
tracts with fine managers and make compensation related to the risks 
borne by these individuals, then the need for elaborate and costly con­
trols is lessened. However, such incentive contracts require accurate po­
sition valuation and proper internal control systems. (FN 5 omitted) 
Such tools, which include position posting, risk analysis, the allocation 
of costs, and setting of required returns to various parts of the orga­
nization, are not trivial. Notwithstanding the difficulty, well-designed 
systems align the goals of managers with other stakeholders in a most
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desirable way. (FN 6 omitted) In fact, most financial debacles can be 
traced to the absence of incentive compatibility ( . . . ) . ’ (p. 87-88)
Goodhart (1996) also addresses the problem of incentive arrange­
ments from the point of view of bank regulation, but is more skeptical 
with respect to its political feasibility. He observes:
‘The influence of capital adequacy on risk-seeking behaviour is un­
derstood by most people, and the consequential rationale for external 
regulators to enforce (graduated) additional controls over financial insti­
tutions with insufficient capital is generally accepted. The iso-morphism 
with the effect on risk-seeking behaviour of the pay structure is generally 
not well understood (FN 8 omitted), and there is little willingness or 
acceptance by internal management for allowing external regulators to 
have any say in the matter.3’ (p. 11)
Llewellyn (2000) writes that
‘while external regulation has a role in fostering a safe and sound 
banking system, this role is limited. Equally and increasingly important 
are the incentive structures faced by private banking agents and the 
efficiency of the necessary monitoring and supervision of banks by official 
agencies and the market.’ (pp. 69-70)
He argues that
‘two structural shifts are needed within the regulatory regime: (1) 
external regulation needs to become less prescriptive, more flexible, and 
more differentiated among different institutions, and (2) more empha­
sis needs to be given to incentive structures and the contribution that 
regulation can make to creating appropriate incentive structures.’ (p. 
70)
More specifically,
‘The key is that appropriate internal incentives need to be developed 
for management to behave in appropriate ways and that the regulator 
has a role in ensuring that internal incentives are compatible with the ob­
jectives of regulation. Combining appropriate incentives for owners and 
managers contributes to a robust financial system, and, in principle, the 
market would evolve such incentives. However, experience indicates that, 
in many areas, and most especially when the competitive environment is 
changing and the regulatory regime is being adjusted, it is hazardous to 
rely on the market evolving appropriate incentives.’ (p. 95)
On the basis of the evidence, it would appear that banks fail because 
of avoidable problems and that, whatever the ultimate causes may be,
3The measure that Goodhart recommends is to ‘require the internal audit commit­
tee (...) to signify that they have considered the implications for the risk preferences 
of key personnel of their pay structures.’ (p. 17)
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credit losses are the primary proximate cause. Dysfunctional incentive 
arrangements are a major contributing factor. Clearly, banks that do not 
manage to offset their loan losses with adequate interest margins on non­
defaulting borrowers will eventually go bankrupt themselves. If bankers 
personally bore (some of) the cost of poor decisions, is it not conceivable 
that they would exert greater care in making lending decisions?
Before one can think about how supervisors might regulate incen­
tive arrangements in this area, an important question arises that the 
preceding quotation hints at: Why should regulators bother to regulate 
compensation when this is really a task for owners? I address this ques­
tion in more detail in Eggenberger (2006c). One possible answer is that 
regulators’ objectives differ from those of the owners. Another possi­
ble justification is that corporate governance problems in banks make it 
difficult for owners to implement sensible schemes, whereas this would 
be relatively straightforward for a regulator. One possibility that one 
should not dismiss out of hand is that simple thoughtlessness leads to 
dysfunctional incentive arrangements being adopted. Goodhart (1996), 
for example, observes that
‘the internal committees and groups that examine risk, and its con­
trol, within firms virtually never consider internal pay structures. Equiv­
alently, the (personnel) committees and groups within companies that 
decide on remuneration virtually never consider, or discuss, the implica­
tions of what they are doing for risk-seeking behaviour.’ (p. 11)
Evidence that thoughtlessness might be playing more of a role in this 
area than the concept of homo oeconomicus allows for is also provided by 
scattered references in the practitioner literature. For example, Nadler 
(2000a), in the American Banker, writes:
‘Consider policies that reward lending officers for the volume of loans 
they place on the books rather than on successful repayment. Such poli­
cies create a great temptation to make marginal loans. And if such a 
loan eventually goes bad, the lenders may be long gone from the orga­
nization. Indeed, the whole concept of performance-based compensation 
needs thorough examination, to make sure that individuals do not make 
decisions that reward themselves but place the bank at risk.’ (p. 5)
In another article, Nadler (2000b) puts it somewhat more drastically:
‘As for rewarding loan officers for placing new loans on the book, this 
is like buying a deck chair on the Titanic. It is easy to make a loan; 
the job is to get your money back on time and with interest. How many 
banks have paid rewards to hotshot loan officers who leave long before 
the bank finds out that it has a sour credit on the books?’ (p. 6)
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Bird (2002) reports that
‘Another bank’s program rewarded lenders only for loan volume growth. 
The loan portfolio grew rapidly, but the lenders were not held account­
able for documentation errors, rapid loan deterioration, special mention 
loans, etc. As a result, during the recent recession the new loans did not 
hold up as well as previous loans.’ (p. 9)
Nadler (2003) claims that
‘It is much easier to put a loan on the books than to get it paid off. 
Yet most incentive programs for lenders base the rewards on the former.’ 
(p. 5)
As for the German practitioner literature, an article by Bolz and 
Thorsch (2002) is very insightful. These two authors wonder why -  given 
banks’ enormous expenditures on risk management systems and informa­
tion technology during recent years -  German banks were hit just as hard 
by the most recent recession as by previous recessions. They argue that 
financial institutions have indeed built up sophisticated risk management 
systems, but that
‘their role in the decision-making process is questionable. Personal 
bonus payments of line management decision-makers, which frequently 
amount to more than half of total annual pay, still depend on volumes 
and gross returns. Risk-adjusted quantities that appropriately take into 
account risk at the moment the loan decision is made are almost never 
used in incentive systems.’4
Rathmann (2002) quotes an industry consultant as saying that
‘Banks’ focus is on volume growth. People [in the back office] fre­
quently do not dare to voice their concerns if the risk appears too large.’ 
(p. 17)5
At any rate, as I demonstrate in Eggenberger (2006c) we know little 
about existing incentive structures and even less about which arrange­
ments would be both effective and feasible. In the following section, I 
give an overview of the questions that we would want to have answers 
to; these questions outline the scope of my fieldwork.
4‘Fraglich ist jedoch deren Bedeutung im Entscheidungsprozess. Noch immer han- 
gen die personlichen Zielboni der operativen Entscheider, die nicht selten weit mehr 
als die Halfte des gesamten Jahressalars betragen, von Volumina und Bruttoertragen 
ab. Risikoadjustierte Kennzahlen, die bereits im Zeitpunkt der Kreditentscheidung 
das Risiko adaquat beriicksichtigen, fehlen nahezu ganzlich in den Anreizsystemen.’
5 ‘Die Betonung in den Kreditinstituten Iiegt auf dem Volumenwachstum. Da wagt 
dann oft keiner mehr, gegen ein Kreditengagement zu sprechen, wenn das Risiko ihm 
zu hoch erscheint.’
191
6.5 Q u estion s o f  in terest
In this section, I will discuss the four issues that have determined the 
scope of my investigation of possible lending-related incentive arrange­
ments. My only claim here is that I have covered the essential questions 
that any such investigation would want to address. One could certainly 
approach the issue in different ways.
1. Which of the products that banks sell are relevant for the re­
search question? Which business areas should be considered?
2. Which groups of employees are relevant for the research ques­
tion?
3. What are the roles played by human effort and the technical 
infrastructure, respectively?
4. Which general requirements should lending-related incentive 
schemes fulfill?
6.5.1 W hich o f the products that banks sell are rel­
evant for the research question? W hich busi­
ness areas should be considered?
Throughout the paper, I will concentrate on lending to small- and medium­
sized companies by commercial banks6. Smaller companies do not usually 
have access to other sources of funding; how well banks assess and man­
age risk in this segment will therefore have important implications for the 
wider economy. The second characteristic that makes smaller-company 
debt particularly interesting is the fact that the bank’s own monitoring 
of the borrower post-disbursement can be expected to influence the prob­
ability of default. I shall discuss this point in detail below. Third, for 
all practical purposes, smaller company debt is non-tradable, and there 
are, therefore, no market prices. Smaller companies do not usually have a 
credit rating from a rating agency and even the debt of those that do will 
likely remain highly illiquid for the foreseeable future. Fourth, lending to 
smaller companies tends to be highly human-capital intensive, both while 
the loan is negotiated and after it has been disbursed. This is because
6 The exact definition of what constitutes a loan to a smaller or medium-sized 
business in the sample will be discussed when I describe the rating models used for 
different customer segments. For ‘official’ definitions, see the discussion on p. 53 of 
Hommel and Schneider (2003). They outline both the EU definition and the one typ­
ically used in Germany which is proposed by the Institut fur Mittelstandsforschimg. 
Conditions for a company to be small- or medium-size relate to the number of em­
ployees (EU: < 250, IfM: < 500) and turnover (EU:<EUR 40mn, IfM:<EUR 50mn). 
The EU definition incorporates additional requirements with respect to total assets 
and the share of capital that is held by a large company. The Hommel and Schneider 
paper also provides a good introduction to the subject of SME financing in Germany.
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smaller companies are particularly informationally opaque. The impor­
tant role of human judgment and effort imply that effective incentive 
arrangements could be particularly valuable in this business segment.
The particular focus chosen means that I do not have much to say 
about incentive schemes in other types of financial intermediaries. In­
vestment banks, for example, do not perform traditional commercial 
banks’ transformation function (turning short-term savings into long­
term loans). The risks that these investment banks take on are mostly 
traded in markets. As a consequence, there are usually market prices and 
risk management systems available that make, for example, performance 
evaluation for security traders fairly straightforward. While spectacular 
losses due to ‘rogue traders’ make for good headlines, trading losses have 
tended not to sink banks in industrialized countries (a well-known, but 
systemically irrelevant exception being the case of Barings).7 Market 
risk in general is much better understood than credit risk, and risk man­
agement techniques are correspondingly more sophisticated8. (However, 
there are worries about current market risk management models, which 
I discuss below.)
Tradable credit risk in its various manifestations (corporate bonds for 
which liquid markets have existed for many years, outright loan trading, 
securitized assets of all kinds, credit derivatives) raises its own set of 
questions, but touches on issues very different from those of non-tradable 
credit risk that are considered here. Where market prices for credit risk 
are available, devising an incentive scheme for employees that trade this 
risk becomes fairly straightforward, at least at a superficial level.
As my research focus is on non-tradable credit risk in individual trans­
actions (expected loss), credit portfolio risk (unexpected loss) manage­
ment warrants only a brief discussion. Every transaction through which a 
bank takes on credit risk changes the bank’s portfolio. Risk management 
on the credit portfolio level can only yield its full benefit (for example, by 
reducing concentrations) when credit risk is tradable. When credit risk is
7 The only episode that I am aware of in which errors in market risk management 
might potentially have had systemic implications is the rather special case of the hedge 
fund, Long-Term Capital Management. The fall of LTCM which, in the words of The 
Economist (2000a) ‘came about through a combination of greed and arrogance’, is a 
sobering example of how excessive confidence in historical relationships and correla­
tions applying in the future compounded by other errors can lead even an apparently 
very sophisticated risk management strategy astray. For a very readable account of 
the demise of LTCM, see Edwards (1999). Jorion (2000) provides a far more in-depth 
analysis. The official report by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
(1999) is usefully supplemented by testimony from senior officials: Greenspan (1998), 
McDonough (1998), Gensler (1999), and Parkinson (1999).
8 A clear distinction between market risk and credit risk is, of course, only a hypo­
thetical construct. In reality the two kinds of risk are clearly related, even if they are 
not usually managed in an integrated way yet.
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non-tradable, credit portfolio management (which will typically exploit 
correlations between the values of assets with different characteristics) 
is restricted to affecting new business, typically via crude devices such 
as quantitative restrictions (limits) for certain industries, jurisdictions, 
risk classes etc; the use of credit portfolio models for pricing is still in 
its infancy. Alternatively, a credit portfolio manager would have to use 
financial instruments for hedging that expose the bank to considerable 
basis risk.
The specific difficulty in creating incentives for good lending-related 
performance in the smaller company segment thus arises from the fact 
that no market prices for loans are available. The true value of a loan 
is unknown and can at best be estimated. For loans of short maturities, 
that might not be much of a concern. However, a maturity of ten or 
more years was not unusual in my sample and that is a long time during 
which to be uncertain as to whether the borrower will repay. It is also 
a time horizon over which staff turnover will be a major consideration 
in almost any financial institution. The role of human effort in lending 
to smaller companies stands in sharp contrast with loans for which the 
banker has virtually no discretion and a computer takes all the decisions. 
The credit scoring techniques that are used in segments such as auto 
loans, mortgages, and credit card loans are described in Mester (1997). 
She notes that
‘[Scoring] has not been widely applied in business lending (...). One 
reason for the delay is that business loans typically differ substantially 
across borrowers, making it harder to develop an accurate method of 
scoring.’ (p. 3)9
While one might consider Mester’s paper superseded in view of rapid 
technical progress in the credit risk area, more recent publications speak 
of the continuing difficulty of automating the loan process for small- 
and medium-sized business borrowers. For example, the Federal Reserve 
notes with respect to business loans,
‘Although credit scoring is becoming more universal, considerable het-
9The U.S. Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy defines a small 
business as one with less than 500 employees for research purposes [Small Business 
Administration (2004)]. Different standards apply as far as the official designation as 
a small business is concerned. The designation is useful, for example, in government 
contracting. Mester does not give a definition, but the loan sizes that she quotes for 
illustration clearly indicate that she is referring to businesses at the lower end of the 
size distribution. In Federal Reserve Call Reports, a small business loan is defined 
as a loan of less than one million dollars whereas a loan of less than USD 100,000 is 
termed a micro-loan [see p. 15 of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2002)]. The definition used in flow-of-funds analyses is different again, leading to 
discrepancies [see FN 49, p. 61, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2002)]
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erogeneity remains in evaluating loans across banks’10 [p. 12, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Securities and Ex­
change Commission (2000)].
The only systematic review of the use of credit scoring that I am 
aware of dates back to a survey carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta in January 1998 [see pp. 816 -  817 in Frame, Srinivasan and 
Woosley (2001) for a description].11 The scarcity of data makes it difficult 
to gauge to what extent scoring techniques have replaced human judg­
ment. In sum, while progress with statistical techniques to assist or re­
place human judgment in loan decisions has undoubtedly been made, the 
(small) business loan segment does not lend itself easily to the application 
of such techniques. Additionally (and contrary to standard practice for 
credit card borrowers or homeowners taking out a mortgage, where the 
bank merely makes sure that scheduled payments are made) the monitor­
ing of smaller- and medium-sized businesses post-disbursement usually 
involves considerable human input.
Extending credit is but one of the three classic banking functions, the 
other two being deposit-taking and the provision of payment services, and 
it is quite clear that the lending business is but one and not necessarily the 
major source of revenue for many banks12. Depending on the applicable 
legislation, banks may be providing many more services. The banks in 
the sample, for example, also sell insurance, mutual funds and other 
investment products of all kinds and some offer even more peripheral 
services, such as real-estate brokerage. However, none of these other 
lines of business pose the particular challenges for devising a sensible 
incentive scheme as credit risk and none of them have a similar potential 
to generate losses. Since I am looking at incentive arrangements from a 
regulatory point of view, the focus on lending to smaller and medium­
sized borrowers seems appropriate.
10 The section on ‘Credit Scoring’ in a more recent report by the Board of Governors 
[pp. 53 -  57 in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002)] primarily 
refers back to Mester’s paper in its analysis.
11 However, the differences between scoring models and internal rating systems are 
not very well defined. Scoring models are sometimes used to fully automate the 
lending decision. As part of an internal rating system a scoring tool typically does 
not make but assists in making a decision.
12Radecki (1999), using a wide but not implausible definition of payments services, 
estimates that in 1996 payments-related revenue accounted for between 36% and 
42.2% of operating revenue for the 25 largest U.S. bank holding companies.
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6.5.2 W hich groups o f em ployees are relevant for 
the research question?
To explain which employees should be considered in a study of incentive 
arrangements, I will outline the organizational structure of commercial 
banks and the lending process. Interestingly, it is not entirely up to the 
banks themselves how they structure either their lending processes or 
their internal organization. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervi­
sion (2000a) released the ‘Principles for the Management of Credit Risk’ 
which have been transformed in Germany into national regulation by the 
financial regulator BaFin (Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsauf- 
sicht) as Mindestanforderungen an das Kreditgeschaft der Kreditinstitute 
or ‘Minimum Requirements for the Lending Business of Financial Institu­
tions’ [BaFin (Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) (2002)]. 
This regulation stipulates that a financial institution’s board of man­
agement has to develop a credit risk strategy (para. 9) that outlines 
the planned development of lending activities by industry, geographical 
breakdown, etc., (para. 11) and review it yearly (para. 10). This task 
cannot be delegated (para. 9). Front-office and back-office have to be 
clearly functionally separated; the back-office, independent of the front- 
office, has a vote in any lending decision (para. 25). Both have to agree 
if a loan is to be approved (para. 31). If they cannot find a common 
point of view, the loan application must either be rejected or the decision 
is to be made by more senior representatives of each function (escalation 
procedure, para. 34). Independent monitoring of risks at the portfo­
lio level and independent reporting are tasks that must not be assigned 
to the front-office (para. 26). Front-office and back-office have to have 
separate reporting lines up to and including the board of management 
(para. 27). Certain kinds of collateral are to be assessed by a unit other 
than the front-office (para. 28). There are provisions on ‘intensive care’ 
for borrowers in difficulty (para. 56), as well as a work-out unit (para. 
58). Work-outs are to be monitored by a unit other than the front-office 
(para. 58). The regulation also restates a statutory requirement for 
regular monitoring through internal audits (para. 93).
While other countries have different regulations dealing with these 
issues, the above extracts give a good idea of the different functions in 
a bank that are involved in the lending process. Top management will 
typically formulate strategic objectives. The actual work of acquiring 
new borrowers or extending further credit in existing client relationships 
falls to the front-office. The back-office is charged with the processing of
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the loan applications and has to review applications under risk aspects13. 
Specialists for assessing the value of collateral may be involved. If diffi­
culties arise in the course of lending that appear manageable, these are to 
be handled by giving the borrower ‘intensive care’. If things take a turn 
for the worse, a work-out unit will either attempt a turnaround or try to 
salvage as much as possible should the borrower go bankrupt. There is to 
be monitoring of credit risk at the portfolio level and a continual review 
by internal auditors. Not mentioned here but of great importance axe 
those employees that develop the bank’s risk management architecture 
such as the internal rating system and portfolio models.
While ideally the incentives of all employees who have a role in the 
lending process should be analyzed, practical considerations required con­
centrating on those groups of employees most interesting with respect to 
the question I am trying to answer: What scope is there for devising ef­
fective lending-related incentive arrangements in practice? Is it possible 
to construct incentive schemes that align the interests of a regulator with 
those of the banks? The focus of my study, therefore, is firmly on the 
line (as opposed to staff) functions: I shall be looking at the front-office 
employees (whom I will also call relationship managers or loan officers) 
and the back-office employees with whom they work (also called credit 
analysts), as well as the work-out specialists. In other words, I am tak­
ing the entire infrastructure (most notably, the risk rating systems) as 
given, and I will not be looking at incentive schemes for top manage­
ment, credit portfolio managers, credit risk modelers and other functions 
outlined above.
As for the reasons for the focus chosen, note that credit portfolio 
management, for example, is still in its early stages. In the case of the 
borrowers that I will concentrate on, credit risk is not tradable, which 
severely hampers any portfolio management. Attempts to securitize this 
type of debt have been slow to get off the ground [see section 4 in Eggen­
berger (2006c)]. In addition, how well credit portfolio managers do their 
job will depend in large part on how good the models are with which 
they work. But evaluating the quality of risk rating, portfolio models 
and similar tools raises mostly technical questions entirely different from 
the ones I wish to address. In the light of the literature, there is rea­
son to think that these models have shortcomings; particularly worrying 
is the treatment of what is alternatively called aggregate or systematic
13In the banks that I worked with, back-office employees as a general rule are not 
supposed to have any contact with clients so that their judgment is as objective as 
possible and not clouded by personal likes and dislikes. This is also standard practice 
in a number of other banks that I was in contact with, although I have not found any 
reference to this being a statutory requirement.
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risk: changes in aggregate default premia (as priced in the markets in 
which credit risk is traded) and changes in aggregate actual default rates 
over time driven primarily by business cycle fluctuations. It is not, thus 
far, a risk that is well understood and the analytical treatment of this 
risk component is even less advanced than that of other aspects of credit 
portfolio risk (such as correlations between different industries). Con­
sequently, serious doubts exist as to whether systematic risk is priced 
appropriately, either in capital markets or by banks’ internal models. I 
review these concerns below with a view to exploring the implications for 
the performance measures I propose.
As for top management, there is a large literature -  both empirical 
and ‘prescriptive’ -  on executive compensation. As I have argued, the 
existing literature on banks and the incentives they face tends to view 
financial institutions as monolithic ‘black boxes’ and does not consider 
the organizational issues that arise from the fact that decisions are not 
made by a single individual -  either ‘owner’ or ‘manager’. This is espe­
cially true for business-lending, where bank employees have a relatively 
large degree of discretion. This paper will fill this gap by looking at in­
centive schemes for the rank-and-file whose decisions, in the aggregate, 
determine the future health of individual financial institutions, as well 
as the wider financial system, just like those taken by the chief executive 
and senior management. Whether one looks at these issues through a 
corporate governance lens or from a regulator’s perspective, the funda­
mental question is always whether and, if yes, how the behavior of these 
front-line bankers can be constrained or influenced and how incentives 
get broken down from larger units to individuals. Analyzing incentives 
for owners and top managers is a very indirect way of investigating the 
actual decisions on the approval and pricing of loans taken by all (includ­
ing more junior) employees. This is not to say that giving owners and 
top management the right incentives is not important, but it is an area 
reasonably well covered by the existing literature.
6.5.3 W hat are the roles played by hum an effort and  
the technical infrastructure, respectively?
The precondition for any incentive scheme is some discretion on the part 
of the employee concerned: His or her effort, diligence, creativity or some 
other unobservable skill must matter. In view of the rapid advances in 
credit risk measurement and management technology during recent years, 
one might wonder how much human influence is left. Above I suggested 
(1) that the bank’s own monitoring of the borrower post-disbursement
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can be expected to influence the probability of default; (2) that lending 
to smaller companies tends to be highly human capital intensive both 
while the loan is negotiated and after it has been disbursed; and (3) that 
the role of human effort in lending to smaller companies stands in sharp 
contrast with other kinds of loans, where the banker has virtually no 
discretion and the decision-making process is largely or fully automated. 
In the following I will detail where this human influence comes into the 
lending process, sketch out the role of technology and outline the rela­
tionship between the two. The argument at its essence is that human 
effort matters, but that its contribution is dependent on technology in the 
way that, for example, the performance of a cyclist depends on his or her 
bicycle. Inadequate technology may critically compromise an otherwise 
effective incentive scheme.
Any incentive scheme has to follow the information technology (IT) 
and software infrastructure (for accounting, risk rating, pricing, and other 
elements of the loan process). The sophistication of that infrastructure 
may therefore constrain sensible schemes. In fact, based on my experience 
I would claim that incentive arrangements cannot be studied fruitfully 
without a working knowledge of the technical systems in use. Broadly 
speaking, human effort matters in three phases of the lending process, 
which are influenced by technology to varying extents. These are
1. Risk rating;
2. Pricing; and
3. Monitoring
The first task in which human effort plays a role is the initial risk as­
sessment. For example, while credit card loans are scored and the bank’s 
IT system will decide on approval and applicable interest rate, judging 
the creditworthiness of a business customer is far more complex. Statis­
tical tools are widely used and contribute to the analysis, but the credit­
worthiness assessment typically still involves a fair amount of judgment 
and processing of ‘soft’ information. The assessment normally results in 
the assignment of the borrower to a risk class (calibrated such that it 
represents a certain default probability). It comprises the evaluation of 
collateral and it provides the front-office employee with a benchmark for 
pricing the loan. With slight exaggeration, one could claim that there is 
no ‘wrong’ risk class, only ‘wrong’ interest rates: Why should a bank not 
lend to a risky borrower if it is properly compensated for the risk that it 
is assuming?
The creditworthiness assessment is crucial for the front-office em­
ployee in negotiating the interest rate and other terms of the loan. The
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market for loans to small- and medium-sized companies is such that the 
price tends to be only one of several criteria that borrowers use to de­
termine which bank to borrow from14, so there is typically considerable 
scope for the relationship manager to negotiate an advantageous rate for 
the bank. These negotiations on terms and conditions are the second 
step in the lending process in which human effort matters.
Third, effort and diligence are very important in the ongoing risk- 
rating, including monitoring of and interaction with borrowers, as well as 
the work-out and liquidation functions (which become involved in case a 
borrower gets into difficulties). As mentioned above, a key characteristic 
of loans to small- and medium-sized companies is that the probability of 
default is not independent of the monitoring provided by the loan officer 
assigned to that particular client relationship. This is because to some 
extent (and typically constrained by legal, i.e. liability considerations), 
a good banker will act as a financial advisor, pointing out operational 
weaknesses, discussing different scenarios with the owner or CEO of the 
client company, which will on average make the borrower financially more 
robust. Another very important task of the relationship manager is to 
sound the alarm as early as possible if things go wrong. The earlier a 
borrower in difficulty is given ‘intensive care’, the higher the probability 
that any rescue attempt will be successful (and that the bank will get its 
money back). If the borrower goes bankrupt, collateral has to be realized 
and effort will typically determine how much of its losses the bank can 
recoup. The post-disbursement monitoring is so important that I will 
return to the issue at some length below in the discussion of what general 
requirements for lending-related incentive arrangements should be.
Thus, it is clear that the frontline banker is dependent on the bank’s 
technology in a number of ways, most importantly when using the bank’s 
statistical tools in the credit rating process. In fact, the relationship be­
tween human effort and judgment and the available technology parallels 
that between staff and line functions. Some central risk management unit 
will typically be in charge of developing and refining the bank’s technical 
infrastructure and the front office must rely on the accuracy of the tools 
provided. As long as portfolio considerations are not transmitted to fine
14 For hard evidence supporting this observation (which I found confirmed in almost 
all of my interviews), see Greenwich Associates (2002). That study, which also covers 
non-credit topics, is based on interviews with more than 19,000 corporate financial 
managers from U.S. companies with between 10 and 500 million USD in annual sales. 
The chart on p. 1 that specifically deals with the importance of various factors from 
the point of view of banks’ customers is based on information from more than 600 
companies. On p.l,  one of the authors states that ‘Banking for middle market com­
panies is largely a relationship business, and decisions to enter or break a relationship 
revolve around many more factors than credit pricing.’
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staff via the pricing tools, the information on how desirable exposures 
(to particular countries, industries, or regions) are from a portfolio point 
of view has to be made available to the front office in some other way. 
A typical (if crude) arrangement is for a central unit to impose quanti­
tative limits, which take into account the lending strategy formulated by 
top management. The frontline banker has to rely on these instructions 
being sensible. In a similar way and related to portfolio concerns, one 
also would want economy-wide or even global developments to be taken 
into account. This would involve, in particular, watching out for imbal­
ances, such as exchange rate misalignments, building up of real estate, 
credit, equity and other bubbles, risks inherent in budget deficits and the 
current-account position. It would not be reasonable to expect individ­
ual bankers to obtain this information on their own initiative, although 
it is clearly relevant for lending decisions. Again, the front-office must 
be able to rely on the information provided15.
In sum, how well the front-office bankers do their jobs is constrained 
by the technical infrastructure and instructions from headquarters. If, 
for example, the risk-rating tools were inadequate, the ability to make 
good lending decisions might be severely hampered. As two practitioners 
discussing a similar problem put it:
‘We have employed risk-sensitive capital tools on an internal basis for 
some time. We have learned -  sometimes the hard way -  that a rigid 
application of these formulas can lead to bad decisions if the human 
element is forgotten’ [Ervin and Seidel (2002)].
Also problematic are strategic or portfolio considerations that turn 
out to have been misguided. One senior banker told me: ‘If management 
decides that the bank should lend more to the telecoms industry and the 
telecoms industry subsequently experiences a sharp downturn, it is hardly
15 Another factor that one might expect to be of importance in this regard are 
centrally mandated credit standards in the sense of non-price loan terms. Lown, 
Morgan and Rohatgi (2000) put the reasoning thus: ‘By raising loan rates, lenders 
may drive off all but the least creditworthy applicants or elicit riskier behavior by 
borrowers. Rather than raising loan rates to curtail the supply of credit, lenders may 
tighten their standards and cut off credit to the marginal borrowers that do not meet 
the higher standards. In essence, credit markets may operate like a trendy night club 
in New York City : you have to clear the velvet rope before you pay the door charge.’ 
(p. 4) The U.S. evidence suggests that these credit standards have historically had 
considerable predictive power with respect to lending and output [see Lown, Morgan 
and Rohatgi (2000) who use the responses from the quarterly Federal Reserve Senior 
Loan Officer Opinion Survey to measure how stringent lending standards are] and 
one might thus expect that credit standards must have affected frontline bankers. 
However, the better banks get at pricing, i.e. the more risk-sensitive pricing becomes, 
the less they will have to rely on non-price terms and the type of rationing alluded to 
here to overcome any adverse selection problems. It is not clear what the impact of 
finer pricing on moral hazard is. At any rate, I will not investigate non-price terms 
in detail.
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the individual banker that arranged the loan who is to blame.’ In view of 
the role that the risk-rating infrastructure plays, it must be a part of any 
discussion of incentive schemes. The focus of this analysis, however, is on 
the ‘human factor’. The bank employees considered in this study have 
at least some discretion to influence lending decisions and their effort 
matters enough to warrant thinking about the development of feasible 
and effective incentive arrangements.
6.5.4 W hich general requirem ents should lending- 
related incentive schem es fulfill?
Four issues that have a bearing on the scope of the study need to be 
discussed under this heading:
A. Dealing with staff turnover
B. Performance evaluation prior to maturity dates of loans
C. Objective performance evaluation and explicit incentive schemes
D. Incentives for post-disbursement monitoring
Additional requirements that are important to practitioners are dis­
cussed below; these four are merely the key requirements for regulators.
Dealing w ith  staff turnover
As pointed out before, maturities of ten years or more would not be 
unusual in the banks with which I worked. Over a time horizon of ten 
years, staff turnover, as well as internal transfers, are a major concern. 
Not surprisingly, staff turnover also has been identified as a major prob­
lem when incentive schemes are not well constructed. Under a scheme, 
for example, that rewards non-risk-adjusted loan volume, the temptation 
is to make as many loans as possible without regard to the borrower’s 
creditworthiness and then move on to the next bank before loans turn 
sour. There is usually a considerable delay between disbursement and 
default, a phenomenon known as the ‘aging’ effect and well-documented 
for publicly rated bonds16: For a given rating grade, the default rate is 
significantly lower during the first couple of years following origination 
than in later years. I will therefore be looking for incentive schemes that 
can deal with turnover.
16See, for example, FN6, p. 7, in Moody’s Investors Service (2004), an annual 
default study published by that rating agency. The aging effect is here defined as 
follows: ’The ‘aging effect’ is based on the empirical observation that bond issuers’ 
risk of default is highest in the third or fourth year after issuance.’ The aging effect is 
somewhat worrying for rating agencies, as it implies that apparently some information 
is systematically not incorporated in their ratings.
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Performance evaluation prior to  m aturity dates o f loans
From a non-practitioner’s point of view, the simplest solution to these 
difficulties would be to make bonus payments dependent on realized prof­
itability (and to pay the bonus only when a loan has been repaid as 
promised). I floated this idea a number of times in my interviews and 
was usually laughed at: Getting a bonus for today’s work in ten years’ 
time is an idea whose time has not yet come. Based on this anecdo­
tal evidence as well as practical considerations (including job rotations, 
employees leaving the bank altogether, shared responsibilities), I am not 
convinced that any such solution would find acceptance -  a key require­
ment for an incentive scheme to work in practice. I will, therefore, be 
looking for incentive arrangements that allow for performance evaluations 
on at least an annual basis.
Objective performance evaluation and explicit incentive schem es
My interest throughout will center on explicit incentive schemes based 
exclusively on objective performance measures. First, such a scheme 
suited the banks with which I worked. However, more general reasons to 
focus on explicit schemes include the following:
• Subjective evaluations are almost by definition not verifiable which 
may make both the employer and the employee view such evaluations 
with suspicion or lead employees to curry favor with their evaluator;
• Subjective evaluations are exceedingly hard (and very costly in terms 
of time) to do well, as banker after banker told me in the interviews17. 
If they are not done well they can be highly counter-productive because 
any perception of unfairness breeds resentment;
• The ‘technology’ for a subjective evaluation scheme, aside from some 
general statements one might find in a company handbook, resides in the 
person of the evaluator and is thus inherently non-transferable within 
banks or from one bank to another except by a lengthy process of ‘learn­
ing by doing’, getting feedback from more experienced colleagues, or
17 A well-designed subjective evaluation would have to focus on the criteria that 
really matter, bearing in mind that one needs to restrict attention to a few items 
for the evaluation to remain operational. The supervisor would need to gather and 
record ‘evidence’ (observations of the employee to be evaluated in different situations) 
continually and systematically and, in doing so, would need to guard against any 
personal biases. The evaluation itself might have to involve highly critical feedback 
without ‘burning bridges’; procedural justice is very important in such evaluations. 
Finally, a supervisor also might need to be able to defend relative rankings in a 
way that convinces employees of the fairness of the assessment. A lot of research 
suggests that people are -  contrary to what standard economic theory postulates — 
quite concerned with relative position and not just how they are doing in absolute 
terms. For a brief introduction, see pp. 102 — 104 in Baron and Kreps (1999).
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other informal methods; and
• My primary interest is the use of incentive arrangements as a regu­
latory tool. A system based on subjective evaluations would be hard to 
impose by a regulator and certainly would not lend itself to scrutiny in 
the same way as an explicit incentive scheme.
My focus on explicit schemes does not imply that subjective evalua­
tions are superfluous or unhelpful. In fact, adding subjective elements to 
an objective evaluation can be an excellent strategy to reduce the gaming 
inherent in such schemes.
Incentives for post-disbursem ent monitoring
Whether and, if yes, how employees should be held responsible for the 
post-disbursement performance of their clients was easily the most con­
tentious issue I encountered during my study. Since this issue is at the 
heart of what lending-related incentive arrangements ought to be about, 
I will explain in some detail why I believe that for the specific product 
that I am looking at, loans to small- and medium-sized companies, any 
arrangement that does not incorporate incentives for post-disbursement 
monitoring is likely to be inadequate.
Three alternative approaches need to be considered18. These are in­
centive arrangements using as objectives:
1. non-risk-adjusted loan volume;
2. expected profit without explicit incentives for post-disbursement 
monitoring; or
3. expected profit plus some measure of actual profitability that in­
corporates explicit incentives for post-disbursement monitoring.
1. Some authors implicitly endorse arrangements where bonus pay­
ments depend on non-risk-adjusted loan volume. Baker (2000), for ex­
ample, offers the following rationale firmly rooted in standard principal- 
agent-theory:
‘The typical incentive plan for loan officers in a bank involves paying 
for “originations”: the loan officer receives a bonus for lending money. 
The puzzle about this type of incentive is that it gives the loan officer no 
incentive to search for and write “good” loans, that is, high-interest-rate 
loans that are likely to be repaid. Instead, loan officers have incentives 
to make any loan, and banks typically have credit committees (made up
18In theory a lot of other schemes based on different objectives are conceivable. 
However, I focus on the three schemes discussed here because 1. non-risk-adjusted 
loan volume seems to be a widely used objective, at least among U.S. banks, and 2. 
and 3. are objectives discussed in the literature. These are also the only three types 
of objectives that I have come across that can make a claim to being sensible.
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of higher-level bank officers) whose job it is to determine the creditwor­
thiness of the potential debtor and to approve or deny the loan. (FN 1 
omitted) An alternative choice for banks would be to pay loan officers on 
the eventual profitability of the loan, rather than on its origination. (FN 
2 omitted) Bonuses based on loan profitability would have the advantage 
of giving loan officers incentives to search out good credit risks and sell 
loans with higher expected value. In other words, such a performance 
measure would provide less distorted incentives to the loan officers. How­
ever, such a scheme would also give the loan officers greater risk, since 
many things can happen to debtors that are unpredictable when a loan is 
written. In this case, it appears, the trade-off between risk and distortion 
is made in favor of lower risk and higher distortion.’ (p. 417)
While the partly exogenous nature of credit risk was indeed an im­
portant point of discussion in my interviews, the consensus was that re­
gardless of the business cycle and other exogenous influences which Baker 
refers to there is enough scope for relationship managers and credit ana­
lysts to ‘work on their clients’ to hold them (at least partly) responsible 
for how their borrowers are doing. This suggests that Baker’s expla­
nation is ‘too clever’; an economic theorist’s hypothesis rather than a 
description of real-world reasoning on the part of practitioners19.
Baker (2000) also points out that under the arrangement described 
above
‘the loan officer need not be expert in determining creditworthiness’ 
(FN1, p. 417).
The specialization that is possible as a consequence of only a few 
credit analysts making loan decisions might reduce the banks’ costs by 
more than any resultant increase in loan losses or might even reduce 
loan losses. While this is a theoretical possibility, of the sources I have 
reviewed only Wuffli and Hunt (1993) write that some banks claim that 
this is actually the case:
‘In the United States, for example, many banks have concluded that 
it is no longer feasible to maintain the skills of hundreds of loan officers 
through their branch systems. They have elected to limit lending au­
thority to a smaller number of regionally based credit experts. These 
underwriters are highly trained and carefully motivated specialists. Cen­
tralizing credit decisions in this way means that only 70 to 100 people 
make virtually all the lending decisions — except, perhaps, for those re­
lated to large corporate clients. Not only does this concentrate credit
19 Indeed, in personal communication Baker told me that his ‘evidence on how loan 
officers are paid is almost entirely impressionistic’ (email exchange with George Baker, 
11 November 2003)
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decisions in the hands of the most capable individuals; it also creates 
centers of information about credit markets, making it possible to ex­
ploit areas that were previously too diffuse to handle. The banks that 
believe in this system argue that the loss of direct customer knowledge is 
more than compensated by better underwriting skills, more concentrated 
information, and greater objectivity in making decisions.’
Wuffli and Hunt also note that
‘Another approach is to embark on a major skill-building program for 
all lenders, setting strict standards and regularly reviewing all limits. So 
far this approach has had mixed reviews. Some banks report success in 
boosting skills, but others have found the large-scale training and review 
procedures difficult to implement.’
In other words, where relationship managers are rewarded for orig­
inations, they might simply not be skilled enough to contribute to the 
risk assessment and this might be a profit-maximizing arrangement. Of 
course, in market segments where the lending decision is automated (and 
post-disbursement monitoring is not an issue) that would be a suitable 
arrangement. But even in that case, should front-office employees not 
have an incentive to negotiate as high an interest rate as the borrower 
will accept rather than as low an interest rate as they can get away with? 
One standard theoretical argument against this would be that higher in­
terest rates are not necessarily profit-maximizing because they aggravate 
the twin problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Even if this 
argument applies, the converse is not true: Surely profits are not neces­
sarily maximized by charging a very low interest rate. I therefore suspect 
that implicit in the above description is a lending policy centered on a 
single interest rate for all accepted loan applications (non-risk-adjusted 
interest rates were standard until well into the 1990s in many banks) with 
the ‘yes or no’ approval decision turning entirely on non-price terms. The 
specialization argument may have made sense at the time of Wuffli and 
Hunt’s writing in 1993 when credit analysts’ judgment played a far more 
important role in the lending decision than it does today. However, with 
the implementation of statistical risk-rating tools that allow discrimina­
tion by creditworthiness via risk-adjusted pricing, basing bonus payments 
on loan volume regardless of interest rate appears sub-optimal.
I can think of other possible justifications for using non-risk-adjusted 
loan volume as an objective but have never seen these stated explicitly. 
For example, a loan-volume objective is easier to administer for the bank. 
Also, using a risk-adjusted target might mean that the front-office em­
ployee has to spend more time doing calculations and consulting with his
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or her credit analyst; i.e., such an approach creates a larger administra­
tive burden for the relationship manager and less time might be spent 
with clients.
Thus, it is not impossible that banks see the shortcomings of schemes 
based on non-risk-adjusted objectives, but they rationally choose to use 
these regardless because the benefits outweigh the costs. However, the 
bankers that I talked to (whether from my sample or other institutions) 
rather uniformly thought such schemes flawed, and I also have found 
very critical voices in the available literature (see above). Such an ap­
proach would not provide any explicit incentives for monitoring post­
disbursement. In the light of the evidence, I did not consider non-risk- 
adjusted loan volume in my study. Concentrating on such a system con­
siderably restricts possible incentive arrangements and would, therefore, 
have limited the scope of the study.
2./3. Using the risk rating and pricing tools that I describe in more 
detail below, it is possible to calculate the bank’s expected profit on a 
loan at the time of origination. The key factor that determines actual as 
opposed to expected profitability is whether the borrower repays or not. 
As part of the risk-rating process, the front-office employee and the credit 
analyst estimate the expected loss on the loan. As I pointed out above, 
some authors assert20 that this is all that one can ask of employees: A 
relationship manager who has priced in the expected loss has done his or 
her job; any incentive pay should be based on the expected profit rather 
than the actual profit. I should note that even expected-profit-based 
schemes have not been analyzed in any degree of detail in the literature.
In some circumstances the use of an expected-profit objective is clearly 
appropriate. If compensation depends on the expected profit, the bank 
becomes the residual claimant with respect to the difference between 
expected loss and actual loss; the employee no longer has any explicit 
incentive to be concerned with the borrower’s creditworthiness. I would 
argue that it makes sense to absolve employees from responsibility for 
a borrower’s credit risk post-disbursement if one of the two following 
conditions applies:
• The bank can hedge the credit risk by buying default protection 
(e.g., a credit-default swap), i.e., there is a market price that determines 
whether the employee has negotiated a good deal for the bank. Such 
credit protection is available in some market segments [mostly for large 
borrowers, see the recent report on credit risk transfer by the Committee
20One cannot say that these authors ‘argue’, for I have not yet come across any 
source discussing the pros and cons of the different approaches systematically. See 
Eggenberger (2006c)
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on the Global Financial System (2003) and Rule (2001)]. Insuring against 
default or using market prices for the evaluation of profitability might 
thus be a suitable strategy to pursue for some wholesale banks.
• The bank cannot hedge the credit risk, but human effort does 
not influence the bank’s profit (loss) post-disbursement. In some mar­
ket segments, it is not cost-efficient to ‘monitor’ borrowers except in so 
far as the bank uses automated tools to ensure that borrowers make 
their contractual payments. In market segments where all monitoring 
is automated, the lending decision will typically also be largely or even 
completely automated. The relevant risk factors in such settings are not 
normally assessed by the front-line banker, but by a central risk manage­
ment unit for the entire bank.
Clearly both conditions are not fulfilled for lending to small- and 
medium-sized enterprises:
• There is no market price for credit risk /  no default protection; 
and
• effort and diligence affect the probability of default (and other 
determinants of actual profit).
This would suggest that a scheme also incorporating incentives for 
post-disbursement monitoring is superior to a scheme that uses expected 
profit. If there are other factors to be taken into account that tilt the 
balance in favor of the latter kind of arrangement, I am not aware of 
them21. As for post-disbursement monitoring, two observations suggest 
that its value is considerable:
1. There was no doubt among the practitioners in my sample banks 
that monitoring is important, but there is surprisingly little research 
evidence on this. However, Carey (1998) has looked at data on privately 
placed (and thus ‘monitored’) bonds and compared the loss experience 
with that for publicly held bonds. Crucially, both categories of debt have 
risk ratings which serve as indicators of ex ante riskiness. Carey finds 
that ‘in the investment grades, private debt performs as well or better 
than public debt. Private debt performs better in the riskier grades,
21 Since loan losses reduce profits, one might think that a system built on expected 
profit only cannot be superior to a well-calibrated system that also takes into account 
post-disbursement monitoring. From the practitioner’s point of view this might not be 
so clear-cut. As I pointed out above with respect to ‘volume only’ schemes, looking 
at expected profit might well entail lower administrative cost than the alternative. 
It might be felt that incorporating actual profitability could make loan officers too 
risk-averse; the bank might fear that under such a scheme, the relationship managers 
would forego too many good deals to avoid a few bad ones. However, if an expected 
profit based scheme really is superior for these or any other reasons, I am not aware 
of anybody having made the case for it (let alone having backed this up with data). 
This applies in particular to RAROC (risk adjusted return on capital) methodologies 
which measure risk-adjusted expected return and are in use in some banks.
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consistent with monitoring having substantial value.’ (p. 1385) While 
Carey uses data on bonds and not bank loans, the results are suggestive.
2. Apart from regular monitoring (which in the case of my sam­
ple banks would involve activities such as discussing business plans and 
scenarios with the borrower, obtaining information but also reacting to 
it, giving financial advice), the other key element of post-disbursement 
monitoring is the early-warning function. There was consensus among 
the bankers in my sample that time is of the essence when borrowers get 
into difficulty. One would therefore want any significant deterioration in 
a borrower’s condition to be detected as early as possible so that prob­
lems can be confronted aggressively. Crucially, while part of the early 
warning process can be automated, a good relationship manager will of­
ten be aware of bad news before it is reflected in the account transactions 
or financial statements. Again, no statistics on the value of such early 
warning are available, but apart from the answers of my interviewees, 
there is qualitative evidence suggesting that this is an important issue. 
Voigt and Andersch (2003) report the results of a survey based on re­
sponses from around 250 German banks that suggests that smaller banks 
in particular recognize and deal with borrowers’ difficulties too late. That 
article also discusses quantitative and qualitative warning signals; banks 
generally attribute considerable importance to qualitative warning signs 
such as changes in the behavior of a borrower’s management (p. 193).
In sum, the features of the lending process can be summarized as 
follows: The relationship manager is in regular contact with the borrower; 
partly to sell bank products, but also to collect soft information for risk 
assessment and monitoring purposes. Post-disbursement monitoring is 
important and is not automated. It makes sense for the same person, 
the relationship manager, to be assigned the tasks of both selling and 
monitoring, i.e. to combine the sales and risk aspects. Splitting up 
these tasks and involving a second person would lead to duplication and 
possibly confusion. Thus, if there is to be monitoring at all it would 
appear to make sense to assign it to the relationship manager.
The question then arises whether one could make the relationship 
manager’s remuneration dependent on expected profit only and still have 
him or her be responsible for post-disbursement monitoring. In the light 
of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), it must appear problematic to re­
ward sales and not provide incentives for keeping an eye on risk. One 
large bank with which I was in contact does not use explicit incentives 
for post-disbursement monitoring, but the risk-related work of the rela­
tionship managers is evaluated (subjectively) by the credit analysts that
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they work with; this evaluation co-determines the bonus. Although that 
particular institution claimed to have been apprehensive with respect to 
the lack of explicit incentives, the fear of undesirable consequences has 
subsided somewhat during the four years that this arrangement had been 
in operation at the time of writing. Apparently in this case the subjec­
tive evaluation provides strong enough incentives to not neglect the risk 
aspect. Since I decided to look at explicit schemes, this approach is out­
side the scope of my study. I will be looking at arrangements that also 
provide explicit evaluation of post-disbursement monitoring.
Apart from the considerations laid out above, two additional reasons 
for post-disbursement monitoring should be mentioned: 1. The bankers 
that I talked to, while critical with respect to details, thought that this 
was the right approach. 2. In view of potential shortcomings of the risk- 
rating technologies in use, one might not have much faith in ‘expected 
profit’ being a very accurate measure of actual profitability. If, for ex­
ample, the procyclical nature of current rating tools distorts the risk 
assessment, tying remuneration to some measure of actual, long-term 
profitability might mean that the loan officer’s judgment to some extent 
counter-balances the shortcomings of technology. The Bank for Interna­
tional Settlements (BIS) (2001), for example, recognizes this implicitly: 
‘Remuneration arrangements that focus on short-run outcomes and 
relative, rather than absolute, performance may discourage a long-term 
perspective and an assessment of aggregate risk.’ (p. 133)
Herring (1999) notes that
‘The fine officers who are in the best position to assess dangers of 
increasing vulnerability should have incentives that encourage them to 
take a long-term view of the institution’s exposure. This generally means 
calibrating bonuses to long-term measures of risk-adjusted profitability 
rather than short-term returns that make adjustment for risk.’ (p. 76) 
The Federal Reserve System Task Force on Internal Credit Risk Mod­
els (1998) in its discussion of the RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capi­
tal) approach notes that
‘Increasingly, measurements of shareholder value added are being used 
by banks in gauging managerial or product performance and in determin­
ing managerial compensation.’ (p. 10)
FN 9 adds that:
‘The shareholder value added concept described above measures an 
activity’s “excess cash flows” above and beyond the bank’s relevant op­
portunity costs for a single period. To mitigate potential distortions 
created by such a myopic measure of performance, banks typically use
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multi-year, rolling averages of shareholder value added when evaluating 
ex post profitability or managerial performance.’
I take this observation as evidence that clearly supports my assertion 
that incentive arrangements need to incorporate some measure of actual 
profitability22.
Summary o f the general requirements that lending-related in­
centive schem es should fulfill
I shall be looking at incentive arrangements for line employees in lending 
to small- and medium-sized businesses. I acknowledge that there are 
constraints imposed by technology, but there should be sufficient human 
influence to make incentive schemes feasible. The schemes that I will 
be looking for should be able to deal with staff turnover and to allow 
performance evaluation of employees before the maturity of a loan. The 
schemes should be explicit and based on objective performance measures, 
and should incorporate incentives for post-disbursement monitoring.
Since this section deals with the scope of the study, it is a good place 
to note that my remarks here apply only to non-criminal behavior. Fraud 
and related phenomena cannot really be discussed in the context of stan­
dard incentive contracting. The study also concentrates on monetary 
incentive arrangements whereas in reality a lot of other incentive devices 
(such as promotions) matter. As is in the nature of a case study, the 
banks with which I worked, the credit risk management software they 
use, and other aspects of the study are not representative of all commer­
cial banks. However, the issues and questions raised within this specific 
context hold relevance for other financial institutions, as will be repeat­
edly demonstrated throughout this analysis.
In Eggenberger (2006c) I discuss related mainstream economics lit­
erature and provide brief reviews of work on relationship lending (theo­
retical and empirical work), small-business lending, and the advantages 
that small banks have in lending to small businesses (section 3). I also 
address the question whether the kind of non-automated, labor-intensive 
lending that is the focus of my study is about to disappear because of 
technological advances (section 4). I conclude that on the balance of the 
evidence, the importance of relationship lending and, therefore, the rele-
22 Unfortunately, the study does not contain any more detailed material on this 
point. The work of the Federal Reserve System Task Force on Internal Credit Risk 
Models ‘involved extensive discussions with twelve [U.S.] banking organizations, two 
non-bank securities firms, and several credit risk consultancies’ [Federal Reserve Sys­
tem Task Force on Internal Credit Risk Models (1998), p. 3, FN 3]. The banks were 
best-practice organizations at the time the research was conducted (April 1996 to 
May 1998).
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vance of the present study should be expected to be reduced by advances 
in technology, but that any such erosion is likely to be very gradual. 
In the following chapter, I set out the methodology and results of my 
fieldwork in detail.
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Chapter 7
Lending-related incentive 
arrangements: Fieldwork
7.1 Sum m ary
In the preceding chapter, I argued that while little is known about 
lending-related incentive schemes, these might conceivably become a use­
ful tool of bank regulation. The research question addressed in the 
present chapter is: What scope is there for devising effective lending- 
related incentive arrangements in practice? Is it possible to construct 
incentive schemes that align the interests of a regulator with those of the 
banks?
I approached this research question by individually interviewing ap­
proximately 120 senior practitioners in a sample of about 25 German 
cooperative banks discussing various aspects of the question (stretching 
from "soft" topics such as human resources management principles to 
"hard" topics such as the measurement and pricing of credit risk). The 
sample banks are relatively small and use a common risk-rating and pric­
ing methodology which the banks were willing to explain to me in great 
detail. The banks’ typical clients, aside from households, are small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, so the banks provided an ideal environment 
in which to examine the monitoring that is seen as one of the key func­
tions of banks and the ways in which bankers can be given incentives to 
perform this function. The interviews in the cooperative banks (which 
typically lasted about one to one and a half hours) were supplemented 
with a number of meetings and telephone interviews in larger commercial 
banks both inside and outside Germany.
In a nutshell, the findings indicate that it is possible to devise in­
centive schemes that both bank owners and regulators would approve 
of. In discussions with the interviewees I identified a number of objec­
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tives that could be used to evaluate performance. The most important 
of these are sensibly defined measures of profit as well as quantitative 
indicators of the quality of risk management. It is sometimes argued 
that, given the long maturities of many loans, it would not be feasible 
to assess the performance of the bankers responsible for these and that, 
at any rate, it would not be possible to sufficiently isolate bankers’ in­
dividual performance from exogenous risk factors (such as the state of 
the overall economy) to which they are exposed. The interviews show 
that these concerns should not be exaggerated in that there are simple 
work-arounds for dealing with these complications.
These candidate objectives should now be tested in a field experiment. 
If these performance measures prove their effectiveness in practice, guid­
ance on the design and implementation of such incentive schemes could 
then be added to banking regulators’ rulebooks. The interviews identified 
a number of "Dos” (e.g., balance objectives carefully so that employees 
have appropriate incentives not to neglect any important duties, ensure 
a very tight integration of performance measures and the analytical tools 
used to assess and price risks) and "Don’ts" (e.g., don’t make bonus pay­
ments immediately, wait a bit until there is more information on loan 
performance) that should be respected. Any incentive scheme should 
be carefully monitored with respect to two concerns that also came up 
in the course of my research: First, current risk measurement tools may 
have potentially serious shortcomings; this might make performance mea­
sures less reliable than they ought to be. Second, explicit contingent-pay 
schemes may not fit into the human resources management strategy of 
each and every bank. Doubts with respect to explicit incentive arrange­
ments have been voiced for a long time and bank management would do 
well to monitor the effect that such incentive schemes have on employee 
behavior. For example, it is well known that team-work and cooperation 
may suffer if individual incentives are too steep.
The chapter is structured as follows: Since the only way to research 
the question posed was through field-work and interviews -  an approach 
that is standard in other social sciences but rarely used in economics -  I 
provide a discussion of the methodology (7.2). The risk rating and pric­
ing techniques are crucial tools without which sensible incentive arrange­
ments would be difficult if not impossible to construct. I therefore discuss 
the risk rating system in use in the sample banks (7.3) before present­
ing my findings in detail by discussing possible elements of an incentive 
scheme (7.4). This is followed by the above-mentioned discussion of po­
tential flaws in current risk measurement tools (7.5). The conclusion
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highlights key results and reviews the implications of the findings for the 
regulatory use of incentive arrangements (7.6).
7.2 M eth od o logy
The only way to find out which, if any, lending-related incentive arrange­
ments could be expected to be effective and feasible was to interview 
practitioners. The interviews were not carried out with the purpose of 
building a dataset that could then be used for econometric analysis, but 
with the aim of identifying major themes that can further understanding 
of the problems inherent in devising and implementing incentive schemes. 
This methodology is standard in a number of other social science dis­
ciplines, including anthropology, social psychology, and organizational 
behavior, as well as fields such as epidemiology and socio-medical sci­
ences. In public health, for example, qualitative research methodology 
is well-established and makes up a significant proportion of U.S. public 
health graduate programs with required methodology courses on inter­
viewing techniques, questionnaire design, and qualitative data analysis. 
In qualitative field work, a sample size of 15 to 25 per ‘segment’ (a defined 
subgroup; e.g., one might have segments differentiated by socio-economic 
status) is considered very good1.
The use of interviews and qualitative fieldwork as a research tool 
is slowly gaining ground in economics, but remains sufficiently non­
standard to warrant a brief discussion. As outlined in section 6 of Eggen- 
berger (2006c), getting a hands-on understanding of production processes 
is a key ingredient in ‘insider econometrics’, where the qualitative work 
is combined with the collection of data for more mainstream economet­
ric work. Bartel (2004), for example, in her work on human resource 
management policies in banks points out that
‘Previous studies of productivity in the banking industry indicate the 
importance of getting “inside the black box” [Berger and Mester (1997)], 
which can only be done through detailed analysis at the plant level, i.e. 
the branch.’ (pp. 181-182)
Maybe the best-known proponent of interview-based work is Truman 
Bewley. Bewley (1999) deals with the question of (work) morale and 
outlines the findings of his book-length study of ‘Why wages don’t fall 
during a recession.’ That paper gives a very good illustration of how
1For a critical view of the current research methodology in empirical economics 
work, see McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) and Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) as well as 
the numerous other articles on the topic in the same issue.
215
insights gained by interviewing can inform subsequent theoretical work2. 
The first contribution in mainstream economics making use of interviews 
that I am aware of is Alan Blinder’s study of the reasons for price stick­
iness. Blinder (1991) contains a very good description and defense of 
the methodology; also see the discussion by Shiller, Gordon and Gross­
man (1991) who offer support as well as criticism. Two recent examples 
of the use of interviews in banking research are De Haas and Naaborg 
(2005a) and De Haas and Naaborg (2005b). The authors, researchers at 
De Nederlandsche Bank, use interviews with practitioners to better un­
derstand the role of internal capital markets in multinational banks and 
the impact of foreign bank entry on SME access to credit, respectively.
The two papers that I found most helpful from a methodological 
point of view were Helper (2000) and Bewley (2002). Helper starts by 
pointing out that modem economics began with Adam Smith’s visit to a 
pin factory and proceeds to outline some insights from the NBER’s field 
research program. She notes that
‘Economists today typically do their research using econometrics and 
mathematical modeling. These techniques have many strengths but share 
the weakness of distance from individual economic actors. In contrast, 
field research allows direct contact with them, yielding several advan­
tages.’ (p. 228)
These are:
1. ‘Researchers can ask people directly about their objectives and 
constraints.’ (p. 228)
2. ‘Fieldwork allows exploration of areas with little preexisting data 
or theory’ (p. 228)
3. ‘Fieldwork facilitates use of the right data’ (p. 229)
4. ‘Fieldwork provides vivid images that promote intuition’ (p. 229)
In the second part of the paper, Helper argues that
‘many criticisms of field work can be answered with improved meth­
ods.’ (p. 229)
She deals in particular with techniques for increasing objectivity, 
replicability, and generalizability. Bewley (2002) is titled ‘Interviews as 
a valid empirical tool in economics’ and is more of a how-to guide than 
Helper’s paper, although Bewley discusses methodological issues as well.
My study, like most interview-based work, has certain features that 
would be problematic if my objectives were different. For example, I 
signed a confidentiality agreement that means that my study is non- 
replicable for other researchers. (Bewley, however, points out that others
2Also see the discussion by Taylor (1999) in the same volume.
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are always free to do a similar study that would confirm or contradict 
the findings.) The sample also is not random, but systematic — I worked 
with 25 banks that indicated an interest in participating in the research, 
that all have the same organizational form (they are organized as coop­
eratives) and are all relatively small compared to industry giants such 
as, for example, Deutsche Bank. There is thus a triple sample-selection 
bias: First, banks other than co-operative banks were not systematically 
included in the sample (although I did talk to many other bankers from 
for-profit and public sector banks in the course of my research). Sec­
ond, the organization sponsoring the study contacted only around 700 
(or around half of its) member banks through their electronic distribu­
tion system and requested that banks indicate whether they would be 
willing to participate in the study3. (In return for participating, banks 
received a detailed report on the findings.) Third, from within the self­
selected group of all cooperative banks that had indicated an interest 
in participating (about 80 strong), I chose an impressionistic sample: I 
strove to obtain the maximum possible variety in terms of size and lo­
cation while keeping the sample to manageable proportions. The size of 
the banks ranged from around EUR 150 million in assets to around EUR 
2.5 billion4.
While I did establish a master questionnaire in cooperation with a 
pilot bank (where employees were particularly generous with their time 
and patient with my questions), sticking rigidly to a list of questions 
impairs the flow of the conversation with the interviewees. I therefore 
used the questionnaire more as a rough guide for myself rather than as 
a standardized list of questions to tick off. As my understanding of the 
issues grew, the initial list of questions was quickly superseded anyway. 
Other reasons for not using a standardized format are:
• The sample is too small to calculate meaningful descriptive sta­
tistics (e.g., percent of interviewees agreeing with a statement), let alone 
do more sophisticated quantitative work. While at first glance a total of 
114 interviews in 25 banks (plus six interviews in the pilot bank) does 
not look too bad, one needs to bear in mind that these interviews fall
3The electronic service was used since this saved time and money and, more im­
portantly, made sure that top management and heads of human resources of member 
banks would be alerted to the study directly (even within banks, access to the service 
is highly restricted). My contacts at the sponsoring organization hold the view that 
banks using the electronic service are not systematically different from the others.
4 While I believe that the significance of my findings is not diminished because of 
the way the sample of participating banks was obtained, it would have been inter­
esting to include other, explicitly for-profit and public-sector banks. As noted in the 
introduction, I invested considerable time and effort into convincing other banks to 
join the study.
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into at least five sub-categories. In each bank I typically interviewed staff 
from the management tier just below top management overseeing human 
resources, controlling/credit risk management, the retail front-office, the 
front-office serving business customers, and the back-office and in each 
of these interviews quite different issues were discussed.
• The study was explicitly exploratory in nature. Not following the 
leads that presented themselves quite naturally in the interview would 
have meant foregoing a lot of valuable information.
• The ‘psychology’ of the interview situation: It was very important 
for the success of the research to keep my interviewees interested in the 
discussion and motivated to help me. They are busy people: An hour and 
a half or more of their working day is a substantial amount of their time. 
I found that turning the interview from a somewhat lop-sided question- 
and-answer session into more of a discussion was much appreciated by 
the interviewees. Demonstrating detailed knowledge of their business 
and empathizing with their concerns was very helpful for building credi­
bility. Some of the interviewees had thirty-plus years of work experience 
in their field and it was gratifying to observe how engaging their inter­
est with probing questions very often turned initially somewhat reserved 
politeness into enthusiasm. To create this sort of interview atmosphere 
while rigidly sticking to a questionnaire is, I believe, impossible.
I usually spent one full day in each bank and held one-on-one inter­
views with the heads of human resources, controlling/credit risk manage­
ment, the retail front office, the front office serving business customers, 
and the back office that usually lasted about one and a half hours each. I 
wrote to the sample banks before the interviews to request permission to 
record the interviews with a digital voice recorder; almost all of my inter­
viewees were comfortable with that. I believe that it is impossible to take 
detailed notes and be an active interviewer at the same time; recording 
the interviews and analyzing them in detail later on while taking only 
essential notes in the interview (points to be followed up on later in the 
conversation) is a (time-consuming) solution to this problem.
The first objective for the interviews was to understand all elements of 
the credit process that have a bearing on incentive issues. In particular, 
this meant looking at risk rating and pricing tools as well as organiza­
tional arrangements in great detail. I also discussed individual bankers’ 
discretion (their scope for influencing decisions) and various aspects of 
possible incentive pay arrangements. The interviews actually covered 
more ground than I report here; part of the agreement with the organi­
zation that sponsored my work was that I would not focus narrowly on
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lending-related incentive schemes for small- and medium-sized business 
loans, but would consider the issue more broadly.
It would have been desirable for my interviewees to review and com­
ment on a draft of the present chapter. However, I was asked not to 
pursue that route of obtaining feedback. Instead, my sponsors circu­
lated the internal report of my findings (wider in scope than the present 
chapter, and looking at incentive arrangements from the point of view of 
senior management rather than a financial regulator) to the participating 
banks and indicated that there were no fundamental disagreements.
In section 5 of Eggenberger (2006c) I provide a brief description of 
the banks that I worked with, preceded by some background information 
on the German banking industry.
7.3 R isk-rating and pricing
A thorough understanding of a bank’s risk-rating and pricing tools is 
essential for any analysis of lending-related incentive schemes. It is par­
ticularly fortuitous in this respect that the Bundesverband der deutschen 
Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken (BVR) e.V., the Federal Association 
of German Cooperative Banks, has published a fair amount of material on 
the cooperative banks’ credit risk rating and pricing methodology, VR- 
Control, and the software that implements it, IFB-Okular. (Cooperative 
banks are not strictly speaking obliged to use VR-Control/IFB-Okular, 
but all the banks that I visited did and so do most of the other coop­
erative banks.) The Federal Association of German Cooperative Banks 
developed this methodology for a number of reasons, not least to prepare 
member banks for the requirements of the New Capital Accord and to 
create a sufficient degree of homogeneity or even uniformity in credit risk 
assessment to enable the securitization of assets on a larger scale than 
hitherto possible. Most other banks consider such information highly 
proprietary and do not make it available to the public. In the following 
I outline the pricing methodology used and, since credit risk considera­
tions are an important component of profitability, discuss the risk rating 
system.
7.3.1 Pricing scheme
The pricing system proceeds via the computation (or, rather, estimation) 
of a sequence of profit contributions by deducting various cost compo­
nents from the revenue obtained through a product sale. The standard 
reference for this approach in the German-language literature is Schieren-
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beck (2001) (especially vol. I). The estimation procedure as outlined here 
is performed by front-line bankers only in the case of negotiated product 
sales; it is too involved to be used for the sale of standard products where 
the individual banker has relatively little scope for adjusting terms and 
conditions as set by the bank.
A key feature of the pricing system is that all figures are expressed in 
present-value terms. This approach has important implications: It makes 
all product sales directly comparable with one another, but of necessity 
relies on its assumptions being accurate. Here I illustrate the estimation 
procedure (available to bankers as a software application within IFB- 
Okular) with the example of a standard, fixed-maturity loan.
Hypothetically refinancing the loan on the capital market (i.e., the 
bank borrows money with the same maturity as the loan, such that the 
payments it receives from and makes to its capital market counterparty 
exactly offset those to and from the borrower under the loan agreement; 
the software has an interface such that it can be continuously fed current 
market information), the bank is left with a surplus called profit con­
tribution I. The decision on whether to actually refinance the loan (and 
thus hedge the interest rate risk) or accept the transformation risk rests 
with the bank’s treasurer and does not concern the front-office employee 
negotiating the loan. He or she does not assume any interest-rate risk. 
Next, the borrower might default. By estimating the expected loss and 
deducting this from profit contribution I, profit contribution II is ob­
tained. Note how the availability of market prices for credit risk would 
make a fundamental difference: Instead of estimating the expected loss 
in the complicated way that I will outline below, the bank could simply 
use the market price for credit risk, just as it already does today for 
interest rate risk. A credit portfolio manager could decide on whether 
to accept or hedge a credit risk, just as the treasurer manages interest 
rate risk. Next, the costs of production (primarily staff time) need to be 
taken into account, which leads to profit contribution III. The bank also 
needs to hold regulatory and economic capital against the loan to protect 
it against unexpected losses. Deducting the cost of holding this capital, 
one arrives at profit contribution IV. More finely differentiated estima­
tion techniques that take into account, for example, differences between 
regulatory and economic capital could be considered, but would not add 
much to the present discussion. The key target variable for cooperative 
banks at this point is profit contribution III; a shift to profit contribution 
IV is being phased in. Schierenbeck (2001) covers the above estimation 
scheme in great detail; Kroon and Pool (2002) provide a concise discus­
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sion tailored to the cooperative banks’ methodology.
7.3.2 Risk rating
Before looking at the specifics of VR-Control, the discussion of some 
general background material is helpful. A number of surveys on actual 
practice are by now outdated, but provide an excellent introduction to 
the issues of interest. In his survey of commercial bank risk manage­
ment (incorporating field work and visits to banks), Santomero (1997) 
describes risk management practices and shortcomings in a number of 
banks. The banks surveyed were ‘best practice’ banks at the time and 
so the analysis was not representative of the U.S. banking system. How­
ever, in view of the pace of progress in the field, the wider banking system 
should not only be expected to have caught up; the paper is most likely 
largely superseded by now, as Santomero (2003) himself points out (in 
another excellent article). For example, facility (and not just borrower) 
ratings are probably standard nowadays, and the recommendations at 
the end of the earlier paper have largely been taken on board by banks. 
Operational risk is not mentioned at all in the 1997 article, but had be­
come a ‘hot’ topic by the time of writing (late 2005). Still, the paper 
provides a very interesting introduction and also covers a number of is­
sues related to portfolio concerns that I am not looking at in much depth. 
The discussion of the need for an aggregation of various risks (market, 
credit, and others) is prescient; little progress has been made in this area. 
A number of papers have grown out of research on the credit risk man­
agement practices of U.S. banks by the Federal Reserve in the late 1990s 
in anticipation of changes to the Capital Accord. Federal Reserve System 
Task Force on Internal Credit Risk Models (1998) provides an overview 
of the features of then ‘state of the art’ credit risk models in use in the 
most sophisticated U.S. banks at the time. The study was prepared 
‘to assess potential uses of banks’ internal credit risk and capital 
allocation models within the supervisory process’ (p. 3)
as now proposed by the New Capital Accord. The paper actually 
takes a top-down approach and begins with a discussion of the distri­
bution of portfolio credit losses before moving on to the risk rating of 
individual customers. Several of the techniques discussed in the paper 
(e.g., the ‘subjective’ approach to assessing credit risk) are likely not 
in use anymore, such that parts of the discussion are of largely histori­
cal interest. However, the report still deals with a number of conceptual 
questions in a (mostly) non-technical manner and makes for a good intro­
duction. The actual construction of risk rating models is not discussed.
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The articles by Treacy and Carey (1998), Treacy and Carey (2000), and 
English and Nelson (1998) concentrate on stand-alone rather than port­
folio risk and cover a larger sample [practices at the fifty largest U.S. 
banks and the banks that are included in the Survey of Terms of Busi­
ness Lending, respectively]. Treacy and Carey (1998) touch on incentive 
issues and conflicts of interest in the rating process; their paper is also 
a nice illustration of the use of qualitative interviewing. They discuss 
organizational issues as well as the use of judgment vs. the use of statis­
tically based models, the risk factors considered, data and other pertinent 
issues. Treacy and Carey (2000) cover much the same ground as the ear­
lier paper. English and Nelson (1998) use data obtained via the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending and telephone interviews 
with the banks included in the Survey. They expand the scope of the 
analysis to include smaller and therefore less sophisticated banks. They 
also look at the relationship between interest rates and assessed loan risk. 
Another source of information on actual risk rating practices is the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel Committee on Bank­
ing Supervision (1999c) contains an excellent overview of actual credit 
risk modeling practice (focusing on technical issues) from a regulator’s 
point of view; a later report [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2000c)] contains a summary of comments received on the earlier one. 
This report is particularly instructive as the Basel Committee’s experts 
have clearly highlighted what were the key unsolved questions at the time. 
A less technical report on internal rating models [Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2000d)] is based on discussions with about thirty 
sophisticated banks. Krahnen and Weber (2001) provide an overview of 
‘generally accepted rating principles’.
The sources cited above are partly outdated by now, but still make 
for a very good introduction to the conceptual issues. A good source 
with respect to current ‘best practice’ (a relative term, as the field moves 
rapidly) are the requirements for rating systems as stipulated by the 
New Capital Accord [see Part 2, section III.H., Minimum Requirements 
for IRB Approach, in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004),
pp. 81 -  112].
The textbooks discussed in section 2.C of Eggenberger (2006c) [Caou- 
ette, Altman and Narayanan (1998), Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001), 
Ong (1999), Saunders (1997), and Saunders (1999)] are also useful, but 
what really helped to become acquainted with the concerns of practi­
tioners were a series of articles in the journal Bankinformation: Erxleben 
and Krob (2002) provide an overview of the entire VR-Control architec­
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ture, Kirmfie, Ehlerding and Putzer (2001) describe the credit process 
and responsibilities of the various parties involved; the risk rating tools 
are covered in a series of papers by Kirmfie and Jansen (2001), Kramer 
(2001), and Nowak (2002). Kroon and Pool (2002) and Dohring and 
Hromadka (2002) look at pricing. Portfolio issues are dealt with in two 
articles by Kirmfie and Schweizer (2001) and Ridder (2002).
VR-Control comprises a total of sixteen different rating tools for dif­
ferent customer segments [Erxleben and Krob (2002), p. 31; the ‘not-for- 
profit-organizations’ segment was added later], the two tools relevant for 
the purposes of this study are the ‘smaller companies’ rating system (up 
to EUR 5 mn in sales) and the ‘medium-sized companies’ rating system5 
(between EUR 5mn and EUR 1 bn in sales). The two rating tools are 
sufficiently similar to be discussed together.
A rating is primarily an assignment to one of twenty-five risk classes, 
each of which is calibrated to correspond to a probability of default [see 
p. 27 in Nowak (2002); note that the last five risk classes all denote 
default states using different definitions of default]. The rating has two 
components6; a quantitative one (weight of 60% in ‘smaller companies’ 
rating and 70% in ‘medium-sized companies’ rating) and a qualitative 
one.
The quantitative component is obtained by using a scoring tool on the 
last two years of financial statements. The financial statements are cen­
trally entered into a database (Geno-FBS), so that there is no discretion 
for employees and no scope for manual interference with the quantitative 
score -  the computer calculates it. The question of which financial vari­
ables to use and how to measure their significance (and especially joint 
significance) is discussed in the articles cited above. Most borrowers by 
law have twelve months from the end of the financial year to prepare 
their financial statements. This means that in theory a rating produced 
in November or December 2005 might be based on the financial data 
from 2002 and 2003. In the meantime, the financial situation of the bor­
rower may, of course, have changed very substantially. Most borrowers 
seem to submit quarterly or monthly interim financial statements (fol­
lowing a template developed by DATEV, an association of accountants 
and tax advisors, known as Betriebswirtschaftliche Auswertung or BWA)
5 Additional criteria that have to be met are: The company has to be a separate 
legal entity that has been around for more than five years, it has to be ‘for-profit’, and 
the bulk of the company’s business must be outside of agriculture, financial services, 
and real-estate. In each case where one of the criteria is not met, a separate more 
specialized rating tool is available.
6 There is actually scope for including the private income and assets of an entre­
preneur via the use of a sub-module in the ‘smaller companies’ tool. I will not discuss 
this in more detail as it adds little information of interest.
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that do not provide information on inventories and other stock figures, 
but are generally seen as helpful by credit analysts. Analyzing these 
BWAs is somewhat time-consuming, as — in contrast to the annual state­
ments -  automated analysis tools are not available7. Judging from my 
interviews, banks are not yet systematically pushing their borrowers to 
submit financial statements as early as possible, but this would clearly 
be a useful possible objective for relationship managers.
The qualitative component is computed based on the answers to a 
range of ‘hard’ questions. A ‘hard’ question is one that leaves no room 
for subjective judgment so that any two relationship managers would 
answer the question in the same way. (The relationship managers axe 
in charge of obtaining the answers to the qualitative questions, because 
these require fairly in-depth discussions with the borrower.) The articles 
cited above discuss the selection of questions. While the qualitative ques­
tions are intended to be objective in this way, it is not clear that this aim 
is always attained in practice. For example, when does a company have 
a succession arrangement for its senior management in place? Assuming 
there were some scope for subjective assessments to influence answers, 
one aspect that might be worrisome with respect to the construction of 
the rating tool would be if during data collection bankers answering the 
candidate questions (about the defaulted and non-defaulted sample bor­
rowers on the basis of whom the rating is constructed) knew whether the 
borrower had defaulted or not. This might influence their answers and, 
as a consequence, the out-of-sample predictive power of the qualitative 
questions might then be reduced.
The discussion of qualitative information (which is time-consuming 
and, therefore, costly to obtain) brings us back to the earlier discussion 
of the value of these data. While I am not at liberty to discuss specifics, 
the qualitative information obtained in the sample on which the two 
VR-Control rating tools discussed here are based has been shown to be 
valuable in statistical terms. Note that the designer of the scheme might 
consider it advisable to include questions that have no statistical value for 
essentially psychological reasons (because the acceptance and credibility 
of the rating tool might otherwise be undermined8).
The combined quantitative and qualitative scores lead to the prelimi­
nary assignment to a risk class. The relationship manager and the credit 
analyst each have a veto right with respect to the risk rating assess­
7The annual financial statements can be submitted electronically to the bank by 
the borrower’s accountant. A similar interface is not available for the interim state­
ments.
81 am grateful to Erlend Berg for pointing this out.
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ment and so some discussion might ensue before the assignment becomes 
definitive. There is scope (within limits) for overriding the assignment 
proposed by the computer. Any kind of information may be used to 
justify a downgrade, while only ‘hard’ (verifiable and verified; e.g., a 
borrower receiving a prepaid large order) information can serve to justify 
an upgrade. The target share of overrides is 10 percent. The interviewees 
suggested that while there were often discussions with respect to the ‘cor­
rect’ assignment of a borrower, it was rare for the escalation procedure 
to be used (in which the respective superiors of the relationship manager 
and the credit analyst would be asked to assign the rating). The rating 
also incorporates ‘warning signs’ leading to a downgrade, but these are 
signs indicative of a liquidity crisis (such as garnishments) and therefore 
likely to be received when the borrower is already in serious financial 
difficulties. The risk management system does not currently include the 
automatic monitoring of the account (s) data9 and nothing in the way of 
the internet-based monitoring tool discussed in section 4 of Eggenberger 
(2006c). The responsibility for monitoring manually is shared between 
the credit analyst (who will typically be in charge of the financial data, 
following developments in the industry, and developing suggestions on the 
basis of the financial information) and the relationship manager [whose 
job it is to keep in touch with the borrower and obtain pertinent in­
formation (including ‘soft’ information) through personal contact, make 
suggestions, and request additional information].
The risk rating is, in principle, independent of a decision on a loan 
application. In particular, the above rating procedure will be carried out 
at least yearly for all borrowers, regardless of whether they are applying 
for additional credit. Collateral valuations will be updated at a similar 
rhythm. The rating may, of course, be produced as part of the bank’s 
deciding on a loan application.
7.3.3 H um an influence
There are really two questions to be answered here: 1. How does human 
effort affect actual profitability? and 2. How does human effort af­
fect estimated/expected profitability as established by the pricing tool? 
The second question matters because of the role that estimated/expected 
profit is likely to have in any explicit incentive scheme. If an employee
9 The BWAs contain some information on movements in accounts held at other 
banks. Requesting that borrowers regularly submit up-to-date statements for the 
accounts held at other banks has not, so far, been considered in the banks that I 
visited. I am not aware of any systematic studies of the value of such data as early 
warning indicators.
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can influence the measured profitability of his or her work him- or herself, 
this has certain undesirable implications that need to be borne in mind 
in the construction of an incentive scheme.
It is quite clear where and how human effort comes into the lending 
process: For one thing, the rating system relies on the relationship man­
ager to obtain accurate answers to the qualitative questions. The possi­
bility of overrides leaves considerable scope for the relationship manager 
and the credit analyst to correct an inappropriate risk class assignment. 
Monitoring and especially the early detection of financial difficulties in­
volve careful analysis and, on the part of the relationship manager, nego­
tiating skills if he or she would like the borrower to implement suggested 
changes. The role of human discretion in collateral valuation deserves 
particular mention. The banks currently rely on a set of rules issued by 
regional associations on which ‘haircuts’ are to be applied to which kinds 
of collateral (so-called Beleihungsrichtlinien). These ‘haircuts’ are fairly 
schematic and do not really answer the question: ‘What would we get 
if we had to sell this (...) tomorrow?’ Few banks back-test collateral 
valuations at present; some of my interviewees indicated that they found 
significant deviations of actual sale prices from estimated valuations. In 
the future, as part of the VR-Control project the post-‘haircut’ estimates 
will be corrected once again to obtain ‘loss given default’ (LGD) estimates 
based on actual experience. An experienced credit analyst should be ex­
pected to quickly spot cases where the general rules are not applicable 
and where even the tool that LGD estimates are based on might lead 
to biased estimates. Because changes in estimated collateral values feed 
through directly into expected profitability, this issue is of considerable 
importance for the subject of incentive contracts.
To all intents and purposes there is no human influence in obtaining 
profit contribution I. The expected loss (the difference between profit 
contributions I and II) is obtained as the product of probability of de­
fault (estimated via the risk rating procedure outlined above), exposure 
at default (‘How much of a line of credit is drawn at the time of default?’) 
and loss given default. Therefore, the human influence in estimating ex­
pected loss is material. In addition to the mostly standardized statistical 
rating, the credit analyst also will analyze an applicant’s debt service 
capacity in detail. This is another element of the credit process in which 
diligence and accuracy matter greatly. The estimated cost of production 
(which leads from profit contribution II to III) is typically obtained as 
an average of how long it takes an employee to carry out the various 
tasks required and, given the characteristics of the transaction, cannot
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be modified. Administrative production costs ought to be estimated by 
each bank on its own, but in practice this is considered too costly and 
disruptive and so a set of general guidelines is applied. The upshot of this 
is that the estimated costs may be very different from the actual costs 
if different processes are used. This problem is magnified in the case of 
business loans which are highly heterogeneous although only a single cost 
estimate can be used per product. According to my interviewees, it is 
not appropriate to use such an undifferentiated cost estimate for all the 
different loan sales that one might encounter. However, they indicated 
that it was possible to disaggregate the loan approval process into its dif­
ferent components for which standardized times and costs could then be 
estimated. Something like a sub-mask in which cost components may be 
added by mouse click might therefore be a useful addition to the software. 
Human effort enters via the actual staff time (and other resources) used. 
However, the relatively undifferentiated nature of estimated administra­
tive costs is actually not such a great concern in business-lending, because 
administrative costs tend to be small relative to the expected loss. The 
last cost component, the (economic and/or regulatory) capital charge, is 
sufficiently important to warrant a detailed discussion.
7.3.4 Econom ic capital charges
The Federal Reserve System Task Force on Internal Credit Risk Models 
(1998) notes that
‘Conceptually, the economic capital allocated to a particular activ­
ity should be measured as that activity’s marginal contribution to the 
portfolio’s overall economic capital requirement, taking into considera­
tion diversification effects between that activity and the rest of the bank. 
Operationally, this marginal contribution would be calculated as the eco­
nomic capital allocation for the entire portfolio less the hypothetical cap­
ital allocation for the portfolio excluding the activity of interest.’ (p. 8)
The calculation of that marginal contribution is computationally highly 
involved. The larger the portfolio, the more complicated the computa­
tion and the less -  all things equal -  the gain from further diversifying 
the portfolio. Issues of database infrastructure may make it impossi­
ble to compute a capital charge without actually booking the exposure. 
Also, an offer is typically extended to the prospective borrower and kept 
open for some time. During that period the portfolio composition might 
shift and the estimated capital charge may no longer be sufficient. The 
shortfall may then either have to be absorbed by the bank/relationship 
manager or the risk has to be passed on to the borrower.
227
In the VR-Control framework, capital charges are not estimated as a 
function of an exposure’s marginal contribution to actual portfolio credit 
risk (‘unexpected loss’ /  Credit Value at Risk or CVaR), but via the 
so-called ‘multiplier approach’ where the capital charge is determined by 
the expected loss10. In other words, diversification, concentration, and 
size effects are not priced directly into the loan and have to be trans­
mitted to the front-fine bankers by way of guidelines on which industries 
are desirable additions to the portfolio and which are not. As long as all 
front-office bankers are kept informed about the bank’s portfolio strat­
egy in a timely manner, this need not impair the operation of incentive 
schemes. From the point of view of incentive scheme design, however, 
it would be preferable if the ‘real’ economic capital cost of a loan were 
considered in the estimation of expected profit. This would strengthen 
the allocative role of prices and obviate the need for additional guide­
lines. One argument against pricing the actual marginal contribution to 
portfolio credit risk into a loan is that this not necessary when credit 
risk can be easily traded. The loans under consideration, however, are 
non-tradable. Another argument that came up in discussions but the 
relevance of which I have not been able to establish is that the portfolios 
of many of the cooperative banks are so small that even small changes 
to portfolio composition can affect the marginal contribution of a given 
exposure to portfolio credit risk considerably. This would be a concern if 
the fluctuations were due to the portfolio credit risk model not working 
as accurately as one would want it to be for small portfolio sizes.
No matter whether the multiplier or a full-fledged portfolio approach 
is used, given the characteristics of the borrower and the existing portfolio 
of loans, the banker does not have any influence on the capital charge 
which in either case is determined by a computer. It was, however, 
pointed out to me by one interviewee that deciding on the industry that 
a borrower is in is not always straightforward and that there may be cases 
in which a banker has discretion to change an industry classification to 
one that attracts a lower capital charge.
This completes the discussion of the pricing and risk rating method­
ology. I have shown in which ways there is scope for human influence 
and discussed some of the implications that this might have for incentive 
schemes. More fundamental technical issues are discussed in a separate 
section below.
10 Controversially, there is no provision in the New Capital Accord for rewarding 
banks with well-diversified portfolios with lower capital charges.
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7.4 F ind ings in  d eta il
In this sub-section I discuss possible objectives for incentive schemes. 
Following the introduction, I describe some desirable features of incentive 
schemes and give some institutional and organizational background. The 
discussion of possible objectives for front-office employees (relationship 
managers) begins with comments on the use of profit targets, followed by 
the analysis of several other candidate objectives. The risk objective must 
be at the heart of any lending-related incentive scheme and is discussed 
in detail. The sub-section ends with a discussion of objectives for credit 
analysts and the tum-around/liquidation unit.
7.4.1 Introduction
My interviewees were by and large in favor of explicit incentive schemes. 
Several banks were already using incentive arrangements of some kind 
or other and the experiences with such schemes differed greatly. Some­
times employees were reported to be entirely unresponsive to financial 
incentives; in another case, a bank had been able to move to a com­
pensation structure centered on commissions rather than salary and was 
very successful. Time and time again, the role of ‘personality’ emerged 
as a theme. It was asserted that there is a ‘salesperson personality’ that 
one either has or does not have, but that cannot be ‘created’ through 
any amount of training or a very cleverly designed incentive scheme. As 
a general rule, older employees were described by human resource man­
agers as finding the transition to contingent pay more difficult -  maybe 
the result of a certain complacency brought about by many years of rel­
atively easy profits and steady, seniority-driven increases in pay. The 
emphasis on personality might be interpreted as support for the sorting 
function of incentive schemes [stressed, for example, in the famous Safe- 
lite paper by Lazear (2000b)]: Maybe the real impact of contingent pay 
arrangements is not (or not in the main) in giving employees incentives to 
exercise more effort, but in leading to desirable turnover in the workforce 
in that low-productivity employees (assumed to dislike contingent pay) 
leave and are replaced by high-productivity employees (supposedly in fa­
vor of contingent pay)11. I find the idea that whether an incentive scheme 
‘works’ or does not ‘work’ might depend more on some innate traits of 
the employees affected than its design or the way it is implemented very
11 In a similar way, one might think that a company not offering contingent pay 
might suffer the exodus of its most productive employees. My interviewees did not 
suggest that this was a problem, but did sometimes indicate that the absence of 
incentive pay was perceived as unfair by some high-productivity employees.
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interesting with potentially far-reaching implications.
7.4.2 Desirable features o f incentive schem es
Above I outlined a number of (from a regulator’s point of view) desir­
able features of lending-related incentive schemes: They should permit 
an evaluation prior to the maturity of a loan while still giving incentives 
for post-disbursement monitoring; they should be able to deal with staff 
turnover; and performance evaluation should be objective. In the follow­
ing I will outline several further desirable features; the first two are drawn 
from theory (and common sense) while the importance of the remainder 
was stressed by the practitioners I interviewed.
Two additional key criteria can be deduced straight from standard 
principal-agent-theory:
1. Objectives should align the incentives of agent and principal. 
This is relatively straightforward for front-office employees, but more 
difficult for credit analysts.
2. To the extent possible, the objectives used for evaluation should be 
under the control of the employees concerned and should not be subject 
to exogenous influences.
Baron and Kreps (1999) make the case for external consistency of hu­
man resource management policies (with the ‘Five Factors’: the external 
environment, the workforce, the organization’s culture and strategy, and 
the technology of production; see Ch. 2), as well as internal consistency 
(Ch. 3). My contribution focuses on incentive arrangements, and I will 
not discuss human resource management practices in as encompassing 
a way as Baron and Kreps do. The interested reader is referred to the 
discussion in their book. I would like to highlight that:
• I focus on one possible element of human resource management pol­
icy, namely incentive arrangements, and on its fit with the technology of 
production (rather than all five factors considered by Baron and Kreps);
• I see no reason a priori why contingent pay should not be expected 
to be effective in the banks that I visited, although occasionally intervie­
wees noted that there might be tension between the consensual tradition 
in the cooperative sector and pay arrangements that focus on the perfor­
mance of the individual;
• Consistency may be an issue in developing incentive arrangements 
for front-office and back-office. The front-office’s primary role is to bring 
in business; the back-office’s role is to protect the bank against unwanted 
risk. The conflict inherent in these objectives is in principle desired; how­
ever, it is intuitively plausible that if both sides had very steep incentive
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schemes based on their respective objectives, gridlock might result.
I do take into consideration the cautionary comments in Baron and 
Kreps (1999) on pay-for-performance (Ch. 11; especially, pp. 256-258 
and pp. 268-271). Of Baron and Kreps7 ‘non-economic caveats’ (pp. 
256-258), only one (fairness) was brought up in the interviews, which 
may have something to do with the fact that the use of contingent pay 
was not widespread in the sample banks and that -  with few exceptions 
-  any resulting differences in income are small. Of the five arguments 
that Baron and Kreps state against pay-for-performance, the first two 
may have ‘technical’ remedies. These candidate solutions constitute an 
important part of my findings.
1. Misalignment of incentives /  multi-tasking considerations /  
‘gaming’: It may be possible that through judicious combination of the 
objectives, the right balance can be attained. I will make it clear in the 
discussion where candidate objectives might lead to dysfunctional reac­
tions on the part of employees.
2. Employees are made to bear excessive risk: This point will be ad­
dressed in detail below. Given the cyclical nature of the banking business, 
it is a key concern.
With respect to the following three arguments, I can only stress the 
importance of communication. It may be that a scheme that has been 
developed in good faith, with employee input and participation at all 
stages of development and implementation, and that is being proposed 
by a management that commands the trust of its workforce is able to 
overcome these issues12.
3. Incentive schemes might not be considered legitimate in the 
eyes of employees.
4. Incentive schemes may be adjusted inefficiently rarely for essen­
tially ‘political’ reasons.
5. The ‘extrinsic motivation’ aspect of pay-for-performance arrange­
ments may undermine intrinsic motivation.
The last point is one so controversial that I refrain from further dis­
cussion here and take it up again in the section on fundamental doubts 
with respect to contingent pay arrangements in Eggenberger (2006c).
Lastly, I outline some of the features that the practitioners found 
desirable. They were strongly in favor of objective evaluations, although 
it was frequently suggested that complete objectivity was not feasible 
and that some subjective component should be retained so that special
12 Empirical work suggesting that there is scope for overcoming self-serving bias is 
described in Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), and I would expect their findings to 
apply to negotiations on incentive arrangements.
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circumstances could be taken into account. Objectives should be such 
that an employee at any time can accurately determine how he or she is 
doing at negligible cost and should be transparent throughout the bank; 
all levels of management should be included (i.e., evaluated according to 
clear criteria). Fairness (as mentioned above) is an essential feature and 
economists would do well to remember that fairness is what is perceived 
as fair. There should only be a small number of objectives, about three 
to five.
7.4.3 Som e organizational and institu tional back­
ground
In the market segment that I am considering, one relationship manager 
is assigned to one customer — that banker is the point of contact for 
all requests. One front-office employee typically works together with 
a number of different credit analysts on different credit files (and con­
versely), but because of the high fixed (and sunk) cost of understanding 
a customer relationship, the customer’s business and accounts, the ini­
tial assignment of relationship manager and credit analyst will typically 
not be changed13, 14. The number of customers assigned to a relation­
ship manager in this way typically varies from approximately 30 to 250 
and depends on such factors as size, complexity, and risk. All business 
transacted with a customer will typically be credited to that customer’s 
relationship manager, regardless of his or her actual involvement. This 
is a concern with respect to incentive schemes: Consider, for example, 
the case where the relationship manager needs to bring in a colleague (a 
specialist in some area in which the relationship manager’s expertise is 
limited). If the revenue is credited only to the relationship manager, the 
specialist has less-than-optimal incentives; if the revenue is credited to 
the specialist, the relationship manager might attempt to avoid bring­
ing in the colleague15. One possible technical solution to this problem 
would be the internal billing of services between units (profit-centers).
13Having said that, one could imagine that employees would try to take advantage 
of staff turnover to get rid of difficult or time-consuming clients by moving these from 
their own portfolio to the portfolio assigned to the then-vacant position. Should this 
happen to any significant extent, this would have potentially serious implications for 
the fairness of contingent pay arrangements.
14 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2003b) discusses possible 
alternative organizational arrangements for the cooperation between front- and back- 
office with respect to risk rating (pp. 65-66).
15 Interestingly, in one of the banks outside the sample that I talked to, allowing 
both specialist and relationship manager to credit the full amount of revenue to their 
respective accounts did not solve the problem: Relationship managers were still very 
reluctant to bring in someone else, maybe for fear that the client might contact the 
specialist directly on the next occasion.
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This, however, is currently not yet technically feasible in my sample 
banks; neither are relationship managers nor the back-office organized 
as profit-centers. Revenues are tracked on a per-employee basis in the 
front-office but not costs, so transparency with respect to costs is in­
complete. Economists do not usually pay much attention to issues of 
accounting and information technology; here, however, the possibility 
of billing services between profit-centers would make a material differ­
ence. Note, for example, that the cost of evaluating loan applications 
is considerable but is not usually charged to the applicant (by the rela­
tionship manager) nor the relationship manager (by the credit analyst). 
It would be highly desirable to directly charge applicants a fee for the 
creditworthiness assessment and the regular meetings that take place in 
an ongoing lending relationship and it was encouraging to see that some 
banks in the sample have moved quite far in that direction. Apart from 
the issue of incentive arrangements, there is an additional, related reason 
for implementing profit-center accounting. It is already possible today 
to outsource the back-office function for certain standardized products 
(primarily residential real estate loans), and it is hard to see how what 
are essentially make-or-buy decisions on keeping or outsourcing certain 
processes can be made without transparency about costs. The hetero­
geneity of business loans in terms of complexity plays a role in at least 
two important ways:
1. The output of the back-office is hard to measure, at least as 
long as the work is not differentiated into individual, standardized com­
ponents. This is different, for example, for residential real estate loans 
which are highly standardized and therefore allow direct comparisons of 
employees’ output.
2. Assuming that profit targets are to be a component of an incen­
tive scheme, it is very hard to tailor portfolios such that no relationship 
manager (or credit analyst) has an obvious advantage over any other. 
This could be a real concern if it leads to an incentive arrangement be­
ing perceived as unfair. For the mass and mass affluent retail markets 
standardized tools are available that use a range of variables (from socio­
economic data to commuting patterns to the bank’s market share etc) 
to estimate the profit potential of a group of customers. Similar tools 
are not available for the business market. In addition, creating portfo­
lios with approximately equal potential may not be management’s first 
priority. Other criteria for assigning customers to relationship managers 
may be
• location (especially in rural areas some degree of geographical con­
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centration of customers in a portfolio may be required)
• industry (not a major concern for the relatively small banks that 
I visited, as there is usually not that much scope for specialization by 
industry -  however, larger banks will have industry specialists)
Sometimes the back-office will be organized around a finer division of 
labor: Certain tasks (such as financial statement analysis, sending out 
requests, compliance/reporting, collateral evaluation) are then central­
ized. In such cases the principles that are discussed here can be applied 
with some modifications.
7.4.4 Possible objectives for front-office em ployees
It is a key insight from the multi-tasking literature16 that if one cannot 
give balanced incentives for all the separate tasks that make up a job, it 
may be best not to give explicit incentives at all. In addition, complexity 
is a real-world concern of great importance. An incentive scheme may 
be cleverly designed; if it is so complicated that it is not understood, 
it will not serve its purpose17. Any effort to develop explicit incentive 
arrangements to a large extent hinges on developing a package of objec­
tives that covers all aspects of the relationship manager’s job and gives 
the right weight to each. It is important to note that the credit risk 
aspect cannot be separated from the other tasks of the relationship man­
ager; in particular, a relationship manager needs to bring in business. (In 
fact, sales and the profits they generate are a source of protection to the 
bank when risk is taken in a disciplined way.) Although I am looking at 
incentive arrangements from a regulatory point of view, it would, there­
fore, not be enough to ask: “How can I punish the relationship manager 
if performance with respect to risk management leaves something to be 
desired?” Any such lopsided scheme would lead to resentment on the 
part of the employees concerned and likely not find acceptance among 
the regulated institutions. There is no contradiction between looking 
at incentive arrangements from a regulatory point of view (where the 
primary concern must be downside risk, in this case, credit risk) and 
taking into account the profit objective of the practitioner. It is not in­
conceivable that such regulation leaves both regulator and bank better 
off; there is ample evidence suggesting that the argument “if something 
were profit-maximizing, companies would already be doing it” does not 
always apply.
16The classic reference is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Baron and Kreps (1999) 
provide an excellent discussion (pp. 251-253, 268-270).
17 For a real-world example of how this happened at Analog Devices, see Baron and 
Kreps (1999) (pp. 221-222)
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The main objectives that I will consider in the following are:
• Profit objective
• Customer satisfaction
• Risk objective
Secondary (or possibly temporary) objectives are:
• Borrowers’ financial statements submitted in a timely manner
• Reduction in overdrafts
• Number of submitted applications complete
• Announcing intention to leave position as early as possible
These seven candidate objectives emerged as potentially useful objec­
tives in the interviews.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Profit objective
To an economist, using the profit a front-office employee generates (by 
summing up the ‘profit contributions IV’ for that employee’s sales) as 
one key objective seems an obvious choice: If the accounting infrastruc­
ture is in place, why look at anything other than profits (which should, 
if measured correctly, align the interests of the bank or regulator and the 
employee)? When a pure profit objective is used, the employee does not 
require any additional guidance (except with respect to portfolio con­
siderations as discussed above as long as these are not yet decentralized 
and automatically taken into account in the bank’s risk management 
and pricing software) and has the right incentives to negotiate well on 
behalf of the bank. All information is assumed to be conveyed via the 
‘profit contributions IV’ as estimated, and the front-line banker is given 
the freedom to decide which products to sell. He or she would then ra­
tionally choose to concentrate his or her sales efforts on those products 
that bring the highest profit (given the time required to sell them)18. A 
profit target also would give the relationship manager an incentive to 
price a lot of services that are provided for free today: Loans, for exam­
ple, are typically bundled with the creditworthiness assessment, ongoing 
monitoring and financial advice and so on. The more innovative banks 
in the sample have started billing for the evaluation of loan applications 
and the regular consultations separately (and have noted that relation­
ship managers are much better prepared for their meetings when they 
know that they have to send the customer a bill afterwards). Whereas 
currently banks typically make binding loan offers to the applicants that 
expose the bank to adverse term structure movements, a profit objective
18 The experiences of banks that pay commissions for the sale of certain products 
but not others bear out that this is what would happen in practice.
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would give relationship managers an incentive to pass that risk on to the 
prospective borrower wherever possible. The question arises why the use 
of profit objectives could ever not be optimal from the point of view of 
the bank.
• The profit estimates might be biased. Below I will outline con­
cerns with respect to credit risk measurement in a separate section. Here 
I wish to discuss the implications of using a profit objective when profit 
estimates are obtained in present value terms. While this ensures apples 
are compared with apples, to arrive at present value estimates for certain 
products, a number of behavioral assumptions need to be made. If one 
cannot not have much faith in these, differences between actual and esti­
mated profits might be large and systematic. Examples of product sales 
requiring such assumptions to be made are loans with option elements 
(Will options be exercised and in which circumstances?) and demand 
deposits (How long will the money be held at the bank?). In the case 
of long-term loans, one also needs to estimate the administrative costs 
associated with future risk ratings, financial statement analysis, discus­
sions with the borrower (if these are not billed separately) many years 
out into the future, when there is actually little transparency with re­
spect to these costs.
• Certain externalities might arise that are not priced19. Balance sheet 
structure, for example, might be a concern if estimated profitability gives 
misleading signals. For example, the bank may be reluctant to lose sav­
ings and time deposits to aggressive direct-banking competitors (paying 
above market rates trying to build market share) even though it would 
be cheaper to switch to wholesale funding rather than to match the com­
petitor’s rates. In this example, deposits are assumed to remain a cheap 
source of funding in the long-run. Cross-selling considerations (“If the 
time deposit disappears, then so will all the other business that the cus­
tomer is doing with us: insurance, credit card etc.”) may be playing 
a role, too. By using appropriately calculated subsidies, the front-office 
banker could, in this example, be insulated against rate fluctuations. 
However, ‘fiddling’ with prices is problematic. At any rate, one would 
want to see any decisions taken on what would be de facto subsidies to 
be based on facts and data rather than rules of thumb and gut feeling. 
Another illustration of an externality are customers whose direct prof­
itability does not reflect their indirect profitability to the bank (e.g., a 
close relative of a very important business customer). Under a pure profit
19 Most of the ‘externalities’ that I came across, however, are likely side-effects of 
any explicit incentive scheme based on individual performance and so it is not the use 
of a profit objective as such that is the problem (see below).
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objective, an employee has an incentive to not spend time on or even get 
rid of all unprofitable customers unless he or she is compensated in some 
way.
• Profit targets possibly lead to inefficiently high degrees of specializa­
tion. If product sales require a certain expertise, an employee might find 
it in his or her best interest to neglect certain products and concentrate 
on those he or she already knows well. This is a real concern in banks 
which would prefer to have well-rounded relationship managers able to 
give advice on a wide range of products. Over time, the loss of a reputa­
tion for giving good advice might constitute an externality with tangible 
costs to the bank.
• Commissions paid by insurance companies are typically paid accord­
ing to a non-linear schedule (the more policies are sold, the higher the 
commission per policy). This is difficult to capture via the accounting 
software.
• Even leaving credit risk concerns aside for now, the use of market- 
driven prices exposes the employee to a lot of risk because of interest rate 
fluctuations. Incentive schemes might need to be adjusted frequently and 
any such changes are problematic. This is one short-coming of a profit 
objective that would not disappear using quantity targets instead.
• The consistent use of profit targets has important implications for 
other areas of bank management. For example, it might render a pre­
ferred marketing tool, campaigns that heavily promote and ‘push’ certain 
products, ineffective. Traditional ‘loss-leaders’ (such as, in the case of my 
sample banks, certain insurance products) would likely also disappear 
unless a relationship manager found it in his or her interest to sell the 
product and incur the associated loss. Pure profit targets also are not 
easy to reconcile with current planning policies that involve quantities. 
Asset growth is still considered an objective by many bank managers (as 
is growth in the number of customers), but is a fairly meaningless con­
cept in a profit-maximization framework. These illustrations highlight 
the need for incentive arrangements to be consistent with other policies 
of the bank.
A relationship manager operating almost independently as a quasi­
entrepreneur marks one extreme; at the other extreme he or she might 
be given detailed quantitative targets for the sale of certain products20.
20If the employee were paid exclusively on a commission basis, one might indeed 
ask why he or she still is an employee of the bank; to all intents and purposes the 
employee is an independent entrepreneur. Implicit in my discussion is the use of 
contingent compensation as a more or less important supplement to a salary. The 
‘pure commission’ model is not as far fetched as it might sound; many mortgage 
originators in the United States are paid this way (see section 4.4).
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Use of quantitative targets would solve some of the problems outlined 
above. However, such an objective is far more complicated than a simple 
profit objective; one would need to weigh different components and deter­
mine the consequences of not meeting the target for individual products. 
(Product quotas can have their own pernicious consequences: For ex­
ample, they give employees incentives to sell certain products no matter 
what in order to fill the quota.) For sales above target, one would still 
need to tell employees how much the extra sales are worth in terms of 
additional pay. In the highly heterogeneous business market, it would be 
especially unhelpful to give bankers binding targets; also, the bankers in 
this area are the most experienced in the bank.
While in theory it might be possible to combine prices and quanti­
ties as tools for managing the front-office, it is my impression that any 
resulting packages of objectives for employees are likely to be too com­
plex. On the basis of the interviewees’ support for a profit objective, 
my impression is that a profit objective, if necessary supplemented with 
certain additional elements, is the most reasonable choice. However, this 
is not a question that can be decided in the abstract. The point of the 
discussion here is to outline various concerns that a regulator thinking 
about making incentive arrangements would need to consider.
In whichever way the bank’s need to generate profits is transformed 
into an objective for the front office, the bank needs to stick to it con­
sistently for a set, pre-announced period of time (typically a year or 
maybe three months during the trial phase). The consistency require­
ment underlines the extent to which well-designed objectives discipline 
not only the employee, but also top management. A number of issues 
(for example, the value of cross-selling opportunities when ‘loss-leaders’ 
are used) would need to be thoroughly analyzed. Ad hoc changes to ob­
jectives will undermine acceptance of such a scheme; so will ratcheting 
up the objectives after the trial phase without a convincing explanation 
and renegotiation. Fiddling with prices or quantitative objectives will 
likely be highly demoralizing when this is to the disadvantage of the em­
ployee. In fact, constant changes to prices will be confusing for employees 
regardless of whether these are in their favor or not21.
A few words on risk are called for within the profit objective context. 
Credit risk will be discussed below in connection with the risk objective, 
but as noted above fluctuations in market rates will have an impact on 
front-office employees even when the interest-rate risk for every transac­
tion is hedged. Agency theory suggests that the risk of term structure
21 An increase in price will make it more difficult to sell the product, but also increase 
the profit.
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movements and the associated fluctuations in profitability should be as­
sumed by the bank, but how to separate the effects of changes in interest 
rates from the effects of employee effort is still not straightforward. The 
standard solution for dealing with risk, relative performance evaluation, 
has its own problems [see p. 253 in Baron and Kreps (1999)] and, in 
the case of the banks that I visited, can be ruled out as a sensible ap­
proach: While relationship managers work largely on their own, they rely 
on the cooperation of their colleagues to a sufficient degree for relative 
evaluation to be very problematic. This may be different for large banks.
This issue leads to the question of how high a target should be set. 
Using a profit objective it would be reasonable to demand from a front- 
office employee that he or she earn all fixed costs (basic salary, benefits, 
office space, other overheads etc) before a bonus is awarded22. While that 
may be a good rule of thumb, certain adjustments need to be made under 
an accounting approach where all profits from a transaction are credited 
at once. The main reason for this is that under that system, a borrower 
in the portfolio (who might, say, have taken out a ten-year loan two 
years ago) makes a lot of work (that the relationship manager does not, 
in most banks, bill to the customer) and does not necessarily generate 
additional profits. In practice a relationship manager will normally be 
able to generate substantial additional sales from an existing customer, 
but not adjusting for the workload that comes with existing customers 
might still be problematic, ft also might be unfair to someone taking 
over a portfolio to not have as much time for generating new business 
as his or her colleagues. A more sensible solution than adjusting targets 
would be to de-bundle the different services and sign separate contracts 
with the customer (application fees, the loan itself, monitoring fees), but 
even this would not help if all revenue components were credited at the 
moment a deal closes. As was repeatedly pointed out in the interviews, 
gauging the sales and profit potential of a portfolio of business customers 
is difficult.
Certain problems, driven primarily by such a profit objective, are in­
herent in the implementation of explicit incentive schemes focusing on 
individual performance:
1. One important issue revolves around the tradeoff between current 
and future profits, and its impact on customer satisfaction and loyalty. 
(Are product recommendations driven by the customer’s needs or by the
22The bonus could be a fixed percentage of all profits above the threshold. Such a 
linear incentive scheme -  similar to piece rates -  has the advantage of great simplic­
ity. The classic reference in the theoretical literature dealing with linear schemes is 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), although it is not exactly a practitioner paper.
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profit they command? Do front-office employees become too aggressive 
and alienate customers?) Interviewees repeatedly related first-hand ex­
periences (not necessarily from the sample banks) with salespeople who 
sold very aggressively and moved on to another bank before the damage 
they had done to customer relationships became apparent. This issue 
was considered so important that the interviewees thought it appropri­
ate to counterbalance the profit objective with a customer satisfaction 
objective (see below).
2. Another side-effect of any performance evaluation that focuses on 
individual performance is a reduced willingness to help colleagues and be 
a team-player. Interviewees consistently indicated that correcting for this 
with an explicit teamwork objective (everyone evaluates everyone else) 
might be possible, although any such bureaucratic device should clearly 
be a last resort. The issue of teamwork has particular relevance in the 
present context, as transactions beyond a certain size and risk require the 
approval of a banker’s superior. Since it takes much less time to reject 
a loan application than to carefully review it, supervisors may have an 
incentive to reject inefficiently frequently. A solution to that problem 
might be to tie the reviewer’s remuneration to that of the more junior 
employee.
3. The more senior the position, the greater the extent of managerial 
responsibilities. The performance of an employee as a manager of people 
is inherently difficult to evaluate objectively. One possibility, again, is 
to tie a manager’s remuneration to that of his or her staff. However, 
depending on the nature of the contributions expected from a manager, 
employees’ remuneration may not be a very good proxy for the quality 
of managing and subjective elements may need to be added.
4. Organizational arrangements may come under pressure. In several 
interviews it was noted that in a setting where employees are paid a fixed 
salary, the tolerance for unclear responsibilities and areas of authority, 
an illogical division of labor and other organizational inadequacies will 
be greater than in an environment where dysfunctional organizational 
practices have direct adverse consequences for remuneration.
Team profit objectives are likely essential for branch staff, but the 
consensus among the interviewees was that the work of the relationship 
managers under consideration here is not so interlinked with that of their 
colleagues that a team objective would make sense.
The bottom line is that an objective finking a relationship manager’s 
remuneration with the profit he or she generates for the bank is conceiv­
ably a useful objective from the point of view of both bank and regulator.
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However, many practical issues would need to be resolved. Some of these 
(such as the heterogeneity of business customers that makes it difficult to 
design comparable portfolios for different relationship managers and may, 
therefore, undermine the fairness requirement) are mainly a headache for 
the bank. Other problems (such as possibly inaccurate profitability es­
timates) are more directly a concern from the regulator’s point of view. 
On the basis of my exploratory interviews it is not possible to gauge 
the extent to which such difficulties make it inadvisable to use a profit 
objective (or, indeed, any of the objectives discussed below).
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Custom er satis­
faction
The use of explicit performance evaluation that focuses on the individual 
may make it necessary to forestall overly aggressive selling. One way of 
doing this would be to regularly contact the relationship managers’ key 
contacts on the customer side and ask them for a detailed assessment of 
the relationship manager according to a standardized list of questions. 
Many banks have call-centers that could perform this task during quiet 
periods; in view of the relatively small number of customers in the busi­
ness segment the cost of such assessments was considered by all inter­
viewees with whom I discussed this issue worth incurring. This kind of 
customer survey is not carried out systematically at present; one could 
use the results of the assessment not just for remuneration and coaching 
purposes, but also for broader business-development efforts. The rele­
vance of such an objective from the point of view of a bank regulator is 
not obvious, but it is possible that customer complaints about aggressive 
sales tactics are of value as an early warning sign.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Risk objective
The purpose of this objective is to give relationship managers an in­
centive to devote an efficient amount of effort to the credit risk aspects 
of the lending relationship, including thorough risk assessment; careful 
monitoring of borrowers and good preparation for follow-up meetings; 
and expeditious signaling of developing problems.
One objective that I considered but rejected were assessments by the 
auditors. I learned in the interviews that auditing is far from an exact 
science. In a number of banks, interviewees described that they had been 
audited twice by different sets of auditors during a year (statutory an­
nual audit plus an audit ordered by the financial regulator at random 
on a sampling basis) and that different auditors came to different con-
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elusions when looking at the same credit files. Building audit results 
into relationship managers’ compensation would likely only lead to end­
less discussions first with the auditors and then with bank management. 
Auditors also concentrate on only a subset of (particularly large and/or 
risky) loans and would likely not review a good-sized sample of loans 
for each and every relationship manager. This problem would be less 
severe in case internal auditors’ opinions were used, since management 
has more leeway in getting internal auditors to widen the scope of their 
investigations. However, using internal auditors’ assessments as the basis 
for performance evaluation still runs the risk of turning the exercise into 
a blame game. Having said this, the out-of-sample bank previously men­
tioned which uses the assessment of relationship managers’ risk-related 
work by credit analysts for compensation purposes reported that this 
approach was working fine. Because of the subjective character of the 
performance signals generated in this way, I will not discuss this evalua­
tion technique further here. If it could be shown to work more generally, 
it would be an interesting and pragmatic idea (although, again, difficult 
to implement as a regulatory instrument).
One related objective that one might consider are what could be re­
ferred to as ‘autopsy results’ where defaulted loans are analyzed carefully 
by an independent unit in the bank to see if the default can be attributed 
to any material errors on the part of employees23. The consensus among 
my interviewees was that clear-cut responsibilities can be established in 
only relatively few cases. A loan loss is not usually attributable to a sin­
gle flawed decision and any flawed decision usually cannot be attributed 
to any one clearly discernible mistake on the part of a specific employee 
(although there are exceptions: missing signatures on key documents, 
guarantees not renewed after a certain number of years). While I believe 
the systematic analysis of defaulted loans would be helpful regardless, 
using such assessments for performance evaluation purposes has the crit­
ical disadvantage that mistakes are only detected if and when a borrower 
defaults.
In the following, I discuss a more promising indicator of the quality 
of the relationship manager’s risk-related work that could be said, with 
some simplification, to compare actual loan losses on a portfolio with 
expected losses. I will consider a measure that I term ‘adjusted gross 
loan losses’ (the gross loan losses are adjusted for migrations, changes 
in collateral value, and other variables) which has the advantage that
23To some extent, this kind of analysis of why and how things went wrong occurs 
today when a credit file is transferred from the front-office to the work-out unit or 
liquidation.
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changes in credit quality short of default are considered24 and that a 
fairly continuous, at the very least yearly, assessment is possible since all 
borrowers have to be re-rated at least yearly. The relationship manager’s 
work on credit risk aspects is reflected in the risk rating of a borrower 
(albeit often with a considerable delay of maybe a year or two because 
fresh financial statements come in yearly intervals); using the measure 
defined below, an improved risk rating would pay off for the relationship 
manager in terms of remuneration, as would an increase in collateral 
value or additional collateral and guarantees. As I will outline below, the 
scheme may also give relationship managers incentives to signal problems 
early on. ‘Adjusted gross loan losses’ would be computed as follows:
1. • Reduction in provisions no longer required (1)
• plus reduction in expected losses due to increases in measured 
creditworthiness (2)
• unless interest rate were to be adjusted immediately to reflect 
the lower risk (3)
• plus reduction in expected losses due to additional collateral 
or increases in collateral value or additional guarantees (4)
• unless interest rate were to be adjusted immediately to reflect 
the lower risk (3)
• plus any other increase in risk premia due to a negotiated 
increase in interest rate (3)
• minus increase in provisions additionally required and write­
offs (1)
• minus increase in expected losses due to decreases in measured 
creditworthiness (2)
• unless interest rate were to be adjusted immediately to reflect 
the higher risk (3)
• minus increase in expected losses due to decreases in collateral 
value etc (4)
• unless interest rate were to be adjusted immediately to reflect 
the higher risk (3)
• minus any other decrease in risk premia due to a negotiated 
decrease in interest rate (3)
• = ‘Adjusted gross loan losses’ (on relationship manager’s port­
folio)
24This is referred to as the mark-to-market paradigm for traded credit risk and 
mark-to-model paradigm for non-tradable risk.
243
For now I will assume that all the items listed above refer to flow 
figures for the evaluation period which I assume to be one year. I also 
assume that there are no loans in the portfolio at the beginning of the 
year and that all loans are made at the beginning of the year for a term 
of exactly one year. This avoids certain complications which I deal with 
below.
1. Provisions and write-offs are the main credit-risk-related costs. 
As the creditworthiness of a borrower declines and the loan becomes 
doubtful, first a provision is created for the amount of the likely loss. If 
the actual loss is less than expected, provisions can always be cancelled. 
If the work-out unit does good work and manages to nurse financially 
fragile borrowers back to health, the provisions for the likely losses on 
these borrowers can be credited back (minus the costs incurred by the 
work-out unit, see below).
2. Changes in measured creditworthiness are primarily changes in the 
probability of default. It is quite clear that the expected loss on a loan 
goes up when the probability of default goes up and conversely. The 
basic assumption behind including these migrations in the above sum 
is that a monetary equivalent to the change in creditworthiness can be 
computed. As I will argue below, estimating these monetary equivalents 
(which are essentially expected losses or, more accurately, differences in 
expected losses) is fraught with difficulty, but cannot be avoided if one 
is to take into account credit migrations short of default.
3. Current practice among my sample banks is to fix the interest 
rate for the term of the loan in the case of a fixed-rate loan. Where 
a loan is at variable rates, the benchmark rate is typically a market 
rate (say, LIBOR plus X basis points). This means that changes in 
credit risk are not taken into account even in the case of loan agreements 
with very long terms. Loan rates are in principle not renegotiated even 
when the creditworthiness of a customer has decreased substantially. In 
practice, it may be possible that individual relationship managers succeed 
in persuading a borrower that the contractual interest rate is no longer 
appropriate, but it is not standard procedure to regularly revise interest 
rates. Interestingly, I have found almost no references to regular risk- 
related adjustments of interest rates in the literature25. This may be 
because loan covenants in many or even most cases allow the bank to 
call in the loan if the financial condition of the borrower deteriorates. At 
any rate, I believe that in view of the possible shortcomings of current 
risk rating technology which I discuss below, regular rate adjustments
25Federal Reserve System Task Force on Internal Credit Risk Models (1998) men­
tions the practice of ‘grid pricing’(p. 23, FN 22).
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should at least be considered (even though their aggregate pro-cyclical 
effects could be considerable).
4. It is quite clear that changes in the value of collateral and guar­
antees affect the expected loss to the bank. A relationship manager can 
directly ‘work’ on these by convincing a borrower to put up more collat­
eral or to find additional guarantors.
My sample banks’ accounting and IT systems are able to calculate the 
above measure with some minor manipulation; this is essential for prac­
tical implementation. I would think that computation of (some variant 
of) the above measure should not be a problem for other banks either. 
The measure as such is not terribly helpful - incurring loan losses is just 
a normal part of the banking business, after all. Some benchmark is 
required that allows an assessment of whether the ‘adjusted gross loan 
losses’ on a relationship manager’s portfolio are ‘high’, ‘too high’, or ‘low’. 
The obvious candidate benchmark is the expected loss on the portfolio 
(calculated as the sum of the risk premia priced into the loans); the idea 
being that a relationship manager with lower loan losses than expected 
is doing a good job. Using the difference between the above measure of 
actual loan losses and expected losses to assess the quality of a relation­
ship manager’s risk-related work raises a number of questions which I 
address next.
While the relationship manager does have some influence on this mea­
sure, surely exogenous risk factors beyond the control of the banker play 
an important, maybe even dominant role. This, of course, is the classic 
risk-incentive trade-off that is at the heart of the principal-agent liter­
ature. As stated previously, relative performance evaluation cannot be 
used as a remedy in the (small) banks that I visited, although larger 
banks might consider comparing bankers that do not need to cooperate 
with each other (as long as the risk factors affecting them are the same 
or at least highly similar; this may not be the case across regions and 
industries). The crucial question with respect to the above candidate 
objective is whether it is possible to sufficiently isolate employee perfor­
mance from exogenous fluctuations. I cannot give a definitive answer on 
the basis of my interviews, but I do outline below some relevant findings.
The expected loss priced into a loan is estimated on a stand-alone 
basis. On the portfolio level, the expected loss is equal to the sum of 
losses expected on the individual loans, but the portfolio loss distribution 
cannot be obtained by modeling the performance of the component loans 
as independent random variables. Rather, defaults are correlated (over 
time and cross-sectionally) in complicated ways and estimating these
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correlations is one of the key challenges for credit risk modeling26. The 
sources cited above attest to the difficulty of the task. In economic 
terms, one way of looking at the correlations is to think of these as being 
driven by exogenous risk factors (such as exchange rates or prices of key 
commodities) that affect all borrowers simultaneously.
These exogenous risk factors have important implications not only for 
the unexpected (portfolio) loss distribution, but also for the estimation 
of expected loss. In my sample banks expected losses (risk premia) axe 
invariant to exogenous risk factors. In other words, the expected loss 
priced into each loan as a risk premium is calculated under the implicit 
assumption of exogenous factors (as well as the relationship manager’s 
effort level) taking some ‘average’ value. The assumption is a merely im­
plicit one as the expected loss is obtained as a historical ‘average’ based 
on data from a sample period spanning several years (ideally at least 
one full credit cycle) during which one would expect the exogenous vari­
ables to move around quite a bit. Exogenous risk factors not entering 
the estimation explicitly means that expected loss is not conditioned on, 
for example, the business cycle. It is theoretically possible to estimate 
conditional transition matrices (which describe the migrations of loans 
between risk classes) and use these for pricing. To the best of my knowl­
edge, such work is being done by academics [see, for example, Bangia et 
al. (2002)] but is not (yet) routinely applied by practitioners.
Given the definition of expected losses as an unconditional historical 
average, there is no reason for expecting actual losses to be close to 
expected losses during any given year. In a real-world setting, one would 
typically see lower-than-expected portfolio losses in six or seven out of 
ten years and higher losses in other years. These deviations of actual 
losses from expected losses are the unexpected losses that the bank holds 
capital against. One should expect this phenomenon to be even more 
pronounced at the level of a single relationship manager’s portfolio at 
which the above objective proposes to measure performance. The reason 
for this is that a single relationship manager’s portfolio is of necessity 
less diversified than the entire bank’s loan book.
Clearly, the relationship manager’s monitoring effort shifts the loss 
distribution [see Carey (1998)], but that observation is, of course, far too 
general a basis on which to construct an incentive scheme. In theoretical 
work one can, loosely speaking, map observed outcomes back into effort
26Treacy and Carey (1998), for example, note that ‘For many firms, industry supply 
and demand cycles are as important or more important than the overall business cycle 
in determining cash flow.’ (p. 899) Also see Wilson (1998) who discusses the role of 
macroeconomic influences.
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by asking: Given the realization of, say, output, how likely is it that the 
agent has chosen the desired effort level? However, our understanding of 
real-world credit portfolio loss distributions is far too rudimentary (and 
data too scarce) to be able to translate this idea into practical incentive 
schemes. To recapitulate, one would ideally want to know the portfolio 
distribution of losses conditional on the values taken by exogenous risk 
factors, and one also would like to know how effort shifts the distribution. 
Such estimates are to all intents and purposes unobtainable. Comparing 
the above measure of actual losses against expected loss without con­
trolling for exogenous risk factors thus exposes the relationship manager 
to a lot of risk. Put simply, when the economy booms, actual losses 
will be much lower than expected losses; the converse is true when the 
economy slows down. Agency theory and common sense suggest that 
incorporating such an objective into an incentive scheme is problematic.
However, my interviews have made me less pessimistic and suggest 
that these concerns can be partly defused with low-tech workarounds and 
rules-of-thumb which may not convince a theorist, but may very well be 
workable in practice.
A possible solution to the problem is to adjust the target by negoti­
ation between management and employees ex ante, for example at the 
beginning of the year, or even ex post. It is important to remember the 
research question: “What scope is there for devising effective lending- 
related incentive arrangements in practice? Is it possible to construct 
incentive schemes that align the interests of a regulator with those of the 
bankers concerned?” The purpose of the interviews was not to find a 
solution that would satisfy a theorist, but rather to find one that stands 
a chance of working in practice and could be imposed by a regulator. 
The bankers I interviewed were not so concerned about the exogenous 
(business cycle, industry cycle) risk as to think the above risk objective 
unworkable. They pointed out that banking is a cyclical business and 
that this is known to employees. Sometimes exogenous factors are favor­
able and sometimes they are not. As long as the risk to an employee’s 
remuneration is limited, shifting some amount of risk from the bank to 
the employee seems acceptable. No matter what the overall business en­
vironment, relationship managers and credit analysts were said to have 
considerable scope for working on risk-related issues. With a few excep­
tions it was felt that the gain from having a risk objective in place would 
still outweigh the complications due to any ‘unjust’ performance evalua­
tions that might result from the use of a relatively crude scheme. While 
attempts to isolate the impact of exogenous risk factors using economet­
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ric tools are not likely to find much acceptance (because one would likely 
need to be a fairly good econometrician to understand the procedure), 
simple rules of thumb agreed on ex ante or even ex post could go a long 
way towards sheltering employees from exogenous risk factors and make 
a risk objective acceptable to employees. These risk factors will vary for 
different portfolios, but plausible proxies for exogenous risk include the 
GDP growth rate or the output gap, the number of insolvencies, and 
other such easy-to-understand variables27. For example, the appropri­
ate value of the target might be negotiated in light of the GDP forecast 
(with a provision that renegotiation is possible in the case of very strong 
deviations of GDP from the forecast). While GDP growth forecasts are 
notoriously unreliable for a period of more than a few months ahead (see 
the discussion of risk measurement tools below), acceptance may well be 
more important than accuracy. Assuming that the historical loss experi­
ence is a good guide to future losses, one would then expect cumulative 
expected losses and actual losses to be roughly equal over a full credit 
cycle; however, a full credit cycle is too long a time frame for compensa­
tion purposes. (Note that one of the key requirements was that at least 
annual performance evaluations should be possible.)
It is possible that there will be a move toward the use of conditional 
transition matrices for risk rating and pricing as credit risk tools improve 
and more high-quality data become available. A scheme that uses the 
(unconditional) expected loss on a portfolio as a benchmark as discussed 
here could at the least be used as a transitional arrangement that serves 
more to create awareness on the part of employees than to determine a 
substantial part of compensation.
In sum, a risk objective worth considering that found support among 
the interviewees (its shortcomings notwithstanding) is to consider the 
difference between the expected losses (risk premia) that a relationship 
manager has priced into the loans in his or her portfolio and ‘adjusted 
gross loan losses’ as a measure of the relationship manager’s diligence 
with respect to credit risk-related work. While I wish to focus on the
27 As far as German data axe concerned, when I analyzed the numbers I found that 
it is not straightforward to detect a negative relationship between banks’ aggregate 
loan losses (the accounting term for this is Risikovorsorge in official statistics) and 
contemporaneous GDP growth or GDP growth lagged by one year. This seems to 
reflect accounting issues rather than the lack of a relationship between the business 
cycle and loan losses. Risikovorsorge is a net term that adds up various figures that 
are heavily influenced by management discretion. To the extent that banks operate 
in other jurisdictions the business cycle of which is not correlated with the domestic 
business cycle, one would expect this to smooth the aggregate figure somewhat. Also, 
the Risikovorsorge figures are available only yearly, so the timing and duration of 
business cycle movements might distort the economic relationship between defaults 
and macroeconomic variables further.
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conceptual issues and do not wish to make any suggestions as to how a 
good performance with respect to this objective should be translated into 
a bonus, I do wish to stress that it is not realistic to expect the measure 
to take a value around zero and that one should adjust the target in the 
light of exogenous risk factors in a transparent, easy-to-understand way. 
Very small portfolio sizes compound these problems.
M oving beyond a  one-year horizon For the sake of completeness, 
it should be pointed out that things are complicated by the fact that in 
reality the loan portfolio does not start at zero at the beginning of the 
year. Neither does it end at zero at the end of the year. Loans are added 
and repaid continuously. In particular, any relationship manager will 
begin an evaluation period with a stock of loans and a starting balance 
of risk premia available to cover losses. Risk premia (expected losses on 
an individual loan) are computed in present value terms and cover the 
entire loan term. This means that in case of maturities longer than one 
year (the usual risk horizon and by assumption the period covered by 
the performance evaluation), the risk premium needs to be apportioned 
appropriately. In the above I had assumed that all loans have a maturity 
of exactly one year so that this effect could be neglected28.
Incentives for giving ‘early w arning’ signals As noted previously, 
it is very important that relationship managers signal difficulties on the 
part of their customers as early as possible. The evidence cited above 
suggests that this is a problem in many banks. Relationship managers 
apparently tend to ignore problems or postpone dealing with them in the 
hope that things will improve on their own. This may be human, but 
it means that borrowers’ financial difficulties, manageable at an early 
stage, often become very serious by the time the borrower’s credit file is 
transferred to the work-out unit and given ‘intensive care’. The objective
28 For an illustration of how it might be problematic when the term of the evaluation 
period (assumed to be one year) differs from that of the loan term, assume that a two- 
year loan has a probability of default of zero during the first year and 50 % during the 
second year. The relationship manager would be required to price a very substantial 
risk premium into the loan. The present value of that risk premium would be added to 
the insurance pool in year one when -  by assumption -  the borrower will not default 
with certainty. This would make the risk performance of the relationship manager 
appear better than it is during the first year, possibly giving him or her incentives 
to leave the bank at the end of year one when the bonus for the good performance 
is paid out. The drastic example aside, adding new loans to the portfolio will in 
all likelihood lead to a temporary increase in risk premia available to cover losses 
without a commensurate increase in defaults — the longer the term of the loan, the 
more pronounced this effect (which is related to the ‘aging effect’ discussed above). 
In what one might loosely speaking call the steady state, defaults on loans made 
in earlier years would, of course, offset the temporary upward blip in risk premia 
available to cover losses.
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proposed here may help to give relationship managers an incentive to 
signal problems early on in that the resulting loss (which influences their 
remuneration) should be lower the earlier problems are signaled.
Transfer of a credit file from the front-office to a specialized work-out 
unit is not currently priced in the banks I visited; i.e., the work-out unit 
is not an independent profit-center and does not charge the front-office 
for its work. I will discuss possible objectives for the work-out unit in 
more detail below. Here I only wish to note that the transfer (‘sale’) of 
a loan out of the front-office should result in a stringent write-down of 
the loan to liquidation value (or possibly even zero) in order to have a 
benchmark for how well the work-out and/or liquidation units are doing 
and to give them an incentive to exert effort. The reduction in loan 
value will initially take the form of a provision. That provision can be 
(at least partly) cancelled if the borrower returns to financial health. 
Earlier signaling of problems makes it more likely that such a provision 
can be cancelled and should therefore be in the relationship manager’s 
interest.
It should be noted that in such a profit-center organization where 
a relationship manager has to ‘pay’ his or her colleagues in the work­
out unit to take care of problem loans, there might be an incentive for 
the relationship manager to try to resolve difficulties on his or her own. 
However, the front-office bankers typically do not have the time nor the 
specific skill set to deal with complex problem cases. The net effect 
of giving the relationship manager a specific risk objective (on the one 
hand an incentive to not involve others, on the other hand an incentive 
to involve others early on as that would reduce the expected cost of a 
problem loan) is hard to gauge, but my interviewees were confident that 
on balance the risk objective should help to get relationship managers to 
signal difficulties earlier.
Variable in terest ra te  contracts As noted above, the banks in my 
sample currently smooth lending interest rates to a significant degree. 
Smoothing interest rates for a given credit risk is straightforward, as 
the bank can always hedge this risk in the market. However, banks 
also tend to ‘freeze’ the credit risk assessment at the moment a loan is 
negotiated and do not pass downgrades on to the borrower in the form 
of higher interest rates. Nor, conversely, does a borrower benefit from 
an upgrade via lower interest rates. As noted above, credit risk is a risk 
that the bank cannot hedge directly; it is also difficult to conceive of 
good ‘indirect’ hedges that are cheap and have little basis risk (even at 
the portfolio level). For example, if a bank could purchase protection
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against a recession that would to some extent obviate the need for direct 
protection against defaults. However, the requisite hedging instrument to 
all intents and purposes does not exist. If it did exist and were reasonably 
priced, it is not clear how well such an insurance contract would allow 
the bank to hedge the risk that it really cares about, namely credit losses 
(and not the recession as such which is merely an important risk factor 
driving credit losses). Having said that, hedging non-tradable credit risk 
indirectly is a fascinating idea that cannot be discussed in the detail that 
it deserves here.
In practice banks self-insure against credit risk by charging a risk 
premium, the expected loss discussed above, to borrowers. Therefore, if 
the expected loss is estimated correctly, possible upgrades or downgrades 
should have been considered in the estimation of the required risk pre­
mium. Expected losses are estimated assuming that the historical loss 
experience is a good guide to the future. Given the relatively short data 
histories that many banks use to estimate transition matrices, that may 
be a rather strong assumption29. I believe that it would be preferable to 
adjust interest rates to assessed credit risk. This would effectively pass 
some exogenous risk on to the borrower and thereby help the relationship 
manager reach a risk objective as defined above30.
‘G am ing’ issues As described above, (partly) subjective assessments 
by the relationship managers affect the risk rating of a borrower. The 
relationship managers (jointly with the credit analyst in charge of the 
customer) may modify the risk grade assignment by way of an override. 
Credit analysts, who also should have a risk objective, have some degree 
of leeway in estimating collateral values. This could be a problem for the 
incentive scheme, since better risk assessments and higher estimated col­
lateral values result in a better (measured) performance and thus higher 
remuneration. Treacy and Carey (1998) describe some of the effects ob­
served when profitability is risk-adjusted, i.e., measured more accurately 
by pricing in expected loss and cost of capital:
‘Interviews indicated clearly that the introduction of risk-sensitive 
profitability analysis puts significant new pressures on the risk grading 
system. Pressure to rate loans favorably arises because expected losses
29 For example, note that it is an empirical regularity that a transition matrix 
calculated for a two-year period is different from the one-year matrix multiplied with 
itself. However, because of a lack of data many banks have to rely on a one-year 
matrix to estimate transition matrices for time horizons beyond a year.
30 However, the aggregate macroeconomic implications of such an approach are po­
tentially quite far-reaching and are being much discussed in connection with the New 
Capital Accord.
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and capital allocations are lower for lower risk loans. Some institutions 
found that many loans were upgraded shortly after the introduction of 
profitability analysis, although the overall degree of the shift was small. 
One institution specifically mentioned an upward bias of about one-half 
grade relative to previous rating practice. Many noted that the number of 
disagreements in which relationship managers pressed for more favorable 
ratings increased once such systems were put into place.’ (p. 919)
Treacy and Carey do not state whether in their sample the more 
exact estimate of loan value affected compensation directly through in­
centive arrangements; if anything that should exacerbate such conflicts 
of interest.
In defense of the measure proposed, the scope for relationship man­
agers to affect the risk assessment is limited in the banks I visited; ar­
bitrary assessments would likely not pass basic plausibility checks. The 
relationship managers’ work in this respect is checked by the credit ana­
lysts, their supervisors, and external as well as internal auditors. While 
in principle the remuneration of the supervisors and credit analysts also 
might benefit from optimistic risk assessments, at least on the part of 
the credit analysts a strong credit culture should be expected to have a 
countervailing effect.
At any rate, in the banks that I visited it also would be possible 
to use only the quantitative risk rating (which cannot be influenced by 
employees) for remuneration purposes.
Being able to adjust interest rates as a borrower’s credit risk changes 
also would reduce the incentive to further influence remuneration through 
biased assessments. Finally, the transition procedure for replacing one 
relationship manager with another suggested below should help. Vari­
able remuneration should be paid out only a year after the end of the 
evaluation period; the bonus payment would thus act as a bond further 
reducing incentives to be over-optimistic (as this would likely not, in the 
end, lead to higher remuneration).
Transition procedure for transfer of portfolio Occasionally, a re­
lationship manager (or the credit analyst) leaves and is replaced with a 
new employee who becomes responsible for a portfolio of loans that he or 
she did not negotiate and the performance of which will, under the pro­
posals outlined here, affect compensation. Such an arrangement is likely 
to lead to acceptance problems unless the transition procedure is fair to 
all parties concerned. One possible procedure that found the support 
of the interviewees is to effectively consider part of the outgoing rela­
tionship manager’s remuneration as a performance bond and pay it, for
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example, in quarterly installments deferred by one year. On taking over 
the portfolio, the new relationship manager (or credit analyst) has one 
year (the usual risk-rating rhythm) to rate all borrowers himself. The 
differences in risk assessment could then be debited or credited to the 
former relationship manager’s remuneration. Once the new relationship 
manager has rated all borrowers, responsibility for the portfolio is his’ or 
her’s alone. It is in the interest of the new relationship manager to be as 
pessimistic as possible, whereas the old relationship manager will be as 
optimistic as possible. This conflict of interests is desired, as it will get 
each side to reveal all the information that supports its case. Ideally, the 
old relationship manager is still an employee of the bank and can negoti­
ate directly. Having to come to an agreement on maybe two-hundred or 
more borrowers, there will be some compromising and give-and-take and 
the interviewees were confident that the new and old employees would 
normally find a consensus. In really critical cases, there is always the 
option of getting the supervisor to decide. As noted above, any relation­
ship manager’s scope for influencing the risk rating (and thus the scope 
for disagreement) is fairly limited anyway. Should the incumbent leave 
the bank, he or she may not be able to directly negotiate with the suc­
cessor. In that case, the new relationship manager could negotiate with 
the credit analyst (assuming that the credit analyst is not leaving at the 
same time) whose interests are largely the same as those of the outgoing 
relationship manager since the risk objective should be an objective for 
the credit analyst, too (see below).
Risk objective for supervisors Much as was proposed with respect 
to the profit target, relationship managers’ performance with respect to 
the risk objective could be used as a factor in determining their supervi­
sors’ remuneration. This would give supervisors incentives to encourage 
their juniors to not neglect risk-related work in order to achieve higher 
sales. One potentially critical aspect of such an arrangement is that this 
might lead supervisors (who need to act as referees whenever two em­
ployees cannot agree on a risk rating, for example) to be less objective 
than they would otherwise be.
One last, rather subtle, observation with respect to the objective pro­
posed here is that over the medium-to-long term one should expect a 
ratchet effect: Current transition matrices have been obtained for an 
‘average’ monitoring effort. Assuming that the risk objective has the 
desired effect and makes relationship managers exert higher effort, fu­
ture actual loan performance will be better than it has historically been. 
However, as more data become available and are used to update the
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transition matrices, the average performance will gradually improve and 
converge toward a new transition matrix for high monitoring effort. This 
means that over time it will become more and more difficult to do as well 
or better than expected.
In summary, by comparing actual and expected loan losses on a port­
folio, it may be possible to measure the quality of a relationship manager’s 
risk-related work. While such an objective may expose employees to con­
siderable risk, simple work-arounds may be able to defuse this problem. 
It is not possible to say with confidence that such an arrangement would 
be effective in practice, but my interviews suggest that it may well work.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Secondary (or 
possibly tem porary) objectives
In the interviews, a number of possible objectives emerged that should 
be considered secondary (or possibly temporary) objectives in the sense 
that they capture aspects of the relationship manager’s work that are not 
directly covered by the preceding objectives, but that also are not key in 
aligning the incentives of employee, bank, and regulator. I will discuss 
these in the following.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Borrowers’ fi­
nancial statem ents subm itted in a tim ely manner
As discussed above, the earlier a borrower submits financial state­
ments the better from the point of view of credit risk management. A 
relationship manager has considerable influence on how quickly borrowers 
draw up their annual accounts and could use this influence. An objective 
measure could easily be defined as the percentage of time that state­
ments are submitted before the deadline, possibly weighted by expected 
loss (which captures both loan volume and riskiness). Assuming the time 
allowed is the calendar year, submission on 01 July represents ‘50% of 
time not used’, 01 April represents ‘75% of time not used’ etc.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: R eduction in 
overdrafts
Within certain limits, overdrafts for business customers are not sub­
ject to the ‘four-eyes-principle, ’ according to which all loan decisions have 
to be approved by both credit analyst and relationship manager. Instead 
it is the relationship manager alone who can approve a request for an 
overdraft (such a request will typically arrive electronically or by phone 
when paying a bill on behalf of the customer would mean that the regular 
line of credit is exceeded). Such overdrafts are seemingly lucrative busi­
ness for the bank because of high penalty interest rates and overdraft
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fees. However, they are very worrying from a credit risk management 
perspective (and very time-consuming: In one of the sample banks, rela­
tionship managers spend up to an hour per day authorizing overdrafts). 
The very fact that a customer needs an overdraft signals a difficult liq­
uidity situation which is not a good sign. Therefore, should a bank have 
handled overdrafts in a lax way in the past, one objective for relationship 
managers could be to reduce overdrafts over time to an acceptable level. 
This should be done gradually because it is not reasonable to expect 
borrowers who have become used to generous approvals of overdrafts to 
adjust to a stricter policy from one day to the next. It is straightfor­
ward to formulate a performance measure that captures a relationship 
manager’s skill in this respect.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Num ber o f  
applications subm itted com plete
In the cooperation between front-office and back-office, it is a frequent 
complaint from front-office employees that credit analysts take too long 
to come to a decision. Back-office employees, on the other hand, often 
criticize their colleagues for handing in incomplete applications. Quite 
apart from a decision on an incentive scheme, any bank should define 
very clearly when an application is complete. There may be a gray area 
in the case of certain complex borrowing arrangements where it is not 
straightforward which documents are required to evaluate the request. 
However, my interviewees argued that by and large it is possible to define 
when an application is complete. In cases where this is a sufficiently 
serious problem, one might consider using an objective for relationship 
managers whereby they are penalized for a more than negligible number 
of incomplete applications.
Possible objectives for front-office employees: Announcing  
intention to  leave position as early as possible
The earlier a relationship manager announces the intention to leave, 
the better from a credit risk management perspective. An orderly trans­
fer to the successor not only allows for the successor to be personally 
introduced, but also enables the leaving relationship manager to impart 
to the successor a lot of ‘soft’ information about the borrower that is 
not written down anywhere. This is undoubtedly valuable (although it is 
hard to quantify the value of that information). A well-planned transfer 
also would lead to a smooth transition with respect to the risk objec­
tive outlined above. A bank could not only guarantee that the early 
announcement of the intention to leave a position has no negative conse­
quences for an employee; it could also pay a bonus to an employee who
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gives notice much earlier than required by law.
7.4.5 Possible objectives for back-office em ployees
The primary function of credit analysts is to protect the bank and ensure 
that risks are accepted in a disciplined manner. Giving them balanced 
objectives via explicit incentive arrangements is even less straightfor­
ward than it is for the front-office. In particular their remuneration 
must not be linked to the profit generated by the relationship managers 
they are working with, for this would skew their incentives in an unde­
sirable way. The same problem would arise if credit analysts were to 
receive a bonus for making cross-selling recommendations: They can of­
ten, through their analysis of the financial statements, develop ideas for 
further product sales to customers. However, to reward them for such 
additional leads gives them an incentive to approve loans that they might 
not otherwise approve since cross-selling is obviously only possible when 
a loan application is approved and not when it is denied. On the other 
hand, my interviews suggest that excessive risk aversion on the part of 
credit analysts is occasionally a real concern and that turning the back- 
office into a profit-center would be very helpful with respect to incentive 
arrangements. Such a move would allow a credit analyst to directly bill 
his or her front-office colleague for loan evaluations and would provide 
the back-office with a direct source of revenue. In particular, a back- 
office profit center would probably not hold the considerable buffer in 
manpower that many banks currently deem necessary, but rather would 
charge differentiated prices for evaluating loan applications at different 
guaranteed turnaround times. While such efficiency gains would not di­
rectly be of interest to a regulator, the resulting increased profitability 
of banks would function as a welcome cushion against adverse shocks.
Possible objectives for back-office employees: Risk objective
The risk objective discussed above ought to be an important element of 
a credit analyst’s incentive scheme. Since it is only the relationship man­
ager who has direct contact with the customers, that might be considered 
problematic. However, it was, in fact, the back-office managers among 
my interviewees who were particularly interested in the use of the risk 
objective, as they felt that this would make the contribution of the credit 
analysts measurable in a reasonably objective way. Credit analysts may 
not be in contact with the customer, but no lending decision and no rat­
ing decision can be made without their approval. They are well-placed 
to provide very important inputs to the credit risk management process:
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They analyze the financial statements in depth and develop suggestions 
on the basis of their analysis; they should see warning signs such as a 
decline in sales or an increase in the use of a credit fine; they can ask the 
relationship manager to discuss points of concern in his or her next meet­
ing with the customer; they are typically in charge of keeping collateral 
values up-to-date; and so on. The dominant view among the interviewees 
was that there is sufficient scope for credit analysts to use their influence 
and that the use of a risk objective for credit analysts is warranted.
Possible objectives for back-office employees: Turn-around tim es
This objective would most likely be of less interest to a regulator, but 
would probably need to be part of a balanced package of explicit incen­
tives for credit analysts. As mentioned above, use of such an objective 
requires a clear definition of when an application is complete and when, 
therefore, the clock starts ticking for the credit analyst. Concurrent use 
of the risk objective should ensure that the quality of loan decisions does 
not suffer.
Possible objectives for back-office employees: Com plexity-adjusted  
number o f applications
Like the preceding objective, this one would not be of much relevance 
to a regulator, but would likely be monitored by the bank (though not 
necessarily become part of an incentive arrangement in practice, since 
the credit analysts cannot themselves acquire further customers and so 
cannot be held responsible for the number of applications they process 
directly). The purpose is to ensure that a credit analyst does a ‘sufficient’ 
amount of work. Once again, in the highly heterogeneous business market 
it would be important to adjust the number of loans for complexity; 
for example by disaggregating every loan application into its component 
parts (which, as noted, my interviewees thought possible).
Possible objectives for back-office employees: Announcing in­
tention to leave position as early as possible
The above comments on the same objective for front-office employees 
apply.
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7.4.6 Possible objectives for the turn-around/liquidation  
unit
The rationale for having such a turn-around/liquidation unit31 in the first 
place is that dealing with loans near or in default requires a different skill 
set and is highly time-consuming. It therefore makes sense for such loans 
to be taken out of normal front-office operations and given to special­
ists. As noted previously, speed in dealing with developing problems is 
of the essence. The risk objective for relationship managers discussed 
above ought to give relationship managers incentives to signal problems 
as early as possible. The banks that I visited were sufficiently small to 
envisage an incentive scheme for the turn-around/liquidation unit as a 
team incentive scheme for the few employees that would typically staff 
such a unit. However, the objectives outlined here could be broken down 
to individuals if the need arose. The turn-around/liquidation unit is in 
many ways the easiest actor in the entire credit risk management process 
to provide incentives for. In fact, some banks most likely have incentive 
schemes for their turn-around units in place. Although such schemes 
are conceptually fairly straightforward, there is evidence suggesting that 
many banks are not yet using them systematically [see Cermele, Donato 
and Mignanelli (2002)].
The ideas discussed here apply to business loans from a certain size 
onwards only. All retail loans with the exception of mortgages are too 
small for them to be dealt with by a highly qualified and highly paid 
specialist banker in a cost-effective way. Such (mostly unsecured) loans 
are typically bundled and auctioned off or sold directly to specialist firms 
that benefit from economies of scale and less expensive personnel (and, 
occasionally, collection techniques that, while entirely legal, a bank would 
not necessarily want to be associated with).
Salvaging as much as possible from business loans in or near default 
takes considerable skill and creativity, but given that the loan has lost 
much or most of its value already, can be a highly lucrative business.
A tum-around/liquidation unit should be organized as a profit center; 
incentive pay can then simply be a share of the unit’s profits. From a 
regulator’s point of view, the key decision to be taken is that on liqui­
dating or attempting a turn-around. That decision should be taken by a 
unit that has the incentives to make efficient liquidation decisions. That 
this is far from a merely academic issue is borne out, for example, by the 
experience of Japan during its long banking crisis. Peek and Rosengren
31 For a general description of the role of a turn-around/liquidation unit by a prac­
titioner, see Wiggers (2002)
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(2005) note that
‘while the evergreening of loans in Japan insulated many severely 
troubled Japanese firms from market forces and may have prevented a 
bank capital crunch, that behavior nonetheless exacerbated economic 
problems for the economy by promoting the allocation of an increasing 
share of bank credit to many of the firms least likely to use it produc­
tively.’ (p. 1165)
Economywide financial problems were thus allowed to fester for years 
and years when it would have been much better to cut the losses at the 
beginning. Having a statutory requirement for an independent unit in 
a bank to decide on liquidation when a certain criterion is met (e.g., 
contractual payment more than ninety days late) would help to reduce 
delays in efficient liquidations.
When is liquidation efficient? What is efficient from the point of view 
of the bank need not be efficient overall. Things get more complicated 
still when there is not only a single debt-holder but several. These issues 
have been treated exhaustively in the theoretical literature. My purpose 
here is to propose an outline of a procedure that should be acceptable 
to both a banking regulator and a bank and which my interviewees in­
dicated should work in practice. It is an outline only as the topic is 
too encompassing for it to be dealt with at length here. In particular, 
I avoid all legal considerations which — in the case of companies near or 
in bankruptcy -  are likely to be very important. For example, liquidat­
ing collateral via foreclosure in case of non-payment is legally different 
from forcing the borrower into bankruptcy (although the two will often 
go together and they are treated as one here).
From the bank’s point of view, liquidation will be preferable to a turn­
around attempt if liquidation results in lower losses. However, gauging 
the likely profitability of either liquidation or a turn-around attempt is 
fraught with uncertainty (How much will the collateral be worth? How 
much fresh money will a turn-around attempt require and what are its 
chances of succeeding?). A turn-around/liquidation unit that is paid 
as a function of the profits it generates has an incentive to acquire the 
information and skills necessary to perform this task well; its incentives 
are aligned with those of the bank, albeit imperfectly32.
The interviewees agreed that one effective way to define the turn­
around/liquidation unit’s success is to:
32 It is clear that in theory an agent who bears the full cost of an action but only 
gets to keep a fraction of the resulting rewards does not have optimal incentives to 
exert effort. What is not clear is whether that is always a problem in real-life effort 
decisions.
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• have it (fictitiously) purchase loans in difficulty or default from the 
front-office at a realistic (i.e., knock-down) price;
• let it retain a share of the profits obtained by either implementing 
a successful turnaround plan and selling the loan back to the front-office 
or liquidating the collateral.
The scope for a turn-around manager or liquidator to generate profits 
for the bank is not in doubt. The requisite skills include, for example, 
negotiation technique and a good business sense. An entrepreneurial 
turn-around manager might, for example, agree with a borrower to have 
relatives provide extra funds in return for a payment holiday. He or she 
might steer the borrower toward a turn-around consultant who can help 
with a necessary restructuring33 or decide not to sell collateral immedi­
ately when, say, the local real estate market is in a slump. Apparently, 
re-possessed property sold at a public auction fetches a very much lower 
price than property skillfully sold directly through negotiations. My in­
terviewees gave many additional examples of how skill and effort can 
make a difference.
The key issues to be solved in implementing the above arrangement 
are how to determine the price that the front-office receives for a loan and 
which criteria should determine when a borrower is sufficiently healthy 
to be returned to the front-office. In neither case did the interviews yield 
clear-cut rules. One approach that is always available in theory is to sell 
ailing loans to an outside party (say, a specialized consulting or invest­
ment firm) in a true market transaction with no promise to buy back 
the loan. (That approach, of course, would obviate the need to discuss 
possible incentive arrangements for a turn-around unit.) In the case of 
the small banks I visited, such an approach is not likely to be feasible 
as the same information problems that make small- and medium-sized 
businesses so opaque are compounded in the case of distressed borrow­
ers. However, Cermele, Donato and Mignanelli (2002) suggest that this 
might be an option for larger borrowers. It is quite clear that it is in the 
interest of the relationship manager to obtain as high a price as possible 
whereas the tum-around/liquidation unit would prefer to pay as little 
as possible. A reasonable benchmark would be the amount obtainable 
from immediate sale of the collateral. But how would this be deter­
mined? Clearly this issue holds the potential for considerable conflict. 
The simplest thing may be not to determine a ‘price’ at all, but to fully 
write down a loan and to let the turn-around unit operate purely on a
33 It was a frequent observation on the part of the interviewees that while there are 
many consultants, not many of them are able to bring results. A bank should be 
expected to have much greater transparency about quality than the borrower.
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contingency basis. Alternatively one could rely on senior management 
to mediate. Similar issues arise with respect to the criterion that deter­
mines whether a borrower has been successfully turned around. There 
are other practical issues that I was unable to explore in the interviews.
I do wish to note, however, that the fact that the employees concerned 
have to work together for many years and on many transactions makes it 
likely that some sort of compromise will be found. It emerged in the in­
terviews that -  apart from dealing with emerging problems rapidly -  the 
continued involvement of the previous relationship manager is essential 
as he or she still has a lot of valuable information that cannot other­
wise be obtained. Under the scheme proposed here, it also would be in 
the previous relationship manager’s interest to actively participate in the 
turn-around or liquidation. While he or she has to take a loss initially, 
all revenues or proceeds from the loan in excess of the written-down loan 
value could be shared between the turn-around/liquidation unit and the 
former relationship manager. These are good reasons, then, to assume 
that the problems discussed here would not be critical in practice.
This ends the discussion of my findings. I first reviewed desirable fea­
tures of incentive arrangements and provided some institutional and or­
ganizational background on the sample banks. I then described in detail 
possible objectives for line employees in lending to smaller and medium­
sized businesses. The risk objective is at the heart of the discussion and 
was reviewed at length.
7.5 P o ten tia l Shortcom ings o f  C urrent R isk  
M easurem ent Tools
As the preceding sections have made clear, reliable risk measurement/management 
tools are an essential prerequisite for lending-related incentive arrange­
ments. It is worrying, then, that the risk management tools currently in 
use are possibly less accurate than one might want them to be. I discuss 
this concern in the present section.
None of my comments in this section should be construed as a state­
ment on the risk rating tools used by the banks in my sample. The 
following discussion is based entirely on material in the public domain.
As shown in section 6 of Eggenberger (2006c), the literature is full 
of examples of incentive arrangements that had disastrous consequences 
because they were based on inappropriate or misleading performance 
measures. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that current credit risk measure­
ment tools are as accurate as one would like them to be. To make the
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term ‘accurate’ operational, I will phrase the discussion here in terms of 
the assessment of the probability of default of individual borrowers. I 
should note that real-world credit risk assessment is considerably more 
complex and involves the estimation of additional variables such as loss- 
given-default and, in particular, correlations and portfolio risk measures 
such as Credit Value at Risk (CVaR). [The estimation of credit portfolio 
risk is critically examined, for example, by Loffler (2003).] A borrower 
will either default or not, so it is impossible to say whether the risk as­
sessment [estimate of the probability of default] of an individual borrower 
was ex ante correct. However, by bringing statistical techniques to bear 
on ex ante assessments and outcomes for a large number of loans, we can 
get an idea of the accuracy of the rating tool used. These validation or 
back-testing methods are still in their infancy as far as credit risk is con­
cerned and a detailed discussion is far beyond the scope of this overview. 
However, I will present some of the concerns that have been voiced as far 
as they are relevant for my question of interest, namely ‘Is it possible to 
develop lending-related incentive arrangements?’
This section has three parts: I first discuss cross-sectional credit risk 
ratings. The main part of this section, however, will deal with the time- 
dimension of credit risk and a number of related issues (such as the accu­
racy of economic forecasts). This is where the main conceptual problems 
and unresolved issues are to be found. A brief conclusion follows.
It is simplest to think about cross-sectional or relative risk mentally 
holding the state of the business cycle constant. If we consider a number 
of loans, some classified as low-risk, some classified as high-risk, and we 
let some time elapse, we would expect to see relatively more high-risk 
borrowers default (the usual horizon for this kind of exercise is one year). 
Making this simple idea operational with the objective of comparing the 
accuracy of different risk rating methodologies or even quantifying the 
degree of accuracy of a single risk rating tool is anything but straight­
forward, however: In practice, for example, one would want to consider 
multiple risk classes and migrations not just into the default state but also 
from one (non-default) risk class to another. Data issues are a consider­
able problem, for by definition of the long risk horizon there are relatively 
few observations. However, even if one had ample data, the statistical 
techniques for quantitatively validating rating tools are in their infancy. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank (2003b), for example, for the time being antic­
ipates making extensive use of qualitative validation criteria in addition 
to quantitative techniques. [For a discussion of candidate quantitative 
techniques, see Sobehart, Keenan and Stein (2000).] The absence of a
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consensus on the validation and back-testing methodology means that I 
cannot present here an agreed-upon list of shortcomings of current risk- 
rating tools. However, that we seem to be far away from anything like a 
standardized quality control mechanism surely is significant in itself. Not 
surprisingly, in a few cases where researchers had access to proprietary 
credit file data, systematic mistakes have been discovered. For example, 
Oehler, Volmar and Schark (2003) document that the pooling of data 
by several banks for the purpose of jointly developing a risk rating tool 
(which is common practice for smaller banks, for example, in Germany) 
may introduce significant bias. Avery, Calem and Canner (2004) show 
that the credit scores for their data set of US consumers systematically do 
not incorporate situational information (that means, for example, that 
a loan applicant who routinely overspends for no good reason may be 
assessed in the same way as an applicant who has defaulted on a loan 
because of a temporary medical problem; however, going forward the two 
individuals may well be very different credit risks). Roszbach (2004), in 
a more involved econometric exercise, shows the credit scoring tool in use 
at the Swedish bank from which he obtained his data set to be inefficient. 
He finds
‘no evidence of banks’ behaving in a way that is consistent with profit 
maximization’.
Although he cannot completely rule out alternative explanations for 
the inconsistencies he documents,
‘none of these suggestions agree ( . . . )  with the practices reported by 
the lending institution that provided the data. Rather, the results bear 
strong evidence of a lending institution that has attempted to minimize 
risk or maximize a simple return function, without success.’ (p. 956)
Of course, maximum accuracy may not be a financial institution’s 
priority regardless of cost. It may conceivably be profit-maximizing to 
use a less accurate credit risk rating tool that is also less expensive to 
develop and maintain. However, it does not appear to be the case that 
banks are at present able to deliberately make such a decision with full 
knowledge of the respective costs and benefits. More likely, credit risk 
measurement tools still are not fully developed so that some institutions 
are working with systematically flawed methods. That, of course, would 
complicate the use of lending-related incentives.
At this point, one legitimate question is why, apparently, the expe­
rience and expertise developed by validating and back-testing internal 
market risk models (which banks have been allowed to use since the so- 
called Market Risk Amendment to the original Basel Accord) do not
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carry over to credit risk models. First, note that what I am primar­
ily concerned with here are rating tools to assess individual exposures. 
Credit portfolio models are beyond the scope of my discussion. Market 
risk models, however, are typically targeted at assessing Value-at-Risk 
(the maximum loss that is not exceeded with a given probability) for 
a portfolio of securities. (I conjecture, but have not verified, that that 
makes it difficult to use VaR in the performance evaluation of individual 
traders, unless these had a genuine portfolio rather than concentrated 
holdings of a few securities.) Second, new data to fine-tune market-risk 
models are generated every day and are abundantly and cheaply available 
at high quality. The return distributions on securities, even if not quite 
Normal, should also be easier to work with than those on a portfolio of 
loans. However, even though the quality of market risk measurement and 
management tools does not appear to be a top concern of either prac­
titioners or regulators, there are good reasons for thinking that there is 
less to the current state of the art in that field than meets the eye. As far 
as I can tell, the most fundamental criticism is that such models axe in­
herently flawed because they fail to account for the feedback mechanism 
that exists between market movements, models, and trading behavior. 
Danfelsson (2002) develops this point and explains that a risk modeler 
is not like a meteorologist who cannot affect the weather; rather, a risk 
modeler indirectly also influences the data she models. The consequence 
of that is that
‘If risk measurements influence people’s behavior, it is inappropriate 
to assume market prices follow an independent stochastic process. This 
becomes especially relevant in times of crisis when market participants 
hedge related risks leading to the execution of similar trading strategies. 
The basic statistical properties of market data are not the same in crisis 
as they are during stable periods; therefore, most risk models provide 
very little guidance during crisis periods.’ (p. 1274)
In other words, the models in use are likely to fail precisely when we 
would most like to be able to rely on them. Danfelsson discusses a range 
of problems with current market risk models. Most importantly with 
respect to the discussion here, he explicitly warns against exporting the 
flaws of the current market risk modeling approach to the credit risk area. 
I wish to take two points away from this sub-section that quite naturally 
lead to the discussion of the time dimension of credit risk: First, current 
market risk measurement technology may be far less sophisticated than 
one might think. In particular, extreme market movements seem to occur 
far more frequently than models allow for. A similar problem in the case
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of credit risk measurement is that the possibility of recessions occurring 
might not be accurately assessed. Second, neither in market nor in credit 
risk measurement do banks appropriately take into account that market 
movements and changes in the state of the economy, respectively, are 
not independent of their decisions. Both of these problems affect the 
desirability and feasibility of incentive schemes.
To restrict the discussion of the time dimension of credit risk rating to 
a discussion of recessions as the only driver of systematic risk is, of course, 
a simplification. However, concentrating on this particular aspect is not 
misleading, as macroeconomic fluctuations are indeed a main driver of 
credit risk [see, for example, Wilson (1998)]. It creates conceptual clarity 
to distinguish only two states of the world, expansion and recession. 
The key issue with respect to the time dimension of credit risk, then, 
is whether the probability of a recession occurring during the term of a 
loan is adequately taken into account (I abstract here from loans other 
than term loans and a host of complications such as the likely presence 
of lags, the duration of recessions etc). Underestimating this probability 
will lead to underpricing and overestimating this probability will lead 
to overpricing. Assume that the state of the economy is the only risk 
factor driving loan performance. If it were possible to hedge against a 
recession, then the price of the insurance could simply be factored into the 
loan rate. However, direct insurance against most macroeconomic risks is 
not available as yet (the recent attempts of two investment banks to sell 
‘economy options’ notwithstanding). In practice, it may be possible to 
replicate such insurance contracts, but the costs will likely be prohibitive 
and there will still be basis risk. (An essential assumption of the entire 
discussion is that market prices for the credit risk of the particular debtor 
are not available.)
One could, of course, obtain estimates of the likelihood of a recession 
occurring over some pre-defined time horizon. However, to the best of 
my knowledge, all attempts at systematically obtaining reliable recession 
forecasts thus far have been found wanting, be they based on surveys, the 
extraction of information from market prices, or forecasting. Forecasting 
in particular has led to much disappointment [see Fildes and Stekler 
(2002a) as well as their discussants’ comments in the same issue for a 
thorough discussion; Diebold (1998) provides a survey and background 
and Stamp (2002) an introduction; Loungani (2001) presents evidence 
on the failure to predict recessions in particular]. Borio (2003), p. 11 
et seq., argues that there axe two schools of thought on the topic of risk 
measurement through time. One view holds that changes in risk through
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time are and will continue to be unforecastable; this is the stance taken 
by, for example, Goodhart (2002):
‘Neither markets, nor regulators, can reasonably predict that it is 
now, say, one year to go till the next downturn, so we had better raise 
our risk premia, or capital requirements, in advance of that eventuality.’ 
(P- 2)
The other view, to which Borio himself subscribes, is that as meth­
ods improve, there will be substantial progress. [Borio illustrates his 
optimism by showing that banking crises can be predicted with a reason­
able degree of confidence. However, while that is certainly good news, we 
are still a long way away from predicting events that give us less advance 
warning and require less of a build-up phase such as recessions.] There is, 
however, consensus that our current ability to forecast material business 
cycle developments, in particular turning-points, is poor.
Unfortunately, the conclusion that the current credit risk rating tech­
niques seem to draw from this observation is that the best that can be 
done is to assume that tomorrow will be like today. [I am painting with a 
very broad brush here. For a more thorough treatment of how cyclical as­
pects are captured in current rating tools, see Allen and Saunders (2003) 
and Allen and Saunders (2004), who look far beyond the estimation of 
default probabilities, as well as -  for a slightly less technical treatment - 
Lowe (2002).] In their discussion of quantitative credit risk models, for 
example, Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) note that
‘While the various models have different structures, most tend to 
extrapolate recent history in one way or another, so that good current 
economic conditions signal good future prospects.’ (p. 20)
The standard philosophy in banks seems to be the ‘point-in-time’ ap­
proach whereby risk is assessed based on current conditions and with a 
horizon of one year. Presumably as a consequence of this short horizon, 
banks seem to be systematically surprised by macroeconomic develop­
ments and the consequences that these have for their loan portfolios. For 
example, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) find that they systematically start 
provisioning too late. All this is a considerable concern for regulators 
in connection with the internal-ratings based capital requirements under 
the Basel II framework which will amplify the procyclical effect of banks’ 
risk measurement techniques [see, for example, Caterineu-Rabell, Jack­
son and Tsomocos (2003)]. An alternative approach labeled ‘through- 
the-cycle rating’ said to be employed by the rating agencies (the agencies 
themselves are careful not to use that term) does not actually strip out 
cyclical fluctuations either: While the assigned risk grade of a borrower
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may well stay unchanged through a recession, the probability of default 
that is implicitly associated with the risk grade may vary by up to a 
factor of four between recession and expansion [e.g., compare the condi­
tional transition matrices for an initial rating of B on p. 462 of Bangia 
et al. (2002); the implied default probability goes up from 1.96 % to 
9.2 %. Also see Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000).] Banks’ credit 
ratings are more likely to be directly calibrated to default probabilities 
and, therefore, more likely to be revised over the cycle. At any rate, 
if capital requirements have to be adjusted one-for-one with changes in 
risk, the resulting fluctuations are enormous. In a knock-on effect, high 
capital requirements curtail banks’ ability to extend credit which, in the 
aggregate, will further slow the economy, thus worsening credit quality in 
the real sector, forcing banks to increase their capital and restrict their 
lending still further. It is quite clear that an effect is in operation that 
is rather similar to what has been described for the case of market risk 
measurement above. A number of remedies to deal with this excessive 
procyclicality have been proposed; among these are, for example, ‘dy­
namic provisioning’ [pioneered by Spain; see Fernandez de Lis, Martinez 
Pages and Saurina (2000) as well as Mann and Michael (2002)] or
‘to try to relate prudential requirements much more to the rates of 
growth of variables, relative to their longer term trends, and not to their 
levels.’ [Goodhart (2002), p. 2]
Even if these approaches were effective from the point of view of a 
regulator, i.e., on an aggregate level, it is still not clear how that would 
lead to correct risk assessments being transmitted to loan officers.
This brings the discussion in this section to an end. The objective 
was to describe problems with current risk measurement techniques that 
might affect the implementation of lending-related incentive schemes. On 
the balance of the material that I have reviewed, I cannot rule out that 
risk measurement problems are sufficiently severe that they constitute a 
critical obstacle to the implementation of incentive schemes. However, 
assessing the extent of possible problems would only be possible on the 
basis of more in-depth empirical work.
7.6  C onclusion
Based on interviews with approximately 120 senior practitioners drawn 
from a sample of German banks, this section investigated the scope for de­
vising effective lending-related incentive arrangements that could double 
as a tool of banking regulation. The results suggest that such schemes
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may -  some caveats notwithstanding -  be feasible and that regulators 
should explore this idea further. The possible objectives presented here 
have not yet been tested in practice; this research was exploratory in 
nature and focused on obtaining practitioners’ views of the feasibility of 
incentive schemes and on identifying candidate objectives that could be­
come part of such schemes. The bankers I interviewed were by and large 
in favor of the ideas outlined. The results reported here are not repre­
sentative, of course, but the issues and questions discussed are likely to 
be relevant beyond the sample banks. Many questions remain, some of 
which can only be answered after an incentive scheme has been imple­
mented. For example, the objectives discussed may need to be combined 
to create a balanced scheme, and there is no guarantee that the right bal­
ance can be achieved and that, in particular, employees would be induced 
to show the right degree of risk aversion.
In a next step, regulators (who have an easier time obtaining access 
to confidential information than outside researchers; this is especially 
valuable with respect to something as sensitive as compensation) should 
seek more comprehensive information on incentive schemes in operation 
and develop a better understanding of how lending-related incentives 
are or could be structured. If researchers associated with the regulators 
were able to gain access to a wider range of banks, this might afford 
an excellent opportunity to collect data for ‘insider econometrics’ and 
study the actual impact of different incentive structures (or lack thereof) 
on various measures of performance directly. That effort would be well 
invested. Enormous sums are currently being spent on upgrading banks’ 
technology, possibly creating a false sense of security while weaknesses 
due to counterproductive incentives might be neglected.
One would be foolish to assume that people do not respond to incen­
tives (whatever these incentives may be; they do not necessarily need to 
be financial). The priority for regulators should be to review existing in­
centive arrangements with a view to prohibiting dysfunctional elements 
as part of the Supervisory Review Process. Rewarding employees for non- 
risk-adjusted loan volume is an example of an incentive arrangement that 
a regulator, in the light of more conclusive evidence, might want banks 
to get rid of. One can also think about less defensive, more sophisticated 
approaches through which a regulator deliberately tries to steer employee 
behavior in desirable ways. To attempt to target just the right behavior 
through financial incentives may be ambitious, but my findings suggest 
that this route may well be worth exploring. At any rate, a regulator has 
ways to create awareness for potentially problematic incentive arrange­
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ments short of imposing mandatory rules. My research is a first step in 
understanding these issues.
The focus throughout was on explicitly linking remuneration to objec­
tive performance measures, as that is what a regulator could most easily 
impose. In practice, a bank would want to integrate an explicit incentive 
scheme into its human resource management strategy and complement 
it with additional elements. Intrinsic motivation of employees may go 
a long way towards ensuring that risk is taken in a disciplined way and 
while this clearly cannot be imposed by a regulator, it is something that 
a bank would do well to foster. In this respect, one may have reservations 
regarding explicit contingent-pay schemes no matter how well they are 
designed as these might crowd out intrinsic motivation. I discuss this 
point as well as other doubts with respect to explicit incentive schemes 
in section 6 in Eggenberger (2006c). These issues are not central to my 
analysis, but ought to be considered in thinking about regulating incen­
tive arrangements.
One important unknown is the quality of risk management tools. As 
argued above, the performance of a relationship manager or credit analyst 
can hardly be assessed independently of that of the risk rating tools 
used. There is some evidence to suggest that -  the enormous technical 
progress of recent years notwithstanding -  current rating tools may have 
systematic flaws.
In summary, my findings do not provide conclusive proof that the 
regulation of incentive compensation in banks should be a tool of financial 
regulation. However, the results of my fieldwork constitute a first stab 
at the question of whether there is scope for devising effective lending- 
related incentive arrangements that align the interests of a regulator with 
those of the banks. My hope is that regulators will build on these findings 
and use their influence to further explore this sensitive but critically 
important area.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
This thesis has contributed to the literature on the link between the 
intensity of bank competition and the allocation of capital in three main 
ways.
Following an extensive literature summary (chapter 2), I extended 
the seminal contribution by Broecker (1990) and showed that contrary 
to Broecker’s conjecture, his bank competition game does not have an 
equilibrium in pure strategies even when banks are asymmetric (chapter 
3). In chapter 4 I modified the auction framework used by Broecker and 
allowed applicants to renegotiate their offers. I showed that the modified 
game has an equilibrium in pure strategies where for a given number of 
banks an applicant’s interest rate decreases with the number of offers 
obtained. Surplus unambiguously increases with entry as long as addi­
tional banks have an incentive to enter, so the allocation of capital -  
in contrast to much of the rest of the theoretical literature — is shown 
to improve with the intensity of competition. Clearly, the question is 
whether an auction framework is appropriate for modeling bank compe­
tition. I argue that it is not and that modeling creditworthiness tests 
should be robust to the empirically highly relevant phenomenon of test 
results becoming (partially) public and thus available to competitors.
My second contribution was to reconcile a discrepancy between the 
empirical and theoretical literatures on bank competition and capital al­
location. In the literature review, I showed that the theoretical literature 
is somewhat pessimistic with respect to the effect of more intense bank 
competition on the allocation of capital whereas the empirical literature 
was shown to have found large gains from more intense bank compe­
tition. I developed the argument that the main role of more intense 
competition may be that of a discipline device. When other mechanisms 
of corporate governance fail for whatever reason (which they do, as the 
evidence on X-inefficiency in banks suggests), a major benefit of more
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intense competition may be that it forces managers to work harder and 
thus leads to improvements in the allocation of capital. The existing the­
oretical work cannot capture this effect, because it assumes that banks 
are profit-maximizing entities. I motivated and formalized my conjecture 
and demonstrated that in the presence of an effort-minimizing bank, the 
allocation of capital unambiguously improves as competition becomes 
more intense.
There may be a more general point here, too. Information problems 
and related obstacles to an efficient allocation of capital (such as the 
moral hazard problem that I model on the part of the borrowers) often 
motivate suspicion with respect to the unfettered operation of markets. 
Indeed, starting with the famous ‘lemons’ paper [Akerlof (1970)], much 
research has been devoted to demonstrating how such problems may lead 
to a market shutdown. A well-known example from the banking literature 
rationalizing a partial market failure is Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The 
contribution that chapter 5 makes is to appeal to the empirical evidence 
and suggest that in some settings the key issue in improving the allocation 
of capital may not be information problems (which to some extent can be 
overcome, albeit at a cost), but agency problems. As I show, the policy 
implications of the two kinds of problems may be diametrically opposed.
Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the transmission mechanism that 
links the intensity of bank competition and the allocation of capital by in­
vestigating the subject of lending-related incentive arrangements; a sub­
ject about which little is known. The existing theoretical literature treats 
banks as black boxes, so the work reported in chapters 6 and 7 can be 
read as a complement to the theoretical work in the preceding chapters: 
One reason to study real-world incentive structures is as an extension to 
theoretical work akin to a robustness check.
As far as the real-world applicability of theoretical work is concerned, 
one crucial question is how the pressures that the bank is facing at the in­
stitution level are transmitted throughout the organization. As an econo­
mist, one is trained to look for and analyze incentives as a key element 
of this transmission mechanism. The interview-based fieldwork I pre­
sented in chapters 6 and 7 therefore addressed the question ‘What scope 
is there for devising effective lending-related incentive arrangements in 
practice?’ While it would be intellectually dishonest to claim to be able 
to give a definitive answer to the question on the basis of the fieldwork 
reported here, my findings indicate that it may be possible to construct 
sensible schemes. I discussed a number of candidate objectives in de­
tail and presented obstacles and potential problems discovered in the
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interviews. These findings are a substantial step forward and shed fight 
on the problems inherent in designing and implementing lending-related 
incentives.
My hope is that other researchers will build on my findings and fur­
ther explore this sensitive but critically important area. In a next step, 
regulators (who have an easier time obtaining access to confidential infor­
mation than outside researchers; this is especially valuable with respect 
to something as sensitive as compensation) should seek more comprehen­
sive information on incentive schemes in operation and develop a better 
understanding of how lending-related incentives are or could be struc­
tured. If researchers associated with the regulators were able to gain 
access to a wider range of banks, this might afford an excellent opportu­
nity to collect data for ‘insider econometrics’ and study the actual impact 
of different incentive structures (or lack thereof) on various measures of 
performance and thence the allocation of capital directly.
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